

The Philosophy of
ANTIOCHUS

EDITED BY
DAVID SEDLEY



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THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANTIOCHUS

Antiochus of Ascalon was one of the seminal philosophers of the first century BCE, an era of radical philosophical change. Some called him a virtual Stoic, but in reality his programme was an updated revival of the philosophy of the 'ancients', meaning above all Plato and Aristotle. His significance lies partly in his enormous influence on Roman intellectuals of the age, including Cicero, Brutus and Varro, partly in his role as the harbinger of a new style of philosophy, which thereafter remained dominant for the remainder of antiquity. Yet much remains controversial about his ideas. This volume, the first in English to be devoted entirely to Antiochus, brings together a team of leading scholars to discuss every major aspect of his life, work and significance. In addition, it contains the first full guide to his testimonia in any modern language.

DAVID SEDLEY is Laurence Professor of Ancient Philosophy at the University of Cambridge, and a Fellow of Christ's College. His books include *Lucretius and the Transformation of Greek Wisdom* (1998), *Plato's Cratylus* (2003) and *Creationism and Its Critics in Antiquity* (2007). He is also editor of *The Cambridge Companion to Greek and Roman Philosophy* (2003).

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In the four years October 2005–September 2009, the Faculty of Classics at Cambridge hosted a project entitled ‘Greco-Roman Philosophy in the First Century BC’, generously funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC). It was directed by David Sedley (principal investigator) and Malcolm Schofield, and employed two post-doctoral researchers, Roberto Polito and Myrto Hatzimichali. In addition, funding was provided by the AHRC for one Ph.D. studentship, which was taken up by Georgia Tsouni. Finally, during the summer of 2009 the project team was fortunate enough to be strengthened by the voluntary research assistance of Samantha Horn. These jointly constituted the project team which planned the present volume.

The warmest thanks are due above all to the AHRC itself, but also to all those who contributed to the success of the project. By the latter I mean not just the official project team, but the many members of, and visitors to, the Cambridge academic community who during those four years participated in the project’s weekly seminar, attended the two international workshops which it organized, or focused their own research on topics falling within its scope. There can be no doubt that in the scholarly community consciousness of its issues both was and remains raised.

The present volume is one of four volumes to come directly out of the project. It is built around papers given to the project’s July 2007 international workshop on Antiochus of Ascalon. In addition to the authors of the individual chapters, those who contributed to the success of the workshop include Jonathan Barnes, Thomas Bénatouïl, Gail Fine, Michael Frede, Katerina Ierodiakonou, George Karamanolis, Inna Kupreeva, Bob Sharples and Stephen White, as well as many Cambridge participants. A further example of that collaboration is that, following the workshop’s discussion of Philodemus’ biographical testimony for Antiochus, David Blank undertook a new autopsy of the papyrus, and was able to send

us from Naples an importantly new reading of the key sentences (see Appendix, **T3**).

To ensure the volume's comprehensiveness, Rebecca Flemming, Georgia Tsouni and Malcolm Schofield were kind enough to write additional chapters (Chapters 3, 6, 8 and 11). In the early editorial stages Samantha Horn's expert assistance, which included checking drafts and assembling material for the appendix of Antiochean testimonies, was of enormous value. At Cambridge University Press, Michael Sharp and Christina Sarigiannidou has been unfailingly helpful, supportive and patient in seeing the volume through to publication, and Jan Chapman's meticulous copy-editing has done much to enhance the quality of the final product. Special thanks are due to Charles Brittain for first suggesting Antiochus as the subject of our workshop. Finally, I would like to express my own personal gratitude to Malcolm Schofield, who co-directed the project with me and has had a huge input into the planning and content of the present volume.

DAVID SEDLEY

Introduction

David Sedley

This book is not *The Cambridge Companion to Antiochus*. Although the distribution of chapter topics attempts to cover all the major aspects of Antiochus' work and significance, their content does not represent an attempt to set out in orderly fashion what we know or reasonably believe about these questions and to present even-handedly whatever issues remain controversial. Authors have been given free rein to defend their own preferred viewpoint on controversial issues, and they will certainly not all be found singing from the same hymn sheet. This, the first book in English ever devoted entirely to the study of Antiochus, is above all an attempt to take debate forward. Nevertheless, anyone seeking to know the state of the art on Antiochean issues, and to find guidance on navigating the ancient testimonia and modern scholarly literature, will find the book an appropriate place to start.¹

The book is born of a project funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, entitled 'Greco-Roman Philosophy in the First Century BC' (see Acknowledgements, p. viii). Constructed around a weekly research seminar and two major international workshops, the project sought to advance our understanding of a significant watershed in the history of philosophy. The first century BCE is the period in which philosophy loosened its historic moorings in the great philosophical schools of Athens and entered the Roman world, often attaching itself to such cultural centres as Alexandria and Rome.² It is no exaggeration to say that the character of philosophy as an intellectual activity was permanently changed by this transition. Cut adrift from the historic institutions which had linked them to their revered founders, the major philosophies shifted their efforts increasingly onto the study of their foundational texts. The Roman imperial age was thus an age in which philosophy centred on the newly burgeoning

¹ For a more succinct and very helpful overview, see Barnes 1989.

² On the nature of this transformation, see Glucker 1978, Hadot 1987, Frede 1999, Sedley 2003a.

industry of textual commentary, above all commentary on the writings of Plato and Aristotle. In this new climate, it became common to treat these two philosophers as the authoritative twin voices of a single philosophical project. The ‘harmony’ of Plato and Aristotle, although it remained controversial, is in a way the hallmark of the new age.³

At the start of this transformation stands an enigmatic figure, Antiochus. He is regularly known as ‘Antiochus of Ascalon’, but there was in antiquity no other significant philosopher named Antiochus, and it seems safe to drop the toponym.

Trained for many years in the Academy under Philo of Larissa (school head from 110 BCE), Antiochus initially endorsed the dialectical scepticism which had dominated this school – in the phase widely known as the New Academy – for many generations, above all under the inspirational leadership of Carneades in the mid second century BCE. But he came to believe that this sceptical turn and the consequent refusal of fixed doctrine were untrue to the legacy of Plato, the school’s revered founder. On that basis, he reconstructed on his own behalf a philosophy which could be attributed to the ‘Old Academy’, the school which he saw himself as reviving or perhaps refounding.

Antiochus’ secession from the ‘New Academy’ to re-establish this alternative ‘Old Academy’ is one of the major events of late Hellenistic philosophy. It is remarkable, for example, that Cicero, who in 45–44 BCE wrote a series of philosophical works aimed at bringing Greek philosophy to a wide Roman readership, regarded the philosophy of Antiochus as one of the four that merited inclusion, alongside Stoicism, Epicureanism and the New Academy. He did not give any separate treatment to either Plato or Aristotle, and it seems reasonable to say that for the purposes of exposition he was prepared to regard Antiochus as their contemporary voice.

Antiochus’ change of direction was not simply a matter of reverting to the direct study of Plato’s dialogues, with or without the additional input of the founder’s first successors, Speusippus and Xenocrates. Two particular twists were added.

The first was the inclusion of Aristotle as an authentic representative of that early Academy, despite the fact that he had left it in order to found his own school. Thus the ‘ancients’ whose philosophy Antiochus purported to be reviving were a broad coalition of the major fourth-century BCE philosophers, including Plato, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Aristotle, to some

³ See especially Karamanolis 2006.

extent Theophrastus, and, probably, before them all, Plato's own teacher Socrates as well.

The second twist was an uneasy accommodation with the Stoics. They had been the dominant philosophers of the third and second centuries BCE, tracing their own origins back to Socrates in particular, and for this among other reasons being the Academy's chief rivals. Much of Antiochus' philosophical work sounded to his contemporaries very like Stoicism, which had after all provided the conceptual and terminological framework in which philosophical issues were being discussed. Some went so far as to call Antiochus a Stoic. But it would be closer to his real view to say that in his eyes the Stoics were dwarfs on the shoulders of the Platonist giants. From that privileged vantage point the Stoics were perhaps enabled to see a little further and a little more sharply than the giants could, and it was therefore appropriate for the moderns to talk in their idiom and even to borrow their insights. But Antiochus emphatically did not consider himself a Stoic.

Beyond there, opinion divides regarding the extent of his concessions to Stoicism. All scholars agree that on at least some basic points Antiochus was advocating a return to the ancients. This applies above all to his central ethical thesis, that the goods that contribute to a happy life are not, as the Stoics insisted, exclusively moral ones. But he also advocated the possibility of knowledge, thus reversing the sceptical tradition of the recent Academy. From what authority did he derive this thesis? Cicero's *Academic Books* survive (incompletely) in two drafts. The *Lucullus*, book 2 of his first draft, tells us in effect that Antiochus took over Stoic epistemology for his own purposes. But the book 1 which survives from the later draft (*Academica* 1) is believed by some to point instead to a Platonic epistemology: in it Antiochus' spokesman, Varro, certainly ascribes a non-Stoic epistemology to the ancients, but the trickier question is whether he is thereby also advocating that epistemology, or allowing that the Stoic alternative has now superseded it. The conflict between these two competing interpretations of Antiochus' theory of knowledge will be visible in the chapters which follow, notably those of, respectively, Mauro Bonazzi ([Chapter 14](#)) and Charles Brittain ([Chapter 5](#)). On the latter, more Stoicizing interpretation, Antiochus conceded that the Stoics had 'corrected' the ancients on some issues; on the more archaizing one, his aim was not to make any concessions to the rival school but, if anything, to appropriate or subordinate it to his rediscovered Platonism. This latter interpretation emphasizes the extent to which Antiochus saw Stoicism as a merely verbal, rather than substantive, departure from the old doctrines.

Another problem on which unanimity will not be found in the chapters that follow is how Antiochus identified the philosophy of the ‘ancients’. Was Plato in his eyes not only the founder of the tradition but also its ultimate authority? Or when Aristotle differed from Plato, as he was seen to do at least regarding the theory of Forms, did Antiochus feel obliged to privilege the revisionary doctrine over the original? If the latter, should we infer that Antiochus took as the early school’s authorities not its founder, but its final summative spokesmen, and Aristotle in particular? The highly Aristotelian content of at least some parts of Antiochus’ ethics (see the chapters of Georgia Tsouni and Terence Irwin in particular) can lend this option credence. Or – an intermediate possibility – did he seek to synthesize a single body of doctrine out of all the writings of the ‘ancients’, without systematically privileging any one over the others? The discussions in the present volume bear closely on these questions but do not resolve them.

We also have to ask how far Antiochus’ breakaway movement reflects the circumstances in which philosophy found itself in the early first century BCE. Did its uprooting from its ancestral home in Athens and its consequent need to compete in the educational marketplaces of wealthy cities such as Rome and Alexandria inflame rival pretensions to ownership of the Academy’s true legacy? Both Antiochus and Philo were refugees from Athens (Antiochus in Alexandria, Philo in Rome) at the time when their rift became fully open. Moreover, an analogous splinter group formed, perhaps around the same time, in Alexandria when Aenesidemus refounded the sceptical school of Pyrrho, probably as the consequence of a different schism in the New Academy, one between hardline and mitigated sceptics. This pattern raises the question whether sectarianism is a sign of the times. Were other disciplines than philosophy riven by sectarianism in those same cultural centres? Rebecca Flemming’s chapter, which compares the medical successions of the first century BCE, is an important first step towards the broader picture that may eventually provide a full answer. Meanwhile Roberto Polito’s [chapter](#) invites us to question just how sharp a schism, doctrinally speaking, it was that Antiochus instituted, and Malcolm Schofield’s [Chapter 11](#) helps to bring out a degree of methodological proximity that continued to link Antiochus to Carneades’ New Academy.

A further perennial question concerns Antiochus’ lasting influence on the history of philosophy. That he had a considerable impact among the Romans of his day is beyond doubt. Not only did Cicero, as already

remarked, regard Antiochus' school as worthy of listing and reporting among the canonical four, but Antiochus recruited among his followers leading members of the Roman intelligentsia. These Roman Antiocheans, treated in the chapters by David Blank and Carlos Lévy, included no lesser figures than Varro and Brutus. Indeed, Cicero himself was deeply influenced by Antiochus and at times leant strongly towards his philosophy, as explained by Malcolm Schofield in [Chapter 11](#), despite the fact that in all probability he at no time transferred his formal allegiance to the Old Academy. Antiochus' influence at Alexandria was also considerable (see again Lévy's chapter). Given in addition the extent to which Antiochus' philosophical positions prove to anticipate later Platonist developments, why need there be any doubt that he was the inaugurator of Middle Platonism?

This is a question tackled in the concluding chapter, by Mauro Bonazzi, who emphasizes many probable continuities between Antiochus and the Platonism of the imperial era. Some will nevertheless continue to question the direct influence of Antiochus himself on the later tradition. For one thing, whatever following he attracted in the early to mid first century BCE, there is little sign that his school as such continued for very long after his death. His impact on the contemporary philosophical scene probably owed much to personal charisma. (In a text newly re-deciphered by David Blank – see Appendix, **T3** – even the Epicurean Philodemus declares his personal affection for Antiochus.) Although the influence of his ideas continues to be detectable in his aftermath (see again Blank, Lévy), there is no sign that they constituted a new orthodoxy in anybody's eyes. Moreover, in the generation or two after Antiochus the style of philosophy changed to what is nowadays sometimes called 'post-Hellenistic philosophy',⁴ whose features included a rapidly growing focus on direct textual analysis of the old masters Plato and Aristotle. The *ipsissima verba* of Plato came to dominate the agenda to an extent that is hard to parallel in what we know of Antiochus:⁵ we cannot even be sure how much of the works of Plato and Aristotle he ever studied. Perhaps as a result of this transformation in the style of philosophy, Antiochus' contribution was largely forgotten, his name virtually never occurring in the philosophical writings of later Greek Platonists. If his influence on the new direction that Platonist philosophy took was seminal, it also went all but unnoticed.

⁴ Cf. Boys-Stones 2001 for the term 'post-Hellenistic philosophy' and some of its dominant features.

⁵ For further remarks on this question, see David Sedley, [Chapter 4](#).

The book is structured as follows. Chapters 1–3 seek to locate Antiochus in his historical, philosophical and cultural context. [Chapter 1](#) by Myrto Hatzimichali, ‘Antiochus’ biography’, establishes what can be reconstructed of his life. [Chapter 2](#), Roberto Polito, ‘Antiochus and the Academy’, explores further the institutional and philosophical nature of his secession. [Chapter 3](#), Rebecca Flemming, ‘Antiochus and Asclepiades: medical and philosophical sectarianism at the end of the Hellenistic era’, opens up a new area of research, the question of how far the philosophical sectarianism of Antiochus’ age may have been paralleled in other disciplines.

The next two chapters embark on the interpretation of Antiochus’ philosophical stance, with an initial focus on his epistemology. [Chapter 4](#), David Sedley, ‘Antiochus as historian of philosophy’, argues that after his rift with Philo in 88 BCE Antiochus’ construction of philosophical history, with regard to epistemology in particular, underwent a major change. [Chapter 5](#), Charles Brittain, ‘Antiochus’ epistemology’, examines this part of his philosophy in its own right, defending a Stoicizing reading of it.

The next group of chapters turns to ethics and covers a series of central issues raised by the conspectus of Antiochean ethics in Cicero, *De finibus* 5. Their titles should be self-explanatory: [Chapter 6](#), Georgia Tsouni, ‘Antiochus on contemplation and the happy life’; [Chapter 7](#), T. H. Irwin, ‘Antiochus, Aristotle and the Stoics on degrees of happiness’; [Chapter 8](#), Malcolm Schofield, ‘Antiochus on social virtue’.

We then turn to a pair of particularly controversial aspects of Antiochus’ philosophy, with [Chapter 9](#), Brad Inwood, ‘Antiochus on physics’, and [Chapter 10](#), G. R. Boys-Stones, ‘Antiochus’ metaphysics’. These bear closely on the question of Antiochus’ respective relations to the early Academy and to Stoicism.

[Chapter 11](#), Malcolm Schofield, ‘The neutralizing argument: Carneades, Antiochus, Cicero’, returns to the central ethical debate between Antiochus and the Stoics but views it especially from the point of view of Antiochus’ relation to his Academic predecessor Carneades, and from that of Cicero’s relation to Antiochus. It thus offers a smooth transition to our final group of chapters, which explores Antiochus’ influence. [Chapter 12](#), David Blank, ‘Varro and Antiochus’, and [Chapter 13](#), Carlos Lévy, ‘Other followers of Antiochus’, chart what signs can be found of Antiochean motifs and theses among those who were directly or indirectly his pupils. Finally, [Chapter 14](#), Mauro Bonazzi, ‘Antiochus and Platonism’, is both backward- and forward-looking, offering one synoptic characterization of Antiochus’

philosophy and connecting it, in largely positive terms, to the advent of Middle Platonism.

In the volume's Appendix I have compiled a guide to the testimonia for Antiochus. Every chapter of the book has the task of evaluating evidence, but an overall conspectus of the primary evidence is to be found only here, based on H.-J. Mette's numeration of Antiochus' testimonies.⁶ It would not have been realistic to print the entire body of testimonies here, because they properly include (even if Mette did not choose to include them) three whole speeches from Cicero's dialogues. Instead, what is offered is a complete set of texts and translations for the non-Ciceronian testimonies, along with a succinct conspectus of the Ciceronian ones.

All the translations used in the Appendix are my own. However, no uniformity has been imposed upon the volume as a whole. Hence the translations of the same passages used by individual authors in the preceding chapters may differ, both from each other and from those in the Appendix.

Abbreviations of titles of ancient works correspond in most cases to those used in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (3rd revised edition, Oxford 2003). The main exception is the abbreviations of Galen's titles, which follow those listed by R. J. Hankinson, *The Cambridge Companion to Galen* (Cambridge 2008), 391–403.

Only one verbatim quotation survives from Antiochus (Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 7.201, included in **F2**, see Appendix), and the remainder of the evidence is entirely indirect. Nevertheless, the recognized testimonies will be limited to passages which cite him by name. Antiochus' influence has been detected in numerous other ancient texts. These include the whole of Cicero's *De finibus* book 4, in which Cicero, doubling up as speaker and author, criticizes Stoic ethics from what seems a recognizably Antiochean standpoint, albeit without once naming Antiochus. They also include a long doxographical passage in Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus mathematicos* book 7 (141–260), which explicitly cites comments by Antiochus at two points. It remains controversial among interpreters (e.g. Brittain vs Sedley in this volume) whether in the remainder of the passage, over and above those two citations, we are hearing Antiochus' voice. Neither of these substantial texts can properly be listed as a 'fragment' or 'testimonium' of Antiochus in any case, but both will be brought into play at certain points in the present volume.

⁶ Mette 1986–7.

It has at times been fashionable to detect Antiochean content much more widely in later authors, in a way comparable to the treatment sometimes accorded to Antiochus' contemporary the Stoic Posidonius. Pan-Antiocheanism, that is, has at times threatened to rival pan-Posidonianism in the scholarly literature. The use of sources in the present volume will at any rate be found to be a great deal more restrained than that.⁷

⁷ General accounts of Antiochus include Luck 1953; Mette 1986–7; Dillon 1977: 52–106; di Stefano 1984; Barnes 1989; Fladerer 1996; Görler 1994; Dorandi 1994b; Karamanolis 2006: ch. 1; Tarrant 2007. Glucker 1978, although less about Antiochus than the title may suggest, makes a major contribution to the historical contextualization of his work.

CHAPTER I

Antiochus' biography

Myrto Hatzimichali

The principal aims of this introductory chapter on Antiochus' biography are to set out the historical background and review the circumstances and events that arguably had an effect on the development of Antiochus' distinct philosophical position. Inevitably, any presentation of this topic will be dominated by what we do not know rather than what we do, because the evidence is not only limited but also in many cases controversial. The main characteristics or turning points of Antiochus' life, about which something more can be said, are his philosophical conversion and abandonment of scepticism; his relationship with Lucullus and the extent of his political activities; the Alexandrian episode known as the 'Sosus affair'; and the establishment of his own school (*diatribē*).

For Antiochus' life we do not have the benefit of a biography by Diogenes Laertius, who ends his series on the Academic succession with Clitomachus (4.67). We do, however, have a section on Antiochus from the papyrus preserving the *History of the Academy* by the first-century BCE Epicurean Philodemus (*Index Academicorum*, *PHerc.* 1021, columns xxxiv 34–xxxv 16);¹ this text offers some interesting but also tantalizingly fragmentary information, which will be discussed in more detail towards the end of the present chapter, since most of its information relates to the end of Antiochus' life and his legacy. The preserved sections of the papyrus do not offer any chronological help regarding Antiochus (in contrast to the detailed chronology for Philo of Larissa, xxxiii 1–41); we must suppose that some dates for Antiochus were given in lines 17–34 of column xxxiv, which are largely illegible.

Thus all we know about Antiochus' birth is that he came from Ascalon in Palestine (part of ancient Syria), not far from Gaza. Two sources, Stephanus of Byzantium and Strabo, mention Antiochus among the most celebrated natives or products of the city (see **T4a–b**). Stephanus mentions the

¹ The entire text is edited in Dorandi 1991; for the section on Antiochus see now Blank 2007.

nickname Antiochus 'the Swan', for which he is the only source. Scholars have connected it with Antiochus' polished and graceful style,² since swans were renowned for their song and were associated with Apollo and the Muses (e.g. Callimachus, *Hymn to Delos* 249–55). It would be interesting to reflect a bit more on the origin of this nickname: for instance, it could reflect particular appreciation in some quarters of his late work and his 'swansong', which must have been the *On the Gods* (Plut., *Luc.* 28.7); or it might suggest that Antiochus himself took a calm and optimistic attitude towards death, such as the one attributed to swans by Socrates in Plato's *Phaedo* (84e3–85b9). Alternatively, it could be that a parallelism with Plato was intended by the nickname: Diogenes Laertius (3.5) relates an anecdote according to which Socrates dreamt of having a cygnet on his knees, one which promptly grew wings and flew away in sweet song. The next day he met Plato and identified him as the swan from the dream.³ On this comparison, Antiochus would be like Plato either in having a sweet but weak voice (Plato is called 'weak-voiced' at Diog. Laert. 3.5), and/or in flying quickly and successfully from his teacher's knees.

For Antiochus' date of birth we have to make an approximate calculation based on the information that he was a pupil of Philo of Larissa and probably also of the Stoic Mnesarchus.⁴ The former became scholarch of the Academy in 110 BCE (during the archonship of Polycleitus, *Index Ac.* xxxiii 15–17), and the latter was prominent in Athens at about the same time (he had been a pupil of Diogenes of Seleucia according to Philodemus' *History of the Stoa* (*Index Stoicorum* li 4–5;⁵ cf. Cic. *De or.* 1.45)). It is normally supposed that Antiochus came to Athens fairly early in Philo's scholarchate because, at a time when Mnesarchus and Dardanus were still prominent Stoics in Athens (i.e. during the 90s BCE), Antiochus had already been in the Academy for an unusually long time (see Cic., *Luc.* 69, cited below).⁶ Therefore, if Antiochus was twenty to twenty-five years old when he came to study with these teachers, he must have been

² Barnes 1989: 51; Görler 1994: 965.

³ Almost nothing is known about Diogenes' source here, the *Περὶ βίῳ* by a certain Timotheus of Athens, which was also used in the lives of Aristotle, Speusippus and Zeno (*RE s.v.* no. 15). The story is also told by Apuleius (*De Platone* 1), who embellishes it with the details that the cygnet had flown from Cupid's altar in the Academy and that Socrates exclaimed: 'hic ille erat, amici, de Academia Cupidinis cygnus'.

⁴ There is no reason to suppose, simply because Mnesarchus and Dardanus are mentioned in tandem by Cicero (*Luc.* 69), that Antiochus was also a pupil of Dardanus; see Barnes 1989: 53–4.

⁵ The text is edited in Dorandi 1994a.

⁶ Glucker 1978: 19–20 thinks that by 87 BCE Mnesarchus and Dardanus may have been too old to be prominent teachers, and they could even have been dead. See also Barnes 1989: 53 and 69 with n. 76; Görler 1994: 939.

born around 135–130 BCE.⁷ The main evidence on Antiochus' teachers comes from Eusebius (citing Numenius) and Augustine (see Appendix, **T1** and **F8a**).

The fact that around 87 BCE, many years after coming to Athens, Antiochus wrote a book entitled *Sosus*, probably named after his Stoic compatriot Sosus (who is also mentioned by Stephanus of Byzantium, **T4b**), suggests a degree of continuing familiarity between the two men. Since Sosus was older (he is named in the list of Panaetius' pupils in Philodemus' *History of the Stoa* (*Index St.* LXXV 1–2)), he may have played a role in Antiochus' philosophical education, but we have no further information;⁸ in fact we know that Sosus was resident in Italy, at least towards the end of his life: Σῶσος Ἀσκαλωνίτης, ὃς ἐν Τεάνῳ διέτριψεν | καὶ μετέλλαξεν ('Sosus of Ascalon, who spent some time in Teanum and died there', *Index St.* LXXV 1–4). Teanum Sidicinum was one of the larger towns in Campania, but we do not know of any prominent resident who might have been Sosus' contact there.⁹

Thus far, therefore, we have seen that Antiochus belonged to Philo's Academy, and that he probably also had some instruction from two Stoic teachers. This should not be surprising, because it was not at all uncommon for Academic philosophers to have teachers from the other schools. For example, Philo appears to have had a Stoic teacher for seven years (*Index Ac.* XXXIII 14–15), and he sent his pupil Cotta to listen to Zeno the Epicurean (*Cic. Nat. D.* 1.59).¹⁰

For a more detailed glimpse into this early period of Antiochus' life as an Academic sceptic, we must turn to a passage from Cicero's *Lucullus*:

These very views I am defending are ones which he studied under Philo for so long that it was agreed that no one had studied (them) for longer,¹¹ and he also wrote about them very acutely (*acutissime*); and he attacked these same views in his old age no more sharply than he had previously defended them. (*Cic. Luc.* 69)

⁷ The suggestion that this was a reasonable age for someone coming to study philosophy in Athens is supported by the fact that Philo and Clitomachus were both twenty-four when they arrived, and Charmadas twenty-two (*Index Ac.* XXXIII 5–6; XXV 3–4; XXXI 34–8).

⁸ A possible parallel could be Philo's eight-year apprenticeship with Callicles in Larissa, *Index Ac.* XXXIII 7–10.

⁹ Rawson 1985: 22–3 argues that Sosus must have been employed by local aristocrats rather than members of the Roman elite.

¹⁰ See Brittain 2001: 50; Arcesilaus, too, had studied with Theophrastus (*Diog. Laert.* 4.29) and he encouraged his pupils to attend other teachers' lectures (*Diog. Laert.* 4.42).

¹¹ As Barnes 1989: 55 n. 18 points out, there are several possibilities when it comes to supplying an object for 'had studied' ('didicisse'): (i) no one studied 'these views' longer than Antiochus ('haec'); (ii) no one studied 'these views under Philo' for longer ('haec apud Philonem'); (iii) no one studied 'under Philo' for longer ('apud Philonem'); (iv) no one remained a student longer than Antiochus (no object supplied).

Cicero's aim here is to demonstrate as great an inconsistency ('inconstantia', *Luc.* 69) as possible in Antiochus' 'before' and 'after' views, but we can still trust that for a long period Antiochus remained a faithful pupil of Philo's and was on record as a keen (and successful) exponent of the sceptical Academy's stance (see also *Luc.* 63). It is not made clear, however, precisely what these views were that Antiochus adopted from Philo and defended so well. From the immediate context of Cicero's speech it appears that the reference is to the position that the wise man has to withhold all assent and therefore nothing is apprehensible (*Luc.* 68). It is in the interest of Cicero's argument here to avoid highlighting any differences between Philo's teaching and the earlier traditions of Academic scepticism, or within Philo's own philosophical trajectory in the period from 110 to 90 BCE: Antiochus must be shown to have exchanged one single position for its exact opposite.¹²

We are also told about one of the arguments used by Antiochus the sceptic against the view that there are impressions which merit assent because they cannot come from something false (*Luc.* 71). He pointed to the case of Dionysius of Heraclea, a pupil of Zeno's who changed his mind radically about the honourable and the good and went over to the Cyrenaics (Diog. Laert. 7.166–7).¹³ This meant, according to Antiochus, that he assented to two opposite impressions, at least one of which must have come necessarily from something false. Ironically, as Cicero points out, Antiochus himself became a prime example for this type of sceptical argument because he changed his mind just as radically (*Luc.* 71).

This apparent philosophical U-turn and rejection of scepticism was an event of great importance in the context of Antiochus' life; it also had wider ramifications for developments in ancient philosophy, which are explored in other chapters of this volume. Our main source for the circumstances of that event is again Cicero's *Lucullus*:

[69] So even though he was sharp – which he was – his authority is weakened by his inconsistency. When did that day dawn, I wonder, that showed him the mark for distinguishing between true and false (*veri et falsi notam*), the existence of which he had denied for many years? Did he think up something new? What he says is the same as the Stoics. Did he regret having held those earlier views?

¹² Brittain 2001: 54: 'It is also plain from Antiochus' characterization of "the Academics" in the *Lucullus* that it was Philonian/Metrodorian scepticism which he learnt from Philo in the 90s BC'; and 181: 'these views [*sc.* Cicero's "haec"] are clearly not the Roman views, but the "Academic views" in the restricted sense of the arguments of Arcesilaus and Carneades (whether in the Clitomachean or Philonian/Metrodorian interpretation)'.

¹³ According to Athenaeus, 7.281d–e, Dionysius joined Epicurus. Cf. Cic., *Fin.* 5.94; *Tusc.* 2.60.

Why then didn't he go over to another school (*cur non se transtulit ad alios*), and in particular to the Stoics? They were the ones who had this disagreement with the Academics. Why wasn't he satisfied with Mnesarchus or with Dardanus?¹⁴ They were the leaders of the Stoics in Athens at that time. He never distanced himself from Philo (*numquam a Philone discessit*) except after he had begun to have his own audience (*nisi postea quam ipse coepit qui se audirent habere*). [70] And then from where did he suddenly recall the 'Old Academy' (*vetus Academia revocata est*)? He seems to have wanted to retain the honour of this name while defecting from the school itself. There were in fact some who said that he did it for the sake of glory, and even that he hoped that his followers would be called 'Antiocheans'. It seems more likely to me, however, that he couldn't withstand the combined onslaught of all the philosophers – for there are several shared views amongst them on the other issues, but this view of the Academics is the only one that none of the other philosophers approves. (Cic. *Luc.* 69–70)

In this passage Cicero's lawcourt persona is in evidence, producing an array of rhetorical questions laden with irony, in a dramatic *ad hominem* attack on Antiochus' perceived inconsistency. Antiochus is being cross-examined on several issues at once, and thus the specific import of Cicero's comments is not always clear. The questions raised are: (i) What sort of mental process led Antiochus to accept the existence of a criterion of truth? Epiphany or regret? (ii) Why did he not join another school, notably the Stoics? This would have been a reasonable course of action if he was motivated by a realization that his earlier sceptical views were wrong, because the Stoics had always been the polar opposites and targets of Academic scepticism. (iii) Why did he decide to name his new school 'Old Academy'? The possible reasons considered by Cicero are ambition for fame, and inability to sustain dogmatist attacks on the (isolated) Academic position. Cicero goes on to speak metaphorically of Antiochus seeking refuge in the shade cast by the venerable old Academics (*Luc.* 70).

As a result, one has to struggle through Cicero's web of irony in order to get reliable information on the timing and motivation of Antiochus' rejection of scepticism; it should not be surprising that different interpretations arise, and, in what follows, my conclusions will not always be in agreement with those of Polito (Chapter 2).¹⁵ As has been pointed out by Barnes and others, we have here proof that the disagreement with Philo on

¹⁴ Reid's alternative punctuation, 'quid? eum Mnesarchi poenitebat? quid? Dardani?', would suggest an even greater degree of (feigned) puzzlement on Cicero's part: 'What was the matter? Was he dissatisfied with Mnesarchus? Perhaps with Dardanus?'

¹⁵ See also Tarrant 2007: esp. 330–1, arguing for three phases in Antiochus' philosophical development, (1) scepticism, (2) invocation of the Old Academy without obvious secession from Philo, (3) more polemical stance after having provoked Philo's rebuke.

the matter of the criterion of truth ('veri et falsi nota') was not a reaction to Philo's Roman books (on which more below) but came about in Athens, at the time when Mnesarchus and Dardanus were the most prominent Stoics, that is in the 90s BCE.¹⁶ The passage **ΤΙ** also suggests that Antiochus' assumption of the role of teacher in his own right¹⁷ was accompanied by an explicit distancing from Philo. As we shall see in a moment, when Antiochus was in Alexandria in 87/6 BCE he already had a circle of faithful students, therefore we have a *terminus ante quem* for Antiochus openly propagating his new Stoicizing views to a group of his own pupils.¹⁸

The remaining problem is whether this subversive teaching took place within the 'fold' of the Academy or in a separate organization. Sedley has argued for the former view and is tentatively followed by Barnes and more emphatically by Polito.¹⁹ A lot turns on Cicero's question 'Why didn't he go over to another school?', which could be taken to imply that Antiochus did not leave the Academy. But it is also possible that Cicero is asking why, upon discovering the criterion of truth, Antiochus chose to pursue his own path rather than join an existing school, the obvious choice being the Stoa, since he was after all, according to Cicero, in full agreement with its views. Cicero's next remark, that 'he never distanced himself from Philo except after he started having followers', suggests that once the loyalty of these followers was secured he *did* distance himself, and this was before the trip to Alexandria. The subsequent comment on the choice of the name 'Old Academy', which suggests an attempt by Antiochus to forge a special identity for his group, supports this interpretation.²⁰

Moreover, even if Antiochus had reasons to remain within the Academy,²¹ it is doubtful whether his Stoicizing epistemology could coexist easily with the teachings of Philo and his followers, because the rejection of the

¹⁶ Barnes 1989: 68–70 with references to earlier literature, in particular Glucker 1978: 15–21; see also Dorandi 1997: 98. Fladerer 1996: 185–8 sought to counter the arguments of Glucker and Barnes and revert to the older view associating Antiochus' conversion with the *Sosus* affair. Much of his case rests on the fact that Antiochus is called 'Philonis auditor' in the context of his first meeting with Lucullus (Cic. *Luc.* 4). But the characterization 'pupil of X' remains valid throughout someone's life, even after the end of the study in question. Fladerer does not offer any satisfactory counter-explanation for Cicero's only explicit chronological indication, 'qui erant Athenis tum principes Stoicorum', *Luc.* 69.

¹⁷ See also Tarrant 2007: 330.

¹⁸ Polito, this volume, p. 33 rejects this *terminus*, arguing that we cannot be certain about the Antiochean allegiance of this group at the time in question.

¹⁹ Sedley 1981: 70; Barnes 1989: 70 with n. 77; Polito, this volume, pp. 33–4.

²⁰ See also Brittain 2001: 55–7. The name 'Old Academy' is also attested in Philodemus' life of Antiochus, *Index Ac.* xxxv 15–16, according to Blank's new readings (see below).

²¹ For instance, Sedley 1981: 70 suggests that he could have had aspirations to become head of the Academy himself.

Stoic criterion of truth was the principal thesis underpinning Academic methodology. On another occasion of a rift within the Academy, namely between Carneades' successors and Clitomachus, the latter left the 'official' school, taught for a while at the Palladium and eventually 'stormed' the Academy after the death of Crates of Tarsus.²² Similarly, the Stoic Aristo of Chios, who held a series of unorthodox views, could be found teaching at Cynosarges (among the Cynics?) having practically founded his own sect (Diog. Laert. 7.161). One may thus surmise that important philosophical disagreements with the incumbent scholarch would drive someone like Antiochus or Clitomachus or Aristo to distance himself (spatially as well as ideologically) from his original school.

At *Lucullus* 69–70 Cicero offers and implicitly rejects several explanations of Antiochus' motivation for this conversion. His strongest point is that Antiochus could not have changed his mind in the light of new and persuasive information or some sort of epiphany/realization, because not only the Stoic position on the criterion of truth but also the relevant series of arguments had been well known all along, and Cicero wants to show that Antiochus in fact adopted them faithfully and without originality. It is of course in Cicero's interests throughout the *Lucullus* to present Antiochus' change of mind as sudden and inexplicable, and the rhetorical flourish describing a sudden epiphany suggests a degree of exaggeration.²³ We do not know what Antiochus would have said if he was faced with this type of critique during his lifetime. He might have tried to explain the alleged yielding to the onslaught of other philosophers as the result of a considered reassessment of the merits of the dogmatist point of view, or of a feeling and absolute conviction that he had come to know something with certainty.²⁴ In fact most of our later sources that refer to the conversion are critical of Antiochus and select from the possible motives in accordance with their degree of hostility.²⁵ Plutarch (*Cic.* 4.2, see Appendix **T5a**) reports that: 'Antiochus by that time was outside the so-called New Academy and had abandoned Carneades' position, either because he yielded to perspicuity

²² Phld. *Index Ac.* xxiv 30–7. The philosophical disagreement underlying these events may have resulted from the existence of an inner circle of Carneades' pupils, who were privy to his 'real' opinions. Cf. Cic. *Luc.* 139; *Index Ac.* xxvi 4–11 (on Metrodorus); Glucker 1978: 303–4.

²³ Barnes 1989: 68 accepts Cicero's ignorance of the motives behind Antiochus' philosophical U-turn as genuine; cf. Görler 1994: 941.

²⁴ Thus Tarrant 2007: 342; but see Polito, this volume, p. 48.

²⁵ The most hostile view, attributing Antiochus' separation from the Academy to vanity and desire for glory, is always presented as hearsay from unidentified sources: 'erant qui . . . dicerent' (Cic. *Luc.* 70); ὡς φασιν ἔνιοι (Plutarch, **T5a**); 'nonnullis visus est' (Augustine, **F8a**). Note also that, in **T1**, Numenius seems to think that the apprenticeship with Mnesarchus persuaded Antiochus to abandon scepticism.

and the senses or, as some say, because he switched and adopted the Stoic position on most matters out of ambition and rivalry towards the circle of Clitomachus and Philo'.²⁶

We have arrived now at the first incident of Antiochus' life that can be dated with certainty, namely his sojourn at Alexandria with Lucullus in the winter of 87/6 BCE. The sources so far have indicated that by this date he had studied in Athens with Philo (and Mnesarchus), had gone through a sceptical phase and had already changed his mind; he had also acquired a circle of followers.

The next puzzling question has to do with the circumstances under which he met and recommended himself to Lucullus. One suggestion, which Barnes found quite acceptable,²⁷ is that Lucullus visited Athens and became a lover of philosophy at a time when Philo and Antiochus were both lecturing from their respective Academic standpoints:

He [*sc.* Lucullus] embraced all philosophy and was well disposed and friendly to all the schools, but from the beginning he had a particular love and eagerness for the Academy, not the so-called New one, even though it was flourishing at the time with the teachings of Carneades through Philo, but the Old, which was headed by Antiochus of Ascalon, a persuasive man skilled in speech. After Lucullus made him his friend and companion (ποιησάμενος φίλον καὶ συμβιωτήν) with all keenness, he was opposed to Philo's followers, one of whom was Cicero; the latter wrote a wonderful treatise on this philosophical school, in which he gave the speech in favour of perception to Lucullus, and the opposing argument to himself. The title of that book is *Lucullus*. (Plut. *Luc.* 42.2–4, **T6a**)

This is the sort of picture of Lucullus that Cicero too paints in the encomiastic prologue to his dialogue; he even suggests there that Lucullus developed an interest in philosophy at a young age ('ineunte aetate', Cic. *Luc.* 4). But all this has been suspected as part of Cicero's quite deliberate efforts to portray Lucullus as an intellectual, and it is also the case that Plutarch's portrait is heavily dependent on Cicero's dialogue.²⁸ Another possibility is that Antiochus and Lucullus met in Greece around the time of Sulla's siege of Athens – this is Glucker's view,²⁹ but any attempt to be more precise would be speculation. Dorandi's view in *The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy* is that they met directly at Alexandria in

²⁶ See also Augustine, *Contra Acad.* 2.15 (**F8a**). On the Plutarch passage see also Tatum 2001. It is interesting that similar yielding to the perspicuity and agreement of (sense) impressions is also cited as the reason for *Philo's* reassessment of his sceptical stance, Numenius *ap.* Eusebius, *Praep. evang.* 14.9.2 (= fr. 28 des Places).

²⁷ Barnes 1989: 60; cf. Görler 1994: 942. ²⁸ See Jones 1982.

²⁹ Glucker 1978: 20–1, with a survey of earlier views; his suggestions are favoured by Görler 1994: 943.

87 BCE.³⁰ This would make Alexandria Antiochus' place of escape from the troubles of the Mithridatic War, parallel to Philo's emigration to Rome, and it could have something to do with the fact that two members of his circle of pupils were native Alexandrians. But it appears to be contradicted by the wording of Cicero, *Lucullus* II, which suggests that Antiochus and Lucullus arrived in Alexandria together, while Heraclitus, another member of the Academy and pupil of Clitomachus and Philo, was already there.³¹ Yet another possibility is that Antiochus visited Rome before 87 BCE (perhaps in one of the embassies mentioned by Philodemus, *Index Ac.* XXXIV 35–9) and met Lucullus there – but we do not know anything about the date of these embassies other than that they stretched over a long time span.

In any case, the very existence of a close relationship between Antiochus and Sulla's general suggests that by 87 BCE Antiochus had achieved prominent status and was considered a worthy and reliable ally for an important Roman.³² The nature of this relationship must be explored further, elaborating on views voiced by both Barnes and Rawson,³³ because it has an important bearing on the kind of activity that Antiochus could and would engage in while in Lucullus' company. If one accepts Glucker's theory that the relationship was born out of purely political considerations on Lucullus' part, namely that he summoned Antiochus in order to employ him as a councillor and go-between in his negotiations with the rulers of the Greek East, then this would leave little scope for any philosophical activity.³⁴

If, on the other hand, philosophy played a part in the relationship between the two men, then Antiochus' sojourn at Alexandria need not be so inextricably linked with Lucullus' pressing political mission. That is to say, if Lucullus had interests and inclinations that would lead him to seek the company of a philosopher in particular (rather than simply a Greek political adviser), then philosophical discussion must have occupied Antiochus in Alexandria and anywhere else he went with Lucullus, because it would have formed part of Lucullus' expectations of him.

³⁰ Dorandi 1999: 35.

³¹ 'cum Alexandriae pro quaestore, inquit [sc. Lucullus], essem, fuit Antiochus mecum et erat iam antea Alexandriae familiaris Antiochi Heraclitus Tyrius.'

³² Cf. Cic. *Luc.* 4: 'cum autem e philosophis ingenio scientiaque putaretur Antiochus Philonis auditor excellere, eum secum et quaestor habuit [sc. Lucullus] et post aliquot annos imperator . . .'

³³ Barnes 1989: 56–7, 62; Rawson 1989: 238–9.

³⁴ See, e.g., Glucker 1978: 26–7: 'Lucullus' choice of Antiochus (and quite probably of his brother) was made for reasons more immediately relevant to his political and military activities at the time. Philosophy came next, and it was never allowed to intrude too much on Lucullus' more "proper" occupations as a Roman *nobilis*. Lucullus the Philosopher is a creation of Cicero.' See also Daly 1950: esp. 44–5.

Let us now examine the evidence linking Lucullus and Antiochus: by far the most important information comes from Cicero's *Lucullus*. This book begins with a eulogy of Lucullus the statesman, where the connection with Antiochus is used as proof of a closer involvement with letters and philosophy on Lucullus' part than some people had assumed (*Luc.* 4). The speech by Lucullus that follows purports to be the account of one or more philosophical discussions he attended in his brief *otium* during his time in Alexandria: Cicero has him stress the fact that he had been able to pay proper attention to Antiochus (*Luc.* 10). We have already seen what Plutarch made of this information; the other two sources linking the two men are Philodemus' biography (*Index Ac.* xxxiv 40–2, cited below) and Aelian, in a passage on the benefits that can be gained from associating with philosophers and other wise men: 'Lucullus derived some advantage from Antiochus of Ascalon, Maecenas from Arius, Cicero from Apollonius, and Augustus from Athenodorus' (Aelian, *VH* 12.25, **T6b**).

The Aelian parallel notwithstanding, the suspicion lingers that Lucullus' philosophical interest may simply be an exaggeration on Cicero's part, designed to account for his selection of Lucullus as an active contributor in an advanced philosophical discussion. This selection was dictated by the needs of the trilogy, which included the *Hortensius* and the *Catulus*, all nostalgically dedicated to prominent figures from an older (and better) generation of *optimates*, as Griffin has shown.³⁵ The suspicion is confirmed by some of Cicero's letters to Atticus, where he explains his reasons for revising the Academic books and transferring what had been *Hortensius*, *Catulus*' and Lucullus' speeches to Cato, Brutus and eventually Varro.³⁶ Hints of this unease can be found already in Cicero's *Lucullus* when he anticipates criticism: 'There are also people who deny that the disputants in my books had real knowledge of the subjects they debated' ('sunt enim qui negent in iis qui in nostris libris disputant fuisse earum rerum de quibus disputatur scientiam', *Luc.* 7), only to dismiss it as jealousy. He also has Lucullus disclaim any originality for what he is about to say and attribute his knowledge of it to careful and repetitive study with Antiochus.

³⁵ Griffin 1997: 7–9.

³⁶ Cicero remarks that the content of the original Academic books 'admittedly did not fit the persons, it was more abstruse than anything they could ever be thought to have dreamt of' ('sane in personas non cadebant; erant enim λογικώτερον quam ut illi de iis somniasse umquam viderentur', *Att.* 13.19; cf. 13.16). The strongest of these comments is that the three noblemen were 'by no means learned' (*Att.* 13.12): the trio of Catulus, Hortensius and Lucullus could not be considered experts in any field of learning and were inappropriate interlocutors for the abstruse and technical issues raised in the Academic books because they lacked the necessary philosophical background.

But is this unease enough to deny Lucullus not only expertise, but also interest and commitment so far as philosophy is concerned? In other words, is Cicero's portrait not just exaggerated but completely false? It is beyond doubt that the historical Lucullus would not have been able to deliver the speech attributed to him in Cicero's *Lucullus*, but this does not mean that he did not encourage and support the pursuit of those philosophical issues by his protégé. From what is known about Lucullus in sources that do not go back to the first version of Cicero's Academic books, he appears to have been a sponsor of various forms of intellectual activity, with a strong preference for Greek letters. This portrait is based on a broad range of evidence across many aspects of cultural life and is therefore too consistent to be entirely false.³⁷ Even if Lucullus' sophistication is somewhat exaggerated by Plutarch,³⁸ we can still see that it was not implausible for him to seek the company and instruction of a Greek philosopher without seeing him merely as a political adviser. This does not mean that Antiochus could not fulfil the role of 'general adviser on Greek affairs'. In fact engagement in political missions was a long-term characteristic of Antiochus' life; Philodemus says that he represented Athens on embassies 'for most of his life', but he is also keen to stress that such business did not get in the way of Antiochus' philosophical teaching (*Index Ac.* xxxiv 34–9, T3).³⁹ This means that we need not impose on Antiochus' activity a strict dichotomy between politics and philosophy (a dichotomy that usually arises from our modern-day assessment of the relevant time constraints). While in Lucullus' company, Antiochus would be able (and probably also encouraged) to engage in intellectual activity not related to politics. In the same way, Archias pursued his own area of expertise by composing encomiastic poetry on the subject of the campaigns on which he followed Lucullus (cf. Cic. *Arch.* 21).⁴⁰

³⁷ Plutarch speaks about his library (Plut. *Luc.* 42.1–3; cf. Cic. *Fin.* 3.7–9); we know that Lucullus and his family also patronized the Greek poet Archias (Cic. *Arch.* 11; cf. 5–6); and he also had respect and admiration for the grammarian Tyrannion (Plut. *Luc.* 19.7). Plutarch also insists on Lucullus' fluency in the Greek language: ἡσκητο καὶ λέγειν ἱκανῶς ἐκατέραν γλῶτταν (1.4), and claims that he wrote a history of the Social War in Greek as a result of a jest between himself, Hortensius and the historian Sisenna (1.7). Strabo reports on his fondness for Greek art: he enforced restraint on his army during the sack of Greek cities, while selecting some objects for his personal collections (Strabo 12.3.11, on Sinope); cf. Plut. *Luc.* 33.4: εἰς δὲ πόλιν Ἑλληνίδα καὶ φίλην οὐδ' ἅπαρ εἰσῆλθε μετὰ στρατοπέδου Λεύκολλος; Pliny and Plutarch also comment on Lucullus' rich art collections (Plut. *Luc.* 39, where there is criticism that these collections were a sign of τρυφή and frivolity; Plin. *HN* 34.36, 25.125, 25.155–6). Cf. Keaveney 1992: 146–7.

³⁸ The way in which Plutarch handled Lucullus' philhellenism and his proverbial life of luxury is discussed by Tröster 2005. See also Swain 1992.

³⁹ Cf. Rawson 1985: 81. ⁴⁰ Rawson 1985: 32, 61, 221 with n. 33.

Thus the relationship between Antiochus and Lucullus is best understood if one adopts a middle position between the ancient image of Lucullus the learned philosopher that was propounded by Cicero and echoed in some passages of Plutarch's biography and the view of some modern scholars who accept only political exigencies.⁴¹ Since, then, Lucullus had the inclination and the intellectual ambition to seek a relationship with Antiochus that did not undercut the philosophical pursuits of the latter, what remains to be examined is the form that these pursuits took under the particular circumstances of the sojourn at Alexandria in 87/6 BCE.⁴²

This short period holds particular prominence within accounts of Antiochus' life because, thanks to Cicero's *Lucullus*, we have a uniquely detailed narrative of a specific episode, the 'Sosus affair':

[11] When I was in Alexandria as proquaestor, he said, Antiochus was with me and Heraclitus of Tyre, a friend of Antiochus', was already in Alexandria. Heraclitus had studied with Clitomachus for many years and with Philo; he was truly esteemed and even renowned in this philosophy which is now being recalled, though it is almost extinct. I used to listen often (*saepe*) to Antiochus having debates (*disputantem*) with him, but both men arguing gently (*leniter*). And then these two books by Philo, the ones that Catulus spoke about yesterday, were brought to Alexandria, and that's when they first came into Antiochus' hands: and this man who was very mild by nature (nothing could be more gentle than him) began to get upset. I was surprised, because I had never seen this before; but he appealed to Heraclitus' memory and asked him whether these views seemed to be Philo's or whether he had ever heard them from Philo or any other Academic. He said no; but he recognized the written piece as a work of Philo's, and this fact could not be doubted, because my friends Publius and Gaius Silius and Tetrilius Rogus were present, all learned men, and they said that they had heard these views from Philo in Rome and had transcribed those two books from the man himself. [12] Then Antiochus said those things that, as Catulus reminded us yesterday, were also said in response to Philo by Catulus' father, and many more, and he did not hold back even from publishing a book against his teacher (*nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet*), which was entitled *Sosus*. Then, as I listened eagerly to Heraclitus arguing (*dissidentem*) against Antiochus and likewise to Antiochus [arguing] against the Academics, I paid closer attention to Antiochus, so that I might learn the whole case from him. And so for many days (*complures dies*), in the company of Heraclitus and many learned men (*adhibito Heraclito doctisque compluribus*) including Antiochus' brother Aristus and also Aristo and Dio, whom he valued most next to his brother, we spent a lot of time (*multum temporis*) on this one debate. (Cic. *Luc.* 11–12)

⁴¹ The most extreme such view is that of Crawford 1978: 205, who claims that 'Lucullus' real philistinism can be inferred from Cicero's desperate protestations to the contrary in the *Academica Priora* (11 4, cf. 7 and 11), even without the benefit of his letters where he explained that Lucullus, Catulus and Hortensius were wildly unsuitable interlocutors in a philosophical dialogue (*Att.* 13.12.4; 16.1; 19.5).

⁴² On Antiochus' sojourn at Alexandria see also Hatzimichali 2011: 37–40.

According to this story, with which Cicero's Lucullus prefaces his speech, after arriving in Alexandria Antiochus met an old acquaintance, Heraclitus of Tyre, who had gone there earlier and was still an adherent of the New Academy. This difference of opinions (since, as we have seen, Antiochus was a dogmatist by this point) led to some polite debate, until the arrival of Philo's controversial books from Rome caused a stir and provoked more discussions.⁴³ Cicero's Lucullus clearly claims that there were many such discussions ('saepe', *Luc.* 11; 'complures dies . . . multum temporis', *Luc.* 12) and that he witnessed them. Other participants included a circle of Antiochus' faithful pupils whose allegiance he had probably secured ahead of his 'secession' from Philo. The attendance of this group of pupils, who must have followed Antiochus from Athens, in Lucullus' entourage can also be taken as evidence that philosophical discussion was perhaps of more importance during their stay in Alexandria than Glucker and others would like to allow.⁴⁴

It is important to know whether the details of this episode in Antiochus' life are described accurately by Cicero, because features like his anger and astonishment at Philo's innovations serve as indications for the content of these innovations and of Antiochus's response.⁴⁵ For example, from this passage it appears that it was the first time Antiochus had engaged in an *ad hominem* attack against his own teacher, something that he had previously been able to restrain himself from doing ('nec se tenuit quin contra suum doctorem librum etiam ederet', *Luc.* 12). We have already seen that the *Lucullus* is open to charges of inaccuracy so far as the portrait of the principal interlocutor is concerned, by Cicero's own admission. But in terms of his references to facts and events, the assessment of Cicero's historical accuracy is generally favourable, and he has been commended for his 'sophisticated feeling for the past' and for a historical seriousness that superseded the loose truth-requirements that were characteristic of the dialogue genre.⁴⁶ This is not to say, of course, that the discussions portrayed in Cicero's dialogues actually took place as such; but the generic setting involving a group of intellectuals gathered in the quiet surroundings of a countryside villa and engaged in philosophical or other theoretical discussion must have appeared plausible to Cicero's audience, even if the particular speeches he reports were never uttered. Cicero's confidence that his readers (including

⁴³ For a different interpretation, involving more substantial changes in Antiochus' own approach, see Polito, this volume, pp. 41–3.

⁴⁴ Glucker 1978: 21 entertains the possibility that Lucullus had befriended the whole group; cf. Brittain 2001: 56: 'The audience he has there appears to be well-established . . . ; and Antiochus seems to have brought it with him.'

⁴⁵ See, e.g., Brittain 2001: 8, 23, 30–2.

⁴⁶ Rawson 1972: esp. 39–40.

the purported speakers, if alive) will not find anything unacceptable in the fictional dramatic settings is evident when he writes to Varro to present him with the final edition of the *Academici libri* (*Fam.* 9.8):

So I composed a dialogue, held between us at my estate in Cumae, where Atticus was also present. I have given you the Antiochean role, a standpoint that I thought I understood you to approve of; I have assumed the role of Philo. I think that when you read it you will be surprised at this discussion between us, which we never had; but you know how it is with dialogues.

Cicero's attention to historical accuracy is even more evident when he deals with events from the more remote past,⁴⁷ and his information is generally confirmed when verification from other sources is possible. Recent commentators on the *De oratore* are confident that Cicero can be trusted in matters related to the historical background underlying the setting of his dialogues, even though the actual content of the conversations is fictional:

When we are dealing with matters of general background, not with aspects touching the subject matter of the work, we must assume them to be historical . . . Cicero clearly aimed at historical plausibility. Thus, there is no need to doubt that both Crassus and Antonius visited Athens on their way to their provinces. Also, when Cicero tells us that Antonius was politically aligned with Crassus and the others in 91 BCE, we must believe him; a discrepancy in this regard would have jarred on the ears of contemporary readers.⁴⁸

The Alexandrian episode involving Antiochus that concerns us here is not the setting of Cicero's dialogue, but a story narrated by one of the interlocutors as part of a more remote historical backdrop. Thus Cicero's practice as described above suggests that such an episode is more likely to be treated as fact (at least by Cicero himself) than the dialogue in which it is embedded. The narratives by the main interlocutors in the *De oratore* describing their visits to Athens and their audiences with representatives from various philosophical schools (Crassus: *De or.* 1.45–7; 3.68; Antonius: 1.82–94) are interesting parallels: any exaggerations are traced only in the portraits of the Roman aristocrats and need not affect our assumptions, for example, about the central role played by Mnesarchus and Charmadas as representatives of the Stoic and Academic Schools in Athens towards

⁴⁷ Rawson 1972 points to a large number of historical sources that Cicero is likely to have used in his careful research for dialogues such as the *De republica* and the *Cato Maior/De senectute*, set in the second century.

⁴⁸ May and Wisse 2001: 17. They go on to treat claims about Antonius' and Crassus' trips to Athens with caution: 'there is no telling whether they indeed met the philosophers whom Cicero makes them meet'. Presumably this is because these men are known to have had no active interest in philosophy.

the end of the second century BCE, or about their views on the role of orators as presented in the *De oratore*. Similarly, we can accept that Cicero may have overstated Lucullus' participation in the Alexandrian debates, but this does not necessarily threaten the accuracy of what is said about the activities of the Greek philosophers. It is therefore a fair assumption that for events in Alexandria connected to developments in the late Academy, Cicero would seek out and rely on information which he judged to be credible and reliable, rather than falsify an episode for the purposes of his dialogue.

Cicero's preference for well-informed sources brings us to the question of where such reliable information might come from as far as the Alexandrian episode is concerned and, ultimately, to the problem of the sources of the *Lucullus*. A *Quellenforschung* favourite has been Antiochus' *Sosus*, the work written in direct reaction to Philo's provocative Roman views. Leaving aside the question whether the *Sosus* was the source (or a source) for the philosophical content of Cicero's dialogue,⁴⁹ one can still claim that it was the source for the historical/biographical details. But it is hard to imagine the work as a record of the discussions mentioned in the Ciceronian passage presented in dialogue form, because that would leave no role for Sosus himself; he is not mentioned by Cicero among those present at Alexandria, whereas the person a dialogue is named after is traditionally a participant. These difficulties can be solved if we imagine an embedded dialogue, with the Alexandrian episode narrated by Antiochus (or another participant) to Sosus.

Thus, by establishing the trustworthiness of the *Sosus* affair as reported by Cicero, we have gained some possibly autobiographical information on what must have been a trying period of Antiochus' life, both personally, with the move from Athens to Alexandria, and intellectually, with a frustrating challenge coming from Philo in Rome, which could undermine his philosophical position. We do not know how long Antiochus stayed in Alexandria, and scholars' estimates vary from a couple of weeks to several years.⁵⁰

There is one further aspect that would have made the *Sosus* affair attractive for inclusion in Cicero's work, even though it involved an arguably unpleasant incident of discord between his two revered teachers.⁵¹ I would suggest that his choice is related to the plausibility of Lucullus as an

⁴⁹ See Barnes 1989: 65–8; Glucker 1978: 406–20; Polito, this volume, p. 41 with n. 26.

⁵⁰ E.g. Barnes 1989: 57 'there is no evidence that Antiochus ever stayed more than a week or so in Alexandria'; Dorandi 1999: 35 'From c. 87 to 84 Antiochus seems to have been at Alexandria.'

⁵¹ See Sedley 1981: 69.

expounder of Antiochus' epistemology: the Alexandrian episode provides the credible and memorable setting of an important debate between prominent Academics (Philo admittedly *in absentia*), where Lucullus was also present. It was a very significant event both in the context of Antiochus' life and in the history of the Academy during the first century BCE, and at the same time it was an episode for which Lucullus could plausibly claim eyewitness status. This must have given Cicero considerable incentive for placing the *Sosus* affair at the opening of Lucullus' speech, because it legitimized Lucullus as a participant in a crucial Academic debate. Cicero also feels the need to provide similar legitimization for Catulus, namely that he was reproducing his father's reaction to Philo ('quae heri Catulus commemoravit a patre suo dicta Philoni', *Luc.* 12).

In terms of Antiochus' overall impact on philosophical life in Alexandria, Gucker was certainly right to point out that no ancient source speaks of his engaging in systematic teaching or even establishing a lasting school there, one which might then have been seen as the background to later philosophical developments in dogmatic Platonism and Eclecticism (the Alexandrians Eudorus, Potamo and Arius Didymus are often mentioned in this connection).⁵² In fact, the most we can say is that the gathering of intellectuals to attend or participate in Antiochus' debates with Heraclitus could potentially have raised the profile of the Academy in Alexandria and drawn attention to competing interpretations of the Platonic tradition.

The setting of these debates appears to be Lucullus' lodgings in the royal palace (Plut. *Luc.* 2.5), where the two parties were 'summoned' ('adhibito', Cic. *Luc.* 12) to argue their case. But we must remember that the Museum formed part of the royal complex too (Strabo 17.1.8), therefore interaction with local intellectuals is not out of the question, even though we are in the dark as to their identity. Antiochus' impact on Alexandrian intellectual life will have to be sought in the impressions made upon Cicero's obscure 'many learned men' ('docti complures', *Luc.* 12). Therefore, if the philosophical influence of Antiochus is observed in the thought of later Alexandrians, it may be connected to his performances while visiting with Lucullus, or to individuals for whom we have reliable evidence that they were his pupils (i.e. Aristo and particularly Dio, who did not become a Peripatetic, see below), but it cannot be assumed a priori on the basis of an alleged continuing school.

⁵² For the view of an Antiochean school in Alexandria see Fraser 1972: vol. 1, 489, vol. II, 707–9. Gucker 1978: 90–7, with references to earlier literature. Cf. Barnes 1989: 57: 'Antiochus' Alexandrian School is a figment of modern scholarship'; thus also Görler 1994: 943. On Antiochus' Alexandrian pupils see further Hatzimichali 2011: 40–50, and Lévy Chapter 13 below.

After the sojourn in Alexandria, the next safely datable stage of Antiochus' life is the period around 79 BCE, when Cicero attended his lectures at the Ptolemaeum in Athens for six months after his successful defence of Roscius of Ameria (Cic. *Brut.* 315 = **F4**; *Fin.* 5.1, included in **F9**).⁵³ This apprenticeship resulted in lasting feelings of esteem and affection, at least on Cicero's part (Cic. *Luc.* 113; *Academica* (*Ac.*) 1.13, 1.43). During the period around 79 BCE, Quintus and Lucius Cicero were also members of Antiochus' audience, and so was Cicero's friend Atticus. He was so impressed by Antiochus' personality and acumen that he almost abandoned his Epicureanism ('ergo adsentiris Antiocho familiari meo – magistro enim non audeo dicere – quocum vixi et qui me ex nostris paene convellit hortulis, deduxitque in Academiam perpauculis passibus', 'then you agree with my friend Antiochus – for I do not dare to call him my teacher – with whom I once lived, and who almost tore me away from our gardens and led me within a few steps of the Academy', Cic. *Leg.* 1.54; cf. *Ac.* 1.14). Varro must have studied with Antiochus during roughly the same period (probably some years earlier than 79 BCE, because he was older than Cicero and Atticus;⁵⁴ cf. Cic. *Ac.* 1.12; *Att.* 13.12.3; 16.1; 19.3; *Fam.* 9.8.1).

At this later stage of his life Antiochus was head of his own school, as is confirmed by the final piece of substantial evidence for his life, namely the section devoted to him in Philodemus' *History of the Academy*. For a discussion of the exact status of this school and its relationship with the traditional Academy see Polito's contribution to this volume ([Chapter 2](#)).⁵⁵ The text cited below incorporates the new readings from Blank's recent re-examination of the papyrus (*PHerc.* 1021).⁵⁶

He spent . . . most of his life on embassies from Athens both to Rome and to the generals in the provinces, and finally while in Lucius Lucullus' attendance (προσκορτεῖρῶν) in Mesopotamia he died, having been regarded with affection by many including myself, and having personally given us a favourable reception. His school (τὴν δὲ δι|ατριβὴν αὐτοῦ) passed on to Aristus, who was his brother and pupil; even though he was a busy man he had many pupils, and in particular our friends (συνήθεις ἡ|μῶν) Aristo and Dio, both Alexandrians, and Cratippus of Pergamum. Of these Aristo and Cratippus . . . heard . . . enthusiasm . . . became Peripatetics, while Dio (belonged to) the Old Academy (**T3**).

⁵³ See also *Brut.* 313–14; *Nat. D.* 1.6; Plut. *Cic.* 3.3–5; 4.1; Anon. *De viris illustribus* 81.1–2 (**T5b**).

⁵⁴ Görler 1994: 944, 971 places Varro's apprenticeship with Antiochus around 84–82 BCE.

⁵⁵ See also Görler's arguments in favour of an Antiochean school independent of the Academy, Görler 1994: 940–1.

⁵⁶ See Blank 2007.

From these few lines we learn that Antiochus had his own *diatribē*, which passed on to his brother after his death, and the term *diatribē* was, according to Glucker, 'synonymous with a philosophical community or school' since the Hellenistic period at least.⁵⁷ As we have already seen, Cicero's evidence enables us to specify the Ptolemaeum as the location of this school (*Fin.* 5.1). Philodemus' text speaks against identifying Antiochus' *diatribē* with the Academy, because the reference is to *his* school (αὐτοῦ); Philodemus does speak of the Academy as a *diatribē* too (confirming Glucker's interpretation of the word as 'school'), but never as someone's *diatribē*.⁵⁸ Moreover, in the final lines of Philodemus' life of Antiochus we learn that the school Dio remained faithful to was the Old Academy. This last point is in complete agreement with Cicero's ironic comment on the 'recalling' of the Old Academy ('unde autem subito vetus Academia revocata est?' *Luc.* 70, cited above). The Old Academy is also treated as a self-contained entity at Cicero, *Brutus* 232: 'that Old Academy and its heir Aristus' ('illa vetus Academia et eius heres Aristus'). Furthermore, Blank has confirmed the reading διεγ[έν]ετο, 'he spent his time', rather than διεδ[έξ]ετο 'he succeeded', in the first readable line of Philodemus' account (*Index Ac.* xxxiv 34): therefore there is no reason to suppose that Antiochus succeeded Philo as head of the Academy.⁵⁹ It is also significant that the pupils associated with this school are exactly the same ones mentioned by Cicero as Antiochus' 'hard core' of followers in Alexandria, namely his brother Aristus and the Alexandrians Aristo and Dio, with the addition of Cratippus.⁶⁰

Philodemus' text is also crucial for another aspect of Antiochus' life, namely his involvement in political activity: we learn that the city of Athens entrusted him with diplomatic missions both to Rome itself and to the Roman generals in the provinces. This suggests that, despite being a foreigner, he had gained considerable prominence and esteem within Athens, comparable to that of Carneades of Cyrene, Critolaus of Phaselis and Diogenes of Babylon (all foreigners), who were sent on an embassy to Rome in 155 BCE (Cic. *De or.* 2.155). Antiochus' contacts with members of the Roman elite would have contributed to his suitability for these ambassadorial duties. According to Philodemus, such embassies occupied Antiochus for 'most of his life', but it is not clear whether this remark

⁵⁷ Diogenes Laertius cites the following as part of the stipulations in the will of Strato of Lampsacus: καταλείπω δὲ τὴν μὲν διατριβὴν Λύκωνι (Diog. Laert. 5.62); cf. Glucker 1978: 162–6.

⁵⁸ *Index Ac.* vi 28–30; vii 8–10; Q 8–10; xviii 2–4; N 6–8, all cited by Glucker 1978: 162.

⁵⁹ The possibility was entertained by Barnes 1989: 58, citing Dorandi 1986: 115.

⁶⁰ See Puglia 2000: esp. 25–6 for a very persuasive reconstruction of the structure and sequence of thought in Philodemus' text, which makes it clear that the reference is to Antiochus', not Aristus' pupils.

should be taken literally or as exaggerating the extent of Antiochus' political involvement and importance; 'most of his life' probably means here 'most of his time' at a certain period of his life, especially if we take it with διεγ[έν]ετο, 'he spent his time'. Görler follows Gucker in suggesting that the embassies should be dated to the later period of Antiochus' life, when he was the eldest and most prominent philosopher in Athens,⁶¹ and when Philodemus was personally acquainted with him. As I have already pointed out, this evidence also speaks against imposing a stark dichotomy between Antiochus' political and philosophical activity, since Philodemus assures us that other occupations ('even though he was a busy man', *Index Ac.* xxxv 5–6) did not stand in the way of Antiochus' philosophical teaching. A commitment to the compatibility of philosophy and political activity would also be consistent with the advice he gave Cicero to renew his pursuit of public life (Plut. *Cic.* 4.4, **T5a**).⁶²

A striking new feature emerging from Blank's readings is Philodemus' close and affectionate personal relationship with Antiochus. From the earlier versions of the text it was clear that Philodemus was friendly with the group of Antiochus' pupils ('our friends', συνήθεις ἡμῶν, *Index Ac.* xxxv 7–8), but now we can gain further insight into Antiochus' agreeable and accommodating character, which had endeared him to so many, including Cicero and his circle, as well as members of the Epicurean school to which Philodemus belonged. In Philodemus' case, closer ties may have been felt because of the relative proximity of his and Antiochus' home towns in Syria.

We are quite well informed on the circumstances of Antiochus' death: Philodemus states that it occurred in the course of another expedition with Lucullus, which testifies to the lasting duration of, and the commitment involved in, the relationship between the two men. Philodemus' word προσκαρτεῖρῶν ('being in attendance') points to a continuation of the type of interaction described above, with Lucullus as the patron and Antiochus as his companion. Cicero's Lucullus claims that philosophical discussion was an activity Antiochus engaged in during that final trip too, as he had done in Alexandria. We also learn that he was keen to maintain an even stronger anti-sceptical stance: 'this is more or less what Antiochus said at that time in Alexandria, as well as many years later, and still more

⁶¹ Görler 1994: 944.

⁶² 'His friends sent many pleading letters, and Antiochus strongly urged him to apply himself to public affairs.' Antiochus' pupil Dio also pursued a public career, taking part in the fateful embassy from Alexandria to Rome, where he was murdered in a conspiracy orchestrated by Ptolemy Auletes (cf. Strabo 17.1.11).

insistently (*multo etiam adseverantius*), when he was with me in Syria, shortly before he died' (Cic. *Luc.* 61). This is in agreement with Cicero's remark a few paragraphs later that Antiochus' acute attacks on scepticism took place in his old age ('in senectute', *Luc.* 69).

The occasion of the sojourn in Syria must have been Lucullus' second mission to the East, this time as general (*imperator*),⁶³ when he defeated Mithridates and pursued him into Armenia, which was at the time a very powerful kingdom controlling large parts of Asia Minor, Mesopotamia and Syria. The Armenian king was Tigranes, Mithridates' father-in-law. We know that Antiochus was alive at least until the major battle of the war with Tigranes, in October of 69 BCE, when Lucullus' forces completely destroyed Tigranocerta, the newly purpose-built capital of the Armenian kingdom.⁶⁴ The battle is described by Plutarch, who adds the following remark: 'Antiochus the philosopher mentions this battle in his work *On the Gods*, and says that the sun had not witnessed another one like it' (T7: Plut. *Luc.* 28.8, repeated by the *Suda* s.v. Λούκουλλος, λ 688). It would be fair to say that Antiochus found here an opportunity to express gratitude to his patron through some exaggerated praise. After the battle Lucullus did in fact spend some time near Mesopotamia (in Gordyene, just east of the Tigris), and probably this is when Antiochus died. Once again (compare the circumstances under which the *Sosus* was written), it seems that he was writing a philosophical/theological work while accompanying Lucullus on a military campaign.

It is not easy to arrive at a satisfactory assessment of Antiochus' legacy, because very few sources other than Cicero explicitly reveal any sort of debt to his work, and very little is known about his pupils' accomplishments. From a historical point of view (the philosophical aspects of Antiochus' legacy are explored by other chapters in this volume), we should note that several people who studied with him ended up espousing different philosophical systems (Cicero was an Academic sceptic, Aristo and Cratippus became Peripatetics); the only 'firm' Antiocheans among his direct pupils are Dio, Varro and Aristus. The last ensured that the school continued for some time after his brother's death (*Index Ac.* xxxv 2–5; Cic. *Brut.* 232), and we know of one prominent alumnus from that period, namely Brutus, who went on to write a delightful (according to Cicero) ethical work *On Virtue* (*De virtute*, mentioned at Cic. *Fin.* 1.8).⁶⁵

⁶³ Cf. Cic. *Luc.* 4: 'eum [*sc.* Antiochum] secum et quaestor habuit [*sc.* Lucullus] et post aliquot annos imperator'.

⁶⁴ See Keaveney 1992: 108–11.

⁶⁵ He also wrote *De officiis* and *De patientia*; cf. Görler 1994: 970. On his connection with Aristus cf. Cic. *Ac.* 1.12; *Tusc.* 5.21–2; Plut. *Brut.* 2.3.

As far as Antiochus' own written work is concerned, we know that in the earlier part of his career he wrote in support of scepticism (*Luc.* 69). We are also informed about the circumstances under which he composed the *Sosus* and can thus date it to 87/6 BCE; as we have seen, this work contained an attack on Philo's Roman books.⁶⁶ The last work Antiochus wrote must have been the *On the Gods* (Plut. *Luc.* 28.7); since it contained a reference to the battle of Tigranocerta, it should be dated in or after 69 BCE. In addition to these works, Cicero suggests that a book treating Stoic and Peripatetic ethics as essentially in agreement had reached the Stoic Quintus Lucilius Balbus shortly before the dramatic date of the *De natura deorum*, that is around 77–75 BCE (*Nat. D.* 1.16: 'the book of our friend Antiochus, which was sent recently by him to Balbus here'). It is harder to date Antiochus' *Canonica*, presumably a work on epistemology and the criterion of truth; Sextus Empiricus quotes verbatim from the work (*Math.* 7.202, cf. 162, **F2**) and the information he offers suggests that it had a certain amount of doxographical content.⁶⁷ Finally, Cicero makes some further references to an unspecified book or books by Antiochus, where he maintained that virtue on its own can produce a happy life but not the happiest life (*Tusc.* 5.22, 'haec quae scripsit Antiochus locis pluribus', 'what Antiochus wrote in a number of passages'); and a work in which he reported a criticism made by Carneades against Chrysippus (*Tusc.* 3.59, 'Carneades, ut video nostrum scribere Antiochum . . .', 'Carneades, as I see that our friend Antiochus reports in writing . . .').

I conclude with some general observations on Antiochus' life: the most spectacular event seems to have been his abandonment of the sceptical Academy's views in favour of a dogmatist position backed up by a radical reassessment of the history of philosophy. His emphasis on claims of historical authenticity is also evident in the choice of 'Old Academy' as the name for his own school.

Our evidence also suggests that Antiochus had an affable and engaging personality, which secured him the lasting esteem and admiration even of those who were not persuaded by his philosophical views, including important Romans such as Cicero and Atticus, as well as the Greek Epicurean Philodemus. He must also have been effective in diplomacy and political interaction, since the city of Athens repeatedly entrusted him with ambassadorial missions. This information suggests that we should not expect philosophy to be a 'full-time job' in Antiochus' case.

⁶⁶ Cf. Görler 1994: 945–6.

⁶⁷ Cf. Sedley 1992: 44–55, and Brittain, Chapter 5 below for the view that Antiochus' *Canonica* is the ultimate source of Sextus' entire doxographical section focusing on the role of *enargeia* (perspicuity) as criterion of truth, *Math.* 7.141–260.

Finally, some stress must be laid on how his career is indicative of the new circumstances that emerged for philosophical activity in the first century BCE: Antiochus was caught up in the upheaval at Athens during the first Mithridatic War and left the city. He was also associated with the rising power and cultural influence of Rome through his relationship of patronage with Lucullus. Moreover, he conducted philosophical debates for a time in Alexandria, a cultural centre that had not hitherto formed the scene of any notable philosophical developments. The *Sosus* affair is also indicative of the changing terms and the decentralization of philosophical debate in the first century BCE, when a book published in Rome was able to cause a stir in Alexandria and provoke a written reply from there.⁶⁸ Not too many years earlier all this would have taken place face to face in the Athenian schools.

⁶⁸ In a similar way, Philodemus conducted from Italy his polemics against the Rhodian group of Epicureans who reported rogue views on the status of rhetoric as an art; cf. Sedley 1989: 103–17, esp. 112.

*Antiochus and the Academy**Roberto Polito*

Antiochus spent most of his philosophical life in the Academy, and yet he was different from all other members of his school. They denied that certainty is attainable; Antiochus thought the opposite. They had been disputing with the Stoics for two centuries; he took sides with the enemy. Thus his disagreement touched the very heart of the school's doctrinal identity and disqualified him as an Academic. Given his deviation from the party line, we can hardly make sense of why he remained in the Academy for such a long time. He should have joined the Stoa instead. Eventually he remedied this embarrassing situation: he seceded from his school and founded a new one. He did call it 'Old Academy', in a way that suggests that he pretended still to be an Academic, but we should not be fooled by the name. Antiochus' 'Old Academy' was a distinct school and in competition with the official Academy, and his claimed allegiance to Plato was but a disingenuous manoeuvre to appropriate his legacy on behalf of the Stoics. In this way, he succeeded in achieving what the Stoics Panaetius and Posidonius had sought but failed to achieve before him.

The story I have just told combines the allegations that Antiochus' opponents made within the school with an interpretation that is widespread today in secondary literature. While details of this story might easily be dismissed as inaccurate – for example on the grounds that there was no such thing as Academic orthodoxy, and that Antiochus' agreement with the Stoics was not unqualified or unconditional – we all tend to regard its upshot, that Antiochus was not a genuine Academic, as uncontroversial. What is more, Antiochus himself encouraged this interpretation. For while other Academics, no matter to what extent they were in reality loyal to the

I would like to thank Myles Burnyeat, Malcolm Schofield and David Sedley for their written comments, as well as the other participants in the Antiochus workshop for useful discussion of the first draft of this paper. I also thank Angela Chew for her feedback, both linguistic and philosophical. None of them, however, should be assumed to agree with the thesis I defend. Whatever the remaining defects, I bear the sole responsibility. The translations from Cicero owe much to Rackham 1933.

teachings of Arcesilaus and Carneades, nevertheless kept claiming allegiance to them, Antiochus openly declared that he was not a part of this tradition, which he wanted to distinguish from that of Plato and his pupils.

Antiochus' claim of discontinuity from the sceptical Academy admittedly makes a difference in relation to the usual pattern of internal conflicts within this school. This difference presumably reflects Antiochus' intention of presenting himself not just as a dissident member, but rather as a radical innovator. It would be tempting, then, to compare his case with that of another Academic renegade, the self-proclaimed Pyrrhonist Aenesidemus. However, we should resist this temptation. Aenesidemus claimed allegiance to an external authority, Pyrrho, and his attack on his former associates did not purport to rescue a more genuine way of being an Academic, but rather to do away with the Academy altogether. (Indeed evidence to the effect that he had been a member of the Academy is controversial.)¹ The case of Antiochus is different and not comparable. The very fact that he went on calling himself an Academic is telling.

In this chapter I shall argue that neither his 'secession' from the sceptical Academy, nor his departure from Academic scepticism, nor his teaching outside the school premises disqualifies him as an heir to the tradition. I shall start from examining the seemingly peripheral question of when his secession took place. As I hope to show, chronology has an important bearing on our assessment of the significance of this secession, and indeed on our assessment of whether 'secession' is the right word. In connection with this question, I shall discuss how early we can date his doctrinal departure from scepticism, and what institutional form, if any, his new 'school' took. Subsequently, I shall turn to his doctrines, and suggest a reading of his 'dogmatism' in terms of an internal – albeit perverse – development of scepticism. He put forward the argument that to claim that everything is inapprehensible presupposes apprehension at least of this very claim. I will suggest that this argument need not be purely dialectical and aimed at cornering his opponents into self-contradiction. Rather, Antiochus may have understood it as a positive argument to the effect that apprehension is possible after all. In this way he could justify his transition from *akatalēpsia* to *katalēpsis*. My conclusion will be, thus, that Antiochus fully belongs to the Academy of his day.

'SECESSION'

Evidence concerning the dating both of Antiochus' departure from scepticism and of his secession from the school comes from Cicero, *Luc.* 69.

¹ See most recently Polito 2002.

Here Cicero appears to be saying that Antiochus began to express his dissatisfaction with scepticism when Mnesarchus and Dardanus were leading figures of the Stoa, and he polemically wonders why Antiochus did not defect to them ('se transferre ad Stoicos') then ('tum'). The chronology of Mnesarchus and Dardanus points to the 90s as the period in question. Glucker interprets Cicero as saying that Antiochus should have joined the Stoa, instead of founding his own school, at that time.² The most obvious inference to make is, however, another one: that Antiochus did *not* secede from the Academy in the 90s BCE, in spite of his dissatisfaction with scepticism.³ This reading is secured by Cicero's subsequent remark that Antiochus disingenuously waited until he had his own pupils before 'defecting from Philo' and founding a new school.

But when did Antiochus actually begin to have his own pupils? In 87 he is found accompanying Lucullus in Alexandria on his mission to King Ptolemy. Antiochus' brother Aristus and two other *docti*, Aristo and Dio, were present at one of the public debates in which he took part there with the sceptical Academic Heraclitus of Tyre.⁴ We are not told whether these three people were accompanying Antiochus and Lucullus or just happened to be in Alexandria independently.⁵ However, since Philodemus at the end of his biography of Antiochus lists them as pupils, scholars assume that they were already such as early as 87,⁶ and since Cicero at *Luc.* 69 dates Antiochus' secession to a time at which he already had pupils of his own, it has been inferred that 87 provides a *terminus ante quem* for his secession.

I am doubtful about the soundness of this inference. Had a school existed already, we would expect Cicero to say something about Aristus', Aristo's and Dio's membership of it. But these people are merely learned men ('docti') to whom Antiochus used to ascribe the greatest value ('quibus ille secundum fratrem plurimum tribuebat'). We cannot even tell whether they sympathized with his position.⁷ However, there is an additional reason for doubting that Antiochus already had pupils of his own, and hence had

² Glucker 1978: 19–20.

³ Sedley, 1981: 70. Barnes 1989: 68–70 dates Antiochus' doctrinal departure from scepticism to this time, but leaves the possibility open that Antiochus' institutional secession took place only later. Hatzimichali in this volume, pp. 13–14, sides with Glucker.

⁴ Cic. *Luc.* 11.

⁵ Dio was murdered in 57 as a result of his involvement in Alexandrian politics and attachment to the wrong side. So perhaps his presence in Alexandria in 87 had a political purpose, although, of course, Dio might have started to become involved in Egyptian politics only later.

⁶ Glucker 1978: 18. See also Hatzimichali, this volume, p. 14. Mariotti 1966: 23–4 speculates that Antiochus' complimentary judgement of Aristus', Aristo's and Dio's skills entails teacher–pupil relationship.

⁷ Sedley 1981: 70 hypothesizes that they did, while rejecting the view that a separate school already existed.

already defected from the Academy, when he came to Alexandria in 87. If the year 87 provides a *terminus ante quem* for this, we are taken back to the 90s, when Dardanus and Mnesarchus were leading figures of the Stoa. But Cicero (*Luc.* 69) was clearly distinguishing between this period and that in which Antiochus actually defected, indicating that a significant amount of time elapsed between the two.

Thus what Cicero writes at the beginning of the *Lucullus* encourages the conclusion that no school of Antiochus' existed while Philo was still based in Athens, and that he seceded from the Academy only after 87.⁸ Our only safe *terminus ante quem* is 79, when we find him lecturing on his own at Athens in a public gymnasium, the Ptolemaeum (*Cic. Fin.* 5.1; *Brut.* 315).

The choice between an early and a late dating is by no means irrelevant to our assessment of Antiochus' relation to the Academy. If he founded a new school before Philo went into exile in 88, we would be dealing with an independent and competing institution. But if the foundation postdates the end of the Academy, then talk of 'secession' is illegitimate: for there can be no secession from something that no longer exists.

In what follows I shall offer a closer examination of evidence concerning both the end of the official Academy and the beginning of Antiochus' own 'Old Academy', and I shall defend the hypothesis that Antiochus' school neither had an institutionalized form comparable to the Academy nor, relatedly, was meant to compete with it but rather sought to take over its legacy at a time when the Academy itself was no longer active.

THE END OF THE ACADEMY

The year 88 is a very important one in the history of the Academy. The new political situation in Athens compels Philo to leave the city together with other members of the school and, more generally, with that part of the local elite collaborating with the Romans.⁹ Philo is later found lecturing at Rome, and remains the official school head until his death in 84/3. It is matter of controversy whether a new scholarch is elected upon his death. Cicero at *Luc.* 16–17 presents a list of eminent Academics, including Arcesilaus, Lacydes, Carneades, Clitomachus, Charmadas and Metrodorus,

⁸ Plutarch at *Luc.* 42 tells us that Lucullus chose to follow Antiochus' Old Academy 'even though [the New Academy] was flourishing at the time'. This description hardly applies to the situation of the sceptical Academy after Philo died (see below). Thus Gucker cites this passage as additional evidence that Antiochus seceded in the nineties. However, as Plutarch's subsequent reference to Lucullus' opposition to Cicero (*sic!*) suggests, the report that Plutarch gives is pure invention based on the dramatic frame of the *Lucullus*.

⁹ *Cic. Brut.* 306.

and ending with Philo. The list does not provide hard evidence to the effect that no successor was elected, since it fails to mention minor school heads such as Carneades the Younger, while including Charmadas and Metrodorus. But at least it suggests that, if a successor was elected, he had little or no authority and reputation.

The same inference can be made from Cicero's remark at *Luc.* 17 that 'while Philo was alive, the Academy did not lack advocacy (*patrocinium*)'. Shortly before, at *Luc.* 11, Cicero has claimed for himself the merit of recalling it to life. It is a plausible guess that the 'death' of the Academy to which he here alludes coincides with the lack of advocacy subsequent to Philo's death, of which he speaks at *Luc.* 17,¹⁰ and that the school came to 'lack advocacy' after that time, in the sense that there was no scholar capable of advocating the Academic case. Indeed this last passage could be read still more naturally as indicating that no scholar was elected, and that the succession simply broke.¹¹ True, Philodemus refers to someone – the letters seem to suggest the name 'Maecius' – who 'held' Philo's school,¹² but the text is lacunose and uncertain, and we cannot make much of it.

The hypothesis that when Antiochus was lecturing on his own in Athens in 79 the Academy not only lacked a school head, but also, and relatedly, was no longer active as an institution, gains support from what Cicero writes at the beginning of *Fin.* 5.¹³ Here he tells of the tour he undertook there, together with some friends, in 79. This tour was a touching experience for all of them. Piso, one of Cicero's friends, finds the sight of the places attended by the *digni viri* of the good old times far more moving than reading these people (5.2). Cicero at 5.4 declares himself to have been so impressed by the exhedra from which Carneades used to lecture that he

¹⁰ So Brittain 2001: 8 n. 9 also suggests.

¹¹ Sedley 1981: 74 n. 3, after Glucker 1978: 413, understands *patrocinium* as indicating *literary* defence alone, and he argues that the lack of such a defence subsequent to Philo's death tells us nothing concerning whether or not Philo had a successor. For we can easily imagine an Academic school head who refrains from writing books, likewise Arcesilaus and Carneades. However, *patrocinium* need not be taken in this restricted sense. The term may well indicate any defence whatsoever, and, of course, it is hard to imagine a school head who does not bother to defend the views of his school. In the same note Sedley advances the hypothesis that Charmadas was nominated school head after Philo. Sedley's ground is Sextus' description of the fourth Academy in *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (at *PH* 1.220) as 'the Academy of Philo and Charmadas'. This hypothesis, however, conflicts with what is these days the most widely accepted dating of Charmadas (dead by 91; cf. Cic. *De or.* 2.360).

¹² *Index Ac.* xxxiv 4. Puglia 2000: 20–4 suggests that Philodemus gives the name of the successor of Philo in the lacuna preceding the reference to 'Maecius'.

¹³ In what follows I defend and develop the reading of the passage originally proposed by Glucker 1978: III.

imagines that he sees and hears Carneades still speaking from there.¹⁴ This shared feeling of nostalgia does not rule out the possibility that someone is still lecturing in the Academy. And this possibility might seem to be confirmed by Cicero's earlier remark at 5.1 that he and his friends visited the site in the afternoon in order to avoid the morning crowd. However, if such a big crowd used to go there in order to attend lectures, one would assume that the lecturer they came to hear enjoyed some popularity. So how would this putative popularity square with Piso's own nostalgia for the *digni viri* of the past? Either Piso is subtly implying that the current lecturer is unworthy of his popularity, or, more likely, there are no ongoing lectures to attend there, and the crowd that gathers in the area does so for other and non-philosophical purposes.¹⁵ For the Academy was not only the site of Plato's school, but also a recreational centre.

Further, the emotional reaction that the sight of the Academy provokes in Cicero and his friends would be inexplicable had they been frequenting the place. One understands that this is more or less their first visit to the site. Yet this visit takes place after Cicero has already been in Athens long enough for attendance of Antiochus' lectures to have become a habit for him ('solebam'). Is it plausible that during all this time Cicero would not have attended lectures in the Academy if there had been any?

Nor does Antiochus' lecturing outside the Academy imply that the exhedra was already in use by someone else;¹⁶ for it is plausible to assume that, in the absence of an official appointment by whoever was legally entitled to use the school's property after Philo's death, Antiochus himself was not allowed to teach there, no matter whether or not someone else was using it.¹⁷

The availability or otherwise of sceptical lectures in Athens, in the Academy or elsewhere, is the subject of a question Lucius puts to Piso at *Fin.* 5.6:

¹⁴ Glucker's proposal (1978: 110) to emend 'Carneades' to 'Charmadas' is gratuitous; see Sedley 1981: 74 n. 3.

¹⁵ Görler 1994: 944, too, believes that no activity is taking place in the Academy any longer.

¹⁶ As suggested by Sedley 1981: 74 n. 3. Dörrie 1987: 546 hypothesizes that Antiochus did not teach in the Academy because this was in ruins.

¹⁷ Philodemus, *Index Ac.* xxix 41 reports that Carneades the Younger inherited 'the exhedra and the school' (ἐξέδραν τε καὶ σχολήν), in such a way as to suggest that the right to lecture from the exhedra went together with school headship. Cicero at *De or.* 1.45 reports that Charmadas, Clitomachus and Aeschines jointly *obtinebant* the Academy, while mentioning Metrodorus separately as being based in Athens ('erat etiam Metrodorus') but without 'obtaining' the Academy. Presumably the official head Clitomachus allowed Aeschines and Charmadas, but not the deviant Metrodorus, to lecture on the school premises.

‘But Lucius,’ he [Piso] went on, ‘do you need our encouragement or are you already leaning towards philosophy of your own accord? You are going to Antiochus’ lectures, and seem to be pretty attentive.’ ‘I suppose so’, replied Lucius, in a timid or I should say modest tone. ‘But have you heard any lectures on Carneades lately? I find him alluring, though Antiochus pulls me in the other direction, and there is no one else to hear.’ (trans. Woolf in Annas and Woolf 2001, modified)

Disappointingly for both Lucius and ourselves, Piso in what follows fails to answer the question. One might have hoped, then, to get some indication from the way Lucius phrases it, but the phrasing licenses different and conflicting interpretations. Sedley mentions this passage as evidence that there were sceptical lectures available:¹⁸ had there not been, Lucius could not possibly have found himself torn between hearing Antiochus and hearing of Carneades. However, it is also possible that Cicero intends only to say that Lucius is torn between endorsing the philosophical position of Carneades and that of Antiochus. Hence Lucius fancies attending a sceptical lecture, and since he has been so far unable to find any on his own, he asks Piso for directions. But nothing in the text suggests that his wish will become reality. True, the very fact that he asks presupposes that he does not rule out the possibility of a positive answer. However, Lucius’ frustrated hope of being given directions hardly proves that sceptical lectures were available.

While Lucius’ dilemma between hearing about Carneades and hearing Antiochus is open to different interpretations, the last clause ‘Antiochus pulls me in the other direction, and there is no one else to hear’ (‘revocat autem Antiochus, nec est praeterea quem audiamus’), if ‘praeterea’ means ‘no other lecturer but Antiochus’, would provide hard evidence that Antiochus was the only Academic lecturing in Athens at the time. However, the expression could also mean that there is no other lecturer worth attending but Antiochus and the Carneadean lecturer about whose availability Lucius is enquiring, and so it is safer to refrain from making any speculation on the basis of this puzzling passage.

ANTIOCHUS’ ‘SCHOOL’

So far I have suggested: (1) Antiochus ‘departed from Philo’ only after the latter was no longer a functioning school head; (2) by the time we find our man lecturing in Athens in 79, he appears to be the only Academic lecturer available. If these two suggestions are correct, Cicero’s derogatory

¹⁸ Sedley 1981: 74 n. 3.

representation of Antiochus as a renegade is to be rejected. It would be more appropriate to say that Antiochus took over the legacy of a languishing tradition and revived it on a new doctrinal basis. I will come later to the question of how he could present his doctrines as voicing, developing or improving the Academic philosophical outlook. Before doing so I shall address another question relevant to the external history of his Old Academy: what was the nature of this new 'school'?

We all tend to assume that Antiochus founded an independent school comparable with the Academy and in rivalry with it. But what is the evidence in favour of this assumption? Cicero at *Ac.* 1.13 presents the New Academy and the Old Academy as two mutually exclusive *domus* (see also the story of Lucius finding himself torn between Carneades and Antiochus at *Fin.* 5.6). Numenius for his part speaks of a 'second' or 'another' (ἑτέρα) Academy, which Antiochus founded in opposition to the official one (Eus. *Praep. evang.* 14.9.3 = **Tr**, p. 355 below). Yet the hypothesis of a competition between two schools is to be ruled out not only on chronological grounds, as we have seen, but also on account of their different natures.

The official Academy was a well-established and publicly recognized educational institution, with its rules and statutes. But what about Antiochus' own 'Academy'? Cicero's talk of *domus* in the passage mentioned above is purely metaphorical. If we consider his overall depiction, it becomes clear that the Old Academy is a *secta* (*Brut.* 120), a *ratio* and a *disciplina* (*Ac.* 1.43), and identified by a body of *sententiae* (1.43). Thus by 'Old Academy' he refers to the *philosophical outlook* of the faction led by Antiochus and, beyond that, to the putative system of the early Academics and Peripatetics. As a philosophical outlook, the 'Old Academy' is certainly in rivalry with the official Academy, but the rivalry in question is a doctrinal one between two conflicting ways of being Academic, not an institutional one between two competing schools. Conversely, when Cicero does mention the Ptolemaeum, he presents it merely as the place where Antiochus was lecturing, and there is no hint that this place constituted the official headquarters of a separate institution.¹⁹

Nor is the idea of a separate institution competing with the Academy conveyed by Philodemus' talk of 'his [Antiochus'] *diatribē*'. For Philodemus uses similar talk of *scholē* for the temporary course of studies run by Clitomachus in the Palladium.²⁰ Clitomachus' course of studies was presumably not a part of the Academic syllabus and hence in a way was

¹⁹ Pace Görler 1994: 944, 'Der Sitz von Antiochos' Alte Akademie war das Ptolemaion.'

²⁰ *Index Ac.* xxv 8–9; cf. also xxvi 36–7; xxx 8–10.

in rivalry with it. However, the very fact that shortly afterwards he was to be elected school head of the Academy shows that his lecturing outside the school premises did not amount to seceding from it and founding a competing school. As a matter of fact, not just Antiochus and Clitomachus, but also Charmadas (32.7–8) and Metrodorus (32.13–16) lectured outside the Academy at some stage of their career. True, Antiochus has his brother Aristus ‘inherit’ (διεδέξατο) his *diatribē* after his death. But Antiochus’ nominating Aristus as a successor need not be interpreted as aimed at giving his *diatribē* its own succession, as distinct from that of the official Academy (which, if I am right, had ceased to function long before). Rather, it could be interpreted as aimed at giving the Academy itself a surrogate succession, in the absence of a real one. In other words, we may conjecture that, by appropriating aspects of the institutional life of the Academy, as well as, for that matter, of any other organized school, Antiochus did not intend to create a fifth Academy, additional to the other four, but rather to present his fake ‘Academy’ as a virtual replacement and a continuation of the official one. This understanding of the matter, in the form of a report concerning the succession of Philo, appears in both Sextus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* (PH) 1.220 and pseudo-Galen, *Hist. phil.* 3. Gucker has conclusively demonstrated that Antiochus was never elected head of the Academy, and hence that Sextus’ report is unreliable in this respect. Despite that unreliability, the report none the less shows that Antiochus’ *diatribē* was understood at least by some not just as a splinter group, let alone an independent and competing school, but as the legitimate heir of the official Academy, once this was no longer in existence.

DOCTRINES

So far I have argued that: (1) Antiochus did not secede from the Academy until the Academy itself was no longer a functioning institution, so that talk of ‘secession’ is inappropriate; (2) Antiochus’ school was not a separate and competing school, and indeed not a ‘school’ at all, but successor to the Academy when the latter did not exist any longer. Talk suggesting that it enjoyed the status and the organization of a proper school applies only by analogy but does not capture the reality of Antiochus’ ‘Academy’. Thus, at least in respect of institutional history, Cicero’s representation of Antiochus as a renegade is both biased and unfair. In this second part of the chapter I will discuss Antiochus’ attitude to scepticism. I shall argue that also in respect of doctrines he remained a genuine Academic throughout his life. By ‘genuine’ I do not of course refer to the theses he argued for,

but to the conceptual categories he used. He examined the consequences of sceptical principles and argued that dogmatism is a necessary point of arrival. Before entering this topic, however, there is a preliminary issue to be addressed. I said that his institutional 'secession' postdated the end of the Academy. But what about his doctrinal departure from scepticism? In what follows I will argue for a late dating of that too. This argument will reinforce my previous conclusion concerning his late institutional 'secession'.²¹

It is by now uncontroversial that Antiochus started casting doubt on scepticism in the 90s.²² As a consequence, we tend to assume that his new system dated from then, at least in embryonic form. However, evidence to this effect, and indeed also evidence that he openly challenged scepticism as early as the 90s, is controversial. Cicero at *Luc.* 69 distinguishes between the time when Antiochus should have defected to the Stoics, but did not, namely when Mnesarchus and Dardanus were *principes* of the Stoa, and the time when he actually put forward his anti-sceptical arguments: 'These very views I am defending [cf. 68: 'nihil posse percipi'] he studied under Philo for so long that it was agreed that no one had studied them for longer, and he also wrote about them very acutely; and he attacked these same views in his old age (*in senectute*) no more keenly than he had previously defended them.' Antiochus was born between 130 and 120, so he could hardly be described as 'old' in the 90s. There is a problem here. According to Barnes, 'we need not infer that these senile attacks were the first he [Antiochus] issued'.²³ Maybe so. But at least we can infer that the full articulation of Antiochus' criticism of scepticism dates to a later time, and we may assume that Antiochus' articulation of a new system postdates, or at least goes together with, the full articulation of his criticism of scepticism.

A dating of Antiochus' full articulation of his criticism of scepticism later than the nineties gains support from the present tense Cicero uses at *Luc.* 69 to describe it: 'He says the same things as the Stoics' ('dicit eadem quae Stoici'). This choice of tense marks a sharp difference from the perfect tenses Cicero invariably uses in the rest of this passage for referring to the time at which Antiochus should have defected to the Stoa.²⁴ Thus Cicero's complaint that Antiochus should have made this move in the nineties need

²¹ In what follows I argue for a division of Antiochus' phases which is different from, although not incompatible with, that recently proposed by Tarrant 2007, esp. 330–2. The difference is that Tarrant aims at offering a comprehensive picture of Antiochus' thought in each of the phases Tarrant identifies. I am merely concerned with Antiochus' attitude to scepticism before and after Philo's Roman turn.

²² *Luc.* 69; cf. Barnes 1989: 68–70.

²³ Barnes 1989: 69 n. 75.

²⁴ I owe this observation to David Sedley, who, however, disagrees with the hypothesis of a late dating.

not be understood as indicating that Antiochus 'said the same things as the Stoics' at such an early date. Rather, it could be understood as being made from hindsight and in the light of Antiochus' subsequent articulation of a new system.

The late dating that can be inferred from Cicero at *Luc.* 69 is not in conflict with his report at 11–12 that Antiochus publicly challenged Philo in 87, when Antiochus wrote the *Sosus*, and was certainly not old yet. For the *Sosus* was primarily concerned with Philo's 'Roman' views, whatever exactly they amounted to,²⁵ and was not a source for the anti-sceptical arguments of the *Lucullus*.²⁶

A more serious difficulty is created by Cicero's other report in that same passage (11–12) that Antiochus and Heraclitus of Tyre had often been found arguing with each other, apparently in public (Lucullus witnessed these disputes), presumably with the former arguing against scepticism and the latter in favour of it, even before the *Sosus* affair. Yet Cicero adds that they used to argue 'in a mild way' ('leniter') at the time. The adverb is, I believe, crucial. The superlative *lenissimus* occurs a few lines later for describing Antiochus' personality. While it is undeniable that the occurrence of the same adjective/adverb ties the two passages, yet I suspect that in the case of his arguing *leniter* personality is only a part of the story. This is suggested by the fact that *both* Antiochus and Heraclitus are reported as arguing in that way. It could be that Heraclitus too had a mild character, but it seems more plausible that the reference is to their shared style, or method, of arguing. Cicero at *Luc.* 69 implies that Antiochus in his old age argued against scepticism 'keenly', albeit 'no more keenly' ('acrius') than he had argued for scepticism in his younger days. A comparison with the report on the same subject at 61 makes it clear that the idea of 'keenness' ('acritudo') is for

²⁵ Philo apparently put forward an interpretation of the preceding Academic tradition, including hardline sceptics such as Arcesilaus and Carneades, as advocating a form of fallible or notional apprehensibility of things (Sedley 1981, Tarrant 1985, Brittain, 2001).

²⁶ From *Luc.* 12 and 18 we understand that the *Catulus*, not the *Lucullus*, incorporated material from the *Sosus*. The *Lucullus* incorporates material from more than one work (Cicero at 4 speaks of *libri*), and while we understand from 61 that the *Sosus* is one of these works, Cicero is vague, and we cannot say what part of Lucullus' speech borrows material from there: 'haec Antiochus fere et Alexandriae tum et multis annis post multo etiam adseverantius'. While it seems unquestionable that at least the *Catulus* incorporated substantial material from the *Sosus*, the hypothesis that either the *Catulus* or any other Academic book was a faithful transposition of material from the *Sosus* incurs the difficulty that the title of Antiochus' dialogue suggests that the Stoic philosopher Sosus was one of the interlocutors in the dialogue, but no Stoic character appears either in *Ac.* 1 or in the *Lucullus* (Rackham 1933 speculates that Sosus was an Academic turned Stoic), nor does Lucullus mention Sosus among those present in Alexandria. Hatzimichali in this volume, p. 23, hypothesizes an embedded dialogue, with the Alexandrian episode narrated by Antiochus to Sosus. On Cicero's source(s) in the *Lucullus* see Glucker 1978; Barnes, 1989: 67–8.

Cicero here a synonym for 'assertiveness' ('adseverantia').²⁷ It is tempting to interpret these adverbs, then, as marking a difference in relation to the 'mildness' of Antiochus' earlier arguments against scepticism. On this interpretation, Antiochus' *lenis* way of arguing with Heraclitus was not, or not only, a matter of his having a mild character: it also refers to his lack of a full-blooded commitment to the conclusions for which he was arguing. He did argue against scepticism, but not in a keen and assertive way; that is, perhaps, he argued against it as part of dialectical training. Maybe he was already dissatisfied with it, but it is only later, when his arguments took a keener and more assertive form, that his dissatisfaction became clear and explicit.

To attribute to Antiochus a dialectical detachment of some sort from his defence of Stoic apprehension is a conjecture. We will never know exactly what Cicero has in mind when he speaks of different degrees of 'keenness'. But the hypothesis that Antiochus did not commit himself to Stoic apprehension without qualification also has the merit of enabling us to reconcile two conflicting aspects of his dogmatism. On the one hand he advocated Stoic apprehension against the sceptics. On the other hand he attributed to the old Academics an epistemological theory that was still 'dogmatic', but different from that of the Stoics (*Ac.* 1.31–2). Brittain (this volume) poses the dilemma – which of the two theories Antiochus actually endorsed – and he opts for Stoic epistemology. But perhaps we should not make a choice between the two: perhaps Antiochus' defence of Stoic apprehension was only instrumental to the goal of forestalling radical scepticism of a kind that would undermine any epistemological theory, including the Old Academic. At any rate I find it difficult to believe that students attending his 'Old Academy' were trained in Stoic epistemology instead of Old Academic.

Whether for the sake of advocating Stoic epistemology wholesale or as an intermediate step towards rescuing 'Old Academic' epistemology, Antiochus at some point of his career did begin to argue more and more keenly in favour of Stoic apprehension. Presumably he made this step only after Philo publicly expressed his own dissatisfaction with scepticism. For it is plausible that Philo's Roman turn prompted a discussion among Academics touching the very heart of the school's identity, thereby

²⁷ 'Haec [sc. the anti-sceptical arguments referred to earlier] Antiochus fere et Alexandriae tum et multis annis post multo etiam adseverantius, in Syria cum esset mecum paulo ante quam est mortuus.' See below for an explanation of Cicero's use of the comparative form 'adseverantius' and the adverb 'etiam'.

transforming a dialectical practice geared to training into a reflection upon oneself, and encouraging other Academics to speak their minds.²⁸ This hypothesis makes good sense of Cicero's use of the adverb 'studiose', somewhat comparable to 'acriter' and 'adseveranter', at *Luc.* 12, for describing the more animated one-time discussion ('tum') in which Antiochus and Heraclitus engaged at the time of the *Sosus* affair. The adverb 'tum' makes a contrast with the 'saepe' used by Cicero at 11 for referring to Antiochus' and Heraclitus' previous habit of arguing 'mildly' against each other. It is probably by comparison with this first instance of 'animated' arguing that Cicero at 61 speaks of 'a still more assertive way' ('etiam adseverantius') in which Antiochus came to argue against scepticism in his old age.

Thus my suggestion is that we should distinguish (1) between Antiochus' attack on Philo and his dissatisfaction with scepticism; (2) between his personal dissatisfaction with scepticism in the 90s and his public arguments against it; (3) between his 'mild' arguments before Philo's Roman turn and his 'keen' and 'more assertive' arguments in the following period down to his old age. It is presumably at this last stage that he fully articulated his positive system.

We cannot of course be sure about the early or late dating of Antiochus' formalization of his non-sceptical position. For my present purpose it is enough to observe that, however early we want to date it, Philo's exile from Athens in 88 and his subsequent publication of the Roman books appear to be the turning point. Thus, not just Antiochus' institutional 'secession' from the Academy but also his public departure from scepticism postdates the institutional demise of the Academy.

But are not these chronological matters after all irrelevant, if our concern is his philosophical legacy? For, whatever the date of his departure from scepticism, it remains a fact that he eventually did depart from it, and that, therefore, his legacy is that of a 'dogmatist'. What is worse, despite his purported allegiance to the Old Academy he actually defended the position of the Stoa, the school most opposed to his original school.²⁹ And he did so without providing any justification.

Or at least this is what Cicero alleges at *Luc.* 69, when he draws his unfavourable portrait of Antiochus. Antiochus, Cicero remarks, has

²⁸ I agree with Dillon 1977: 53, contra Barnes 1989: 68 n. 71.

²⁹ Did Antiochus actually endorse Stoic epistemology wholesale? (Cf. Brittain, this volume.) Or did he revive aspects of Plato's theory of Forms, thus anticipating Middle Platonism? (Cf. Bonazzi, Boys-Stones, this volume.) He at least defended the Stoic theory of apprehension, to which Cicero is referring in this passage.

changed his mind about scepticism after having keenly defended it for years. But has he discovered any new ground for advocating apprehension?³⁰ No. Cicero claims to be unacquainted with any argument in favour of it of which Antiochus had not previously been aware when he was an ardent sceptic. This is the substance of Cicero's charge of 'inconstancy' ('inconstantia') of a sort that undermines Antiochus' credibility ('auctoritas'): Antiochus deviates from foundational principles of his own without any justification.

However, the preceding does not necessarily imply that Antiochus had not in fact discovered any new argument. One thing that discourages giving straightforward credence to Cicero is the line of attack Antiochus adopted against Philo in the *Sosus*. Here Antiochus' criticism consisted in alleging that Philo was abruptly departing from his earlier convictions (*Luc.* 11): 'But then those two books of Philo, which Catulus spoke about yesterday, were brought to Alexandria and came into the hands of Antiochus for the first time. And, although he was by nature a very mild man . . . he began to get angry . . . He appealed to Heraclitus' memory, asking him whether these views seemed to be Philo's, or whether he had ever heard such views from Philo or any other Academic.'

There would be nothing strange in a sceptical Academic's being disappointed with Philo for changing his mind about scepticism. But it would be strange for one who has himself abandoned scepticism to attack an opponent on these grounds. So we should conclude that Antiochus believed and wanted others to believe that his departure from scepticism was in some way consistent in a manner that Philo's was not. Something of this sort must be what accounts for his criticism of Philo in the *Sosus*.³¹ So either Antiochus was simply employing an unfair double standard in criticizing Philo in the way he did, or we must seek a more subtle interpretation of Antiochus' own 'change of mind' than Cicero provides.

There is, in fact, a philosophically interesting possibility, worthy of consideration, that I will be exploring in what follows: Antiochus thought that, as a matter of logical necessity, one who tries to adhere to the principle of inapprehensibility (henceforth PI) must eventually yield to Stoic apprehension. For if Antiochus thought this, then it would follow that, from his

³⁰ I take the question 'excogitavit aliquid?' as referring to finding any new argument in favour of Stoic apprehension, rather than putting forward a new theory.

³¹ Alternatively, we might think that Antiochus had not yet completed his transition to dogmatism by the time of the *Sosus*. Yet, as we have seen, he had already started casting doubt on scepticism, although arguing only mildly against it, before this time.

point of view, his transition from scepticism to dogmatism (unlike Philo's transition to a form of mild scepticism) would be consistent.

Now, there is a way in which Antiochus could have advocated apprehension, without falling foul of the scepticism of his day. This would have been to make a positive claim about the possibility of apprehension whilst adding or implying the usual Academic qualifications expressing uncertainty; for the mitigated scepticism of the first-century BCE Academy granted its followers the intellectual freedom to make virtually any claim they wished, without thereby defying the principle that infallible knowledge is not available.³² Indeed, at *Luc.* 10 Cicero puts just such a strategy into the mouth of his Antiochean character, Lucullus: 'But I protest that even though the case [I defend] was shaken by yesterday's discussion, it nevertheless appears to me (*videtur*) to be profoundly true, at least as it stands at present (*ut quidem nunc se causa habet*).' What Lucullus is here advocating is the (temporary and subjective) truth of Stoic apprehension, and these remarks of his bring to the fore a live possibility of reconciling yielding to apprehension with scepticism.

Since Lucullus usually speaks for Antiochus, we might initially think that any such reconciliation, too, would go back to Antiochus. However, this cannot be right. For Antiochus at *Luc.* 29 maintains that PI constitutes the very essence of the sceptical Academic philosophical outlook, such that one is not an adherent of this outlook unless one commits oneself to it. But, on this view, there is no way for an Academic consistently to advocate the simultaneous truth, or even persuasiveness, of Stoic apprehension. So Lucullus' advocacy of Stoic apprehension in terms appropriate to Academic fallibilism certainly does not go back to Antiochus, and indeed we should perhaps understand it as merely ironic.

However, there is an alternative strategy that emerges from the above. Antiochus can exploit the commitment to PI that he attributes to the Academics to argue that, precisely because they make a claim about things, namely that things are inapprehensible, they must admit that they have *apprehension* of something. In what follows I shall first take a closer look at this argument. I shall then discuss how Antiochus could move from this argument to the full-blooded Stoic theory of apprehension.

First, then, the argument that, since the Academics advocate PI, they must admit that they have apprehension of PI. Antiochus puts forward

³² See, e.g., *Tusc.* 4.7, 5.33, 5.83, *Luc.* 8. Cicero himself advocates intellectual freedom on ethical and theological matters, but his position leaves the way open for others to follow the same route in epistemological matters.

this argument at *Luc.* 29: the Academics make the claim that things are inapprehensible.³³ But to make a claim implies that one has apprehension that the relevant claim is true. It follows that the Academics must admit that they have apprehension that PI is true. Later, at *Luc.* 109, Cicero presents the argument as a way for Antiochus to show that, if the Academic sage withholds assent about everything on account of PI, then he must admit that he has apprehension that PI is true.

On the face of it the argument seems to be a standard dialectical move: take premises the opponents put forward and deduce consequences unacceptable to them. But, as I will show, if Antiochus' argument is a piece of dialectic, then it is a *bad* piece of dialectic.

Antiochus' declared target is Carneades (*Luc.* 109). Carneades was interpreted as holding either of two alternative views. The first is the one Cicero cites at *Luc.* 110 in responding to Antiochus: the Academics do *not* say that the sage makes no claim unless he has apprehension that it is true; rather, they say that he will make all sorts of claims, provided he does not assent to them as apprehended but merely 'approves' them as persuasive ('illa [*sc.* decreta] habet probabilia, non percepta'). The second view is the one that Cicero puts into the mouth of Catulus (148): the sage will not only make all sorts of claims but also assent to them and hold the opinion that they are true, provided he is aware that this is just an opinion and that he may be wrong about it. But Antiochus fails to consider any of these distinctions. He takes it for granted that to make a claim is to have apprehension of it. Thus Antiochus, in constructing his argument, attributes to Carneades a premise that Carneades himself did not hold on any interpretation then current, an illicit move in dialectic. Rather, to run together claiming and apprehending was a move distinctive of Arcesilaus, who maintained that, since we have no apprehension of anything, the sage will always withhold his assent and hence will neither hold opinions nor make any claim, including the very claim that he has no apprehension of anything.³⁴

Perhaps Antiochus, in order to make Carneades an easier target for refutation, put forward an argument, not reported by Cicero, to the effect

³³ I translate 'habere decretum' as 'to make a claim' after Frede's (1987: 206–7) distinction between 'to take a position', or 'to make a claim', and 'to have a view'. This strong notion of taking a position is precisely that which Antiochus has in mind. Rackham 1933 translates 'to hold as a decision'; Brittain 2006a: 19 translates 'take it to be a principle'. Cicero tells us that Latin *decretum* translates Greek δόγμα, on which see below n. 37.

³⁴ Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.151–7; Cic. *Luc.* 66; *Ac.* 1.44–5. Plutarch at *Col.* 1122A talks of δόγματα with reference to the *epochē* and *akatalēpsia* advocated by Arcesilaus, but his talk hardly reflects Arcesilaus' own. Presumably it was the talk of the 'sophists' whose criticism of Arcesilaus Plutarch is reporting.

that Carneades, no matter what he himself may have actually said, was committed to Arcesilaus' position. However, while there is no evidence that Antiochus did this, there is, by contrast, evidence that he *in propria persona* believed that the sage ought to hold no opinion, as well as never make any claim, unless he has apprehension of it. This is clear from the following passage:

Consider the validity of this syllogism: 'If the sage ever assents to anything, he will sometimes also [give assent to what can be false, and hence] hold an opinion, but he will never [give assent to what can be false and hence] hold an opinion; therefore he will not assent to anything.' This syllogism Arcesilaus used to approve, for he used to accept both the major premise and the minor. Carneades used sometimes to grant as minor premise that the sage sometimes assents, so that it followed that he also holds an opinion. . . . But the major premise, that if the sage did assent he would also hold an opinion, both the Stoics and their supporter Antiochus declared to be false, arguing that the sage is able to distinguish the false from the true, and what is apprehensible from what is not. (*Luc.* 67)

In the light of this passage, it is plausible to think that Antiochus in his argument against PI committed his opponents ('Carneades') to the premise that to make a claim is to have apprehension of it, not for the sake of weakening their case, but rather because this was for him the right way of framing the epistemological problem; and the fact that Arcesilaus too, the initiator of Academic scepticism, had framed the problem in this way would in his eyes warrant the correctness of such a move.

But there is more. Although after his dogmatic conversion Antiochus did not believe that we have no apprehension of anything, he did believe it in his youth. Thus, if we consider his philosophical career as a whole, we do not need to see his argument merely as challenging someone else's position, but also, and I shall suggest primarily, as reflecting upon the principles he himself had advocated and as giving a justification for his paradigm shift into dogmatism. Such a reading gains support from the fact that it was precisely by means of this argument that he proposed to forestall the criticism of *inconstantia* that his schoolfellows had levelled against him, and to turn this criticism against the sceptics themselves.

Evidence to this effect is found at *Luc.* 17. Here Lucullus tells his interlocutors that nobody before Antiochus and Antipater ever undertook to challenge the sceptics' own views, on the grounds, mistaken according to Antiochus, that sceptics have no views of their own. The reference clearly is to Antipater's and Antiochus' arguments against PI, as expounded at 28–9

and 109. For all that the report is in need of qualification,³⁵ it none the less shows that Antiochus, for whom Lucullus speaks, did claim to have new grounds for rejecting PI and thus a reply to his opponents' allegation of an unmotivated change of mind.³⁶ Moreover, at 29 Antiochus adds that their reluctance to admit that they have apprehension of PI is a token of *inconstantia*. The occurrence of the *inconstantia* theme here recalls Cicero's criticism of Antiochus at 69. That this theme was important for Antiochus is borne out by what his spokesman Lucullus says at *Luc.* 53: 'We are seeking the judgement of gravity, constancy (*constantia*), firmness, wisdom.' Thus I suggest that Antiochus' main aim in adducing his argument against PI was to show up his Academic opponents as 'inconstant' in more or less the way that Cicero accuses him of being 'inconstant': they deviate from fundamental principles of their own without any justification. This would indicate that Antiochus thinks that he is following through upon (*not* deviating from) his own fundamental principle by this move: he is following through upon holding PI *by advocating apprehension*.

Now, there is an objection to this reading: is the point not simply that, if the sceptics were consistent with their principles, they would have to declare that they have apprehension that no apprehension is possible, and hence that the view they defend is self-contradictory and untenable? It does not follow that the view they oppose is thereby right. On this other reading, Antiochus would not be providing any positive argument in favour of apprehension, but only forcing his erstwhile schoolfellows into silence.

But supposing that he wanted to persuade them to follow him all the way in taking a dogmatic turn, it is the conclusion that apprehension is possible that he needed to establish. That this would be his aim in arguing with them is at least not implausible. Moreover, a purely dialectical reading of his argument is unconvincing, as I have already shown. Thus I would invite my reader to follow me in considering the fruitful possibilities of reading it in the way I have suggested.

Antiochus' argument against PI is framed in terms of 'making claims' ('habere decretum'). In this formulation the argument has no known

³⁵ Cicero presumably refers to Stoic opponents alone. For Lucretius 4.469–72 shows that at least the Epicureans did challenge the sceptics in respect of PI. Cicero at 109 describes Antiochus' argument as being 'old, familiar and often rejected'. However, there is no need to see a conflict with what he puts into the mouth of Lucullus at 17, since the reference at 109 is presumably to the internal debate within the Academy concerning the epistemic status of their principles, a debate which dates as far back as Arcesilaus.

³⁶ I here disagree with Tarrant 2007: 324, 'Antiochus did not need new arguments to support a Stoic epistemology. What he needed was the absolute conviction that he had found some truth.'

antecedent in the Hellenistic epistemological debate.³⁷ Yet it does pick up and rework a very well-established item on the agenda of that debate, namely the topic of whether and when the sage will give assent. Antiochus addresses this topic in his other argument at 67, which we considered earlier:

Consider the validity of this syllogism: 'If the sage ever assents to anything, he will sometimes also [give assent to what can be false, and hence] hold an opinion, but he will never [give assent to what can be false and hence] hold an opinion; therefore he will not assent to anything.' . . . But the major premise, that if the sage did assent he would also hold an opinion, both the Stoics and their supporter Antiochus declared to be false, arguing that the sage is able to distinguish the false from the true, and what is apprehensible from what is not.

Both this argument and the one against PI employ the assumption that the sage will not give his assent, and hence will not make a claim, unless he has apprehension of the thing he is to assent to and to make a claim about. The Academics (Arcesilaus) drew from this premise the conclusion that the sage will always withhold assent. The Stoics notionally agreed with them. Antiochus had quite a different take on the matter. He did *not* concede to the sceptics that, if (someone makes the claim that) there is not apprehension of anything, it follows that it is wise (for him) to withhold assent about everything. In Antiochus' view whatever claim one makes, the mere fact of making a claim implies that one has apprehension that the content of the claim is true. It follows that the sceptics themselves must admit that they can distinguish between what is apprehensible and what is not, and hence that apprehension is possible. Here, I submit, is the novelty of the strategy Antiochus pursued against the sceptics: he attempted to establish that there is apprehension on the basis of what the sceptics themselves say, or were committed to saying. Here also is Antiochus' rationale for isolating the 'claim-making' theme, which was, as such, peripheral to the preceding debate.

The above is a simple and powerful argument Antiochus could invoke in order to establish apprehension, thus warranting a wholesale defection to a Stoic approach. However, the argument against PI at *Luc.* 29, according to the interpretation previously considered, fails to do this job. It establishes

³⁷ The term *decretum* in the *Lucullus* appears only in the two reports of Antiochus' argument (27–9 and 109). The Greek term, δόγμα, was to become a thematic word in post-Hellenistic Sceptical literature starting from Aenesidemus but, for all we know, had no technical meaning in Hellenistic philosophical vocabulary (Tarrant 1985: 29–33; Barnes 1982: 6–9 = 68–74 of the reprint). From Aristotle onward it is a common word for 'doctrine' regardless of the degree of commitment that one has to it.

at most that the sceptical position is self-contradictory and untenable, not that the Stoic position is preferable. But in the light of what we have just said we have a better interpretation of what is at issue. It is the following.

The sage's admission that he has apprehension of PI consists of two distinct claims: first, that apprehension is not possible (PI); second, that apprehension (of PI) is possible. Antipater took it that one can make these two claims simultaneously, presumably because the latter in his view refers to a second-order apprehension, which covers PI alone. It is not clear how, if at all, he hoped to trouble the sceptics by means of this argument.³⁸ Be that as it may, Antiochus did not agree with him that apprehension of PI can be second-order in this way, and hence compatible with PI. Rather, apprehension of PI is the same in kind as the apprehension of any other object of apprehension.

For Antipater, you [Lucullus] tell us, was censured because he said it is consistent for a person who affirms that nothing is apprehensible to say that that itself is apprehensible. That seemed stupid and self-contradictory to Antiochus as well. For it cannot be consistently said that nothing is apprehensible if, of anything at all, it is said that it is apprehensible. The way he [Antiochus] thinks Carneades should rather have been pressed is the following: to make him admit that, since the sage can make no claim that is not apprehended, perceived, known, by him to be true, this very claim that nothing is apprehensible, because it is the sage's claim, is apprehended by him.³⁹

Accordingly, I propose that 29 be read as follows. When Antiochus claims that the sceptical sage must admit that he has apprehension of PI, his actual aim is not to show that apprehension of PI is self-contradictory, but rather that the sceptic too has apprehension of *some* object (namely, as it happens, PI). On the assumption that there is no difference in respect of apprehensibility between different objects of apprehension, the sceptic too is now committed to the possibility of apprehending things. The self-contradiction theme contributes to the argument in so far as it establishes that the object of apprehension cannot be PI itself, since apprehension of PI is self-contradictory ('sibi contrarium'). Once we have done away with

³⁸ See Burnyeat 1997 for a suggestion.

³⁹ *Luc.* 109: 'nam Antipatrum repensum quod diceret consentaneum esse ei qui adfirmaret nihil posse comprehendere id ipsum saltem dicere posse comprehendere. quod ipsi Antiocho pingue videbatur et sibi ipsum contrarium; non enim potest convenienter dici nihil comprehendere posse, si quicquam comprehendere posse dicatur. illo modo potius putat arguendum fuisse Carneadem, cum sapientis nullum decretum esse possit nisi comprehensum perceptum cognitum, ut hoc ipsum decretum, quod sapientis esset, nihil posse percipi, fateretur esse perceptum.' Unfortunately, the last line of the text, which says exactly what Antiochus' move was in contrast with Antipater's, is corrupt (I adopt the reading of Reid's *editio minor* (Reid 1874), following Burnyeat 1997: 282).

PI as being an untenable object of apprehension, apprehension itself is what we are left with.

This reconstruction of the argument, conjectural as it is, nevertheless has the merit of enabling us to make sense of a puzzling passage in Cicero's report of this argument at *Luc.* 29:

The determination of truth and falsehood and of what is known and not known is the governing rule that applies to all parts of a philosophical system; and since they [the sceptical Academics] adopt this view (*rationem*) [i.e. PI], and want to teach what impressions ought to be accepted and what rejected, they unquestionably ought to have apprehension of this claim itself, which is the basis of every judgement of truth and falsehood; for (he said) the two greatest things in philosophy are the criterion of truth and the ethical end, and no man could be sage who is ignorant of either the basis of knowledge or the goal of appetition, and who consequently does not know from where to start and where to arrive; but to be in doubt as to these matters and not to feel immovably sure of them is to be very widely remote from wisdom. On these lines therefore they ought to have been required rather to say that this one thing at least was apprehended, that is, the impossibility of apprehending anything.⁴⁰

The passage is puzzling because, contrary to what Antiochus says, the Academics themselves did not assign to PI the job of enabling them to distinguish truth and falsehood (except, perhaps, in the negative sense of *ruling out* the possibility of making such a distinction), or to determine choices and avoidances. Antiochus is foisting onto PI the role that the principles of dogmatic philosophies play in those philosophies. Along these lines, the point he intended to make could be the following. *If* Academic scepticism wants to qualify as a philosophy, the principle that constitutes the starting point of their system *ought* to provide a rule both for distinguishing between truth and falsehood, and for determining choices and avoidances, and it could do so only if it is apprehended.

But how could we have PI do this job, even if it is apprehended? The job Antiochus attributes to PI apprehended ceases to be puzzling if we adopt my conjecture that the conclusion that we have apprehension of PI was not intended to invalidate both the claims of which it consists, (1) that

⁴⁰ 'hanc enim esse regulam totius philosophiae, constitutionem veri falsi cogniti incogniti; quam rationem quoniam susciperent docereque vellent quae visa accipi oporteret quae repudiari, certe hoc ipsum, ex quo omne veri falsique iudicium esset, percipere eos debuisse; etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum, nec sapientem posse esse qui aut cognoscendi esse initium ignoret aut extremum expetendi, ut aut unde profisciscatur aut quo perveniendum sit nesciat; haec autem habere dubia nec is ita confidere ut moveri non possint abhorrrere a sapientia plurimum. hoc igitur modo potius erat ab his postulandum ut hoc unum saltem, percipi nihil posse, perceptum esse dicerent.'

apprehension is not possible, and (2) that apprehension (of PI) is possible. Rather, it was intended to provide the premise for the additional point that apprehension, without qualification, is possible. For there is only one way in which the Academics could make use of PI for the purpose Antiochus wants them to, namely by extending to all our cognitive and moral life the apprehensibility which in Antiochus' view they ought to grant to PI in the first place, and, as I have suggested, only provisionally.

There is one parallel for the move I attribute to Antiochus here, that of blurring the distinction between a report of someone else's view and the conclusion of one's refutation of them, so as to have the Academics advocate a criterion of truth. This is found in Sextus' account of Carneades' criterion at *Math.* 7.159–89. Here we are told that Carneades challenged all philosophical criteria [of truth], and yet, being required to provide a criterion of life, posited the persuasive. Sextus at 166 makes it clear that Carneades' 'persuasive' served the sole purpose of enabling us to conduct our everyday life. But then at 173 he unexpectedly ends up by describing the persuasive as Carneades' criterion of *truth*. There are several ways of explaining this inconsistency, but no agreed solution has been found.⁴¹ Now, Antiochus is mentioned twice in the context (*Math.* 7.162 and 201), and therefore he is presumably Sextus' basic source for this argument.⁴² According to Antiochus, to have a criterion of truth is not only a necessary condition for a system's qualifying as a philosophy, but also, and relatedly, for its enabling us to determine choices and avoidances (*Luc.* 29 above). In other words, a criterion of life for Antiochus is thereby a criterion of truth, and no distinction can be made between the two. It seems to me that Sextus at 173 makes exactly the same assumption. The idea presumably is that, although Carneades presents his persuasive as a criterion of life, it turns out to accomplish all the jobs that a criterion of truth would, and therefore it can be legitimately seen, and termed, as being one. The consequence of attributing to Carneades a criterion of truth is of course to undermine his argument to the effect that no such criterion exists. Thus, beyond the surface of a neutral report, what we can get in Sextus is a subtle manoeuvre aimed at challenging the consistency of Carneades' position. This manoeuvre is conjecturally attributable to Antiochus,⁴³ and

⁴¹ Ioppolo 2007: 242–52 provides a recent discussion.

⁴² David Sedley (this volume) suggests that Antiochus may be the source of the entire Hellenistic section of Sextus' doxography on epistemology. Brittain (this volume) challenges the suggestion. For my present purpose it is enough that Sextus' report on Carneades incorporates material from Antiochus, as it certainly does.

⁴³ I am referring to the 'dogmatic' Antiochus, and here I depart from Tarrant 1985: 93, who hypothesizes that Sextus' source is a work of Antiochus written when he was still a sceptic.

it provides a parallel for the argument Cicero attributes to him at 29, since in both cases Antiochus is found superimposing onto his sceptical opponents aspects of his refutation, as if these had already been a part of their original doctrine.

CONCLUSION

It has been my argument that Antiochus fully belonged to the Academy of his day, both institutionally and doctrinally. He did not defect from his school so long as it was a working institution, and when it was no longer working, he attempted to re-establish it by making up a fake succession. The philosophical outlook of his 'Old' Academy was certainly different from Academic scepticism, and yet it was based on a reflection upon sceptical principles and justified as a matter of logical necessity.

The two parts of which my argument consists, the one concerning institutional history and the other concerning Antiochus' attitude to scepticism, are complementary to one another, and cumulatively point to continuity as the kernel of Antiochus' contribution to the history of the Academy. My conclusion is intended to balance what I believe to be an excessive emphasis on discontinuity, which characterizes the majority of studies of this thinker. The fairest thing to say probably is that Antiochus, just like several other first-century BCE figures, displays both continuity and discontinuity with the tradition from which he has sprung.

It is widely assumed, however, that the idea of discontinuity is not just a matter of interpretation, but one that Antiochus himself was keen on emphasizing. This assumption needs qualification. Antiochus could not deny that Arcesilaus, the initiator of the sceptical Academy, inherited the school's headship from Crates. The idea of 'succession' (*diadochē*), which we might consider external and irrelevant to the history of philosophy proper, in fact provides its established framework in the Hellenistic age, and in respect of succession not only were Arcesilaus, Carneades, Clitomachus and Philo legitimate heirs of Plato's school, but they were 'heirs' even in a stronger sense than Antiochus himself, who was a member of the school but never elected its head and spokesman.

Things being so, Antiochus was left with two options. One was to renounce any claim to institutional descent from the early Academy, and to veer towards a claim of a merely spiritual legacy. The other was to put up with the fact that the sceptical Academics were an integral part of the tradition. Antiochus went for the second option. This is suggested by the unduly neglected statement that the Antiochean speaker makes to

his Philonian counterpart at *Fin.* 5.94: 'Your Arcesilaus, although rather too addicted to argumentation, nevertheless was one of us. For he was of Polemo's lineage' ('Arcesilas tuus, etsi fuit in disserendo pertinacior, tamen noster fuit. erat enim Polemonis'). At first sight we might think that Arcesilaus is 'Polemonis' in the sense that he was a pupil of Polemo. But this cannot be the point. For Zeno too was a pupil of Polemo, but Antiochus would never call Zeno 'one of us'. Thus I take the genitive to indicate 'one of Polemo's lineage' in the sense of belonging to the same tradition. And if Arcesilaus belonged to this, it follows that the entire sceptical Academy of which he was the initiator also did so. It may seem odd, then, that Antiochus was so fond of criticizing the sceptical authorities of his school. But this, once again, stands in continuity with the practice of the sceptical Academy. As Cicero puts it (e.g. *Nat. D.* 1.10), what qualifies the Academic as an Academic is precisely his lack of deference to any given authority, and his freedom to speak his mind.

*Antiochus and Asclepiades: medical and philosophical
sectarianism at the end of the Hellenistic era*

Rebecca Flemming

According to Sextus Empiricus, a man who himself combined medicine and philosophy in his career, Antiochus ‘from the Academy’ engaged with the views of Sextus’ similarly poised predecessor, the famous physician Asclepiades of Bithynia.¹ The identification, it should be stressed, belongs to Sextus, who is discussing the Cyrenaics’ theory of knowledge and its affinity with those who declare that the senses are the criterion of truth. He chooses to illustrate this latter position with a quotation from Antiochus’ *Canonica*: ‘But a certain other man, second to none in the medical art, and also a student of philosophy, believed that the sensations are really perceptions, and that we apprehend nothing at all by reason.’ This ‘other man’ Sextus suggests, indeed suggests that Antiochus suggests, is Asclepiades. For the Bithynian physician’s notorious rejection of the notion of the *hēgemonikon* leaves all the work of the soul to be done by the five senses (or vice versa), and they were contemporaries, alive at ‘the same time’, so the allusion seems clear; and it has remained plausible ever since.²

Sextus’ chronological accuracy has, of course, been called into question; but his pairing of Antiochus and Asclepiades is still instructive.³ However long (or short) their actual contemporaneity, both were, importantly, participants in the changing intellectual and political world of the late Hellenistic Mediterranean, a world being reshaped by the increasing power of Rome. Both spent time in Rome, Asclepiades actually settling there, and both were drawn into wider networks of Roman elite patronage and influence.⁴ Moreover, Asclepiades’ choice of the emerging metropolis as his base at the expense of Alexandria, the established medical centre of the

My thanks to Charles Brittain, David Leith and David Sedley for comments on an earlier draft of this chapter.

¹ Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.201–2 (see Appendix F2).

² See also *Math.* 7.380, and e.g. Tert. *De. anim.* 15.2–3 for further emphasis on Asclepiades’ rejection of the *hēgemonikon*.

³ By Rawson 1982, discussed extensively below.

⁴ For Antiochus’ biography see Chapter 1, and for Asclepiades see below.

Mediterranean, finds a parallel of a kind in Antiochus' displacement from Athens, the historic home of the philosophical schools, to the less philosophically developed Egyptian capital as well as other cities of the East, as ambassador to various Roman generals and companion to Lucullus.⁵ Nor is it just the pair's patterns of mobility and relations with the Roman aristocracy which can be aligned, for they share an innovative relationship with their respective intellectual traditions as they took organizational form: with, that is, the configuration of philosophical schools and medical sects which characterized the Hellenistic period.

Asclepiades is not recorded as leaving anything particular behind when he founded his 'new sect', though he will ultimately have a famously disloyal pupil – Themison of Laodicea. Nor, indeed, do shifting allegiances in medicine, breaking away from teachers to establish or join other groupings, generally seem to have attracted the kind of recriminations heaped on Antiochus, but the Bithynian physician's move was a bold one none the less, mounting a definite challenge to the old sectarian order in medicine, dominated by Alexandria and framed in particular terms as it was. Likewise Antiochus, and also Aenesidemus, seem to have changed the rules about allegiance within the Academy and contributed to a wider reconfiguration of philosophical schools, their location, interrelations and identities, at the time. There is, then, a certain lack of precedent, at least in their own traditions, for either Antiochus or Asclepiades, but the question arises whether there was any borrowing of practice, or just exchange of ideas, between philosophy and medicine at this juncture. The most obvious possibility is that Antiochus took inspiration from patterns of Alexandrian sectarianism in the medical domain, but perhaps the emphasis should be on a common context – social or political, cultural or geographical, or some combination of them all – which engendered, or encouraged, both moves.

It is the above questions that this chapter attempts to address. It begins, therefore, with an outline of the sectarian landscape of Hellenistic Alexandrian medicine: the traditions and arrangements, groupings and individuals that Antiochus might have encountered in Alexandria in the early decades of the first century BCE, and their historical trajectories. The picture is also broadened out to trace the spread of medical schools beyond Alexandria, but with the Ptolemaic capital as their mother city, and then the development of centres of medical learning, medical lineages, without such

⁵ Whether Asclepiades ever even visited Alexandria is unclear, though he did spend some time in Athens: Cael. Aur. *Celeres passionnes* (CP) 2.129.

Alexandrian roots, especially in Rome. The aim is both to indicate possible points of practical and conceptual dialogue between philosophy and medicine, and to explore other congruities between the two, where paths cross or run together for more geopolitical reasons.

MEDICAL SECTARIANISM IN THE FIRST CENTURY BCE:
ALEXANDRIA (AND SATELLITES)

Any discussion of ancient medical sectarianism must begin with the *Empeirikē hairesis*, the Empiric sect. It was the departure of Philinus of Cos from 'the house of Herophilus' (the great Hellenistic anatomist, and Philinus' teacher), his development of a new approach to the medical art, founded solely on experience (however complexly conceived) and not on speculative theories about the workings of the human body, which started everything moving.⁶ Not that epistemological debates had been absent from previous medical discourse, but from this moment in early Ptolemaic Alexandria onwards they took on a new significance, as one group decided to base their identity on their position in this debate: to focus on related questions about the nature of knowledge and the nature of the medical art (*iatrikē technē*). Thus the sources repeatedly insist that these physicians 'call themselves Empirics, from "experience" (*empeiria*)'; they refuse to be named after a man, as the Herophileans or Erasistrateans (the followers of Erasistratus, the other great physician of early Hellenistic Alexandria), but want to be known 'by their frame of mind'.⁷

There is then a certain unevenness in the sectarian terrain from the very outset. Philinus' successor as key shaper of Empiricist doctrine, Serapion of Alexandria, composed a treatise *Against the Sects* (*Pros tas haireseis*), which presumably treated all the medical lineages which were named after their founders as *haireseis*, despite the sense in which they were formed on quite different terms from the Empiric sect.⁸ But what the Herophileans and Erasistrateans (and, indeed, others) shared, however implicitly, was a commitment to the use of reason in medicine, to enquiries into the causes of diseases, and physiological theorizing; so, by default, they were given the

⁶ Philinus' departure: [Gal.] *Introductio seu medicus* (Int.) 4.2 (9.15–18 Petit); Herophilus and his '*oikos*': von Staden 1989. On the Empiric sect more generally see the fundamental work of Deichgräber (1965).

⁷ Cels. pr. 27: 'se empiricos ab experientia nominant'; cf. pr. 10; Gal. *Subf. emp.* 1 (p. 42 Deichgräber (Dgr)): 'a dispositione que secundum animam' (Nicolò da Reggio's translation): he draws a parallel with the philosophical sceptics in this respect. On the wider resonances of this claim see Polito 2007b.

⁸ Gal. *Lib. prop.* 12.1 (Boudon-Millot (B.-M.) 163.10–11).

collective label 'rationalist sect' (*logikē hairesis*). But, as Heinrich von Staden has emphasized, this is a purely conceptual category, useful for structuring lists of important medical figures, and setting out certain debates in a clear fashion; it is not a self-definition, nor an actual organization.⁹ Indeed, in general, the unambiguous sectarian lines drawn in later handbooks and, most especially, Galen's far from disinterested discussions of the differences between various groupings need to be treated with caution.¹⁰

The development of the eponymous *haireseis* themselves seems, moreover, to be a product of Hellenistic Alexandria, if not of the particular pressures of the *Empeirikoi*. Thus the teachers of Herophilus and Erasistratus – Praxagoras of Cos and Chrysippus of Cnidus respectively – belong to a previous era in this regard.¹¹ They are prominent physicians of the late fourth century who made a considerable impact with their writing and teaching (probably located in their home cities), formulated important theories and had influential pupils, but, it appears, were not in the business of founding long-term lineages.¹² Thus, neither Herophilus nor Erasistratus is considered a defector in any sense, indeed both are doctrinally dependent on their teachers – Herophilus shares Praxagoras' fundamental humoralism and Erasistratus develops Chrysippus' distinctive opposition to therapeutic bloodletting.¹³ Rather they inaugurate a new phase in the nature of medical groupings. These figures, together with Erasistratus' brother Cleophantus, will not just have students, but also followers for generations to come.¹⁴ They will provide points of identification; essential parts of their teaching will continue to command allegiance, long after both their deaths and the demise of those who studied with them, as some kind of pedagogic continuity and collective identity is maintained down the centuries.

⁹ Von Staden 1982: esp. 81–3; on the parallel development of the concept of philosophical sects to aid the orderly composition of philosophical handbooks, see Mansfeld 1999: 19–23.

¹⁰ Galen has particular reasons for wishing (like Celsus before him) to exaggerate sectarian vitality, divergence and mutual animosity, so that his own position may appear all the more distinctive, moderate and sensible.

¹¹ Praxagoras and Herophilus: e.g. Gal. *Trem. palp.* 1 and *MM* 1.3 (VII 584–5, and X 28 Kühn (K.)); Chrysippus and Erasistratus: e.g. Gal. *Ven. sect. Er.* 2 and 7 (XI 152 and 171 K.); Praxagoras and Chrysippus are also often paired together: e.g. Cels. pr. 8.

¹² Occasionally Galen vaguely implies that they did – e.g. *Lib. prop.* 1.9 (B.-M. 138.13–14) and *Ven. sect. Er. Rom.* 2 (XI 197 K.) – but neither he nor anyone else actually names any followers rather than students, and the context never suggests serious attention to historical accuracy (rather the reverse).

¹³ Humoralism: e.g. [Gal.] *Int.* 9.6 (22.7–9 Petit), though Praxagoras' humours were quite distinctive, see Steckerl 1958, and cf. e.g. Gal. *Diff. puls.* 4.3 (VIII 723 K.); venesection: e.g. Gal. *Cur. rat. ven. sect.* 2 (XI 252–3 K.), though much of this treatise and the others on Erasistratus is about his inconsistency, deviations from Chrysippus, himself, his fellow-students, pupils and everybody.

¹⁴ *Hairesis* of Cleophantus: Gal. *Hipp. Epid.* 3.2.4 (CMG V 10.2.1: 77.19–21); see also Cael. Aur. *CP* 2.56.

Still, all these *haireseis* are pretty loose genetic formations, based on a mixture of shared doctrine and descent, without any formal organization. Ptolemaic Alexandria became a centre of learned medical activity, including education. It was a place where Herophilean, Erasistratean and Empiric teachers could be found, as well as those with no apparent affiliation; but it was not the location of an Empiric or Herophilean School. At any one time there might have been a particularly pre-eminent figure operating in a specific current or field, but there is no indication that any kind of pedagogic monopoly or sectarian scholarchy attended on such a position; and eminence was just as often shared, or indistinct, in any generation. Nor, in fact, did studying with a Herophilean, or anyone else, necessarily determine the allegiance of a student, who might indeed have shopped around for his learning. There is a certain presumption in that direction, however, a sense that being the *auditor* (Greek *akoustēs*) or *discipulus* (Greek *mathētēs*) of someone – which is a relationship the ancient sources are certainly interested in – implies a degree of doctrinal continuity, of sectarian succession, unless otherwise stated. Still, things might well turn out otherwise and, in a world without formal leadership or organisation, there can really be no orthodoxy either. The followers of Herophilus may all have agreed with their founding father that sphygmology was an important part of the medical art, for instance, but they all offered their own, slightly different, definition of the pulse and developed its study in diverse ways. And there are greater disagreements too, noted between followers, or between founder and followers, and noted without particular excitement.¹⁵

All of these issues, and more, are illustrated in the *Empeirikē hairesis* of the first century BCE; for the most prominent Empiric physician of that century (probably of any century) followed a career path not unlike that of the sect's founder: Heracleides of Tarentum was a pupil of the Herophilean Mantias before switching allegiance.¹⁶ Despite his fame as a pharmacologist, Mantias' dates are not known, nor indeed his location; though there is a strong Alexandrian presumption in all of this.¹⁷ Generally, if a Herophilean left Alexandria it was noted, and no such notice appears for either Mantias or Heracleides. Heracleides is also a little more datable since

¹⁵ On Herophilean sphygmology see von Staden 1989: 445–50; and e.g. Soranus places the Erasistrateans Athenion and Miltiades on the opposite side from Erasistratus in the debate about whether there are diseases specific to women (*Gynaecology*. 3.1), though perhaps implying that they interpreted their founder's views differently.

¹⁶ Gal. *Comp. med. gen.* 2.1 and 5; *Comp. med. loc.* 6.9; which are T(estimonia) 11, T17 and T14 in Guardasole's edition (1997). This includes improved editions of many fragments, and discussion. Heracleides is certainly the most widely cited Empiric in the extant literature, by a long way.

¹⁷ On Mantias see von Staden 1989: 515–18.

he reuses a remedy belonging to the Erasistratean Hicesius, whose activities are mentioned by Strabo (in an interesting passage which will be discussed below) and placed 'in the time of our fathers'; that is about 100 BCE.¹⁸ All the other chronological hints and relations pertaining to Heracleides tend to prevent his moving too far away from Hicesius, so Alessia Guardasole (as Karl Deichgräber before her) concludes that his *floruit* is most likely to be around 75 BCE.¹⁹

Heracleides' departure from Mantias appears to have been less hostile than Philinus' from Herophilus, though, for he seems to have taken both strong pharmacological interests and some slightly rationalist ideas with him. The late antique, and far from Empiric, Latin medical writer Caelius Aurelianus even accuses Heracleides of failing to observe the 'custom' ('mos') of his *secta*, by advocating a therapeutics which depended, in part, on notions of disease causation.²⁰ Galen, on the other hand, allows Heracleides to defend himself from any charges of un-Empiric conduct in relation to his discussion of the vexed question of whether or not a dislocated hip can ever be successfully reset. Heracleides' view, which Galen quotes in order to agree with it, is that it can be, as a range of distinguished witnesses and his own experience testify.²¹ From this it follows, he says, and in response to a Herophilean argument for impossibility on anatomical grounds, that sometimes the tendon which keeps the hip bone in place does not snap completely, despite the dislocation, but rather loosens and can tighten up again.²² Having thus ventured into possibly enemy terrain and become involved in speculation about hidden processes, Heracleides concludes that 'to enquire into these things is useful, though not entirely universal (*koinon*)'.²³ Galen explains that the Tarentine added this to protect his empiricist principles, though he is less helpful on exactly how it achieved that.

Whether Heracleides' statement here, embedded as it was in a work on therapeutics, should simply be taken as clarificatory, or whether his Empiric credentials were being called into question at the time is entirely unclear.²⁴ Against exactly whom any defence might have been offered

¹⁸ Gal. *Comp. med. gen.* 5.6 (F1 Guardasole); Strabo. 12.8.20: ἐπὶ τῶν πατέρων ἡμετέρων.

¹⁹ Guardasole 1997: 23; following Deichgräber 1965: 258.

²⁰ Cael. Aur. *CP* 1.166–183 at 181 (F49 Guardasole); more generous interpretations are also possible.

²¹ Gal. *Hipp. art.* 4.40 (F43 Guardasole at 81).

²² The argument that the anatomy of the hip joint means that dislocations cannot be reset belongs to the Herophilean Hegetor: see von Staden 1989: 512–14.

²³ ἐπειδὴ τοῦτο ζητεῖν ἐστὶ χρήσιμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παντελῶς κοινόν: Guardasole F180 (20–1), a text which differs significantly from that in Kühn, and therefore, from that in Deichgräber.

²⁴ Galen is quoting from the fourth book of Heracleides' *External Remedies*. It should be noted that, following V. Boudon-Millot's reinterpretation of Gal. *Lib. prop.* 12.3 (B.-M. 163.16–17 and 218 n. 14), Heracleides is left without any programmatic works.

would also make a considerable difference. Being called inconsistent, or contradictory, by external rivals is one thing, indeed a very common thing in ancient medical discourse, but it would be quite another, unparalleled in fact, if an internal rival were to accuse a fellow-sectarian of not being a 'real Empiric' (or 'real Herophilean' or the like).

Heracleides certainly does seem to have had at least one contemporary internal rival. Apollonius of Citium is the author of the only text to survive from the incredibly vigorous and productive medical scene in Hellenistic Alexandria – that is, his so-called commentary on the Hippocratic treatise *On Joints* – and it is a text which evinces an Empiricist position, albeit rather more subtly than some would like.²⁵ Apollonius never refers to himself explicitly as an *Empeirikos* but, in discussing the question of resetting the hip, he lays out the positions of those who argue from anatomy and those who argue from experience, the latter being the view he himself clearly favours; indeed his exposition is more strictly Empiric than that of Heracleides.²⁶ On this occasion Apollonius made no mention of the Tarentine, but he also wrote eighteen books against Heracleides' Hippocratic lexicography and three books against the first of such glossaries, that of the Herophilean Bacchius.²⁷ Though Hippocratic interpretation of various kinds was certainly an important activity for the Alexandrian *Empeirikoi* (from Philinus onwards), as also for the Herophileans, and both groups wished to claim the authority of the great man, there is no indication that Apollonius was doing anything other than asserting himself in the genre in the customary manner – that is by attacking and replacing the most recent work in the area (belonging to Heracleides in this instance) – rather than anything more systematic or sectarian.²⁸ So, this looks more like the Herophilean debates about the pulse than anything more serious; ancient medicine was, after all, a competitive business, and differentiation from, and contest with, rival physicians was just a part of the way things worked. The arguments within rather than across sectarian boundaries were of a distinct kind, but they were no less lively and committed for that.

Apollonius, unlike Heracleides, seems to have had an Empiricist teacher – Zopyrus of Alexandria.²⁹ Zopyrus is not labelled as an Empiric

²⁵ Thus Wesley Smith argues that he is a 'Hippocratean' rather than an Empiric: 1979: 214–15.

²⁶ Apoll. *Commentary on Hippocrates, On Joints* 3 (CMG XI 1.1: 78.24–82.6); and see on this debate more generally Frede 1988: esp. 89–95 (though Frede uses the Kühn text).

²⁷ Erotian, pr. (fr. 311; cf. frs. 317 and 323 Dgr). On Bacchius see von Staden 1989: 484–500.

²⁸ On the development of sectarian exegesis see von Staden 1982: 90–1; Erotian names at least four *Empeirikoi* and four Herophileans who wrote competitive Hippocratic glossaries against each other (pr. 4.24–5.14 Nachmanson).

²⁹ Apoll. *Comm.* 1 (CMG XI 1.1: 12.1–5 = fr. 266 Dgr) for his relationship to Zopyrus, whom he describes as practising orthopaedic surgery in the most Hippocratic fashion. Given the amount

in any surviving source, his name appearing in no extant list of prominent *Empeirikoi*, but what little is known about him is perfectly congruent with Empiricism, so his allegiance is inferred from that of Apollonius. As well as probable doctrinal continuity between the two, there is a certain continuity of orientation towards royalty. Apollonius dedicated his Hippocratic commentary to King Ptolemy, and the guess is, given that he is a contemporary, perhaps a younger contemporary, of Heracleides, that this is Ptolemy Auletes (or *Neos Dionysios*), who ruled most of what remained of the Ptolemaic Empire from 80 to 51 BCE (though he was briefly deposed in 58–55 BCE), or his brother, Ptolemy of Cyprus, king of the other part of the imperial domains from 80 to 58 BCE.³⁰ Zopyrus is reported by Celsus to have concocted an antidote for King Ptolemy, perhaps Auletes again, or one of his longer-lasting predecessors (Soter II or Alexander I); and by Galen to have sent a similar recipe to Mithridates VI Eupator – the culturally and territorially ambitious King of Pontus – carried by a condemned man on whom it was intended to be tested (once he had been poisoned, of course).³¹

Given Mithridates' famous interest in both medicine and poisons, this story is probably too good to be true, unless Zopyrus was a court physician and this was essentially a diplomatic mission.³² He might, though, have been a more ordinary participant in Mithridates' network of medical patronage and correspondence, or at least have aspired in that direction; and the tale, with or without its embellishments, serves to confirm Zopyrus as an older contemporary of Heracleides.³³ Mithridates did not die until 63 BCE (and then with some difficulty), having been King of Pontus for some sixty years, but his medical activity is likely to have reached its heights in his most expansionist, empire-building phase, in the couple of decades before the outbreak of the first war with Rome in 88 BCE; though there is no reason to think it then came to a complete halt.

of attention that Heracleides' status as pupil of Mantias receives, it is pretty unthinkable that he had another teacher, so I do not consider that the Heracleides without an ethnic who is listed by Diogenes Laertius (9.115) as pupil of Ptolemy of Cyrene and teacher of Aenesidemus is actually the Tarentine, whatever claims are being made.

³⁰ The royal dedication may be one reason why Apollonius is more reticent on his sectarian affiliations than he might be in a text more directly addressed to his colleagues; though actually lack of explicit self-labelling seems quite standard, for example, in Soranus, *Gynaecology*.

³¹ Cels. 5.23.2; Gal. *Antid.* 2.8 (XIV 150 K.).

³² Mithridates certainly did seek alliances with the Ptolemies. The Ptolemaic princes (who were to become Ptolemy Auletes and Ptolemy of Cyprus) were brought up at his court after Mithridates took Cos, in 88 BCE, and they were, reputedly, later betrothed to his daughters (App. *Mith.* 23 and 111). On stories about Mithridates and antidotes see Totelin 2004.

³³ Mithridates also corresponded with Asclepiades of Bithynia, for example, and was associated with the notable *rhizotomos* Crateuas (Plin. *HN* 25.62).

Roman power was also being felt quite acutely in Egypt at this time: the whole Mediterranean world was being reconfigured politically and culturally in the first century BCE. So it is perhaps unsurprising that Apollonius of Citium seems to bring the Hellenistic, Alexandrian, phase of the *Empeirikē hairesis* to an end. There are a couple more Empiric physicians plausibly located in the mid first century, but after that the record becomes largely blank.³⁴ Deichgräber's attempts to bridge the gap between Apollonius and the revival of a more sceptical medical empiricism in the early second century CE are ingenious but not convincing.³⁵ There is only one figure of any solidity in this period – Cassius – and, whether or not he was an Empiric, and whether his career began in the first century BCE or later, he was definitely based in Rome, not Alexandria.³⁶ This was now the place to be.

There are some parallel developments within the 'rationalist' community of the first century BCE, in terms of the shifting geography of learned medicine. The emergence of Rome as a real centre of medical culture in this century, a story which is very much bound up with the crucial and controversial career of the great 'rationalist' physician already mentioned, Asclepiades of Bithynia, will, however, be deferred for the time being, while we complete the consideration of the various other, more Alexandrian, reconfigurations of the period. In this respect, Strabo reports that in his time a 'great school (*didaskaleion*) of Herophilean physicians' was founded in the vicinity of the temple of Men Karou, near Laodicea in Phrygia, by Zeuxis, just as in the previous generation Hicesius established an Erasistratean school at Smyrna.³⁷ It appears that the institution at Men Karou was somewhat more successful than that at Smyrna, however. Hicesius had followers, but no known heirs; while Zeuxis had been succeeded by Alexander Philalethes by the time Strabo was writing, and he was then perhaps followed by Demosthenes Philalethes in the first century CE.³⁸ Regardless of longevity, these moves seem to mark a new development in ancient medical organization. Strabo's use of the term *didaskaleion* is striking, as is his explicit assertion that these are Herophilean and Erasistratean

³⁴ These are Diodorus and Lycus, whom Deichgräber places around 60 BCE (1965: 203–5). See also Stok 1993.

³⁵ They involve (1965: 209–12) a complete nonentity (Archibios) and an attempt to multiply the doctors called Zeuxis in the period to include an Empiric.

³⁶ See von Staden 1997 for a review of the evidence for Cassius.

³⁷ Strabo. 12.8.20: διδασκαλεῖον Ἡροφιλείων ἱατρῶν μέγα; and see von Staden 1989: 529–31.

³⁸ Follower of Hicesius: Diog. Laert. 5.94; Strabo 12.8.20 refers to Alexander's succession, and perhaps the demise of the Smyrnan enterprise; von Staden 1989: 575 suggests that Demosthenes was not just Alexander's student (Gal. *Diff. puls.* 4.4 and 5: VIII 726–7 and 731 K.) but his successor.

schools respectively. A monopoly situation seems to be envisaged, within an exclusively pedagogical context, involving scholars; which is all rather different from the Alexandrian set-up and looks in some ways closer to the philosophical model.

Whether such monopolistic considerations played any part in motivating these moves is entirely unclear, however. Both Herophileans and Erasistrateans continued to be active in Alexandria at the same time, and along much the same lines as before. The Herophilean Dioscorides Phacas may have been associated with the Ptolemaic court of Auletes and his warring children, Cleopatra VII and Ptolemy Theos Philopater, for example, while his younger contemporary, Apollonius Mys, is one of the most famous and influential followers of Herophilus more generally.³⁹ Apollonius, indeed, lived through the final defeat of Cleopatra (and Antony), and Egypt's annexation by Rome, entailing as it did Alexandria's absorption into a new international order and thus her political, if not yet cultural, eclipse. The names of Erasistrateans who can be securely located in first-century BCE Alexandria are rather harder to come by, but the current actually seems to have been collectively more robust than the individually better-populated Herophilean grouping. The *Erasistrateioi* are the strongest corporate presence in the first-century CE compilation by Anonymus Londinensis, for example, and they were a successful and distinct presence in Galen's Rome, while the Herophilean lineage had dissolved over a century earlier.⁴⁰

Doctrinal divisions between the Herophileans of Men Karou and those of Alexandria are equally elusive. It has been suggested that Alexander Philalethes was a pupil of Asclepiades of Bithynia, though the only source to assert this is very late and the practicalities are problematic; but he is certainly associated with Asclepiades and Asclepiadean ideas more widely, giving his Herophileanism a particular flavour.⁴¹ One of his pupils, Aristoxenus, seems to have been a very contentious character, moreover, whose substantial treatise, *On the Sect of Herophilus* (*Pēri tēs Hērōphilou hairesēōs*), criticized pretty much all its members, though von Staden suggests that his fellow-Laodiceans may have been spared.⁴² This is speculation, however,

³⁹ Strabo mentions Apollonius (14.1.34), and he is also cited by many surviving medical authors; on Dioscorides see von Staden 1989: 519–22.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., Anonymus Londinensis 26–8 and 36; and Galen's polemical treatise *On Venesection against the Erasistrateans in Rome*. For background on the London text see, e.g., Manetti 1999.

⁴¹ Only the anonymous Brussels fragment 'On the Seed' labels Alexander as *discipulus* of Asclepiades (Anonymus Bruxellensis 1), though the latter is a figure of the early first century BCE, while the former is located much later in that century. Vaguer connections between the two are made at e.g. Cael. Aur. *CP* 2.1.5–6.

⁴² Gal. *Diff. puls.* 4.10 (VIII 746 K.); von Staden 1989: 559–65.

and Aristoxenus could also be described as following a trend set by the Alexandrian Herophileans Apollonius Mys and Heracleides of Erythrae, both probably slightly older than him, in composing such a text, focused on his own sect.⁴³ All may be demonstrating a degree of insecurity about their own sectarian identity, and concern about the diminishing strength of Alexandria in an increasingly competitive cultural environment, medicine included; a world in which some of the terms of the medical debate are shifting. The old epistemological battle lines are being redrawn, or indeed erased, in favour of more generally systematic ones, in which competing versions of the medical art make greater use of a range of philosophical concepts and approaches to system building.

The key figure in driving this change forward, in breaking up the old Hellenistic medical settlement, is Asclepiades of Bithynia. It is he who puts Rome on the map of ancient medical learning, who finds this growing Mediterranean metropolis a location conducive to the development and propagation of a new, more joined-up and theoretically elaborated style of medical system. This is a style which engages with Hellenistic epistemological debates and other dividing lines but also moves beyond them and takes the tradition in a different direction. So it is to Rome that our discussion must now turn. Before making that move, however, Antiochus must be fitted into the narrative, one which has some more general parallels with the contemporary story of philosophical decentralization too.

While much remains uncertain about Antiochus, it is undoubtedly the case that Alexandria's medical scene, and wider cultural situation, made it a relatively easy place for him to find an appropriate audience, one that would be receptive to a new doctrinal direction, less judgemental and more flexible about matters of school allegiance and identity than was normal in Athens. Heracleides was about to leave his Herophilean teacher for the Empiric sect, for example, apparently without recrimination, and he, like all around him, would continue to claim Hippocratic authority for his version of the medical art. It is worth noting here that Alexandria is also where Aenesidemus established his new philosophical circle.⁴⁴ Moreover, while Antiochus' relationship with Lucullus complicates the picture, the facts that he did not go to Rome when forced out of Athens, that open hostilities with Philo broke out when Philo was in Rome and Antiochus in Alexandria and that the dispute could be thought to express the wider animosity between the two cities are surely significant. Without Lucullus' presence, it is assumed that Ptolemy Soter II might well have sided with

⁴³ Von Staden 1989: 540–63.

⁴⁴ Eus. *Praep. evang.* 14.18; and see, e.g., Mansfeld 1995.

Mithridates and, regardless of royal manoeuvring, Alexandrian sympathies are likely to have been largely anti-Roman, particularly among intellectual circles.⁴⁵ Rome was not just a political threat but, increasingly, a cultural rival too. The medical *hairesis* of Alexandria may have had outposts in Smyrna and Laodicea, but not Rome, and Zopyrus corresponded with Mithridates, not the Senate: it was the Battle of Actium in 31 BCE which finally broke Alexandrian resistance in this respect.⁴⁶ So, however accidental the circumstances, Antiochus' travels, both his departure from Athens and his sojourn in Alexandria, did probably play a role in his doctrinal development, in fostering his distinct position and his own claim to the legacy of Plato.

MEDICAL SECTARIANISM IN THE FIRST CENTURY BCE: ROME (AND SATELLITES)

Meanwhile, Asclepiades had been having a major impact on the medical scene in Rome, as is evinced by the privileged position he occupies in all the surviving Latin medical texts of the early empire: that is, those of Celsus, Scribonius Largus and Pliny the Elder. The value each places on the Bithynian physician's intervention varies, but all these authors give him the decisive role in determining the shape and substance of learned medicine in Rome thereafter, which they are all responding to, engaging with, in their own ways. He made a more general impact on the classical medical tradition too, one which can be traced across most of its textual remains, including its more summary compilations – its handbooks and catechisms.⁴⁷ Indeed, Asclepiades also features in more philosophically oriented doxographies, as well as being recognized for his commitment to the philosophical enterprise by Antiochus of Ascalon himself, as mentioned at the outset.

The more local Roman evidence seems the best place to start, however. In the summary history of ancient medicine which forms part of his proemium to the books on the medical art, Celsus describes developments as petering out, and a dull inertia setting in, as the division between rationalists and empiricists became well established and congealed: 'until Asclepiades changed, in large measure, the approach (*rationem*) to

⁴⁵ Indeed, even with Lucullus there, the help Ptolemy provides is limited, see Plut. *Luc.* 2.5–3.1.

⁴⁶ Fraser 1972: 810.

⁴⁷ Vallance 1993: 711–27 lists extant references (though several additional testimonia have been discovered since).

healing'.⁴⁸ It is, then, Asclepiades and his most famous but divergent pupil, Themison, whom Celsus casts as the founders of modern medicine; it is they who have shaped the medical art of the present day, as reflected in his text.⁴⁹ Scribonius Largus, in the dedicatory epistle which commends his collection of recipes to the imperial freedman Callistus, refers to Asclepiades as 'the greatest medical authority', though one whose position on pharmacology was rather underdeveloped, and so vulnerable to being traduced.⁵⁰ The Bithynian physician's first appearance in the *Natural History* is just as laudatory. Asclepiades is hailed as the 'most outstanding' ('summa') figure ever in the art of medicine, outstripping even Hippocrates himself.⁵¹ Though it counts amongst his achievements at this point, however, it will turn out that founding a 'new sect' ('nova secta') is actually not a good thing to do; and the numerous innovations which Asclepiades introduced into the medical culture at Rome, the large-scale changes he wrought, will be lambasted in the rest of the work. Asclepiades is the chief villain in Pliny's Roman medical history, a fact that emphasizes, rather than diminishes, his impact.

It is his 'new sect' that is of most interest here, of course, but before we examine its formation in more detail, questions about Asclepiades' dates must be addressed. For, in an important article, Elizabeth Rawson argued that the Bithynian was more a figure of the late second than early first century BCE, and her chronology has been very widely accepted.⁵² It is, however, questionable, for she puts far too much pressure on a single, somewhat ambiguous, sentence of Cicero's *On the Orator*; and she rejects the reasonably substantial conflicting evidence (such as that of Sextus) pretty much out of hand. The fact that Cicero has the great orator L. Licinius Crassus say, in a dialogue set in 91 BCE, that 'we have been familiar' with Asclepiades, 'as physician and friend', while praising his rhetorical skills and noting the medical success they have brought, certainly means that the Bithynian was well established in Rome by this date, having already gained the respect of cultured Roman aristocrats; but it does not mean that

⁴⁸ Cels. pr. 11: 'donec Asclepiades medendi rationem ex magna parte mutavit'.

⁴⁹ Not only does an ongoing dialectic between the old and the new, embodied by Asclepiades, structure much of Celsus' discussion, but on occasion he explicitly follows some of the Bithynian's organizing principles, see, e.g., Cels. 2.14.1.

⁵⁰ Scrib. Larg. Ep. 7–8: 'maximus auctor medicinae'; and see also 75, recipe which belongs to 'Asclepiades noster', and 84.

⁵¹ Plin. *HN* 7.123–4.

⁵² Rawson 1982. The only recent monograph on Asclepiades, for example, Vallance 1990, concurs on the dating. There are those who remain agnostic, but the only direct challenge has been made by Polito 1999, who argues (interestingly but unconvincingly) for an even further backdating.

Asclepiades was already dead by that juncture.⁵³ Despite Cicero's historical punctiliousness in his dialogues, they are also literary products, after all; and, even if Crassus is taken to be definitely asserting that familiarity with the Bithynian had completely ceased at this point, his demise is not the only possible, or indeed most plausible, explanation of that situation.

That Asclepiades has left town may be unlikely, and Cicero would probably have reported a serious quarrel but perhaps not something less dramatic: what if the Bithynian had simply withdrawn from Crassus' circle to pursue other projects? Like Galen, several centuries later, Asclepiades may have moved on from an initial phase of frenetic self-promotion, of chasing elite patients and patrons and of 'surpassing the other physicians in eloquence', to a period of intellectual consolidation and system-building. He may have turned from public performance and the cultivation of the smoothest of bedside manners to gathering a circle of pupils around him and putting his vision of the medical art into writing. This is, after all, what is involved in founding a 'new sect', and these are activities which neither Crassus nor any of his other conversationalists make any reference to at all.⁵⁴ Pliny may be quite loose in his use of the term 'secta', which he takes to be synonymous with 'factio' and 'schola', but it is clear that he means a grouping with a distinct identity, comprising adherents to particular doctrines, and all owing allegiance to their eponymous hero.⁵⁵ It is also clear, from that and other evidence, that this was a Rome-centred phenomenon; the imperial capital was where Asclepiades had his greatest intellectual impact, where his lineage really flourished.⁵⁶ So, while Pliny's temporal framing, which places the Bithynian 'in the time' ('aetate') of Pompey the Great, pushes things too far forward, Sextus' synchrony of Antiochus and Asclepiades may have more to it.⁵⁷ Probably an older contemporary of the philosopher, the Bithynian physician certainly arrived in Rome before

⁵³ Cic. *De or.* 1.62: 'neque vero Asclepiades is, quo nos medico amicoque usi sumus, tum, cum eloquentia vincebat ceteros medicos, in eo ipso, quod ornate dicebat, medicinae facultate utebatur, non eloquentiae.'

⁵⁴ Such a change in focus would also fit in with Pliny's accusation that Asclepiades began his career as a teacher of rhetoric, before deciding that medicine would be more lucrative (*HN* 26.12). While there seems to be no actual foundation to the attack, all the indications are that Asclepiades' medical interests predate his arrival in Rome; though his rhetorical skills were clearly considerable, it might be that his turn from patient-chasing to system-building provides the basis which Pliny embellishes with vitriol.

⁵⁵ Plin. *HN* 29.6 places Asclepiades in a generally sectarian setting in which medical *factiones*, *scholae* and *sectae* all feature; otherwise he has a *schola*: 14.76, 20.42 and 22.128; following on from the *nova secta* of 7.124.

⁵⁶ In addition to Rome, Asclepiades reports cases witnessed in Athens, Parium, and the Hellespont more generally (Cael. Aur. *CP* 2.129).

⁵⁷ Plin. *HN* 26.12; see also, e.g., 22.128.

the end of the second century BCE, but he is also likely to have lived into the second decade of the first century, perhaps long enough to see the young Pompey's rise to fame as Sullan partisan in 83 BCE. This would give Asclepiades the time in Rome necessary to have the kind of impact that he did and would produce the most plausible relative chronology for his various pupils and followers, and for the 'new sect' he founds.

Four physicians are specifically labelled in the sources as the Bithynian's pupils (*auditores* = Greek *akoustai*; or *discipuli*), and not just as his followers (*sectatores* or *Asklēpiadeioi*). They are Themison of Laodicea, Titus Aufidius the Sicilian, Philonides of Dyrrachium, and Nico of Agrigentum.⁵⁸ Of these, all except perhaps Themison, whose eventual defection will be discussed below, clearly participated in Roman networks of influence, power and status. They hailed from either Sicily or Rome's main bridgehead to the east, and Titus was even a Roman citizen.⁵⁹ Others were to follow in his footsteps. In addition to Marcus Artorius, Octavian's physician, and the freedman Antonius Musa, who famously cured Augustus with cold baths in 23 BCE, both of whom seem to have been Asclepiadeans, two of the most significant pharmacological authorities of the mid first century CE are the *Asklēpiadeioi* Sextius Niger and Tullius Bassus.⁶⁰ This sectarian label is applied to them by Dioscorides, the most influential writer on medical materials of that century, and Pliny cites both as authorities for most of the medical books in the *Natural History*, making explicit what would otherwise have to be surmised: these were Romans who wrote in Greek.⁶¹ Dioscorides lists other affiliates of what he considers to be the dominant current in his field too, including a Petronius, who would seem to be Roman by birth or manumission, as do the Marcus Gallus, Clodius and perhaps Lucius who are referred to as Asclepiadeans in other sources.⁶²

⁵⁸ Plin. *HN* 29.6 (and, implicitly, e.g. Cael. Aur. *CP* 2.84): Themison; Steph. Byz. (Meineke 245.1–6) and Cael. Aur. *Tardae passionēs* (*TP*) 1.178: the others. Alexander Philaethes is also so named in a single late source (Anon. Brux. 1), but the claim is a dubious one, whereas other ancient references to Themison, Titus, Philonides and Nico fit well with their status as direct pupils.

⁵⁹ Laodicea in Syria is also brought within the ambit of Roman power by Pompey and might also of course provide a link with the Herophileans of Men Karou.

⁶⁰ This is to identify Octavian's physician M. Artorius, whose dream saved his patron at Philippi (see e.g. Vell. Pat. 2.70.1), with Artorius the Asclepiadean cited in Caelius Aurelianus (e.g. *CP* 3.113). Antonius Musa's sectarian affiliations are attested at Plin. *HN* 29.6, and although 'auditor' is an insertion by some editors, as the text stands he is simply a follower rather than a student of Asclepiades; on his cure of Augustus see, e.g., Suet. *Aug.* 59 and 81; and Cass. Dio 53.30.3–4, which states that he is a freedman.

⁶¹ Diosc. *Materia medica* (*MM*) pr. 2; Plin. *HN* 1 (books 12–16 and 28–32: Niger; 20–7 and 33–4: Niger and Bassus), cf. 29.17. Presumably Titus also wrote in Greek: a *De anima* is referred to by Caelius Aurelianus (*TP* 1.178), which would have been *Peri psychēs* in Soranus.

⁶² Diosc. *MM* pr. 2; Gallus appears in Galen, *Comp. med. loc.* 8.5 (XIII 179 K.), Clodius in Caelius Aurelianus (*CP* 3.96), and Lucius (or Lysias) in Soranus, *Gyn.* 3.1.

Dioscorides, a non-sectarian author of a specialist medical treatise, also identifies the doctrinal signature of the *Asklēpiadeioi* in much the same way as encyclopaedic summarizers and compilers of medical handbooks will. It is their commitment to a particulate physics which is crucial: their commitment to a conception of the human body as composed from *onkoi* (corpuscles) and *poroi* (pores or passages); and to a definition of health as balance (*summetria*) of the *onkoi* and *poroi*, and disease as caused by the impaction (*entasis*) of the former in the latter.⁶³ This, of course, also informs their therapeutics. Galen repeatedly brands Asclepiades 'shameless' for his rejection of a specific humoral approach, indeed of any kind of qualitative approach to curative regimes and prescriptions altogether.⁶⁴ Others found more appealing the notion of 'general remedies' (or 'aids') – such as abstaining from or drinking wine or water, fasting, massage and various forms of 'passive exercise' (for example, rocking) – which emerged from Asclepiades' ideas about how human bodies interact with their environment – how somatic composition and balance are affected.⁶⁵ Celsus adapts an Asclepiadean pattern in parts of his exposition, and Pliny views the seductive simplicity and pleasantness of these therapies as the secret of the Bithynian's success amongst the Roman elite.⁶⁶

The encompassing and integrated character of Asclepiades' medical system is thus clear. His views obviously had epistemological dimensions too, and, as well as the implicit commitment to reason as the basis of his version of the *iatrikē technē*, the Bithynian is cast by Galen as openly despising experience more generally: as a vocal, though contradictory, opponent of reliance on it in medicine and, it follows, hostile to the *Empeirikē hairesis*.⁶⁷ This does not seem to be Asclepiades' main concern, however. He was more positively focused on his systematic and joined-up approach to medicine and on promoting its innovative qualities: on the newness of his prescriptions and therapies, and the way they fitted into a larger set of

⁶³ See, e.g., Cels. pr. 15–16; [Gal.] *Int.* 9.5 and 13.6 (21.12–14 and 47.15–18 Petit); and Gal. *PHP* 5.3.18 (*CMG* V 4.1.2: 308.27–9). For general discussion see Vallance 1990; though debate about the precise nature of these *onkoi* is very much ongoing: see Polito 2007a and Leith 2009.

⁶⁴ Gal. *Hipp. elem.* 12.1–11 (*CMG* V 1.2 147.8–149.14).

⁶⁵ *Communia auxilia* in Celsus (2.14) and Pliny (*HN* 26.13); *communia adiutoria* in Caelius Aurelianus (*CP* 1.152); perhaps originally κοινὰ βοηθήματα?

⁶⁶ Cels. 2.9–17; Plin. *HN* 26.13–17.

⁶⁷ Gal. *Sect. int.* 5 (*Scripta minora* 3 9.9–13); *Subf. emp.* 11 and 12 (84.11–31 and 88.19–89.1 Dgr); *Med. exp.* 1 (86 Walzer). Galen is, of course, a deeply hostile witness, but the criticism of Asclepiades as over-reliant on theory at the expense of practice and experience is more widespread: e.g. Diosc. *MM* pr. 2; Plin. *HN* 26.12–13.

understandings and explanations.⁶⁸ The novelty may have worn off, but his many followers certainly stuck to his main teachings and remained committed to a physiology, pathology and therapeutics based on *onkoi* and *poroi* – on the body's particulate situation, processes, and interactions. And they did so with continuing success, as has already been illustrated, in respect of both the prominence of their patients and their wider contribution to the intellectual and practical portions of the medical enterprise.⁶⁹

Doctrinal continuity seems to have been maintained, in part, through systematic exegesis of Asclepiades' writings. Medical pedagogy was to become increasingly bound up with commentary, the detailed explication of a set of texts, and it appears that this was the Asclepiadean practice from early on. Caelius Aurelianus (following Soranus) has Asclepiades' *sectatores* picking over his statements word by word, and Pliny makes a rather vague reference to close study, examination, of Asclepiades' famous book *The Wine-Giver* (*Oinodotes*).⁷⁰ This suggests some kind of institutional framework, presumably located in Rome, though there is no reason to suppose that that was the only place where the teachings of Asclepiades might be engaged with; nor should the formality of any such set-up be exaggerated. The list of followers or adherents is a relatively long one but it lacks scholars, or even leaders; and, indeed, specified master–pupil relationships are absent after the first generation. Rawson agrees that the physician Sextus Fadius, whom Cicero encounters in Velia in 44 BCE, is the pupil of Nico of Agrigentum, though neither his teacher's ethnic nor his sectarian affiliation is specified.⁷¹ Artorius or Antonius Musa would be similarly second- or third-generation Asclepiadeans, but all the other physicians so labelled float more freely in time, occupying a space somewhere after Asclepiades and before the date of the treatises in which they appear. The vitality of the Asclepiadean lineage through the first century BCE and well into the first century CE is apparent none the less, as is its focus on Rome,

⁶⁸ Though the reports (e.g. Cels. 2.14 and Plin. *HN* 26.14) tend to refute, or minimize, Asclepiades' claims to innovation, at least in the therapeutic domain, that only serves to emphasize novelty as a key aspect of his rhetoric.

⁶⁹ Contrary to Vallance's entirely unfounded assertion that the followers of Asclepiades were 'few, somewhat neurotic', and 'not particularly important' (1990:, 131).

⁷⁰ Cael. Aur. *CP* 1.pr.7–9, and 3.189; Plin. *HN* 23.32.

⁷¹ Cic. *Fam.* 7.20.3; Rawson 1982: 363 n. 34. Her argument is very plausible but does tend to speak against her dating – not definitively by any means, but the sequence works more smoothly if Asclepiades' activities extend beyond 91 BCE.

although there are numerous Greek names as well as Roman amongst its adherents.⁷²

The *nova secta* that Asclepiades founded is, therefore, new in both form and content, not to mention location. The geography and cultural flavour of learned medicine is shifting, aligning itself more closely with the changing patterns of political power. So it is perhaps unsurprising that the main challenge to Asclepiadean dominance at Rome should come from within, from the defection of Asclepiades' pupil Themison of Laodicea and the establishment of a rival medical grouping by his followers, based on a particular 'method' (*methodos*). It is in this direction that this discussion will now turn.

A passage in Pliny has Themison initially loyal, adding to his teacher's writings, and then subsequently changing his doctrines ('decreta').⁷³ Celsus considered this divergence to have occurred very late in life – *in senectute*.⁷⁴ Caelius Aurelianus' ongoing engagement with both master and pupil presents a similar pattern of continuity, collaboration and then departure but from a different perspective.⁷⁵ While for Pliny Themison's move is symptomatic of a wider malaise in the world of Greek medicine, as its factionalism, instability, disagreements and changeability all count heavily against it, for Celsus it is more progressive but still generically so.⁷⁶ It is not that Celsus actually favours the Laodicean physician's teachings, the *methodos* he and his followers propound, but that he has a broadly positive view of change, new ideas, in the medical tradition in general. Recent developments, as he sees it, have pushed matters forward, adding to the medical resources he can call on in compiling his encyclopaedia today. For Caelius, on the other hand, Themison's defection is a very specific step in the right direction, towards the true 'method', and the formation of the sect with which he himself identifies.⁷⁷ There is still considerable work to be done: Thessalus of Tralles and (most especially) Soranus of Ephesus,

⁷² Diodorus and Niceratus: Diosc. *MM* pr. 2; Chrysippus: Cael. Aur. *TP* 4.114; Demetrius of Apamea: Sor. *Gyn.* 3.1; Arius: Gal. *Comp. med. loc.* 4.8 and 5.3 (XII 776 and 829 K.). These are all names which appear elsewhere in the medical literature too, without sectarian specifications; in some cases identity is almost certain, in others most unlikely, and in many somewhere in between.

⁷³ Plin. *HN* 29.6. ⁷⁴ Cels. pr. 11.

⁷⁵ The linked references to Themison and Asclepiades are too numerous to mention, but *CP* 2.84 is the most explicit about their ongoing interplay and collaboration.

⁷⁶ Though Pliny still labels Themison 'a top authority' ('summo auctore'): *HN* 14.115; and includes him in the list of authorities for a number of his books.

⁷⁷ See, e.g., *TP* 4.6, where Themison had 'not yet clearly grasped the methodic teaching' ('nondum limpide methodicam perspicere disciplinam'); and 5.51, where his views are described as partly *methodicus* and partly not; in contrast to *nostri methodici* at e.g. *CP* 2.179.

whose treatise Caelius is 'Latinizing', will need to complete the job in the first century CE; but they are building on Themison's foundations and, indeed, owe much to Asclepiades too.⁷⁸

Still, Celsus, writing a couple of decades before Thessalus' arrival on the Roman medical scene, speaks of the followers ('aemuli') of Themison as a distinct grouping, as a self-identified, definite presence in contemporary medical culture.⁷⁹ He locates them in the context of the epistemological debates between the champions of reason and those of experience, and as asserting their distance from both.⁸⁰ According to Celsus, they held that causes are irrelevant to therapy, all that is required being to grasp the 'generalities' ('communia') of disease: its division into 'constricted' ('adstrictum'), 'fluid' ('fluens'), and 'mixed' ('mixtum') varieties. Recognition of these types, whether the conditions are acute or chronic, and of their phases, leads to the appropriate therapeutic conclusions. They call this path, or process, 'the method' (*methodos* in Greek) and have built their sectarian identity around it. Thus, they disagree with both the notion that medicine is a matter of 'conjecture about hidden things' ('coniectura rerum latentium'), and the view that it is a matter of 'studying experience' ('observatione experimentorum'). Having set up this double rejection, however, Celsus goes on to undermine its validity.⁸¹ Themison's followers must, in fact, be relying on reason or experience in the construction of their method, and on their commitment to it; and they have impoverished these two possibilities, these two approaches, through their denials and misunderstandings. Excluding the benefits of causal considerations, on the one hand, and the detailed differentiation of diseases, cases and circumstances, on the other, is unhelpful and is not what actually happens anyway.

Celsus' project in all this is pretty clear, for his own position emerges through this discussion as roughly the mirror image of the one he gives to Themison's *aemuli*: that is, an acceptance of the contribution of both reason and experience, generality and particularity, to the medical art, in a properly balanced combination.⁸² His reportage is, therefore, undoubtedly rather

⁷⁸ On Caelius' relationship to Soranus' text see, e.g., *CP* 2.65, 2.147; for a neat alignment of Asclepiades, Themison, Soranus and Caelius see, e.g., *TP* 3.122.

⁷⁹ Celsus always uses *aemuli* rather than the later *sectatores* (e.g. pr. 20 and 62 – of Asclepiades and Themison respectively); those associated with Themison are a presence *saeculi nostri* (pr. 54). The Latin terminology may still be under construction – see Langslow 2000 for discussion – or Celsus may have a different view of such 'followers'.

⁸⁰ They are the focus of discussion at pr. 54–7; though it should be said that the actual views of Themison himself are not articulated here and indeed may be different (54).

⁸¹ Cels. pr. 62–7. ⁸² Cels. pr. 68–75; and see the discussion of von Staden 1994.

contrived, and quite different from that of Soranus and Caelius Aurelianus, for example. Though consistently critical of Themison's Asclepiadeanisms, these authors never represent his moves towards the true 'method' in epistemological terms, and they rarely deploy traditional (or Hellenistic) sectarian terms more generally.⁸³ There is little sense of a really radical break at any level, either between Asclepiades and Themison or between the latter and his successors; rather there is a rolling programme of therapeutic reform. Caelius catalogues and corrects numerous curative errors, in which the occasional conceptual misprision is of no more significance than the much more frequent mistakes of practical detail, of timing and technique, of prescription and process.⁸⁴

Alongside the regular engagement with the man himself, Caelius also repeatedly refers to Themison's *secta* and *sectatores*.⁸⁵ Indeed, he mentions two followers by name – Eudemus and Proclus – and reports, praises and criticizes their views on a number of medical matters.⁸⁶ Though the only figure explicitly labelled as Themison's student (*mathētēs*) is Meges of Sidon (by a scholiast on Oribasius), the assumption has been that both Proclus and Eudemus were his pupils, not just adherents: students, indeed, of his old age, because, unlike Meges, they appear in various listings of *Methodikoi*.⁸⁷ This is all rather speculative, however, and attempting to construct a lineage of Themisonians, or early Methodics, is impossible given the partial and contradictory nature of the evidence. Some texts tend to confirm the closeness of Themison, Proclus and Eudemus, others refute it, and many are entirely indifferent.⁸⁸ All that can be said with certainty

⁸³ This may be a function of what survives: Soranus' more theoretical works (e.g. *On Generalities* and *On Causation*) might have participated in different debates. On his oeuvre see Hanson and Green 1994.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., the sustained engagement at *CP* 1.116–54 (Asclepiades) and 155–65 (Themison). Caelius does accuse Themison of speculative 'dogmatism' and mistaken Asclepiadean physics (*TP* 4.4–8) but errors of timing are just as important.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., *CP* 1.155 and *TP* 1.179 ('secta') and *CP* 3.173; *TP* 1.183, 2.157 and 4.8 ('sectatores'); see also Sen. *Ep.* 95.9–10 for reference to the *sectae* of Asclepiades and Themison (as well as Hippocrates) as exemplifying doctrinal difference in medicine.

⁸⁶ Cael. Aur. *CP* 2.219, 3.105 and 3.107 (Eudemus); *TP* 3.100 (Proclus)

⁸⁷ See, e.g., Gal. *MM* 1.7 (X 52–3 K.) for such a listing; and for Meges see schol. on Orib. *Coll. med.* 44.21 (*CMG* VI 2.1: 142.12). Caelius does use the word *discipulus* on occasion, but he is not consistent in picking out pupils from amongst the general adherents, and, is, of course, much later.

⁸⁸ Confirming: e.g. the *Suda* entry which describes the Neoplatonist Proclus as a 'hierophant of Themison of Laodicea' (s.v. Πρόκλος; 210 Adler), and Gal. *MM* 1.7 (X 52–3 K.); refuting: e.g. [Gal.] *Intro.* 4.3 (9.24–10.5 Petit); indifferent: Celsus, in which some of the other names on Galen's list appear (which would make them early), but without sectarian or any other identifying labels, and they are hardly rare (e.g. Dionysius!). Attempts to identify this Eudemus with Eudemus the physician (and more) of Livilla, the ill-fated wife of Drusus and daughter of Germanicus (mentioned, without sectarian affiliation, at Tac. *Ann.* 4.3–11 and Plin. *HN* 29.20) would obviously help with

is that Themison did found a distinct medical grouping in the mid first century BCE, which seems to have been centred on Rome and formed according to the new style;⁸⁹ that is, on terms which could be construed epistemologically but do not seem to have been presented that way by their instigator. His followers might have been more inclined to discourse on reason and experience; but, while Celsus may be right to say that ‘through their name’ (‘eo nomine’) they registered their dissent from the partisans of both, on the assumption that the name in question is ‘Methodics’ (or, at least something based on *methodos*), this dissent could be more thoroughgoing than he allows.⁹⁰ It might be less concerned with rejecting speculation about hidden causes or observation than with rejecting both as routes to intellectual identity, asserting instead that they should be defined in a more processual way, through their whole approach to the aims of the art of medicine.

It is not just Asclepiades and Themison in Rome who are ringing in the changes at this juncture, breaking up the old Hellenistic medical settlement, for there is another, less easily localized but just as distinctive, medical current which arrives on the scene in the first century BCE. The *Pneumatikē hairesis*, a grouping within the ‘rationalist’ fold which is named not from its founder or its ‘frame of mind’ or ‘method’ but from its commitment to the ‘all-pervading *pneuma*’ as the underlying cause of both health and disease.⁹¹ This is just one of the notions that Athenaeus of Attaleia, the inaugural *Pneumatikos*, took from the Stoics, for he was, according to the surviving Arabic translation of Galen’s treatise *On Containing Causes*, ‘a pupil’ (*tilmîd*) of Posidonius.⁹² The Latin version is less specific in its phrasing but certainly places Athenaeus and Posidonius in a direct and personal relationship.⁹³ The obvious place for the Attaleian physician to have studied with Posidonius is Rhodes, and the indications are that this was in the latter stages of Posidonius’ career, but where Athenaeus then

the chronology but have nothing else to recommend them (and the maths at Tescusan 2004: 14 does not work at all).

⁸⁹ Celsus clearly, if implicitly, locates Themison and his school in Rome, and the Laodicean wrote about a case of satyriasis he witnessed in Milan as well as addressing therapeutic letters to one Asilius, a good Roman name (Cael. Aur. *CP* 3.186).

⁹⁰ Cels. pr. 57; he never uses the word ‘methodici’, but does emphasize that there is self-definition through the *methodos*, as does, Caelius.

⁹¹ τῶ διήκοντι δι’ αὐτῶν πνεύματι: [Gal.] *Int.* 9.6 (22.12–17 Petit); whether they called themselves *Pneumatikoi* is entirely unclear; indeed there are hints to the contrary.

⁹² Gal. *CC* 2.1 (*CMG Supp. Or.* II 54.3–6); the links with Stoicism are more general, and more generally remarked on, too, see, e.g., [Gal.] *Int.* 9.5 (21.14–21 Petit).

⁹³ Athenaeus was ‘conversatus’ with Posidonius, in Nicolò da Reggio’s translation (*CMG Supp. Or.* II 134.3–6).

lived, practised, wrote and taught is entirely obscure. He might have stayed on Rhodes, or moved to Alexandria or to another city of the Greek East or even, though this seems the least likely, have visited Rome. If Athenaeus had spent time in the imperial capital then he and his followers would not have escaped Celsus' notice, as they did, whereas recent medical developments outside the metropolis are basically ignored by the encyclopaedist. It is a few decades after Celsus was writing that the *Pneumatikoi* make a splash at Rome, with Agathinus the Spartan and his even more famous pupil, Archigenes of Apamea; and Agathinus seems to have made a conscious effort at relaunching the 'pneumatic' brand of medicine.⁹⁴

Though the *Pneumatikoi* do not seem to have made the most propitiously located of starts, then, Athenaeus did have students, one of whom – Theodorus – is named by Diogenes Laertius, and a 'Magnus' also comes between the original founder and Agathinus.⁹⁵ What Athenaeus also had was a systematic and theoretically developed approach to the medical art, which seems to have been contained in a single thirty-book work, *Peri boēthēmātōn*, from which only fragments survive.⁹⁶ It covered elemental physics and general principles of causation, as well as human physiology and pathology – the causes and classifications of disease – regimen and therapeutics. Galen has nothing but admiration for the scope and coherence of Athenaeus' vision, for his rigour and thoroughness, and his construction of an entire medical system, though he often strongly disagrees with the actual content (or, at least, claims he does).⁹⁷ He also notes that Athenaeus engaged with, and argued against, Asclepiades' elemental theories, which not only would tend to confirm the Attaleian as a figure of the mid rather than early first century BCE but also emphasizes the equivalence between the two men's medical projects.⁹⁸

These are both systems built around the application of certain kinds of physics to medicine, to understanding the human body in sickness and health, and to the movement between the two. These physics come as part

⁹⁴ See e.g. [Gal.] *Def. Med.* 14 (XIX 353 K.) for Agathinus' 'discovery' of a 'fourth sect', which he called 'episyntetic'.

⁹⁵ Diog. Laert. 2.103; Theodorus; Magnus appears between Athenaeus and Agathinus in lists at both Gal. *Diff. puls.* 3.6 (VIII 674 K.) and Cael. Aur. *CP* 2.58 though the latter is cast, in some sense, as a listing of methodics. At a stretch, Theodorus and Magnus could make a direct paedagogic line of descent from Athenaeus to Agathinus, and so Archigenes.

⁹⁶ Mostly as excerpts in Oribasius, and a collection of the fragments and testimonia remains very much a desideratum. Wellmann 1895 is outdated but not really superseded by Kulf 1970.

⁹⁷ See, e.g., Gal. *Hipp. elem.* 6.2 (CMG V 1.2: 102.7–10); *Caus. symp.* 3.1 (VII 165 K.); Athenaeus' division and organization of the parts of medicine also made it into the medical handbooks, see e.g. [Gal.] *Int.* 7.4 (14.9–14 Petit); cf. [Gal.] *Def. med.* 10 (XIX 351 K.)

⁹⁸ Gal. *Hipp. elem.* 9.20 (CMG V 1.2: 132.21–134.2).

of wider packages, moreover: they fit into larger philosophical structures. The sense of buying into the whole package may be more direct and obvious for Athenaeus in relation to the Stoics than for Asclepiades in relation to the Epicureans, and much scholarly energy has been expended on trying to distance the Bithynian from contemporary atomism; but it is still there none the less.⁹⁹ David Leith has recently and persuasively argued for a closer connection between Asclepiades and Epicurus than has been fashionable lately, and there is a broader point of systematicity too.¹⁰⁰ Theoretical reach and coherence, practical completeness and explanatory continuity have all become important features of the way in which sectarian identities are formed in the medical world of the first century BCE, in line with other intellectual developments of the period, well exemplified by Antiochus' new philosophical system. Again reminiscent of Antiochus, epistemology has been integrated into these more encompassing approaches, rather than making the running; and there is a sense in which Themison's 'method' could be seen as a more compact, pared down, version of this same project.

This is, of course, to argue that a primary characteristic of the changing shape of medical sectarianism in the late Hellenistic period is a growing philosophical influence on medicine or, to be more precise, a greater impact of certain philosophical schools on medicine, rather than vice versa.¹⁰¹ However, these more philosophically sophisticated medical currents could then contribute to, and become more involved in, discussions within and between the various philosophical formations, as Antiochus registers with his reference to Asclepiades' views on sensation and perception. The importance of location and connection has also been emphasized in this increasingly Rome-centred world. Being in Rome itself is more important for the medical men than for the philosophers at this point, but both benefit from association with the Roman aristocracy. The key source for the elite relations of Antiochus and Asclepiades, however, namely Cicero, again underlines the distinction between the two. He makes only a single reference to the Bithynian physician, to his persuasiveness and success, but without any medical content, which stands in stark contrast to his much more substantial discursive engagement with Antiochus. This is far more expansive, and with real content, actual exploration of his teaching, involving a larger cast, a larger set of ideas and a larger stage. The relative position of

⁹⁹ See, e.g., Vallance 1990; Asclepiades' *onkoi* are definitely frangible, but there is a question about how much that really matters.

¹⁰⁰ Leith 2009.

¹⁰¹ This is a trend that will continue, so, for example, the revitalization of the Empiric sect under the Roman Empire will be in close alliance with Pyrrhonian Scepticism.

philosophy and medicine, with the former being something that a Roman senator might himself practise and the latter something he will get others to practise for him, is thus writ large. Still, these aristocratic entanglements were advantageous in both cases, strengthening as they did Antiochus' and Asclepiades' claims to authority and leadership in their own fields.

CONCLUSION

There is then a sense in which medicine and philosophy converged in the late Hellenistic world. The philosophical schools moved a little closer to the medical *haireseis* in their configuration and meaning, with the new/old foundations of Antiochus and Aenesidemus, and a greater degree of mobility between groupings more generally; while the figures really setting the pace in the medical domain are those who have finally adopted the programme of the Hellenistic philosophical schools and have built coherent medical systems on philosophical models. Antiochus' gesture towards contemporary medical thought, preserved by Sextus Empiricus, could be seen as recognizing that growing philosophical sophistication amongst some leading physicians. However, though much of this movement, on both sides, fits in with wider patterns of change in the late Hellenistic Mediterranean, little actual interaction between medicine and philosophy has been detected beyond the general traffic in ideas. Moreover, while some of the geopolitical factors at work have had similar effects across the board, others have impacted in a more differentiated way, reinforcing the divergent social and political positions of medicine and philosophy, and underlining their distinct organizational principles.

So, for example, while the metropolitan strongholds of philosophy and medicine – Athens and Alexandria respectively – are both damaged and displaced by the rise of Roman power, and by the conflicts and alliances implicated in that rise, there are elements of commonality and difference in the stories which play out as a result. On the one hand, that decentralization fosters greater variation in approach and allows for more innovation (however framed) is a point of general validity; on the other hand, Athens and Alexandria are quite distinct cities, with quite distinct metropolitan claims, so that much else will diverge. Whereas Athens' grip on philosophy is historical and ideological and has already survived its political fall, Alexandria's grip on medicine is rather more pragmatic. The Egyptian capital will find enough of a history to be able to rebuild itself as the premier, though far from exclusive, centre of medical education in the early Roman Empire, after its power has definitely departed, but with that political

loss will go its ability to keep hold of the most medically ambitious. These physicians will, by and large, move on from Alexandria to Rome; for unlike the philosophers, who can expect sections of the Roman elite to come to them, physicians have to go to their patients, and, for the time being, their aristocratic interactions will be mainly by the bedside or at least have the bedside in fairly direct view.¹⁰²

Antiochus and Asclepiades demonstrate these differences despite their dialogue. Antiochus will return to again-defeated Athens to teach and will have Roman senators as students; Asclepiades will stay in victorious Rome but will not count senators amongst his pupils, and, though it is necessary to construe the category of patient pretty broadly to encompass his relations with Crassus, that does seem to be the correct category none the less.¹⁰³ Moreover, while without a school identity of some kind a philosopher would find students hard to come by (indeed, it might be argued that in the ancient world just being a philosopher, without a school, is existentially tricky), the same cannot be said of physicians in search of patients. Claiming to have studied in Alexandria or to be an Asclepiadean or the like will have assisted in the process of self-marketing, especially to the elite, but it was not essential, and other aspects of the presentation took priority. Certainly, just being a physician, without further affiliation, was not only a viable possibility but also a very common one, even amongst those operating in the learned medical tradition. For all could go back to Hippocrates and lay claim to his authority; sectarian divisions in medicine came later and, however elaborate, were less fundamental than in philosophy. Antiochus, on the other hand, rather emphasizes the fundamental quality of the philosophical schools.

¹⁰² The situation will have changed by the late second century CE when, as Galen records, the didactic and epideictic dimensions of interactions between doctors and elite in Rome have become more prominent, but winning patients remains essential.

¹⁰³ Ancient doctors offered a range of services, both practical and discursive, to their patients, particularly the richer ones.

CHAPTER 4

Antiochus as historian of philosophy

David Sedley

Is the history of philosophy a part of philosophy? This question may divide twenty-first-century philosophy departments, but no philosopher in antiquity would have hesitated to answer affirmatively, and Antiochus least of all. For him, understanding the history of the Academic tradition was integral to the task of achieving a correct philosophical alignment. Most of what I have to say in this chapter is concerned with his presuppositions and methodology in reconstructing Academic history, with particular regard to epistemology.

At least one of the texts I will be visiting takes me back to two earlier papers¹ in which I developed the thesis that Antiochus is the source of Sextus Empiricus' doxography of Epicurean epistemology. For present purposes I shall mainly content myself with discussing just one part of the longer passage from which it comes, the section concerning Plato. But I will thereby be implicitly raising the question, familiar from the parallel history of Posidonian studies, how legitimate it is to use as evidence for a philosopher passages which are not explicitly attributed to him but judged to embody his work. Some are wary of ever extending the Antiochean database beyond the explicitly attributed testimonia (listed in the Appendix to this volume). Others may limit themselves to querying whether the Antiochean credentials of this particular text are strong enough. For my part I am sure that any passage that proves to be of recognizably Antiochean content should be given a certain weight in the reconstruction of Antiochus' thought. The most prominent example is book 4 of Cicero's *De finibus*, widely and justifiably used as evidence for Antiochus' thought despite containing no reference to him. Although, following the lead of Edelstein and Kidd in the case of Posidonius, I do not favour including such passages in any list of Antiochus' fragments and testimonia, I am

¹ Sedley 1982, 1992. I regret the amount of self-citation in this chapter, but its main thesis is one that has been evolving gradually in a good deal of my past work.

certain that we ignore them at our peril. Antiochean studies have undoubtedly seen an overuse of speculative attributions, but minimalism is not the only alternative to maximalism. There is plenty of middle ground, whose potential for extending our knowledge of Antiochus we should be actively exploring. I aim to illustrate the point in this chapter.

ANTIOCHUS' METHODS

In outline, I shall characterize Antiochus' historical priorities as follows. It is no accident that he calls himself an Academic rather than a Platonist, because his interest is in realigning himself with the mainstream tradition of the Academy as a school, not with the thought of Plato in particular. Hence in ethics the two most important figures for him are in fact Aristotle and Polemo (Cic. *Fin.* 5.14), whom he regards as having bequeathed the best-articulated versions of the school's stance. Aristotle, that is, despite founding a separate school, was Plato's most important pupil. Polemo, for his part, was the last major figure to head the Academy proper in its early phase and is thus in a sense the voice of the entire foregoing tradition. These two are, then, the Academy's summative spokesmen, having taken the ethical system nearly as far as it could go, while safely predating the tradition's collapse in the early third century BCE, as marked by the sceptics' takeover of the Academy and the accession of the narrowly focused physicist Strato to the headship of the Peripatetic school. As for Plato himself, although his unique status as originator of the movement is not in doubt, he is by no means its best spokesman. There is little sign that Antiochus anticipated the main Middle Platonists in making the text of Plato's dialogues the primary focus of study. I know of only one Platonic sentence that he can be seen to have scrutinized closely (I shall turn to it shortly). But I shall also be arguing that in the last two decades of his life Antiochus was moving in the direction of the close textual study which was to become the hallmark of the new philosophical age. Moreover, no matter what uncertainties may remain as to which of the Stoics' 'corrections' to the Academic stance Antiochus endorsed, he certainly endorsed a number of them,² and I see no possible doubt that Plato was among those being corrected. For Antiochus, Plato's unique importance as founder of the school did not imply his infallibility.

The central focus of this chapter will be Antiochus' history of his tradition's epistemology. For not only was epistemology *the* central issue for the

² For ethics, see the calculation in Brittain 2006a: xxxii: of the six 'corrections', Antiochus accepted four. Even on a more conservative estimate, one that suspends judgement about his view on soul division, he accepted half. See further, Brittain (this volume).

historical identity of the Academy as a distinct school, it was also the issue which led to Antiochus' defection from the school and which underlay his subsequent skirmishes with its official head, Philo. I shall argue that he tried out two importantly different versions of the school's epistemological history, both of them put at the service of his own philosophical stance. One approach, probably the earlier of the two, maximized the diachronic unity of the tradition. The second, probably later version, is openly pluralistic and emphasizes a variety of deviations from the correct position ultimately established.

My proposal will be that this latter, more pluralistic alternative emerged after the publication in 87 BCE of Philo of Larissa's Roman books. Antiochus did after all continue to write for approximately twenty years after the Roman episode, and there would be risks in ignoring the final phase of his career when considering his development.³ In the Roman books Philo had outraged Antiochus by claiming that the entire Academic tradition, not excepting the New Academy, had shared a single core epistemological doctrine. It was, I shall suggest, in order to undermine this historical 'lie' (Cic. *Luc.* 12), as the Antiocheans called it, that Antiochus adjusted his own philosophical history.

SOCRATES

Let me start with a small illustration of the point. One key historical link which Antiochus sacrificed in order to win his battle with Philo seems to have been the inclusion of Socrates in the Platonic fold. It was typical of ancient Platonism to merge the philosophical positions of Plato and Socrates, and Antiochus can be indirectly witnessed doing so himself in Cicero, *Lucullus* 15.

Both Plato and Socrates are to be excluded from their [the sceptics'] number . . . Socrates was self-deprecatory in debate, and gave more of the credit to those he was setting out to refute. Thus, since it was his practice to say one thing but mean another, he enjoyed habitually using the kind of pretence that the Greeks call 'irony'.

According to the Antiochean Lucullus here, Socrates' disavowal of knowledge does not suffice to differentiate him from the doctrinaire stance of

³ Tarrant 2007 also marks off Antiochus' final twenty years as a distinct phase but takes their defining doctrine to be the acceptance of Stoic *katalēpsis*. I myself believe that Antiochus had already endorsed this doctrine in the 90s, the period in which it was being asked why he did not defect to the Stoa (Cic. *Luc.* 69). On the chronological issue, see further Hatzimichali, this volume, pp. 13–14 and Polito, this volume, pp. 32–4.

Plato, his pretensions to ignorance being merely ironic. The main Antiochean arguments from which Cicero constructed this speech of Lucullus are ones that predated Philo's Roman books, because the Roman innovations, although mentioned at the outset, are explicitly excluded from the scope of his attack (*Luc.* 12).⁴ If by contrast, as I am hypothesizing, the material used for Varro's Antiochean speech in book 1 postdates the Roman episode, that chronological hypothesis makes immediate sense of an otherwise puzzling contradiction between the two speeches. For according to Varro (*Ac.* 1.16–17) Socrates' disavowal was entirely sincere: he was a non-doctrinal dialectical disputant who believed himself to know only that he knew nothing; and Plato's philosophy represented a new start, of which Socrates would have disapproved:

[16] In virtually all his discussions, which were elaborately and fully transcribed by those who heard them, Socrates debates in such a way as to affirm nothing, while himself refuting others, and to declare that he knows nothing, with the exception of that one fact itself. He says that what makes him superior to others is that they think they know the things that they do not know, whereas he himself knows only that he knows nothing. The reason why he thinks Apollo has called him the wisest of all people is that this is the only human wisdom – not to think you know what you do not. Since this was what he was constantly saying, and an opinion which he persisted in holding, his talk was entirely taken up in praising virtue and encouraging people to pursue it, as can be learnt from the books of the Socratics, and those of Plato above all. [17] . . . [The Platonists and Peripatetics] abandoned that Socratic practice of arguing about everything in a spirit of doubt without affirming anything. Thus there came into being what Socrates least of all approved of: a kind of philosophical expertise, a system, and the construction of a discipline.

So firm a separation of Plato from Socrates would be widely accepted today, but as far as I know Antiochus was its only ancient proponent.⁵ Is this a sign of his refreshing emancipation from the prejudices of ancient philosophical historiography? Probably not. My suggestion is, rather, that

⁴ The text from which Cicero actually drew these arguments was probably Antiochus' reply to Philo's Roman books, in debate with the New Academic Heraclitus, because they include the summary of 'a whole day's debate' (*Luc.* 49) about the Academic appeal to empty impressions, and this 'day' was clearly one of 'complures dies' (*Luc.* 12) that the entire Antiochus–Heraclitus debate took up. But Lucullus is explicit in immediately adding that he will omit the part concerning Philo's Roman heresy, and we can therefore assume that, as the remainder of Lucullus' speech tends to confirm, the arguments excerpted reflected Antiochus' disagreement with the New Academy as developed prior to the Roman episode. There is no necessity to suppose that Antiochus' rather radical re-evaluation of Socrates' relation to Plato (see immediately below) occurred instantaneously, and some reason to think otherwise, since it will have required rereading a good deal of the corpus.

⁵ On the seeming 'modernity' of this reading, cf. Sedley 2002a: 51; Karamanolis 2006: 52, who also points out that Varro contrasts Socrates' concentration on ethics with Plato's systematic philosophy.

the idea arose as a countermove to Philo's extravagant thesis of the unity of the entire Academic epistemological tradition, a thesis which (just like the Antiochean history with which it was competing) will almost certainly have included Socrates in its scope, along with Plato and his successors.

These twin accounts of Socrates are important, because they stand as clear evidence that Antiochus did not operate throughout with a single historical model, and that in his version of philosophical history preserved in Cicero's *Academica* I he was less syncretistic than in some other contexts.

PLATO'S ANTI-EMPIRICISM

With this finding in mind, I now turn to another, equally surprising feature of Varro's speech, his unexpectedly anti-empiricist interpretation of early Academic epistemology (Cic. *Ac.* 1.30–2):

Although it arose from the senses, they did not want the criterion (*iudicium*) of truth to lie in the senses. They wanted the mind to be criterial (*iudicem*) of things, holding that it alone was worthy of being believed, because it alone discerned that which was eternally simple, uniform and in possession of its own character. This they called an *Idea*, as Plato had already named it, and we can correctly use the word 'Form'. As for the senses, on the other hand, they judged them all to be (a₁) dull and (b₁) slow, and not to grasp at all any things that appeared to fall under the senses' gaze, because those things were either (a₂) too small to be accessible by a sense, or (b₂) in such frantic motion that none was ever single or even the same thing, everything being in continual flux. For this reason, they called this entire realm 'opinionable'. Knowledge they believed to lie nowhere but in the mind's conceptions and reasonings.

Although this anti-empiricism is attributed to the early school quite generally, there should be little doubt that for once Plato's own text is paramount, not least the radical statement of the two-world view⁶ at *Timaeus* 27d–28a, to which we will be returning below.

Antiochus' message is quite clear: for the entire early Academy and Peripatos, the criterion of truth lay in reason alone, and the senses were discounted as hopelessly unreliable. The supposed Peripatetic contribution no doubt lies mainly in the material about dialectic and rhetoric which follows (at 32) the passage I have translated, but Plato himself is here

⁶ In saying this I am not taking sides in the debate, addressed by Boys-Stones (this volume), as to whether Antiochus himself took Plato's Forms to be metaphysically transcendent. However, his description of Plato as thinking there to be something divine in them (*Ac.* 1.33) suggests to me that he had in mind passages such as *Resp.* 500d, which elevate the Forms to a far higher status than the human ἐνορήματα to which Stoicism had reduced them. Cf. Blank, pp. 274–5 below.

implicitly the school's epistemological ringleader, because the reported grounds for the unreliability of the senses lie squarely in his physics and metaphysics as classically represented in the *Timaeus*.⁷ (a) The real nature of physical things lies in the primary triangles and particles of which they are composed, and these are below the threshold of perception: that is the explanation of the senses being too 'dull'. (b) What does present itself to the senses is in a state of constant and rapid flux which makes it only opinable (δοξαστόν, *Ti.* 28a3), not knowable: this rapid flux is the explanation of the senses being too 'slow'. The analysis, in other words, is careful to blame the senses' inadequacy on the microscopic or rapidly changing nature of their objects.

With this in mind, we can now turn to Philo's Roman heresy. Since it apparently included a denial that the New Academy represented any departure from the early Academy (*Ac.* 1.13), the distinctive doctrine of the Roman books, which caused such outrage, was to all appearances one that Philo was attributing to the entire Academic tradition. It is formulated as follows by Sextus Empiricus (*PH* 1.235):

So far as the Stoic criterion, namely the cognitive impression, is concerned, things are uncognizable; but so far as the nature of the things themselves is concerned, they are cognizable.

ὅσον μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ Στωικῷ κριτηρίῳ, τουτέστι τῇ καταληπτικῇ φαντασίᾳ, ἀκατάληπτα εἶναι τὰ πράγματα, ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν, καταληπτὰ.

For present purposes there is no need to resolve the controversial question of what the first half of this antithesis implies about the possibility and limitations of human cognition. On a widely held view, Philo is asserting on behalf of the entire Academic tradition that there really is cognition, albeit of a kind that fails to satisfy the infallibility requirement embodied in the celebrated Stoic definition of the cognitive impression.⁸ On an alternative view, which I prefer, he goes along with the almost universal assumption that cognition entails infallibility and does not necessarily exclude its being available to the gods, but he holds (probably citing Plato,

⁷ One detail, the emphasis on the extremeness of the flux, reflects other dialogues, esp. *Theaetetus* (cf. Long 1995: 46 n. 18 for the point), more than *Timaeus*.

⁸ On this reading, which is fully defended by Brittain 2001, the New Academy was according to Philo not really arguing for *akatalēpsia*, just exposing the incoherence of the Stoic version of *katalēpsis*. A weakness of the interpretation is that it requires a fallibilist conception of *katalēpsis*, yet such a conception seems to play no part in Stoic–Academic debates, and instead to be a fringe position associated exclusively with certain unidentified Peripatetics (*Luc.* 112).

Ti. 29c–d) that human beings lack the capacity for it, a capacity such as the Stoics had described with their theory of the cognitive impression.⁹

Quite regardless of that interpretative choice, I think there is an overwhelmingly strong case for understanding the second half of the antithesis as adding that the impossibility of our achieving infallible cognition is not to be blamed on the nature of the actual objects; for ‘so far as the nature of the things themselves is concerned, they are cognizable’. The favoured alternative reading of this, which takes ‘so far as the nature of the things themselves is concerned’ (ὅσον δὲ ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν) to mean merely ‘in fact’,¹⁰ seems to me a considerable under-interpretation. It fails to allow for the emphatic recurrence of ‘things’ (πράγματα) in both halves, a recurrence whose significance is emphasized by ‘the things *themselves*’ (τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν). In so far as ‘things’ are said here to be knowable, that is not simply a statement of the cognitive facts of the matter, but a statement about the way the actual putative objects of the knowledge are: it is in virtue of those objects’ very own nature that they are knowable. They have an intrinsic capacity for being known, even if no human being will ever actualize that capacity.¹¹

An added attraction of this far more natural reading is that it may help us uncover Antiochus’ counter-strategy. For what Antiochus is hammering home in Varro’s report is that not only did the early phase of Platonism exclude knowledge of the entire realm of sensible things, but it blamed that unknowability squarely on the nature of the things themselves. That amounts to its direct denial of a thesis which, according to Philo, had united the entire Academic tradition.

One reason why Varro’s words have caused such consternation lies in the assumption, unjustified in my view, that any thesis that Antiochus

⁹ I argue briefly for this reading in Sedley 1981. See Brittain 2001: 28–9 n. 49 for a list of other proponents. It was advanced by Brochard 1887: 192–205, but has rarely been defended since and is usually altogether ignored. It is therefore misleading of Brittain to call it the ‘standard’ view. If only it were!

¹⁰ Brittain 2001: 138–40.

¹¹ For this semi-technical notion of something having a capacity ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει (an expression used nowhere else by Sextus, and therefore almost certainly Philo’s own), cf. Aëtius 2.4.2, where Plato’s position in the *Timaeus* is reported as follows: φθαρτὸν μὲν τὸν κόσμον ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει . . . οὐ μὴν φθαρησόμενόν γε, προνοίᾳ καὶ συνοχῇ θεοῦ. For a fuller version, see Philoponus, *De aeternitate mundi* 227.23–228.10, including μὴ πάμπαν εἶναι ἄλυστα καὶ ἀθάνατα ἀλλὰ θνητὰ μὲν καὶ λυτὰ ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῇ ἑαυτῶν διὰ τὸ τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν τοιαύτην εἶναι. The world has an intrinsic capacity for being destroyed, despite the fact that no agent will ever actualize that capacity (only god could do this, and he would not choose to). For a use of the same technical expression to express virtually the same epistemic point as I attribute to Philo, cf. Ammonius, *In Porphyrii Isagogen* 87.9–10, εἰ καὶ μὴ ἔγνωσται πόσα ἐστίν, ἀλλ’ οὖν γνωσθῆναι ὅσον ἐπὶ τῇ φύσει τῇ ἑαυτῶν ἐδύνατο. These examples are considerably closer to Philo’s reported usage than any cited by Brittain (2001: 139–40).

attributes to Plato and the early Academy must be one that he himself endorses, an assumption that has even led some to maintain that the passage's anti-empiricism represents his own view.¹² I think Varro makes it pretty clear that this is not the case. For at the end of his historical exposé he completes his account of Zeno's innovations with an extended summary of his empiricist epistemology (1.40–2), including a particular emphasis – much more pronounced than in Lucullus' exposition – on Zeno's vindication of the senses as reliable. And although Varro does not explicitly say that the innovation was, in Antiochean eyes, among Zeno's legitimate corrections to the earlier tradition, the length at which he sets this one out, added to its consonance with Antiochean epistemology as this is set out by Lucullus in book 2, makes that conclusion hard to resist.

My suggestion, then, is that, in order to expose the error of Philo's historical thesis, Antiochus was prepared to draw attention to the metaphysical basis of Plato's anti-empiricism, virtually citing chapter and verse for it. The fact that this simultaneously opened up a new gap between early Academic epistemology and his own did not matter, or at least represented a sacrifice he was willing to make.¹³ For it was in any case Antiochus' policy to endorse from time to time 'corrections' to the Academic tradition introduced by the Stoics, and this turned out to be just such a case.

THE EVIDENCE OF *DE FINIBUS* 4

In what I take to have been his earlier stance on the same question, predating Philo's Roman heresy, Antiochus had favoured the antithetical strategy of maximizing the continuity of his own Stoicizing epistemology with the early Academy: the Stoics were merely developing, and translating into precise technical terms, what the early Academy had already said or at least prefigured. On this unified historical overview, the early Academy and the Stoics were in agreement on the essential point that the criterion of truth lies neither in the senses alone nor in reason alone, but in the inseparable partnership of the two.

To demonstrate the existence of this as an alternative Antiochean historical account, I shall start with one short piece of evidence, then go on to a long but more contentious one.

¹² Lévy 1992: 186ff.; Bonazzi this volume.

¹³ Cicero's Philonian speech in the *Lucullus* includes the following (142–3): 'Plato autem omne iudicium veritatis veritatemque ipsam abductam ab opinionibus et a sensibus cogitationis ipsius et mentis esse voluit. num quid horum probat noster Antiochus?' It seems likely that this reflects Philo's own response to Antiochus' move, pointing out how far he has now distanced himself from Plato.

The short testimonium comes from Cicero's historical synthesis in his *De finibus* 4, a book whose main content, including its critique of Stoic ethics, is of unmistakably Antiochean origin. According to him (4.8–9), in the logical branch of philosophy, including epistemology, Zeno did not have to make any change to what he inherited from the ancients ('*nihil erat quod Zeno commutare gestiret*', 8). One reason is that the ancients 'in numerous places issue a virtual warning, that we should neither seek confirmation by the senses without reasoning, nor by reasoning without the senses, and that we should not separate the one from the other' (9). His presumed Antiochean material for this remark clearly differed utterly from that which went into Varro's history, maximizing rather than minimizing the continuity between the early Academy and Stoicism. This is, no doubt, just what one might expect of Antiochus in the absence of polemical pressures such as those exerted by Philo's rival historical thesis, and that is why I suggest that it represents his ideas prior to the Roman episode.

THE CANONICA

The longer and more contentious piece of evidence is a passage from Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 7) which forms part of his history of theories of the criterion. Its attribution to Antiochus¹⁴ requires some introduction and defence.

Sextus' doxography of the criterion falls into three very different parts. The first (*Math.* 7.49–88) is a sceptic's catalogue of those who deny any criterion of truth. I do not detect the hand of any non-sceptic source. The second (89–140) works through a series of Presocratics, maintaining that they all hold some kind of reason (λόγος) to be the criterion. The third and final part (141–260) considers a series of post-Socratic philosophers, all of whom are alleged to have made sensory self-evidence or perspicuity (*enargeia*) the criterion, some of them including 'reason' (*logos*) with it, others not. It is this third part that seems to me to be the handiwork of Antiochus. But the best way to broach my argument for such a conclusion is by starting from the second section.

The second section, on Presocratics who hold *logos* to be the criterion, contains a great deal of material which has been widely recognized as revealing the hand of the Stoic Posidonius, and there are excellent grounds for taking Posidonius to be its source. Posidonius is in fact named in it, but

¹⁴ I argue the case more fully in Sedley 1992. For the opposing view, see Brittain, this volume, pp. 108–13.

just once. If the question is asked, as it sometimes is, why someone who is the source of the whole passage would be cited by name just for one item contained in it, the answer at least in this case is clear. Sextus writes at 93,

And, says Posidonius by way of interpreting Plato's *Timaeus*, just as light is cognized by vision, which is light-like, and voice is cognized by hearing, which is air-like, so too the nature of the world is cognized by reason, which is akin to it.

The passage is elaborating Pythagorean epistemology in terms of the principle, ubiquitous in this section of the doxography, that like is known by like. The citation of such a principle from the supposedly Pythagorean *Timaeus* is part of the catalogue of supporting data, but Sextus cannot simply attribute it to the *Timaeus*, because nothing remotely like this assertion is made there. Rather, he knows it to be Posidonius' second-order comment on the *Timaeus* read globally, and he acknowledges as much in the way he reports it ('... says Posidonius by way of interpreting (ἐξηγοούμενος) Plato's *Timaeus*').¹⁵ In doing so he is obliged, for once, to name his source.¹⁶ This does not prove that Posidonius is the source for the entire Posidonian-sounding section, but the single occurrence of the name encourages the identification. And since we know of a work by Posidonius, entitled *On the Criterion*, whose content on the evidence available seems fully in tune with what we find in this Sextan doxography,¹⁷ the hypothesis that it is that doxography's main source here becomes both plausible and economical. But what is most instructive for present purposes is the glimpse we are afforded of the sparing policy on naming sources adopted in Sextus' long doxographical excursus. He does not as a matter of policy name his sources, but he does so on occasion in order to indicate a second-order comment or gloss, so as to distinguish it from direct doxographical reportage.

With that in mind, I turn now to the third section of the doxography, the one that shows the hand of Antiochus. That Antiochus attached key criterial importance to *enargeia*, sensory self-evidence, is well known from the centrality of its Latin counterpart *perspicuitas* to Lucullus' Antiochean speech in Cicero's *Lucullus*. The theme of this doxographical section in

¹⁵ There is therefore not the slightest reason to think, on the evidence of the word ἐξηγοούμενος, that Sextus' source here was an otherwise unattested *commentary* by Posidonius on the *Timaeus*, a conjecture which has had more currency than it merits.

¹⁶ It has to be admitted that later, at 119, he fails to repeat the same qualification when quoting a very similar interpretation of the *Timaeus* – probably from the same source, although this is less than certain because more or less the same interpretation of the *Timaeus* is already to be found in Aristotle (*De an.* 1.2, 404b16–18).

¹⁷ See further, Sedley 1992, where I also point out further Posidonian fingerprints on the passage.

Sextus is precisely that all the dogmatist philosophers listed and discussed in it have in one form or another recognized *enargeia* as having criterial status, and that some of them have in addition acknowledged reason as its inseparable partner. Antiochus, who is named twice as source in individual passages of the section, is a strong candidate for its overall authorship as well. The passage culminates in the Younger Stoics (253–60), whose epistemology, based on the ‘self-evident’ (ἐναργής) cognitive impression which all but drags us to assent, is widely recognized to be a primary source of Antiochus’ own (see esp. *Luc.* 38). That they should be represented, as they are here, as the culmination of the *enargeia* tradition is only too easily seen as an Antiochean take on philosophical history. Indeed, leaving aside for now one marginal figure, Asclepiades, it looks plausible that the main sequence of philosophers in the passage has been constructed to confirm the pedigree of precisely this Stoic criterion. Starting with Plato, whose epistemology is read as a partial anticipation of Stoicism (more on this shortly), the author proceeds through the history of the Academy down to Carneades, followed by the Cyrenaics, Epicurus, the Peripatetics and finally the Stoics. One particularly striking feature is that the list is so ordered as to culminate in those philosophers – from Carneades to the Younger Stoics – who explicitly used the term *enargeia*.

The treatment of Arcesilaus and Carneades (150–89) could well be Antiochean. Carneades, we are told, recognizes that a criterion of truth, if there were one, would have to take as its starting point the effect of *enargeia* on the soul (161). So far, then, an implicit endorsement of the Stoic stress on *enargeia*. But, the text continues, Carneades sees an obstacle in the fact that this effect upon the soul is a *phantasia* which must reveal not only itself but also its object, the problem being how it can be relied on to do the latter. In the course of explaining this problem (161–3), Sextus quotes Antiochus by name, repeating the latter’s clarification of what the double revelation amounts to:

For example, Antiochus says, when we look at something, our sight takes on a certain disposition, and we do not have it disposed in the same way as it was up to the moment when we looked. But in virtue of this alteration we apprehend two things, one of them being the alteration itself, namely the impression, the other the thing which has caused the alteration in us, namely the seen object. And similarly with the other senses.

Antiochus’ doxography had presumably made it clear that this was not part of Carneades’ exposition but Antiochus’ own gloss (one of Stoic

parentage,¹⁸ which he was therefore well placed to articulate), and Sextus was scrupulous enough to acknowledge as much, following a policy we have already met in the Posidonian section. This encourages the conjecture that the main contents are being taken from Antiochus, whose primary intention may have been to show how even Carneades, for all his epistemological negativity, recognized the dependence of any criterion on *enargeia*. Moreover, when the passage goes on (166–89) to describe the practical criterion that Carneades was ‘compelled’ (166) to adopt in order to deal with the realities of life, that criterion, although not self-certifying, is one which at its most reliable combines the data of sensory experience with checks administered by reason, a combination which Antiochus might, with suitable qualifications, approve. Antiochus was not entirely negative about Carneades,¹⁹ and here in the Sextus passage we can perhaps see him citing his Academic forerunner as a witness *malgré lui* to the necessity of a criterion such as he himself advocates.

It may seem surprising that an Antiochean lineage should include the Cyrenaics and Epicureans, as this one does at 190–216. But the justification is made clear: the Cyrenaics, we are told (190), were Socratics by origin, just as Plato was. In other words, the Academic family is being extended to include its cousins. If even they turn out to emphasize *enargeia*, as they certainly do (albeit neglecting the role of *logos*), that will confirm the immediate family’s ownership of this criterion.²⁰ The further extension of family membership to Epicurus is initially even more surprising, but because of his hedonism he was widely treated as a philosophical dependant of the Cyrenaics, and that is likely to be the pretext here. The motivation for his inclusion becomes clear when we find that the ensuing report of him, to a degree unique among our Epicurean testimonia, highlights *enargeia* as the pivotal concept of his criterial theory.

That Antiochus was himself responsible for appending Epicurus to the Academic family here finds some confirmation in the passage at 201–2, which serves as the bridge between the report of the Cyrenaics and that of Epicurus. Sextus quotes verbatim an obscure remark from Antiochus (see Appendix, F2), naming book 2 of the latter’s *Canonica* as the source. The passage has the unique status of containing our only explicitly verbatim quotation from Antiochus:

¹⁸ Cf. Aëtius 4.12.2, reporting Chrysippus: ἡ φαντασία δέικνυσιν ἑαυτὴν καὶ τὸ πεποικὸς αὐτήν.

¹⁹ Cf. Schofield, Chapter 11, this volume.

²⁰ For Antiochus’ readiness to cite the Cyrenaics as partially endorsing his epistemology, cf. Cic. *Luc.* 20.

Not far distant from these people's [the Cyrenaics'] opinion seem to be those who declare the senses to be the criterion of truth. For the fact that there have been people of such an opinion has been made clear by Antiochus the Academic, who in book 2 of his *Canonica* writes the following words: 'Someone else, second to none in medicine, and who tried his hand at philosophy as well, believed that perceptions are really and truly apprehensions, and that we cognize nothing at all by reason.' By these words Antiochus seems to be hinting at the faction just mentioned, and in particular Asclepiades the doctor, who rejected the commanding-faculty (*hēgemonikon*), and who was a contemporary of Antiochus. But I have given a more elaborate and specific exposition of Asclepiades' approach in my medical writings, so there is no need to harp on it again.

Sextus, who has an abiding interest in his fellow-doctor Asclepiades, cannot resist taking the opportunity to identify him as the anonymous subject of Antiochus' remark, before hurrying on to Epicurus. The fleeting and anonymous reference quoted shows that Asclepiades, officially a doctor and not a philosopher, did not feature in his own right in Antiochus' *Canonica* but was mentioned in an *obiter dictum*.²¹ His intrusive occurrence at precisely this point in Sextus' discourse is most simply explained by the hypothesis that the quoted remark occurred at the corresponding point in the source text for the surrounding material. If so, that source text was Antiochus' *Canonica*.

To sum up the Antiochean credentials of the doxographical passage: it has all the hallmarks of single authorship by someone of non-sceptical bent;²² in the course of it Antiochus is cited twice as source for particular points, whereas no other doxographical source is named at any stage. The theme of *enargeia* and *logos* as twin criteria, which recurs constantly, closely recalls Antiochus' position as conveyed to us by Lucullus, namely that some facts, notably perceived ones, are self-evident or self-certifying, and that reason, although it has no independent criterial status, is needed to protect the self-evident from sceptical assault. In our doxographical passage this pairing of *enargeia* and reason ties the first listed subject, Plato, to the last, Antiochus' most immediate influence, namely the Younger Stoics, by way of virtually the entire series of philosophers regarded by Antiochus as belonging within the Academic family, whether as loyal or as deviant

²¹ I thus disagree with Barnes (1989: 85) and Brittain (this volume, p. 110) that Antiochus' reported mere 'hint' at Asclepiades conflicts with the assumption that the *Canonica* was a doxographical work.

²² As a sign of Sextus' close dependence on a source, note in particular 7.208, where the first person singular is used illustratively in the way an Epicurean or sympathizer might use it, but in which Sextus himself would not; it has clearly been transcribed directly from his source without the appropriate adjustment.

members, plus two others who could at a stretch be seen as its philosophical cousins.²³ No one of these points on its own can prove that Antiochus is the source of the whole developmental history, but cumulatively they add up to a strong case.

PLATO IN THE CANONICA

With this in mind, let us now turn to the doxography's opening report, concerning Plato himself (141–4):²⁴

Πλάτων τοίνυν ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ διελόμενος τὰ πράγματα εἰς τε τὰ νοητὰ καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ εἰπὼν περιληπτὰ μὲν λόγῳ εἶναι τὰ νοητά, δοξαστὰ δὲ τυγχάνειν τὰ αἰσθητά, προδήλως κριτήριον ὥρισε τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων γνώσεως τὸν λόγον, συμπεριλαβὼν αὐτῷ καὶ τὴν διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐνάργειαν. λέγει δὲ οὕτως: “τί τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ, γένεσιν δὲ οὐκ ἔχον, καὶ τί τὸ γινόμενον μὲν, ὄν δὲ οὐδέποτε; τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσει μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, τὸ δὲ δόξῃ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως.” περιληπτικὸν καλεῖσθαι φασὶ λόγον παρ’ αὐτῷ οἱ Πλατωνικοὶ τὸν κοινὸν τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας. δεῖ γάρ τὸν λόγον ἐν τῷ κρίνειν τὴν ἀλήθειαν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας ὁρμᾶσθαι, εἴπερ δι’ ἐναργῶν ἡ κρίσις γίνεται τῶν ἀληθῶν. ἀλλ’ ἢ τε ἐνάργεια οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτάρκης πρὸς γνῶσιν ἀληθοῦς· οὐ γὰρ εἴ τι κατ’ ἐνάργειαν φαίνεται, τοῦτο καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὑπάρχει· ἀλλὰ δεῖ παρῆναι τὸ κρίνον τί τε φαίνεται μόνον καὶ τί σὺν τῷ φαίνεσθαι ἔτι καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ὑπόκειται, τουτέστι τὸν λόγον. ἀμφοτέρω τοίνυν συνελθεῖν δεήσει, τὴν τε ἐνάργειαν ὡς ἂν ἀφετήριον οὔσαν τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς τὴν κρίσιν τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ αὐτὸν τὸν λόγον πρὸς διάκρισιν τῆς ἐναργείας. εἰς μέντοι τὸ ἐπιβάλλειν τῇ ἐναργείᾳ καὶ τὸ ἐν ταύτῃ ἀληθὲς διακρίνειν πάλιν συνεργοῦ δεῖται ὁ λόγος τῆς αἰσθήσεως· διὰ ταύτης γὰρ τὴν φαντασίαν παραδεχόμενος ποιεῖται τὴν νόησιν καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην τάληθους, ὥστε περιληπτικὸν αὐτὸν ὑπάρχειν τῆς τε ἐναργείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ὅπερ ἴσον ἐστὶ τῷ καταληπτικόν.

Plato in the *Timaeus* distinguished things into intelligibles and sensibles, and said that intelligibles are ‘comprehensible’ (περιληπτὰ) by reason, but that sensibles are opinable. Clearly he specified reason as the criterion for knowledge of things, but comprehended (συμπεριλαβὼν) in it sensory self-evidence (ἐνάργεια) as well. These are his words: ‘What is that which always is but has no becoming, and what is that which becomes but never is? The one is comprehensible by intellection along with reason, the other by opinion along with sense perception.’ According to the Platonists, Plato used the term ‘comprehensive reason’ to mean reason which is common to self-evidence and truth. For reason, in discriminating the truth, must take its start from self-evidence, since discrimination of what is true comes about through things which are self-evident. But self-evidence is not sufficient for knowledge of what is true, since it is not the case that, just because

²³ Withdrawing my suggestion in Sedley 1992: 47 n. 79.

²⁴ On this passage as Antiochean, cf. Tarrant 1985: 96–103.

something appears self-evidently, it is also truly so, but it requires the presence of something which discriminates what merely appears from what, in addition to appearing, is also truly the underlying reality; and that is reason. Hence the two will have to combine, namely self-evidence, which is like reason's starting-block for the discrimination of truth, and reason itself, for the critical evaluation of the self-evidence. But in order to focus on self-evidence and to evaluate critically its truth content, reason in its turn needs sense perception as its collaborator. For it is through sense perception that reason receives the impression when it develops intellections and knowledge of what is true. Hence reason is 'comprehensive' of self-evidence and truth. And that term is equivalent to 'apprehensive' [or 'cognitive'] (καταληπτικόν).

This construal of Plato's epistemology is built on the very same quotation from the *Timaeus* (27d–28a) as appeared to underlie Varro's history but interprets it in an utterly different way. The guiding idea is that when Plato, as quoted, says that each of his two metaphysical realms is 'comprehensible' (περιληπτόν) by, respectively, reason and sense perception, this choice of vocabulary hints at a 'comprehensive' notion of cognition, 'comprehensive' now meaning 'inclusive'. And it is that inclusiveness, whereby intellectual cognition includes sensory *enargeia* and vice versa, that is inferred to characterize his epistemological outlook. That this reading is designed to narrow the gap between Platonic and Stoic epistemology is already clear and will become clearer still by the end of the passage.

The message about inclusiveness is extracted from Plato's text only thanks to a harsh truncation of the second sentence quoted.²⁵ What Plato actually wrote was τὸ μὲν δὴ νοήσῃ μετὰ λόγου περιληπτόν, αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὄν, τὸ δ' αὖ δόξῃ μετὰ αἰσθήσεως ἀλόγου δοξαστόν: 'The one is comprehensible by intellection along with reason, *always being the same*, the other *opinable* by opinion along with *irrational* sense perception.' I have emphasized here the words which Antiochus (if I may now so call our author) chooses to omit, and we must ask what the omissions can teach us of his motivation.

The first omission, 'always being the same', is relatively harmless in the context, since the eternal being of the intelligible, at least, has already been stated in the first sentence quoted (τί τὸ ὄν αἰεὶ . . .). No doubt the omitted words αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτ' ὄν would have added something, namely that the intelligible is also changeless, and one can imagine Antiochus preferring to de-emphasize that Platonic thesis, since there is no changeless realm in the Stoic epistemology which he espouses. But such an omission is well within the norms of ancient citation practice and should occasion no surprise.

²⁵ Cf. Tarrant 1985: 98 for this point.

The omission of ‘irrational’ as a qualification of ‘sense perception’ is also relatively innocuous, although it may well be influenced by the wish to maximize Plato’s harmony, not just with the Stoics, but also with his successor Speusippus, who is immediately afterwards (145–6) reported as giving criterial status to ‘scientific sense perception’ (ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις). This is exemplified there by the skilled touch or ear of the trained musician, which may well have been understood by Antiochus as having a rational component, and, if so, as hard to reconcile with any blanket description of sense perception as ‘irrational’. Even so, the amount of actual distortion involved is small.

The final omission, however, that of ‘opinable’ (δοξαστόν), dramatically changes the meaning of the passage. Plato had contrasted the realm of being, ‘comprehensible’ by reason, with the realm of becoming, merely ‘opinable’ by sense-based opinion. Initially our Sextan passage observes this sharp distinction between that which is comprehended and that which is opined (‘Plato . . . said that intelligibles are “comprehensible” (περιληπτὰ) by reason, but that sensibles are opinable’), but when it comes to the verbatim quotation of the Platonic sentence the omission of δοξαστόν serves to undo any such impression. By leaving out ‘opinable’, Antiochus makes it look as if ‘comprehended’ applies equally to both kinds of cognition, thus giving an apparent foundation to a quasi-Platonic ‘comprehensive’ criterion of truth spanning senses and intellect.

The purpose of this dramatic revision to the epistemology of the *Timaeus* becomes clear at the end of the passage: ‘Hence reason is “comprehensive” (περιληπτικόν) of self-evidence and truth. And that term is equivalent to “apprehensive” (κατάληπτικόν).’ Here the newly concocted ‘comprehensive’ criterion of truth is opportunistically linked to Stoic ‘apprehension’ or cognition, κατάληψις – the conjunction of a self-evident sensory impression plus rational assent – through the linguistic kinship of the terms ‘comprehensive’ (περιληπτικόν) and ‘apprehensive’ (κατάληπτικόν).

The most puzzling aspect, at first sight, is the news that this Stoic-leaning interpretation of Plato is put forward by ‘the Platonists’ (οἱ Πλατωνικοί). Who could these be? The term is not very likely to be Sextus’ own indirect way of referring to Antiochus, who elsewhere in Sextus is an ‘Academic’, not a ‘Platonist’.²⁶ On the other hand, what other actual Platonists could possibly be meant, given that this implausible attribution of a virtually Stoic epistemology to Plato appears to be uniquely characteristic of Antiochus and his school? I shall return to that puzzle later.

²⁶ On this point I differ from Tarrant 1985: 97 and Fladerer 1996: 73 n. 224.

The term ‘comprehensive reason’, we are told here, was used by Plato to mean ‘reason which is common to self-evidence and truth’. Self-evidence alone, it becomes clear, is not yet a guarantee of truth: something might present a self-evident appearance and yet fail to be that way in reality. Hence even self-evident appearances have to be scrutinized by reason, and it is the teamwork of the two, reason acting upon the data of sensory self-evidence, that can discriminate true from false. This is not yet the full Stoic epistemology embraced by Antiochus himself, in which self-evident sense impressions are by definition true. To the credit of the interpretation, it does not force the Platonic evidence that far, at the price of ignoring, for example, the demonstration at *Theaetetus* 184–6 that sense perception by itself has no access to truth.²⁷ The important move *towards* Stoic epistemology lies in the elimination of the full-strength two-world view, according to which, on a literal reading of the *Timaeus* lemma, *logos* is called upon solely for intellectual access to the Forms, the only realm in which, strictly speaking, truth obtains. Instead, according to the present interpretation, there are legitimate truths about the sensible world, and reason is given a leading role in their discrimination. Many modern interpreters of Plato would agree with this dilution of the full-strength two-world view, and in fact evidence supporting the dilution is available from the *Timaeus* itself, which elsewhere (notably 37b) allows there to be both reasoning and truth about the sensible world. It is entirely possible that the full version of the interpretation before us called upon those passages. But what Sextus preserves is limited to the interpretation’s strategy for deflecting the counter-evidence of *Timaeus* 27d–28a.

Despite the passage’s parting shot which identifies the Platonic ‘comprehensive’ with the Stoic ‘apprehensive’, there is in reality no attempt to close altogether the gap between Platonic and Stoic epistemology:²⁸ sense perception, it is conceded, does not for Plato function as a criterion of truth. But when we look ahead to the immediately following report of the early Academy (145–9), we can see the gap narrowing further. Speusippus and Xenocrates, we are told there, retained versions of Plato’s two-world

²⁷ There is good reason to think that the *Theaetetus* was a text taken very seriously in the Academy and not easily ignored, cf. Annas 1992, Sedley 1996.

²⁸ That earlier thinkers in the Academic tradition are here represented as merely pointing towards, and not as fully espousing, Stoic epistemological principles is I believe sufficient to defuse Brittain’s counter-citation (this volume, pp. 111–13) of incompatibilities between the Platonic and Aristotelian epistemologies presented in this passage and their Stoic counterpart. (Brittain’s main aim in arguing against the Antiochean provenance of the Sextus passage is to resist its use as evidence for Platonizing tendencies in Antiochus’ epistemology. I do not myself use the passage for that purpose, since I interpret it as indicating that Antiochus sought to assimilate the Platonists to his own Stoicizing position, not vice versa.)

view (to which Xenocrates added a third), and both gave reason an integral role in the cognition of the sensible realm. They nevertheless, unlike Plato, made sense perception itself the criterion of truth in the sensible realm. Speusippus, as noted above, called his sensory criterion 'scientific sense perception' (ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις), to reflect the way in which it draws on the guidance of practised scientific reasoning in order to arrive at unerring judgements about underlying objects.²⁹

These developments in the early Academy make reason no longer, as it had been for Plato, the sole discriminator of truth. Instead reason functions, in the sensible realm, as a support to sense perception, which is now itself deemed the actual criterion of truth there. There has thus been a clear move towards the Stoic division of labour between senses and reason. Since all these early thinkers – Plato, Speusippus and Xenocrates, and also, it later turns out (217–26), the Peripatetics – continue to believe in an additional, intelligible realm knowable independently of sense perception, they have clearly not gone all the way to the Antiochean epistemology we meet in Lucullus' speech. For the moment that intelligible realm's significance is merely de-emphasized – for example, the report of Speusippus concentrates almost entirely on the criterion for the sensible realm – but not edited out altogether. Nevertheless, so far as the cognition of the sensible realm itself is concerned, the early Academy has by now anticipated the essentials of Antiochus' own epistemology.

In the light of this it becomes easier to see why the short matching passage in *De finibus* 4 (p. 88 above) says that Zeno's insight about the partnership of sense perception and reason was anticipated, not specifically by Plato, but by the ancients more generally. This corresponds to the fact that in the fuller exposition preserved by Sextus, Plato is not the final spokesman for the early Academy, but just its canonical starting point, refined and improved on by his successors. Yet again we have confirmation that for Antiochus the early Academic position is to be established not so much by looking to its originator Plato, as by asking how Plato's original position ended up when the school had had time to refine and articulate it fully.

²⁹ Xenocrates further specified that the sensory criterion itself qualifies as 'true', even though its truth somehow falls short of the truth characterizing scientific reasoning. However, there may be a further implication that scientific reasoning is, for Xenocrates too as already for Speusippus, available to sense perception as a support which will make its findings entirely dependable. I infer this from 148, καὶ τούτων κοινῶς τὸ μὲν διὰ τοῦ ἐπιστημονικοῦ λόγου κριτήριον βέβαιόν τε ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἀληθές. The emphasized word may be meant to imply that this criterion can be used in common with regard to all three ontological realms.

In the light of this, I return now to the puzzling opening remark in the Plato doxography, to the effect that this Stoicizing interpretation is one put forward by ‘the Platonists’ (οἱ Πλατωνικοί). Who, I asked earlier, could these Platonists be? The obvious candidates must now be the likes of Speusippus and Xenocrates. I do not mean that these two, in their own exegeses of the *Timaeus*, will have actually set out the interpretation which Sextus reports. Obviously they *could not* have been the authors of the anachronistic closing remark about the ‘apprehensive’ (καταληπτικόν). No doubt one might conjecture that this closing remark was appended by Antiochus to his source material as he found it. But the extraordinary emphasis on *enargeia* elsewhere in the report of Plato seems equally to reflect Antiochus’ Stoicizing agenda, giving the entire report a recognizably Antiochean stamp. By contrast Speusippus and Xenocrates, in the ensuing doxography preserved by Sextus, do not have the same term *enargeia* attributed to them, even though Theophrastus’ use of it will later (217–21) be carefully brought to our attention. We may then conjecture that what Sextus found in his Antiochean source was something like the following: ‘Plato said that the criterion of truth lies in a partnership of reason and *enargeia*. At any rate, his famous pronouncement at *Timaeus* 27d–28a *can* be read that way, by detecting in the term ‘comprehensive’ (περιληπτόν) an allusion to an inclusive criterion of truth; and the fact that numerous of the early Platonists themselves adhered to such an epistemology shows that they were reading him that way too.’ An original statement along these lines would explain both why Cicero, in his Antiochean voice in *De finibus* 4, attributes the epistemology to the ‘ancients’ generally, and why Sextus says that the Platonists – meaning, it seems, the early Academy – interpret Plato himself that way.³⁰

Notwithstanding any residual uncertainty as to who these ‘Platonists’ may be, one thing should remain clear. The Sextus passage reports the attribution to Plato of what amounts to an anticipatory gesture towards Stoic epistemology, including even an oblique reference to the terminology of Stoic ‘cognition’ (κατάληψις). This is a most unusual attribution, and, even if we did not have the surrounding context to hint again and again that Antiochus is the source, we might be hard put to it to think of anyone else who would have thus represented Plato’s epistemology. (Cf. Sextus at *PH* 1.235: ‘It was Antiochus’ practice to show that the doctrines of the Stoics can be found in Plato.’) We have in addition, as noted, the positive encouragement of *De finibus* 4 to suppose that Antiochus did represent the

³⁰ According to Glucker 1978: 206–25, the term Πλατωνικός is unattested before the second century CE, but Brittain 2001: 223–4 n. 8 subsequently pointed out an exception: the Latin *Platonicus* is used by Cicero (*Nat. D.* 1.73) precisely to designate a member of the fourth-century BCE Academy.

early Academy this way. We should therefore be prepared to think of the Sextus passage as authentically Antiochean. We should also take seriously the likelihood that, as I suggested at the outset, it represents Antiochus' work prior to Philo's Roman heresy, at a time when he was keen to maximize the unity of the tradition to which he had aligned himself.³¹

Those who uncompromisingly limit the pool of evidence for Antiochus to passages where he is named may think their practice has the merit of playing safe. This is not necessarily so. Take the case of the Younger Stoics. Antiochus' own epistemology as summarized by Lucullus appears to be drawn directly from them, once again reflecting Antiochus' view that a tradition may well find its best spokesmen in its latest proponents rather than its founders. The Younger Stoics are therefore a vital link in our historical understanding of Antiochus' views. Yet our only explicit information on them comes from the very section of Sextus' doxography which has a strong claim to be of Antiochean origin. If that attribution is substantiated, two consequences appear to follow. The first is positive. We can with considerable plausibility put names to these Younger Stoics: they have every chance of being Mnesarchus and Dardanus, the two Stoics whose epistemology according to Cicero (*Luc.* 69) so influenced Antiochus that it was asked why he did not join their school.³² The second consequence, however, is worryingly negative. If everything that we know of these Younger Stoics' epistemology has reached us through Antiochus' *Canonica*, and if that work of Antiochus' was driven by a syncretistic agenda which often took precedence over historical accuracy, a new question arises. To what extent was Antiochus borrowing his epistemology from recent or current Stoicism, to what extent constructing that Stoicism to suit his own syncretistic agenda?

The primary intended focus of this chapter so far has been Antiochus' methods and criteria in writing the history of philosophy, but the last remarks have moved the spotlight towards a subsidiary question: when we use Antiochean material as a source, how far can we trust its historical information if uncorroborated by independent data?

In seeking an answer, we must consider first Antiochus' frequently repeated and much-derided thesis that the early Academy and the Peripatos were in reality one school. The early Academy and the Peripatos he argued were, although institutionally distinct, philosophically united. His justification for this conflation was twofold (*Ac.* 1.17–18, 22): (a) both

³¹ Such a dating of the *Canonica* to pre-87 BCE is also argued, on partly different grounds, by Tarrant 1985: ch. 5.

³² See Hatzimichali (this volume, p. 20) for Antiochus' studies with Mnesarchus.

schools were the direct philosophical heirs to Plato; (b) in the taxonomy of values – the philosophical issue which Antiochus treated as paramount, especially since it represented Stoicism's most radical departure from the tradition – the two did not differ. This is, and is presented as, a selective philosophical evaluation, not a straight claim of historical fact.

When Antiochus' spokesman Varro proceeds to summarize the Academy's and Peripatos' supposedly unified body of doctrines (*Ac.* 1.18–33) he seems to take his lead from the Academy, more or less ignoring Peripatetic ideas and formulations. It is mainly with regard to their deviations from the early tradition that the Peripatetics are brought in explicitly: Aristotle destabilized Plato's Forms³³ and added a fifth element; Theophrastus abandoned the sufficiency of virtue for happiness; and Strato abandoned ethics altogether. Apart from the intrusion here of the curious if not quite unparalleled³⁴ idea that Aristotle's fifth element was the stuff of souls as well as stars (26), there is no reason to doubt that the very little we are told is, in doctrinal terms, accurate. The evidence provided for Peripatetic history is thin and perfunctory and probably contains one error. But it is not seriously misleading or tendentious, and there is no sign of any self-serving agenda for the rewriting of history.

I have focused initially on the place of the Peripatos in Antiochus' conspectus, because this school's integration into the early Academy appears to be a constant, recurring in historical sketches which, according to the division proposed above, both predate and postdate Antiochus' change of direction in 87 BCE. Leaving the Peripatos aside, we are in a position to compare the two phases with each other from the point of view of historical reliability.

Let us return, with this question in mind, to the Antiochean reading of Plato's *Timaeus* in Antiochus' *Canonica*, which I have proposed dating prior to the Roman episode, at a time when Antiochus was still aiming to maximize the continuity of his own Stoicizing epistemology with Plato's. The actual exegetical manoeuvre by which he secures his result is clumsy by the standards of later Platonist commentary. It is very possibly characteristic of someone not yet well versed in the exegesis of Plato's *ipsissima verba*, or at any rate not expecting an audience ready to cite classic Platonic sentences from memory. If, as I have maintained, the quite different and much more sensitive reading of Plato, centred on the same *Timaeus* evidence, that is presented at *Ac.* 1.30–2 represents a later phase of Antiochus' work, that may be symptomatic not merely of his new polemical motivations

³³ See further Boys-Stones, this volume.

³⁴ Cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 1.22.

following Philo's own attempt to rewrite Academic history, but also of contemporary progress in the close study of canonical philosophical texts. In Alexandria, where Antiochus was located when he launched his response to Philo's Roman books (we do not know how much longer he remained, but it may have been years),³⁵ the textual study of Plato and Aristotle either was or at any rate was set to become within a generation or two a highly developed scholarly preoccupation.³⁶ We have no specific evidence for the exegesis of philosophical texts in Alexandria as early as the 80s BCE. But with its great library and its coterie of scholars, Alexandria was already long established as the Hellenistic world's major centre for textual scholarship, including more than a century earlier the work of Aristophanes of Byzantium on the organization of the Platonic corpus. Since it seems to have been at Alexandria, in the presence of 'large gathering of learned men' ('doctis . . . compluribus', *Luc.* 12), that Antiochus embarked on his new, more pluralistic and less procrustean strategy for reading his school's canonical texts, the city's scholarly climate and traditional focus on the close study of texts are likely to have played a significant part. Among his followers in the next generation, we should not be surprised to find that, as I have argued elsewhere,³⁷ his follower Brutus made close use of Plato's *Statesman* when arguing his case for the assassination of Caesar. This growing respect for the letter of Plato's text is at once a natural outcome of Antiochus' quarrel with Philo about Academic history, and a characteristic of the newly decentralized philosophical world, cut adrift from its Athenian home following the Mithridatic War of 88–86 BCE, a world in which a school's canonical texts now constituted its strongest link to its origins.

PHYSICS

This consideration leads into my final topic, the unexpectedly elaborate summary of the early Academy's physics that Varro includes in his Antiochian history of philosophy (*Cic. Ac.* 1.24–9). The passage was traditionally taken – assumed more often than argued – to be a virtual fiction on Antiochus' part, a two-principle physics concocted in order to make the Stoics' two-principle physics look like a direct continuation from that of the early Academy rather than any real new departure. I have myself

³⁵ See Hatzimichali, this volume, p. 23.

³⁶ For a survey of philosophical activity (including commentary) at Alexandria in the first century BCE, see Hatzimichali 2011.

³⁷ Sedley 1997.

argued elsewhere³⁸ that its contents are, on the contrary, a basically authentic account of the Academic physics in the late fourth century BCE. This will have been the physics that Zeno, Stoicism's founder, studied during his years in the Academy, its resemblance to Stoic physics fully explained by that historical link. Stoic physics really is, after all, a descendant of Plato's as set out in the *Timaeus*, and the Academic physics reported by Varro, which in doctrinal terms sits roughly midway between Platonic and Stoic physics, is just the kind of development from Plato's that we should anyway have expected to link the two. There was, moreover, a sustained tradition of reading Plato's physics as a two-principle system,³⁹ and this cannot have been in its entirety an unhistorical retrojection of Stoicism, because the reading was already known to Theophrastus, who was in his old age by the time Stoicism was in its infancy.

Although that proposal has received a mainly sympathetic reception,⁴⁰ it is countered by Brad Inwood in the present volume, with a whole battery of new cautions. I do not have space to restate my side of the case here,⁴¹ but in the light of what precedes I can usefully add one final set of considerations to the debate.

If what I have argued in this chapter is on the right lines, the unhistorical retrojection of Stoic physics onto the early Academy of which Antiochus is suspected would not be entirely out of character. For if the Antiochean origin of Sextus Empiricus *Math.* 7.141–4 is granted, he has indeed been caught there in the act of rereading the epistemology of the *Timaeus* through distorting Stoic spectacles so as to maximize the continuity of the tradition that culminated in Stoicism. Consider, then, another aspect of the same Sextan doxography. No one, as far as I can recall, has defended as fully reliable its reports of Speusippus, Xenocrates and the Peripatetics

³⁸ Sedley 2002a.

³⁹ Theophrastus (*ap. Simplicius, In Phys.* 26.7–15 = fr. 230 Fortenbaugh, Huby, Sharples and Gutas (FHS&G)), Cic. *Luc.* 117–18 ('tantum de principiis rerum e quibus omnia constant videamus quem probet; est enim inter magnos homines summa dissensio . . . Plato ex materia in se omnia recipiente mundum factum esse censet a deo sempiternum'), Aristotle (*SVF* 1.98), Diogenes Laertius (*Diog. Laert.* 3.69). Of these, Cic. *Luc.* 117–18 is especially significant, since it reflects a New Academic source: if this two-principle reading of Plato's physics had been invented by the renegade Academic Antiochus in order to make Stoicism a legitimate heir of the early Academy, it is hard to imagine it being taken over by the contemporary (Philonian) Academy.

⁴⁰ Esp. Dillon 2003: ch. 4; Frede 2005 (although dissenting from my further proposal that the physics represents the Academy of Polemo in particular); Gill 2006: 17–19; Tarrant 2007: 331 n. 43. Apart from Inwood's, the only counter-arguments I have seen so far are the brief ones of Algra 2003: 77–8, with some reservations also expressed by Gourinat 2009: 51–4. But it is early days.

⁴¹ Inwood has certainly been successful in exposing a number of apparent incoherences in Varro's account, but I doubt if they are symptomatic of anything more than Cicero's characteristically speedy condensation of a complex body of source material.

(*Math.* 7.145–9 and 217–26), and according to the argument I have developed in this chapter that implicit distrust is well-founded. For they too are parts of the material from Antiochus' *Canonica*, driven by the same radically syncretistic agenda as generated the distortion of *Timaeus* 27d–28a.

These thoughts might seem to strengthen the case for a similar syncretistic falsification in Antiochus' account of Academic physics. But there is a vital difference. On the reconstruction that has emerged, the strongly Stoicizing report of fourth-century Academic and Peripatetic epistemology reproduced by Sextus represents Antiochus' earlier phase. The account of physics, on the other hand, occurs in Varro's speech and belongs to Antiochus' later phase. There it finds itself in company with some of the most historically sensitive readings of Plato to emerge from the entire ancient tradition, including not only an accurate report of the *Timaeus*' metaphysics and epistemology adopted even at the cost of highlighting their distance from Antiochus' own stance, but also, remarkable for its modernity, a synoptic reading of the Platonic corpus which separates a historical Socrates, who sincerely disavows knowledge, from a system-building Plato. This is, as we have seen, a new Antiochus. Thanks probably to his fresh confrontation with Philo's historical 'lies', he seems no longer motivated to impose artificial unity upon the tradition. On the contrary, he is quite ready to emphasize signs of its diversity. And correspondingly, whether or not encouraged in this by the criteria of Alexandrian textual scholarship, he is visibly content to take his lead from the texts themselves.

Given that this new Antiochus has altogether abandoned his earlier syncretistic interest in dressing up Platonic epistemology to look like an anticipation of Stoic epistemology, it would be puzzling to find him, at the very same time, dressing up early Academic physics to look like an anticipation of Stoic physics. The simpler hypothesis is that what he reports here was known to him to be fundamentally historical.⁴²

⁴² I am grateful to participants in the 2007 Cambridge workshop on Antiochus for searching comments, and to Charles Brittain and Roberto Polito for helpful subsequent discussion.

*Antiochus' epistemology**Charles Brittain*

TWO QUESTIONS

The central problem for modern scholarship on Antiochus' mature epistemology is fairly simple: almost all of the evidence tells us that he adopted Stoic epistemology wholeheartedly, but many scholars have proven unwilling to believe this owing to certain presuppositions about his role in the development of Platonism.¹

The scope of the problem can be seen by two reminders about the evidence:

- Antiochus was regarded as someone who defiled the Academy with Stoic doctrines by Plutarch, Numenius, Sextus and Augustine, as well as by Cicero in his sceptical Academic persona in the *Academica* – that is, by everyone in antiquity whose report has survived, including the three Platonists who were interested enough in Hellenistic deformations of the Academy to mention him.²
- We have a substantial report on Antiochus' epistemology in Lucullus' exposition of his views in the *Lucullus* (= *Academica* 2), which demonstrates that 'logic' was one part of philosophy in which Antiochus plainly did advocate Stoic views. In fact, it shows not just that he explicitly adopted the Stoics' normative constraints on rationality – which one might take to be, at least loosely, developments of Platonic or Aristotelian views about wisdom, and so the sort of thing any defender of the tradition against scepticism might adopt – but also that he advocated

¹ This chapter does not reconsider Antiochus' connections with the sceptical Academics. For detailed treatments of his influential anti-sceptical arguments, see Barnes 1989: 70–8 and 83–5; Brittain 2001: 72–168 and 2007; Hankinson 1997; and Polito 2007b. On the controversial details of his institutional history, see Sedley 1981, Barnes 1989 (whose principal results are disputed by Polito in this volume), and Puglia 2000.

² See Plut. *Cic.* 4; Numenius, fr. 28 (des Places); Sext. Emp. *PH* 1.235; August. *C. acad.* 3.41 and *De civ. D.* 19.3; and Cic. *Luc.* 69, 127, 137, etc. These testimonia are all concerned with Antiochus' epistemology.

a view that was Stoic to the smallest detail. Thus we find in the *Lucullus* that Antiochus accepted Zeno's definition of *katalēpsis* ('apprehension', 'cognition') and ban on mere opinion; Chrysippus' formal logic; the standard Stoic anti-sceptical arguments, including the 'inactivity argument' and the defences against the Academic *aparallaxia* arguments; the standard Stoic definitions of perception, memory, concepts, arts, sciences, and virtues, investigation, discovery, and proof; and their related theories of human impulse and assent, dreams and imagination, and the *idiōs poion*.³ We also find that he took over directly, and apparently verbatim, the epistemological views ascribed to the Younger Stoics in Sextus *Math.* 7.257–60 on perception, the criterion, assent and perspicuity, and that he explicitly credited Antipater – who was perhaps the chief of the 'Younger Stoics' – for his defence of perspicuity and an argument for *katalēpsis*.⁴ The evidence for these borrowings is well known and largely undisputed.⁵ A number of the more controversial points are addressed in more detail below; but even if some of them remain in doubt, the basic case is hard to deny: Antiochus' epistemology is profoundly – as well as explicitly – Stoic.

The source of the scholarly problem is that this attested epistemology looks antithetical to the actual views of the Platonic tradition Antiochus claimed to be following and is in fact incompatible with the views that Antiochus himself ascribed to them according to the report of Varro in *Ac.* 1.30–2 (see below). As a result, some scholars have been drawn either to ascribe to Antiochus Platonic or Peripatetic doctrines derived from other sources that do not mention him, or to press the evidence into an Academic or Peripatetic mould that does not fit it.⁶ My aim in this chapter is to address this problem by reassessing the evidence from the ground up to see if we can discern any signs of a specifically Antiochean epistemology.

³ Zeno's definition of *katalēpsis*: *Luc.* 18; 'nil opinari': e.g. *Luc.* 59; Chrysippus' formal logic: *Luc.* 91–8, esp. 98, cf. *Luc.* 143 and *Fin.* 4.9–10; the 'inactivity argument' and anti-*aparallaxia* arguments: *Luc.* 37–58; perception: *Luc.* 19–20; memory: *Luc.* 22; concepts: *Luc.* 22; arts: *Luc.* 22; sciences: *Luc.* 23; virtues: *Luc.* 23; investigation: *Luc.* 26; discovery: *Luc.* 26; proof: *Luc.* 26; impulse and assent: *Luc.* 24–5, cf. 2.37–8; dreams and imagination: *Luc.* 47–54; *idiōs poion*: *Luc.* 54–8, cf. 85.

⁴ Younger Stoics: *Luc.* 19 = *Math.* 7.258 on perception, *Luc.* 33 = *Math.* 7.260 on the criterion, *Luc.* 38 = *Math.* 7.257 on assent, and *Luc.* 45–6 = *Math.* 7.259 on perspicuity. Antipater on perspicuity: *Luc.* 17–18; on *katalēpsis*: *Luc.* 28.

⁵ The evidence is set out *passim* in the notes to Reid's commentary and my translation of the *Academica*: see Reid 1885, Brittain 2006a.

⁶ The first route is taken by e.g. Dillon 1977, Donini 1982, Tarrant 1985, Fladerer 1996 and Karamanolis 2006, and Bonazzi in this volume, amongst the more moderate *recentiores*. (Most of them ascribe a Platonic 'recollection' doctrine to Antiochus; Donini proposes an elaborate Aristotelian metaphysics on the basis of Seneca's *Ep.* 58 and 65.) The second is most prominent in e.g. Fladerer 1996 and Tarrant 1987, but even Woldemar Görler (1994) and Jonathan Barnes (1989), the *principes* of clear-eyed Antiochean studies, and David Sedley (2002a, and in this volume) seem to me to succumb to it at times.

But I start with some brief arguments against the presuppositions that seem to underlie a number of treatments of this issue. The first question is whether our evidence for Antiochus' conception of the history of philosophy actually gives us *prima facie* reasons to be worried by the scholarly problem. The evidence for this part of Antiochus' work is not as complete or consistent as we might wish, because Varro's report in *Ac.* 1.15–42 summarizes what Antiochus took to be the thinking of the main protagonists in his tradition, and he notes various changes and deformations of this without explaining their relation to his own position. Nevertheless, three points about Antiochus' position seem fairly clear:

- (1) he appealed to the authentic tradition as a whole, rather than to any specific part of it, as the warrant of his own position;⁷
- (2) he accepted that at least some of the innovations to the early Academic and Peripatetic position were correct;⁸
- (3) he accordingly took the tradition to be an evolving one, presumably with himself as its philosophically most accurate exponent.⁹

It follows from these three relatively uncontroversial points, I think, that Antiochus was not a Platonist – since he did not regard Plato as the principal (or last) repository of truth – but rather an 'Academic' of some sort, as all our sources present him. But this means that there was no ideological reason for him not to adopt Stoic epistemology wholeheartedly as a useful 'correction' to – or within – the Academic tradition.

Next, while our evidence for the historical thesis does not positively assert that he did adopt a Stoic epistemology, there are good textual reasons in the *Academica* to think that he did.¹⁰ Varro, after all, concludes

⁷ This is why Antiochus stresses the substantive agreements of the early Academics and the Peripatetics (*Ac.* 1.17–18, 1.22), despite allowing their significant differences on various issues (e.g. *Ac.* 1.33–5, 1.39); and why he is interested in accounting for the apparent innovations of the Stoics in ethics as largely terminological (*Ac.* 1.35–7, cf. 1.43, *Luc.* 15–16, etc. See Barnes 1989: 78–81, and Karamanolis 2006: 51–9 (who sets out the evidence with great care, but then ignores its most significant implication, viz. that Antiochus was not a Platonist). See further Sedley in this volume.

⁸ It seems fairly clear, e.g., that Antiochus rejected the view of Xenocrates and the *superiores* that the soul was an immaterial causal entity, *Ac.* 1.39 – cf. 1.24.

⁹ The best evidence for this in *Luc.* 13–18, where Lucullus first allows that the Presocratics represented a primitive phase of dogmatic philosophy (*Luc.* 15) and then, after rescuing Socrates and Plato for the dogmatic tradition, says: 'But let's assume, if you like, that those old doctrines didn't amount to knowledge. Has nothing changed now that these subjects have been investigated since the time Arcesilaus objected to Zeno (as it's thought), and, in his desire to overturn Zeno's definitions, tried to cloak the clearest things with darkness?' (*Luc.* 16). This suggests that epistemology has evolved for the better not just since Plato and Aristotle, but since the early Stoics; see Britain and Palmer 2001. (This conclusion is consistent with Antiochus' view on intellectual progress in general; see *Fin.* 5.57.)

¹⁰ See Görler 1994: 952–5.

his report of the tradition with an extensive treatment of Zeno's explicitly 'novel' epistemology, without any criticism at all or any caveats of the sort that qualify his report of Stoic ethics. And Lucullus' exposition is explicitly aimed at supporting the existence of the apprehensive impression (*phantasia katalēptikē*), the centrepiece of Zeno's view (*Luc.* 18), and unabashedly dependent on the Stoics' elaborations of it (*Luc.*, *passim*).

Thirdly, Lucullus' account of Antiochus' actual epistemological views is incompatible with Antiochus' interpretations of the early Academic and Peripatetic views attested in *Academica* 1 and elsewhere. Varro's presentation in *Ac.* 1.30–2 and 34 is a rapid and perhaps deliberately vague sketch, based on allusions to largely uninterpreted Platonic passages.

The criterion of truth was not in the senses, they maintained, although it took its start from the senses: the mind was the judge of things. They believed that this was the only faculty deserving our trust, because it alone discerned what was always simple, uniform and same as itself. (*Idea* was the term they used for this, the name Plato had already given it; but we can rightly call it a 'Form'.) [31] The senses were all blunt and feeble, in their view, and quite unable to apprehend the things people thought were subject to perception, because the latter were either so small that they were undetectable by the senses or moving so rapidly that nothing was one or constant or even self-identical because everything was continually slipping or flowing away. For this reason, they called this whole domain 'subject to opinion'. [32] Knowledge, they believed, existed only in the conceptions and reasoning of the mind... (*Cic. Ac.* 1.30–2)

As I see it, five points are clear: (i) the senses do not yield apprehension (*Ac.* 1.30–1); (ii) the sensible world is not apprehensible (it is the realm of 'opinion', 31); (iii) knowledge or science is restricted to the mind's conceptions and reasoning (elaborated through etymology and syllogistic, 32); (iv) the mind ('mens') is the criterion because it has access to Forms (30); and, we learn subsequently, (v) Aristotle later undermined Platonic Forms (34). Of these, all but (v), the denial of the Forms – which the Stoics agreed with – are flatly contradicted by Lucullus.¹¹ There is also no evidence that Antiochus made any attempt to paper over or soften the apparent discrepancy between the earlier tradition and the Stoics on the issue of epistemology, for example by forging connections between his views and the more empirical Peripatetic position. The only mention of Peripatetic epistemology in a vaguely Antiochean context is at *Fin.* 4.9, which contradicts *Ac.* 1.30–1; and the summary of Peripatetic 'logic' in

¹¹ (i) is contradicted in *Luc.* 21, and (ii)–(iii) in *Luc.* 19–22 and *passim*; see below. On Aristotle's treatment of the Forms, cf. Boys-Stones, this volume.

Fin. 5.10 stresses rhetorical and topical doctrines rather than epistemology.¹² In fact, Peripatetic epistemological theory is mentioned by Cicero only in his own New Academic persona, and then always as a patent objection to Antiochus' pretensions to represent the dogmatic Academic tradition (*Luc.* 112–13, 147; cf. *Fin.* 5.76).¹³

Thus, in my view, we can easily account for the principal evidence we actually have for Antiochus' epistemology by assuming that he thought that the Stoic view was a useful correction to the early part of the tradition, that is, one that offered a secure basis for rejecting scepticism and on which he could build an updated Academic ethical system. If so, the question that scholars should be addressing is not: 'How did Antiochus [use Aristotle to] fit the Platonic Forms into his materialist and empiricizing epistemology?' It is rather: 'Is there any evidence that Antiochus made any changes at all to Stoic epistemology?'

SOURCE QUESTIONS

However, before we examine the evidence for Antiochus' epistemology – primarily in *Lucullus* and *De finibus* 5 (with some indirect support from *Ac.* 1 and *Fin.* 4) – it may be useful to review at least one question about an untested 'source'.¹⁴ Many additional texts have been proposed as presenting Antiochean material, but Sextus *Math.* 7.141–260 – the epistemological doxography from Plato onwards – is the only pertinent one that has a plausible historical and textual case for seeing Antiochus' hand behind it.¹⁵ That case is roughly (a) that Antiochus is unexpectedly cited twice for minor points in this doxography, and (b) that the interpretations of Plato,

¹² *Fin.* 4.9: 'quid quod pluribus locis quasi denuntiant ut neque sensuum fidem sine ratione nec rationis sine sensibus exquiramus atque ut eorum alterum ab altero ne separemus?' ('What of their frequent asseverations that we should not look for reliability in the senses without reason or in reason without the senses and that we should not divorce the one from the other?') Cf. Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.226. Cic. *Ac.* 1.30–2 denies that we can secure *fidem sensuum* ('reliability in the senses') in any strong sense.

¹³ Note also that Augustine's report of Varro's *De philosophia* in *De civ. D.* 19.3 suggests (contrary to *Luc.* 29) that Antiochus may not have considered the selection of a criterion of knowledge to be determinative of whether a philosophical group constitutes a distinct 'sect' ('disciplina' or *hairesis*), since the differentia of 'sceptical/not-sceptical' is explicitly denied this role there. On criteria for constituting a sect, see Polito 2007b.

¹⁴ See the excellent summary of the difficulties for Antiochean *Quellenforschung* in Barnes 1989: 64–8.

¹⁵ I do not discuss Cicero, *Orator* 8–10, the *Topica*, or Seneca, *Ep.* 58 and 65 because there is no evidence to link these works to Antiochus; see Inwood 2007b and Boys-Stones (forthcoming) on Seneca, and Reinhardt 2003: 7–17 and 258–62 on the *Topica*. The wildly implausible 'fragments' and 'sources' from the second century CE advocated by Theiler 1930 and others are interesting mainly as examples of a curious fashion in twentieth-century scholarship.

the Peripatetics, the Stoics and the Academics are in some way consistent with our expectations of Antiochus given Cicero's evidence.¹⁶ Both points, however, are mistaken, I think.

First, let us look at the citations. *Math.* 7.162 introduces Antiochus unexpectedly into a summary of Carneades' general argument against there being any criterion of truth:

So we must look for the criterion in the soul's affection resulting from perspicuity. But this affection needs to be indicative both of itself and of the apparent thing that made it, that is, it must be the affection constituted by an impression. [162] Hence the sort of affection in an animal that is presentative of itself and something else should be called an 'impression'. For example, when we have looked at something, as Antiochus says, our sight is disposed in a certain way, and not in the same way that it was before we looked at it. But in accordance with this alteration we apprehend two things, first, the alteration itself, which is the impression, and secondly, what made the alteration, namely the visible thing. And likewise with the other senses. [163] So just as light shows itself and everything in it, so too impression, because it is the foundation of knowledge, needs, like light, both to illuminate itself and to be indicative of the perspicuous thing that made it. (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.161–3)

There are two things to note about this case: first, Antiochus is cited only for an illustration of the point made at *Math.* 7.161 and elaborated at 164; the passage could be cut out without ultimate loss to the overall argument. Secondly, the illustration is a dogmatic one, and more precisely, an endorsement of a claim that is explicitly ascribed to Chrysippus in Aëtius (*SVF* 2.54), and echoed by the Younger Stoics in *Math.* 7.259: perceptual impressions reveal both themselves and their causes, like light, and are thus the basis for all knowledge. So it looks as if Sextus is using the Stoic Antiochus of *Lucullus* to illustrate Chrysippus' position in a Carneadean argument designed to refute it. There is no hint of any larger borrowing from Antiochus: all the passage suggests is that Sextus or his source regarded Antiochus as a reputable dogmatic authority on the Chrysippean view.

Math. 7.201–2 (see Appendix **F2**), on the other hand, gives an explicit citation of Antiochus' *Canonica* book 2 (our only 'fragment' of Antiochus):

¹⁶ Tarrant 1985 argued that Antiochus was the source of the whole doxography in *Math.* 7, and that he wrote it before he 'converted' to a Stoic-type epistemological view, but under the influence of mitigated scepticism or even Fourth Academic dogmatism. Sedley 1992 argues only for *Math.* 7.141–260 (the earlier portion of the doxography is ascribed to Posidonius) and attributes this part to the dogmatic Stoicizing Antiochus of the *Lucullus*. The latter view is defended again and elaborated by David Sedley in this volume.

Those who declared that our perceptions are the criterion of truth seem to have been not far from the view of these people. That there have been some who held this view was made plain by Antiochus (the Academic), in the second book of his *Canonica*, where he says explicitly this: ‘There’s another person, second to none in medicine, but also interested in philosophy, who believed that perceptions are really and truly apprehensions, but that we grasp nothing at all by reason.’ [202] Here Antiochus seems to lay out the position described above and to hint at Asclepiades the doctor, as a contemporary of his who did away with the governing part of the soul. But I have gone over his position specifically and in more detail in my medical books, so there’s no need to repeat it all here. (Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.201–2)

But this passage gives us no reason to think that Antiochus was Sextus’ source for his doxography in *Math.* 7.141–260. First, it is clear that Sextus is not citing Antiochus here as his source for the Cyrenaic doxography he has just given (in *Math.* 7.190–200);¹⁷ for Sextus introduces the Cyrenaics in 7.191 as holding the view that only our affections are criteria, and he concludes in 7.200 that, unlike Plato, they restrict the criteria to just what is perspicuous and affections. But then he shifts, before introducing Antiochus’ work, to a *different* claim at *Math.* 7.201, namely that this is not far off the view of those who declare that perceptions are the criterion of truth. This is clearly a bridge to prepare for a new claim he finds in Antiochus but clearly did not find in his source for the Cyrenaics in *Math.* 7.190–200. So Sextus does not cite Antiochus as his source for the Cyrenaics. Secondly, the remark that Antiochus ‘seems’ to have brought up the new view and to have alluded to Asclepiades suggests that the *Canonica* was not a primary source Sextus was following, since Sextus omits the other proponents and any wider discussion of this view in Antiochus’ work. (If there was any: Sextus’ phrasing suggests that the work – or at least, this part of book 2, the only part we know of it – was not explicitly engaged in giving a doxography at all, since it just hinted at views like those of Asclepiades.) Finally, the passage gives us a very good reason why Sextus should happen to know of and cite Antiochus’ view about just this question at the end of the passage, even though he is plainly not using the book as a general source: Sextus himself has written extensively about Asclepiades, the person Antiochus actually mentions, elsewhere.

¹⁷ The phrase ‘Antiochus seems to lay out the position *described above*’ in *Math.* 7.202 is confusing. It is easy to think that Sextus means that Antiochus connected the Asclepiadean view and the Cyrenaics’ – though, as Tarrant 1985: 95–6 allows, even if this is correct, the elaborate transition shows that *Canonica* book 2 was not Sextus’ source for the Cyrenaics. But, as David Sedley pointed out to me, it is much more likely that the phrase in fact refers just to the new position, i.e. the view that perceptions are the criterion of truth. If so, there’s no reason to think that Antiochus discussed the Cyrenaics at all in this work.

I conclude that there is no direct evidence for the claim that Antiochus is the source of *Math.* 7.141–260 (contra (a)) – and that all we know of Antiochus from these passages is that he adopted the basis of Stoic epistemology and wrote a book called *Canonica*, which alluded to Asclepiades.

The second claim (b), that the doxography reflects Antiochean epistemological or historical views at various crucial points, is more important, since parts of it are adduced to explain the evidence in *Academica* 1 and the *Lucullus*, even by those who do not regard Antiochus as Sextus' direct 'source'. I focus on the excerpts on Plato and the Peripatetics, since, if they were Antiochean, these would provide the most significant information not given to us in the *Academica*. The discussion can be brief, because these are supposed to be *philosophical* similarities, so the difficulties for claim (b) are readily apparent.

The case of Plato in *Math.* 7.143 is straightforward: this is an interesting (if implausible) attempt to reconcile Plato's anti-empiricist epistemology in the *Timaeus* with a Hellenistic-type position. But despite some similarities, it is clearly incompatible with Lucullus' view in the *Academica*, since it denies that perceptual clarity or perspicuity is veridical (*Math.* 7.143 $\neq$ *Luc.* 17–18). It is also clearly incompatible with Varro's report on the old Academic view in *Academica* 1, since it allows that reason judges the truth in perspicuity, while Varro denies that the sensible world is apprehensible (*Math.* 7.144 $\neq$ *Ac.* 1.31–2).¹⁸

The Peripatetic report in *Math.* 7.217–26 is more intriguing (especially for its claims about our knowledge of individual forms and species and genera in 7.224–5), and may well come from Antiochus' lifetime. But again, it fails to correspond to either *Academica* 1 – where the Peripatetics are ascribed the anti-empiricist epistemology of the early Academics – or Lucullus' view in the *Lucullus*.¹⁹ The latter is the vital point, and it is made clear in *Math.* 7.221 and 7.225. In *Math.* 7.221 we learn that the Peripatetics distinguished (i) a perspicuous sensory input, from (ii) a second psychological motion, defined as both a 'memory' of (i) and an 'impression'

¹⁸ Similarities: we start from the senses (*Math.* 7.143 = *Ac.* 1.30) but judgement as such is not in the senses (*Math.* 7.143 = *Luc.* 21?). (Note that the term 'Platonists' used by Sextus in *Math.* 7.143 is extremely rare before c. second century CE.) David Sedley, in this volume, argues that, while this interpretation of Plato is strictly incompatible with Antiochus' own Stoic epistemology, it is Antiochus'. But assimilating Plato to a Peripatetic position (as this author does to the one set out in *Math.* 7.217–26) is a common thing in the evolving history of Platonism. It also seems unlikely that Antiochus would make the fundamental disagreements between the Platonic/Peripatetic position and his own Stoic position as clear as Sextus' doxography does (see below).

¹⁹ But Varro does note that Aristotle at least rejected transcendent Forms in *Ac.* 1.33, even if there is no sign that Antiochus saw this as the basis for a useful non-Stoic epistemological view.

of its source, and both are further distinguished from (iii) a third rational 'impression' with an abstract content that occurs at our will. The passage looks very similar to some elements of the view of cognitive development set out in *Luc.* 19–31 (see below).²⁰ But it differs in at least two basic respects. First, Lucullus accepts the Stoic account of memory, in which it is defined as the retention of a proposition rather than of an irrational sensory input (see *Luc.* 22 with *Luc.* 106); and, secondly, Lucullus takes the Stoic view that perspicuous perceptual impressions give rise to *katalēpsis*, namely actual knowledge (e.g. *Luc.* 33–4), whereas these Peripatetics seem to reject this view, by reserving full accuracy only for 'science', and distinguishing 'art' from mere 'opinion', assent to a perspicuous perceptual impression, in *Math.* 7.225.²¹ These points are not mere details: they show exactly where a sympathetic updating of Aristotle would disagree with the Stoa, as Cicero suggested *against* Antiochus in *Luc.* 112–13.

In both cases, we can see something that is closer to what we might have expected Antiochus to say than our evidence in the *Academica* shows he did say. But since both passages give views that are inconsistent with the attested evidence and neither is ascribed (implicitly or otherwise) to Antiochus, we should conclude that we have no reason to suspect that they are Antiochean. The negative case could be strengthened by looking closely at further passages – it would be curious, for instance, if Antiochus was responsible for Sextus' garbled interpretation of Carneades' 'practical criterion', given that Lucullus seems to get it right in the *Lucullus*.²² But this is unnecessary, for a simple reason: the one passage from Sextus that does correspond in detail to Lucullus' account is *Math.* 7.253–60, the report of the Younger Stoics' epistemology. Thus even if Antiochus *were* Sextus' source, his view here would pose the same problem for scholars as Cicero's *Academica* does, because Sextus' doxography shows very little sign of wanting to assimilate Plato to Speusippus or Xenocrates or these Academics to the Peripatetics or any of them to the Stoics. We would thus still have to conclude that Antiochus adopted a profoundly Stoic view

²⁰ Similarities: *Math.* 7.226 = *Luc.* 31, the mind uses the senses as an artist does, and *Math.* 7.221–5 = *Luc.* 19–23, both go from perception to impressions to memory, art and science. Other dissimilarities: *Luc.* 30, the mind is itself a sense, is incompatible with the sharp distinction between the faculties of perception and intellection at *Math.* 7.217. (See Barnes 2007 for a wider evaluation of this passage and our evidence for later Peripatetic epistemology.)

²¹ A third difference may be that these Peripatetics take rational impressions to be limited to type (iii) in *Math.* 7.221; but this is not clear from *Math.* 7.221 and 7.225. The author may just mean to specify that only rational creatures are capable of abstract conceptualization – a point with which the Stoics agreed.

²² See Allen 1997.

and apparently did not strive to reconcile it with the early Academic or Peripatetic positions.²³

I conclude that we have no reason to think that *Adversus mathematicos* 7 is drawn directly from an Antiochean work – although it is clear that there are intriguing connections between the Stoic and Academic reports and arguments in *Math.* 7.150–89, 7.227–60 and 7.401–45 and Cicero's (unknown) sources for the *Lucullus*.

ANTIOCHUS' EPISTEMOLOGY IN THE *ACADEMICA*

My aim to this point has been to try to remove the presupposition that we need to find, or should expect to find, any markedly Platonic or Peripatetic doctrines in Antiochus' epistemology, given that our principal evidence – Lucullus' account in the *Lucullus* – is manifestly Stoic. This is a necessary preliminary, I think, if we are to have any chance of securely identifying any alterations he may have made to the Stoic position he explicitly defended (cf. *Luc.* 17–18). That position is built around a roughly two-part defence of Zeno's definition of *katalēpsis*, explained in *Luc.* 45–6: one part, *Luc.* 17–39, aims to make the epistemic force of 'perspicuity' manifest, while the second, *Luc.* 40–60, tries to defuse the sceptics' assaults on it using standard Stoic arguments. The idea in the first part is to show that the apprehensive impression provides a natural criterion which serves as the necessary basis for the development of knowledge and the possibility of a good life. The general argument is modelled, I think, fairly directly on the Younger Stoic view summarized in *Math.* 7.157–60; but instead of trying to establish this in detail, I will assume that its generically and roughly Stoic basis is agreed (see above) and briefly review instead four points in Lucullus' account that might mark Antiochean innovations.

The first case concerns the account of perception and concepts in *Luc.* 19–21, and in particular, the hierarchy of apprehensions in *Luc.* 21 from, for example, 'white', to 'This is white', to 'This is a dog' to 'If something is a man, it is a mortal animal that participates in reason.'

²³ David Sedley argues in this volume that Antiochus' *Canonica* contained a history of the *development* of epistemology, terminating with the correct view of the (Younger) Stoics (cf. Sedley 1992: 44–55). This is an attractive idea, but not one that fits Sextus' doxography, in my view. It seems unclear to me that the history of disagreements about the nature and criterial functions of perspicuity in *Math.* 7.141–260 is either irenic – i.e. derived from a non-sceptical source – or better suited to an Antiochean view than a late Stoic perspective, if it is. The fact that its author regards the sceptical Academics and Cyrenaics as part of the Platonic tradition but treats the Peripatetics along with the Epicureans and Stoics is also particularly difficult to square with the hypothesis that he is Antiochus. In the absence of strong evidence that Sextus' doxography is Antiochean, its incompatibility with the history in *Academica* 1 and the epistemology in *Lucullus* seem to me to rule out this hypothesis.

Such are the things we claim are apprehended by the senses. The next set are just like them, though we don't claim that these are apprehended by the senses themselves, but by the senses in a certain respect – for example 'That is white', 'This is sweet', 'That is melodious', 'This is fine-scented', 'This is rough.' Our apprehension of this set now comes from the mind rather than the senses. Next comes: 'That is a horse', 'That is a dog.' Then we get the rest of the series which connect more significant things and encapsulate what we might call a filled-out apprehension of things – for example 'If something is human it is a rational animal partaking in reason.' It's from this set [of impressions] that our conceptions of things are stamped on our minds, and without them there can be no understanding, investigation or argument. (Cic. *Luc.* 21)

Two questions have been posed about this passage: is it Stoic? And, if so, is it any more Stoic than Peripatetic?²⁴ Both issues depend on the relation of *Luc.* 21 to its context. The standard view, which I share, is that *Luc.* 21 is a transition between the exposition of the manifest power of perception as such in *Luc.* 19–20 and the arguments in *Luc.* 22–3 that our advanced cognitive capacities (memory, art, science, virtue) directly depend on perception. In both cases – namely on either side of *Luc.* 21 – Lucullus ties the relevant cognitions explicitly to the Stoic definition of apprehensive impressions (the third clause in the definition from Zeno he gave and set out to justify in *Luc.* 18). And both have distinctively Stoic doctrinal elements: in *Luc.* 19, for example, Lucullus tacitly borrows the Younger Stoic argument from *Math.* 7.258 to show that we naturally use the apprehensive impression as our criterion, by changing perceptual conditions until 'our vision itself provides the warrant for its own judgement'; and in *Luc.* 22 he alludes to the Stoic definitions of memory and art.²⁵ Two other wider points show that the context is directly tied to a Stoic account: the very similar, but explicitly Stoic account of the senses and capacities that develop from them in *Nat. D.* 2.147–53, and the fact that perception is taken to be propositional at various points in *Luc.* 19–20. So the context is clearly Stoic, rather than Peripatetic or syncretic.

The function of *Luc.* 21, on the standard view, is to explain how our advanced cognitive capacities derive from perception, that is, to explain the development of the conceptualization that amounts to rationality. This makes for a degree of confusion, because the lowest rank in the hierarchy from sensing to perceiving complex states of affairs or objects can be interpreted in two ways. Taken as the first stage in a standard Stoic

²⁴ Barnes 1989: 83–4; cf. Karamanolis 2006: 65–9.

²⁵ See Brittain 2006a ad loc. On memory, cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.373, Plut. *De soll. an.* 961c, and Cic. *Luc.* 106. On art, cf. Sext. Emp. *PH* 3.188, *SVF* 1.73 and 2.93–7 and Cic. *Luc.* 107 and 144–6.

account of concept-formation, it is the pre-rational perception of infants – that is, a kind of perception that we cease to have once we become, or start becoming, rational. Read like this, simple perception in *Luc.* 21 is not equivalent to the propositional sort praised in *Luc.* 19–20.²⁶ But the distinction between what we grasp with the senses *per se* and the propositional contents we grasp with the mind can also be read as marking a permanent divorce between purely perceptual content as such and the contribution of the mind (*dianoia*) to any perceptual impression, even in a rational adult. And this seems to pick up on the parts of *Luc.* 20 that focus on the individual senses of taste, smell and ‘inner touch’. But, if present at all, this distinction is not alien to the Stoa either, since the Stoics clearly distinguished the perceptual faculties from the *dianoia* and emphasized the latter’s role in forming all our impressions.²⁷ So on either account, *Luc.* 21 looks fully compatible with Stoic epistemology.

That leaves, as far as I can see, one possibility: that, despite its exclusively Stoic context, and full consistency with Stoic doctrine, the passage can still be read as Stoic/Peripatetic, because the Peripatetics held a similar view of cognitive development from perception, through memory, to the universal (concepts), and thence to arts and sciences (see, e.g., Arist. *Metaph.* A, and Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.217–26 above). This is true only if one ignores the context and hence the significant philosophical differences in their conceptions of each stage, set out above.²⁸

The second case concerns the related passage giving an account of human cognitive development derived from physics in *Luc.* 30–1. This has been taken by Fladerer to show that Antiochus’ epistemology is centred on the decidedly non-Stoic process of the higher mind evaluating its perceptual inputs.²⁹

The next topic is wide-ranging, but since it is a little more recondite (it includes a bit of physics) ... Still, it could be argued in detail that nature employed great artistry in constructing first every animal and then man in particular; and (1) one could thus show the power the senses have: (a) how first impressions strike us, then impulse follows under their stimulus, and then (b) how we direct our

²⁶ See Brittain 2005: 166–85; cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.51 and 7.63 on rational impressions, and Aëtius 4.11 on concept-formation. (On the Stoic definition of apprehension as such, see Striker 1990, Frede 1999b, Sedley 2002b, and Backhouse 2005.)

²⁷ See Brittain 2002: 259–62; cf. Calcidius 220 and Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.344.

²⁸ Though even in this brief paragraph there is one point that looks obstinately Stoic, namely the logical form of the definition of man, which seems to correspond to a specifically Chrysippean-influenced theory adverted to in *Math.* 11.8–11.

²⁹ Fladerer 1996: 86–94.

senses towards the things we want to apprehend. (2) For the mind, which is the source of the senses and is even itself identical to the senses, has a natural power it directs at the things by which it is moved. (3) Thus it seizes on some impressions for its immediate use, while storing away others as the source of memory; but it organizes the rest of our impressions by their similarities – and these give rise to our conceptions of things (... *ennoiai* and *prolēpseis*). After the addition of reason, proof, and a wealth of countless facts, one's apprehension of all those facts becomes apparent, and reason itself, now perfected in these stages, achieves wisdom. (Cic. *Luc.* 30)

There are three questions here, I think. The simplest concerns *Luc.* 31, which claims that the human mind is adapted for knowledge, particularly embraces *katalēpsis* and creates the arts as second senses. The first and third of these clearly echo some Aristotelian ideas that are picked up by the Peripatetics in *Math.* 7.226. But the paragraph also, and more clearly, echoes attested Stoic views. The claim that the mind is adapted for knowledge is familiar from Cicero, *Off.* 1.11–19 and *Nat. D.* 2.147–8. The exclusively Stoic claim that the mind particularly embraces *katalēpsis* is implied in *Nat. D.* 2.147–8 and elaborated in *Fin.* 3.17–18. And the function of the arts as enhancers of the senses is stressed in *Nat. D.* 2.145 (cf. 2.146 fin. and 2.150ff.). So we can ignore *Luc.* 31.

The second question, about the first part of *Luc.* 30 (down to 'as the source of memory' in (3)), is more difficult, since it is hard to know how to construe the passage, and it also contains a textual problem. But in my view, Lucullus abbreviates a discussion of the design of the human cognitive faculties in these three sentences: the first singles out two functions of perception, namely (a) that we act on some impressions, and (b) that we use other impressions to gain knowledge. The second sentence then elaborates briefly on point (b); the third summarizes the two functions and prepares us for the more extensive development of (b) in the rest of *Luc.* 30. Thus, following Reid's text, I take (a) to be adverting to the standard Stoic view, which Lucullus has just gone through in *Luc.* 24–5, that action is caused by impulse, and that impulse is caused by our assent to impressions – exactly what the third sentence summarizes in its first part: 'Thus it seizes on some impressions for its immediate use...' And I read (b) and its explanation – the claim that 'we direct our senses towards the things we want to apprehend. For the mind, which is the source of the senses and is even itself identical to the senses, has a natural power it directs at the things by which it is moved' – to mark the way we make active use of our senses to discover or discern things. So understood, the latter may seem to stress our *active attention* more than we expect in a strictly Stoic context, but

it is in fact exactly what Lucullus describes in *Luc.* 19 (cf. *Math.* 7.258).³⁰ And this makes sense of the explanatory second sentence: it is precisely because the mind (*dianoia*) is *not* a second higher power, fully distinct from the senses, but is actively involved in perception properly speaking (viz. experiencing impressions), that the Stoics can consider perceptual experience to be propositional. Read in this way, then, the first part of *Luc.* 30 is an entirely and uniquely Stoic account. It depends on Lucullus' previous decidedly Stoic reports on impulse and action and on active perception (*Luc.* 24–5, 19); it explains one of them using a Stoic (or anyhow non-Peripatetic) quasi-identification of the mind and senses (cf. *Math.* 7.307); and it expounds a patently Stoic (and non-Peripatetic) doctrine of providential design, of the same type as that given in *Nat. D.* 2.147–53.

I have gone into this in some detail, because Fladerer's alternative, though otherwise implausible, has the merit of retaining the received text in part (a) of the first sentence, namely 'prima visa' or 'first impressions'. In my view, the emendation to 'primo' or 'at first' is mandated by the sense and is likely, given Ciceronian usage, since the concatenation 'primo . . . deinde . . . tum' ('first . . . then . . . then') is one of his favourites. But Fladerer's reading of *Luc.* 30 does not depend on this. He thinks that in the first sentence Lucullus distinguishes between initial sensory inputs and subsequent judgments or apprehensions. And he uses this distinction to argue that the later part of *Luc.* 30 restricts 'apprehension' or knowledge to the subsequent judgment of our reason about perceptual contents.³¹ The main problem with this interpretation – and similar 'Academic' or 'Peripatetic' interpretations relying on a prior reconstruction of an allegedly Antiochean epistemology based on an imaginative take on *Ac.* 1.30–2 – is very simple: it is inconsistent with what Lucullus has told us about perception and impulse and action in the previous eleven sections of the argument.³²

The third question on *Luc.* 30 concerns the remaining sentences, dealing with our ideal cognitive development. Since we have looked at this in *Luc.* 19–22, I can be brief here. The one questionable point for a Stoic reading

³⁰ The parallel in *Math.* 7.258 even has the verb ἐκτείνειν, which must be what Cicero is translating with *intenderemus*. Active perceptual attention is also noted in e.g. *Nat. D.* 2.140–2.

³¹ As far as I know, there is no parallel for the term 'prima visa' in Greek or Latin. It is true, however, that various texts do talk about the initial *effects* of impressions on the mind, in the context of discussions of emotion (see esp. Gellius 19.1.5, Sen. *De ira* 2.1.4, etc.). But I do not think that Lucullus can be alluding to 'propathēiai' here: the context ensures that either the whole sentence refers to cognition (Fladerer's view) or this clause is all he says about action (my view). The close parallel in Sen. *Ep.* 113.18 – giving the sequence 'impression, impulse, assent' – is disturbing, but I agree with Inwood (2007a: 284–5) that this must refer to *propathēiai* too and hence is irrelevant to *Luc.* 30.

³² On Fladerer's understanding of the term '*mens*' here, see n. 48 below.

here seems to be the claim that ‘knowledge (*perceptio*) of all these things’ comes only at the final stage. Given Cicero’s normal usage, this ought to mean *katalēpsis* – but why should *katalēpsis* be delayed until one reaches wisdom? I can think of two reasons. First, Cicero may be using *perceptio* to mean something less precise, like ‘knowledge’, since he stresses in *Luc.* 31 that *scientia*, ‘understanding’ or ‘synoptic knowledge’ – which seems to be constituted by the ‘knowledge (*perceptio*) of all these things’ – is the end to which ‘comprehensio’ (i.e. *katalēpsis*) is the means. Alternatively, we can keep the standard meaning, and explain the phrase by distinguishing ‘*katalēpsis* of all those things’ – achieving a technical conception of things such as horses, dogs, god – from the initial *katalēpseis* about such things, namely our common conceptions. And on either reading, the sentence will refer to all the information with which we need to supplement our common conceptions if we want to acquire wisdom.

So much for *Luc.* 30. My conclusion is that it can be read in a ‘Peripatetic’ spirit only at the cost of positing significant philosophical inconsistencies in Lucullus’ report, whereas an unforced reading yields a uniquely Stoic interpretation. To the extent that our disagreements about Antiochus depend on our exegetical methods, this seems to me to be the crucial passage.

The third case concerns Antiochus’ understanding of the criterial function of the cataleptic impression in the *Lucullus*, and particularly at 32–6 (his critique of the sceptical Academic’s ‘practical criterion’).

But how can this be a rule for truth and falsity if their indiscriminability means that we can’t have a conception of truth or falsity? If we do have one, after all, true and false should be as different as right and wrong. But if there’s no difference between them, there’s no rule: someone whose impressions [aren’t distinctive of what’s true but] are shared by what’s true and false alike can’t have any criterion or mark of truth at all. The Academics, of course, say that they’re only doing away with one point – that an impression can be true in such a way that there couldn’t be a false one just like it – while conceding everything else. But it is childish for them to deny that they’re doing away with ‘everything else’, when the thing they’ve done away with is the means by which everything is judged. It’s as if someone were to say that he hadn’t deprived a person of perceptible objects when he’s had their eyesight removed! Just as in that case the objects are recognized by means of our eyes, so ‘everything else’ is recognized by means of impressions – but through a mark distinctive of true impressions, not one shared by true and false alike. Hence, whether it’s ‘persuasive impressions’ or ‘unimpeded persuasive impressions’, which was Carneades’ idea, or something else again that you’re proposing to follow, you’re going to have to come back to the sort of impression at issue between us. [34] However, if the properties of that impression are shared by false impressions, there won’t be any criterion, because a distinctive property can’t be marked by a shared

sign . . . [36] Indeed, is there anything more absurd than their saying 'I follow this because it is in fact a sign or evidence for that; but it may turn out that what it signifies is false or entirely non-existent.'? (Cic. *Luc.* 33–6)

Gisela Striker has suggested that this passage shows that Antiochus accepted an 'internalist' interpretation of the 'distinctive mark' ('*propria nota*') of the apprehensive impression, mainly on the basis of his designation of that mark as a 'sign' of the impression's truth in *Luc.* 34 and 36.³³ She argued that the influence of his prior Carneadean training led him to construe the phenomenal character of impressions as evidence the subject uses to *infer* that the state of affairs they represent is true (cf. *Math.* 7.161–89). Hence he now regards the distinctive mark of the apprehensive impression as conclusive evidence for its acceptance, which must thus be directly available to the perceiving subject – rather than holding that the apprehensive impression itself is the natural and automatic criterion, as the Older and Younger Stoics did (on the standard interpretation).

Since the issue is very complex – as the long-standing controversies about the precise nature of the Stoic position(s) show – it is hard to rule out Striker's thesis.³⁴ But there are some reasons to think that it is not correct. The first is that Antiochus' defence of *katalēpsis* rests on the Younger Stoic position, as I mentioned above: in *Luc.* 17–18 he identifies the sources of apprehensive impressions with 'perspicuity', claims that their clarity is fundamental and cites Antipater as his predecessor in defining and defending this; in *Luc.* 19, as we saw, he tacitly uses a Younger Stoic argument to show that it is a natural criterion; in *Luc.* 33 he explicitly argues that the third clause of the definition is necessary for its criterial role, and he caps this with an analogy drawn directly from *Math.* 7.260; and in *Luc.* 38 he follows the Younger Stoics in regarding our assent to apprehensive impressions as so natural as to be virtually necessary (cf. *Math.* 7.253–7; see below). So it is very hard to believe that Antiochus did not see that the defence of the Stoic position against Carneades relied precisely on not succumbing to the temptation to take the apprehensive impression as evidence for our acceptance of the truth, rather than as its natural criterion.³⁵ The second reason is that elsewhere Lucullus preserves the terminological details of the Younger Stoic position precisely, but in

³³ Striker 1997: 262–5.

³⁴ I assume the 'standard view' here; see e.g. Frede 1999b or Striker 1990. Note that it does not matter for the question about Antiochus' originality which view of the Stoics or Younger Stoics is correct, since on either account Antiochus had at least one 'internalist' predecessor to follow (Carneades or *ex hypothesi* the Younger Stoics). But, it matters quite a lot for our understanding of his epistemology.

³⁵ See Striker 1990, Allen 1997 and Brittain (forthcoming).

ways that also might invite ‘internalist’ interpretations if we did not have Sextus’ report of the Stoic usage. Thus we find him stressing the degree of ‘trust’ (‘fides’) required for our criterion in *Luc.* 18, 19, 36 and 59, which looks dubiously Stoic but corresponds directly to the Younger Stoics’ stress on *pistis* in *Math.* 7.258 (cf. 7.253, 7.254, 7.256 and 7.260). And we can assume that Lucullus’ talk of the ‘distinctive mark’ or *nota* of the apprehensive impression in *Luc.* 33, 35, 36, 58 (cf. 70, 71, 83 and 110) – everywhere except the ‘sign’ passages in *Luc.* 34 and 36 – is supposed to capture the Greek *idiōma* – which is attested for Carneades’ Stoic opponents in *Math.* 7.252 and 7.408 – rather than a more inferential term such as *symbolon*. Lucullus’ fidelity in these respects leaves it open to us, I think, to allow that the Younger Stoics may have referred to the ‘distinctive mark’ of the cataleptic impression as a ‘natural sign’ in some contexts. The third reason is that the only context in which Lucullus does construe the mark as a ‘sign’ is when he is arguing against the sceptical Academics – and on the second occasion it is put explicitly in the mouth of a sceptic who *does* consider his impressions rationally evaluable (if inconclusive) evidence for his acceptance of the truth (*Luc.* 36; cf. *Luc.* 111 and *Math.* 7.161ff.).

I remain uneasy about this case. But I think that there is good reason to try to read it in a way that is consistent with the Younger Stoic position, because the alternative is incompatible with the principal argument Lucullus uses and provides a defence against scepticism whose weaknesses were very familiar to Antiochus.³⁶

The final case concerns Lucullus’ account of assent in *Luc.* 37–8.

First, when I was explaining the power of the senses, it also became clear that many things are apprehended by them, which can’t happen without assent. Secondly, since the principal difference between an animal and something inanimate is that an animal acts in some way (it’s impossible even to imagine what an animal that did nothing would be like), we must either deprive the animal of its senses or allow it the faculty in our control, namely assent. [38] In fact, by not allowing people to perceive or assent, there’s a sense in which the Academics actually rob them of their minds. For just as the balance of a scale must sink down when weights are placed on it, so the mind must yield to perspicuous [impressions]; just as an animal can’t fail to have an impulse towards something that appears suited to its nature (what the Greeks call *oikeion*), it can’t fail to approve a perspicuous thing it is presented with. (Cic. *Luc.* 37–8)

³⁶ Another cause of anxiety is the problem set out in Britain 2006a: xlii–xliii, namely Cicero’s systematic conflation of ‘apprehensible’ objects and impressions. This problem remains unexplored (to my knowledge); but it is possible that it is connected to the questions about internalism explored in Striker 1997 (see above).

Elsewhere in the book Lucullus follows the standard Stoic view about assent, outlined by Varro in *Ac.* 1.40–2 (cf. *Luc.* 24–5, 31, 53, 58–9, 61–2, and 107–8). But here he seems to commit Antiochus to two new claims: (a) that our assent to apprehensive impressions is necessary and (b) that all animals have assent. Since the Stoic views on these questions are controversial, it is not clear whether either of these is an Antiochean innovation. But there is at least some reason to think that the second claim is new, and perhaps significant.

I can be brief about (a), the necessity of assent, since the debate on this question is primarily a matter of our understanding of Chrysippus and the Younger Stoics. I have argued elsewhere that none of the Stoics thought that assent to apprehensive impressions is necessary: their idea was rather that while we are naturally set up to assent to them, our beliefs can override this natural mechanism in certain circumstances, because its default mode is defensive.³⁷ If this interpretation of at least the Younger Stoic view is correct, the relevant question here is whether and, if so, why, Antiochus departs from it at *Luc.* 38, given Lucullus' manifest fidelity to their position in other respects. The answer, in my view, is that he probably does not depart from it, because the point of *Luc.* 38 is only to claim that it is our *nature* to assent to apprehensive impressions, not that it is unconditionally necessary. This is indicated, I think, by the analogy with animal impulse, since it is not strictly speaking necessary for an animal to go for each thing it perceives as 'suited to it' (*oikeion*). Rather, animals are set up, for example, to eat suitable food when they perceive it – that is their nature, and it is necessary for them to do so if they are to survive. But it is only unconditionally necessary for them to go for something 'suited to them' when doing so is 'appropriate' (*kathēkon*), for example, when they are not being chased by a predator, or already full. So the analogy suggests that it is natural for the mind to assent to perspicuous impressions, without implying that it is necessary that it do so in every case.³⁸

The second claim (b), about animal assent, is more promising, I think, because it seems unlikely that any Stoic held this view, given the connection

³⁷ See Brittain, 'The necessity of assent' (forthcoming). The circumstances are e.g. when facing an episode of illness (*Luc.* 53; Diog. Laert. 7.127), a sorites puzzle (*Luc.* 94; *Math.* 7.416), or the Carneadean obstacles the Younger Stoics consider in *Math.* 7.253–7.

³⁸ The interpretation is supported by Cicero's apparent reply to this argument in *Luc.* 107, which characterizes it as the claim that 'it is impossible for anyone to assent to nothing'. A problem with my view is that it makes it even harder to explain why Lucullus does not mention the 'obstacle' cases dealt with by the Younger Stoics in *Math.* 7.153–7. The best I can do is suppose that Cicero thought this was too complicated to deal with in the *Lucullus*. The places that might reflect Ciceronian elisions of relevant material are *Luc.* 53 and 57.

between assent and rationality. There is some contrary evidence, but it is late and in both cases can be explained as careless reporting, in passages that cover both animal and human assent.³⁹ If this is right, the question here is why Antiochus would want to ascribe *assent* as such to animals, rather than stick with 'yielding' (*eixis*), the non-rational analogue to it that the Stoics seem to have granted them. Lucullus' rather confusing account in *Luc.* 37–9 does not give us much help with this question: his argument in *Luc.* 37 is that animals are defined as agents, so that, if assent is necessary for perception, and perception is a precondition for action, all animals must have assent. But he characterizes assent as 'what is in our power' and immediately restricts his discussion to what are clearly *rational* agents in *Luc.* 38–9. As a result, it is tempting to think that Cicero has made a mess of this, by conflating two distinct claims in Lucullus' abbreviated report.

But if we assume that this was Antiochus' view and that it is not Stoic, there is a scrap of evidence in *De finibus* 5 that might help to explain it. This is the curious passage in *Fin.* 5.38, which singles out a limited range of higher animals as the possessors of 'something similar to virtue', on the grounds that, unlike most animals, whose good is just in their bodies, these ones are capable of a degree of complex psychological activity. The basic idea here is presumably the familiar Aristotelian one that animals and children possess 'traces or seeds' of the virtues (*Arist. Hist. an.* 7(8).1), or what he calls elsewhere 'natural virtue' (*Arist. Eth. Nic.* 6.13, cf. 3.8 on the role of *thumos* in human and animal behaviour). But it is unclear how much this helps Lucullus, for two reasons. First, Piso's wider account stresses the difference between genuine virtues, which at least depend on, even if they may not be exhausted by, reason, and natural or proto-virtues. So Antiochus did not mean to claim that horses or lions require assent in the Peripatetic sense of rational choice: he does not think that any animals are rational or virtuous, properly speaking. But then it is not obvious why Stoic 'yielding' is not sufficient for him in *Luc.* 37–8, since this is designed to be the mechanism that explains apparently 'voluntary' action by non-rational animals. Secondly, even if Antiochus had a theory distinguishing the non-voluntary action of most animals from the voluntary but non-rational actions of higher animals, and tying the latter to assent, it still would not be consistent with *Luc.* 37–8, since that passage asserts that

³⁹ See Alexander, *De fato* 13 (*SVF* 2.979) and Nemesius, *De natura hominis* 35 (*SVF* 2.991); cf. Inwood 1985: 72–91 and Bobzien 1998: 378–87. Note that Long and Bastianini's supplementation of Hierocles col. 6.27–8 is a conjecture depending on these two passages; see their comment in Long and Bastianini 1992: 438.

assent is part of the nature of *any* animal.⁴⁰ As a result, it is unclear what we can usefully say about Antiochus' possible innovations on the subject of animal assent. (But see below for one speculation.)

A full survey of Antiochus' epistemology in the *Lucullus* would need to include the anti-Academic arguments explicitly assigned to him in *Luc.* 18, 28, 44 and III. I omit them because I do not think that they are of a form that could show evidence of innovation in his epistemological *theory*.⁴¹ My tentative conclusion is that there is very little or no sign in our principal epistemological report that Antiochus departed from the Stoic views he claimed to be defending.

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

If this is right, the most interesting question about the evidence for Antiochus' epistemology is whether Lucullus' account of it is consistent with the sketch of Antiochus' moral psychology given by Piso in *De finibus* 5. Since Antiochus seems to have been primarily interested in ethics, and since his ethical views were not immediately Stoic, it is in his attempt to fit Stoic 'logic' with Academic 'ethics', if anywhere (in our evidence), that we should expect to find epistemological innovations. My aim in this final section is very limited: rather than taking on the larger issues – such as Antiochus' position on non-rational motivation in adult humans – which remain intractable, I look at three more manageable topics relating to human cognitive development, namely Piso's accounts of concept acquisition, the seeds of virtue and the stages of self-knowledge.⁴² Although Piso tends to treat them separately, the three issues are related, since each of them pertains to his consciously non-Stoic theory of *oikeiōsis* – which is what makes them promising *loci* for Peripatetic or old Academic modifications of Antiochus' otherwise Stoic epistemology.

I start with concept-acquisition, because this is the most straightforward case. Piso brings up the issue only in *Fin.* 5.59, where he notes that nature

⁴⁰ Note that *Luc.* 38–9 gives us some reason not to think that Antiochus superimposed a Peripatetic theory distinguishing mere assent from full rational choice (in the way Alexander does), since these paragraphs tie virtue directly to assent.

⁴¹ Barnes 1989: 68–78 is the best treatment. Cf. Brittain 2001: 129–58 and 2006a: xxxiii–xxxv.

⁴² The evidence seems insufficient to determine whether Antiochus accepted the Platonic and Aristotelian bi- or tri-partition of the soul, or its desiderative capacities, into rational and non-rational 'parts'; see *Ac.* 1.38–9, *Luc.* 135–6, *Fin.* 5.31–2 and 5.95. Bonazzi, in this volume, argues that he did – though it should be noted that the fact that even a sage is *moved moderately* by the threat of pain or death, etc. does not show this: given that pain and death are genuinely bad, in Antiochus' theory, it is perfectly *rational* to be a bit upset at their approach.

set us up with functioning senses, but with no more than the fundamental basis for acquiring virtue. The crucial sentence is:

It's true that nature gave us a mind capable of acquiring every virtue, and (i) implanted in us without teaching little concepts (*notitiae*) of the biggest things, and (ii) began as it were to teach us and (iii) led us to the things that were already there [in us] as the 'elements' of virtue – but (iv) [with this] she only set the initial path for virtue, nothing more. (Cic. *Fin.* 5.59)

Some scholars have taken this to provide Antiochus with a post-Platonic theory of innate concepts, which fits nicely with their interpretations of *Ac.* 1.30–2, and seems secured by references to the supposedly Antiochean parallels at *Leg.* 1.26 and *Tusc.* 1.57–8. But there are three problems with this view. First, it means that the epistemology of *De finibus* 5 flatly contradicts the elaborate theory given in *Luc.* 21–2 and 30, where our concepts derive from perception. Secondly, neither of the two 'parallels' is an attested source: *Tusculans* 1 shows no sign of Antiochus at all, and *Tusc.* 1.57–8 is paraphrased directly from Plato's *Meno*; and *De legibus* 1 gives a Stoic theory of reason. And thirdly, *Leg.* 1.26 is expanded in *Leg.* 1.33 in a way that suggests that its 'innatist' language is misleading: these 'inchoatae intellegentiae' seem to be impressed on us by means of perception, as the Stoic – and Antiochean – theory in the *Lucullus* mandates.

So there is good reason to try a different reading of the sentence in *Fin.* 5.59. As I read it, it says: (i) we naturally develop basic concepts, without any teaching; (ii) these preconceptions amount to nature's 'instruction' as it were; and (iii) point us to the 'seeds of virtue' – non-conceptual features of our minds (see below); and (iv) this is enough for us to go on to develop virtue later on, if we are careful. If this is right, the conceptual doctrine in the sentence is fully consistent with the standard Stoic theory of concept development, which also starts with 'untaught' preconceptions derived from perception (Aëtius 4.11, *SVF* 2.83). (That this is a possible meaning of 'ingenuit . . . sine doctrina' is shown by the parallel in *Fin.* 5.43; see below.) The question here, then, seems to me to be the same as it is for Chrysippus, namely what exactly are the natural or 'implanted' *dispositions* for concept-acquisition that nature equips us with?⁴³ And I take it that Piso means us to look at the inbuilt 'elementa' – the 'seeds of virtue', I think – for an answer to that.

⁴³ See, e.g., Inwood 1984, Frede 1994, Scott 1995: 157–210, and Britain 2005: 176 n. 47 on the 'connate' *prolēpseis* ascribed to Chrysippus in Plut. *De Stoicorum repugnantiis* (*Stoic. rep.*) 17, 1041E, and *De communibus notitiis* 24, 1070C. It seems likely that Chrysippus meant to point out that some of our basic ethical concepts come from internal 'perception' – as Antiochus' seems to think here – rather than from just our interactions with the external environment.

Unfortunately, however, what Piso tells us about the seeds of virtue is not very much. Most of our information on them comes in *Fin.* 5.43, where we are told that

without any teaching, children are moved by simulacra of the virtues (c), whose seeds (a) they have within themselves. For these are the first elements (a) of their natures, from which, once they have been augmented (b), the first shoot of virtue (c) is produced.⁴⁴ (*Cic. Fin.* 5.43)

The idea here, I think, is that we need to distinguish between four stages of development:

- (a) the first elements (the seeds of the virtues)
- (b) the additions that augment them
- (c) the non-rational analogues ('simulacra, germen') of the virtues children sometimes develop
- (d) the rational virtues we end up with ideally.

The initial stage, (a), seems to represent the faculties and dispositions we have at birth, since *Fin.* 5.18 characterized the seeds of virtue as psychological dispositions that are analogous to the well-ordered bodily states that represent the initial objects we strive to attain or preserve – the mental analogues of health, strength and beauty, and so on. Piso does not specify what these are, but it is likely that they are the same as the 'non-voluntary' dispositions mentioned in *Fin.* 5.36, namely the materials for the 'natural virtues' constituting our mental character ('ingenium') – which he exemplifies with the quality of our memory and our teachability. The main question with this initial stage is whether it includes the *actualized* natural dispositions to sociability, knowledge and the virtues, which are the principal subjects of Piso's theory of ethical development. But Piso indicates that it does not in the sequel in *Fin.* 5.43, where he supports the sentence quoted above with a reference to our original possession only of their 'starting points' ('principia') – and this is confirmed by the account of *oikeiōsis* in *Fin.* 5.24 and 5.41–3 (see below). Sadly, he leaves us in the dark as to what these 'starting points' are (if we assume that they are distinct from the faculties constituting the *ingenium*).

The second stage, (b), is harder to identify; but I suggest, given what we have seen about the first stage, and following my reading of *Fin.* 5.59

⁴⁴ Tad Brennan drew my attention to an alternative reading of this sentence, taking 'virtutem percipiendam' to mean 'understanding what virtue is' and the 'simulacra' to be the apparently good external actions that children use to build up their concept of it (cf. *Sen. Ep.* 120). But there are parallels for both phrases in the sense adopted above in *Fin.* 2.38 – on 'attaining' pleasures – and in *Off.* 1.46 (cf. *Fin.* 2.111) on 'quasi-virtuous dispositions'; and my reading fits better, I think, with the rest of *Fin.* 5.43.

((ii) above), that it involves the development and early deployment of ethically relevant concepts in young children through their interactions with the environment. The idea would thus be that our initial set-up and proto-dispositions allow us to develop the conceptual equipment to gain a more sophisticated understanding of our natures – to see something of what the ‘seeds of virtue’ are and acquire some new ethical concepts – and so act to maintain and preserve them. The result of this new understanding and behaviour is then stage (c), the non-rational proto-virtuous dispositions that we admire in children; and from this, once we are rational, we can develop virtue itself (stage (d)).

I am not confident that I have Piso’s picture entirely right here. But assuming that the theory is something like this, we can now ask the crucial question: are the epistemologically relevant bits of this view of psychological development in early childhood inconsistent with the Stoic theory Antiochus follows in the *Lucullus*? The frank answer is that we do not know, because we do not know enough about the Stoic view on these issues. But it is perfectly consistent with what we do know, namely that infants start off with non-conceptualized proto-dispositions, develop ethically relevant concepts and thus come into cognitive possession of hazily defined ‘starting points’ (*aphormai*) to virtue.⁴⁵

This leaves us with Piso’s main account of *oikeiōsis*, which is certainly non-Stoic in some respects and is easily read as yielding a theory that is incompatible with the picture I have given above.⁴⁶ The part of Piso’s account that is not contested, I think, is that it involves a gradual development in ‘self-knowledge’, which takes place over three general stages:

- (1) early infancy, when the subject has only a basic impulse for self-preservation, ‘so it only maintains itself however it is, and doesn’t understand what it is or what it is capable of or what its own nature is’ (*Fin.* 5.24; cf. *Fin.* 5.41 and 5.43 fin);
- (2) childhood, when it ‘gradually begins to progress and recognize itself’ (*Fin.* 5.24; cf. *Fin.* 5.43 fin) and see ‘how we differ from other animals’ (*Fin.* 5.41) and accordingly has impulses to maintain and preserve the parts of its nature that it now recognizes;
- (3) adulthood, when it ideally fully understands itself and becomes virtuous (*Fin.* 5.41, etc.).

⁴⁵ See Brittain 2005: 179 n. 59 on the Stoic evidence, viz. Diog. Laert. 7.89 (*SVF* 3.228, cf. 3.229); Stobaeus 2.60 (*SVF* 3.264 fin.) and 2.65 (*SVF* 1.566); and Origen (*SVF* 2.988.10–11).

⁴⁶ See Inwood 1984. On the wider context of Piso’s account, see, e.g., Prost 2001, Görgemanns 1983, and Schofield (Chapter 8 of this volume).

What is contested is the exact mechanism which powers this process of cognitive development, and the degree to which the process as a whole is inconsistent with the Stoic analogues in Hierocles and Seneca. Brad Inwood, for example, has argued that the Antiochean account is modelled on a widely attested Peripatetic view, which differs from that of the Stoics' in three major respects: it does not appeal to the mechanism of continuous self-awareness from birth that defines the Stoic position; it is explicitly gradualist; and it presupposes that animals start out with a fixed nature, though one that is partially unrealized at various stages.

I do not want to deny that there *are* significant differences on all three points or that Piso's view reflects a Peripatetic theory. But I think that the degree of difference is easy to overrate, in ways that would create clear inconsistencies between Antiochus' epistemology and his moral psychology. On the first point, for instance, it is true that Piso explicitly rules out self-awareness of the sort that would give the infant a full grasp of its nature or capacities in *Fin.* 5.24:

At first, its take on this set-up is confused and unclear, with the result that it just maintains itself however it is, without understanding what it is or what it can do, or what its own nature is.

But Piso claims this precisely to explain why it is that infants are relatively inactive, why their initial impulses are so limited. That is, it is *because* he agrees with the basic Stoic idea that our impulses are conditioned by our self-awareness that he argues against the Stoic claim that animals start off immediately with full awareness of their current capacities. So it seems a mistake to think that Antiochus did not regard *oikeiōsis* as an initially cognitive process: the difference is limited to the range of objects he thinks is available to awareness at the various stages. This may imply a different theory of psychosomatic interaction and proprioception; but it is consistent, I think, with the (Stoic-friendly) epistemological picture I have given above. For both Hierocles and Seneca are careful to point out that at the cognitive level that is central for Stoic epistemology – i.e. the level of 'impressions' ('visa' or *phantasiai*) – animals have, and infant humans start out with, impressions that are 'unclear', 'crass' and 'non-specific'.⁴⁷ Moreover, Seneca explicitly applies these qualifications to their

⁴⁷ Cf. Brittain 2002: 273. Stoic impressions are unclear, *obscure*, Sen. *Ep.* 121.12, or *non dilucidus* 121.13 = ὁριστώδης, Hierocles, *Elements of Ethics* (*El. eth.*) 8.7, 8.16, 8.21; their imprinting is crass, *crasse*, Sen. *Ep.* 121.12 = παχέϊα, Hierocles, *El. Eth.* col. 8.1; and they are general, *summatim*, Sen. *Ep.* 121.12, or *nec expressus*, 121.13 = ὁλοσχερής, Hierocles, *El. Eth.* 7.60, 8.24. Cf. the further examples of 'confused' animal impressions in Sen. *De ira* 1.3.7, *Ep.* 124.18, and Philo, *De animalibus* 95 (?).

self-representations; that is, he applies them in the context that Piso is discussing in *Fin.* 5.24.

We can see the same sort of higher-level agreement between the Stoic and Antiochean theories in the case of the second question, about gradualism, I think: since Seneca allows that our 'constitution' is different in infancy, boyhood, adolescence and old age (*Ep.* 121.14–17) and his first three constitutions correspond more or less with the three stages in Piso's account, the difference between the two theories is not large. Further, the explanation of their disagreement seems to be Antiochus' rejection of the Stoics' implausible general view that radical psychological changes, such as those resulting in rationality or virtue, are instantaneous, and the corresponding Stoic ethical theses that moral progress is 'indifferent', all sins are equal, and so on. Again, I do not want to deny that this is a significant disagreement, but it is not clear that it is one that implies that the epistemological theory of the *Lucullus* is inconsistent with Antiochus' moral psychology.

The final question, however, at last brings us to an Antiochean departure from the Stoics that does look like an innovation of relevance to his epistemology. Piso is very insistent that there is a fixed entity that is human nature, even if it is one that we only realize gradually: see *Fin.* 5.24 and 5.41, and his further remarks on 'natures' in *Fin.* 5.33. If we press this insistence in the case of the mind, it is easy to think – as Fladerer does – that it leads to a major departure from Stoic epistemology: a Peripatetic (or early Academic) *mens* is already there at birth (*Fin.* 5.59). But, while it seems likely that this is a Peripatetic feature of Antiochus' psychology, it is important to recall what we know about this *mens*. First, it starts out without any concepts, and develops them through perception (conceived Stoically); secondly, its rational abilities – and reason itself – develop in the standard Stoic way, as we have seen above in *Luc.* 21 and 30 and *De finibus* 5; and, thirdly, it is not characterized by a strict distinction between faculties of perception and intellection; and, in fact, there is no hint that it can 'intellect' at all. So if, like Fladerer and Tarrant, we decide to call this a Peripatetic 'potential intellect' – although Ciceronian usage in Stoic contexts suggests that the Antiochean term that 'mens' translates was probably '*dianoia*' – it is worth remembering that there is no evidence that this term points to any *theoretical* disagreement with the Stoic epistemology.⁴⁸ The Stoics,

⁴⁸ *Mens*: *Ac.* 1.30 says that the *mens* alone can discern Forms, i.e. the senses cannot; but this does not need to imply that the word translates νοῦς. Elsewhere in *Academica* 1, *mens* seems to be 'the mind' rather than the intellect (see *Ac.* 1.20, 1.26 and 1.39), though since the divine *mens* in *Ac.* 1.29 is characterized by Stoics as an intellect, νοῦς may be the Greek term underlying Cicero's use of *mens* there. Lucullus uses *mens* with or without 'animoque' in simple contrast with 'the senses' or 'the

after all, agree that the human mind can develop all the properties attested for the Antiochean *mens*: the only difference is that, as far as we know, they did not use the Peripatetic terminology of potentiality and actuality that seems to be lurking in Piso's exposition.⁴⁹

It thus seems to me that the account of cognitive development in *De finibus* 5 is consistent with the Stoic epistemological position in the *Lucullus* – or, at least, that these portions of it are. I do not conclude that there were no Peripatetic or early Academic elements in Antiochus' epistemology, however, for three reasons. First, as we have seen above, Piso's account of *oikeiōsis* may have relied on a non-Stoic theory of basic self-perception and proprioception (though it may also not have relied on any developed theory at all). Secondly, if the evidence ends up showing that Antiochus thought that there were non-rational sources of motivation in adult humans, there may be significant implications for his epistemology (although I am not convinced that we will be able to tell what they are). And, thirdly, we are always free to speculate about additional features of Antiochean epistemology that our evidence is silent about. The one that I find attractive is tied to the two *attested* innovations that I have been able to identify, namely the ascription of assent to all animals in *Luc.* 37–8, and the implicit claim that we start out with a potential nature that we will, ideally, actualize over time in *Fin.* 5.24. It seems quite likely to me that Antiochus held the former view, if he did, because he wanted to deny the Stoic thesis that we acquire wholly new faculties or 'parts' of the mind – such as the faculties of assent and reason – when we mature. If so, we can imagine that he regarded our rational abilities as modifications of pre-existing faculties, that is, of the first elements of our nature.

A more adventurous speculation would be that Antiochus retro-fitted his Stoic epistemology in a way that was compatible with some favoured interpretation of the indeterminate sketch of old Academic views in *Ac.* 1.30–4: perhaps he thought that the development of concepts is equivalent to discovering universals, and that the task of the natural scientist is to identify Aristotelian forms or essences (cf. *Ac.* 1.34), which are eventually intuited by a special kind of intuition or intellection (cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.*

body', in *Luc.* 34, 48 and 52, as Cicero does in *Luc.* 66ff. *Fin.* 2.45 gives a Stoic use of *mens*, paralleled in e.g. *Nat. D.* 2.29 and 2.149, which doesn't mean 'intellect'. *Fin.* 5.34 notes that the *mens* contains the remarkable power of reason, knowledge and the virtues, which implies that it is not an intellect (strictly speaking).

⁴⁹ But see Sen. *Ben.* 4.6.6: 'insita sunt nobis omnium aetatum, omnium artium semina, magisterque ex occulto deus producit ingenia.' ('We have implanted in us the seeds of every stage of our physical development and of all the skills we develop: it is god, our master, who draws out of hidden depths in us our abilities.')

7.217–26), and to build up demonstrative sciences by syllogistic arguments based on their definitions (cf. *Ac.* 1.32) – and maybe even that these essences were created in conformity with the Ideas, namely the thoughts of god, and hence that our scientific grasp of them meant that our thoughts conform with the divine mind (cf. *Ac.* 1.30 and 32).

This unsupported speculation could be right: all I have argued is that there is no direct evidence for it or any a priori reason, in the texts that purport to set out Antiochus' actual epistemology, to suspect that anything like it is even remotely true. If we adhere to the evidence, the only reason to think that anything of the sort might be roughly on target is the strong indications from elsewhere that the Stoics themselves were tempted by some of these ideas – and, as Cicero suggested, Antiochus seems never to have strayed more than a foot away from the Stoics in his 'logic' (*Luc.* 143.) On the other hand, *De finibus* 5 does contain quite a bit about 'natures', and a good deal of praise for natural science, so perhaps further study of the evidence for his physics or metaphysics will show that I am mistaken.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Further studies relating to various aspects of Antiochus' epistemology include Luck 1953, Dörrie 1971, Durand 1973, Gucker 1978, Mette 1986–7, Lévy 1992, and Alessandrelli 2003. A good deal of work on Cicero's philosophical stance is also relevant, including Gucker 1988, Görler 1995, Görler 1997; so also is some recent work on the form of late Academic scepticism at the time of Antiochus' defection, such as Schofield 1999, Gucker 2004, and Britain 2006b.

CHAPTER 6

Antiochus on contemplation and the happy life

Georgia Tsouni

THE DRAMATIC PROLOGUE AND THE VALUE OF PHILOSOPHY

The fifth book of the *De finibus* is the only surviving philosophical dialogue of Cicero that takes place on Greek soil.¹ Away from the usual setting of other Ciceronian philosophical works, usually country houses of Roman noblemen, at the beginning of the book we are transferred in time and place to the Athens of 79 BCE (as against 52 BCE in the rest of the work). Cicero and his companions are depicted in a nostalgic mood, associating places in Athens with great figures of the past.² Cicero himself, following his philosophic inclinations, remembers Carneades, whereas Piso, the main speaker of the book, shows his allegiance to the philosophy of Antiochus.

The nostalgic mood is suggestive of a return to old authority, a motif most intimately connected with Antiochus' movement of the 'Old Academy'. Although Antiochus was in other contexts happy to include in his canon of authorities all the successors of Plato down to Polemo, *plus* Aristotle and Theophrastus,³ Piso's account in *Fin.* 5 is repeatedly advertised as a specifically Peripatetic account, conveying a Peripatetic theory of ethics, with little emphasis on Platonic authority.⁴ Aristotle and Theophrastus

Material from this chapter has been presented at papers given at the First-Century BCE lunchtime seminar series at the Faculty of Classics, Cambridge (Michaelmas Term 2008) and at the Classical Association/Classical Association of Scotland joint conference at Glasgow in April 2009. I have profited from the discussion on both occasions, as also from numerous discussions with David Sedley.

¹ The only other case of a Greek setting in Cicero is probably the incomplete *Timaean*, whose prologue is set in Ephesus.

² *Fin.* 5.1–6.

³ This canon appears explicitly in Varro's account in *Ac.* 1, where the Antiochean spokesman is stressing the dogmatic aspect of the Academic school against the sceptical version of the history of philosophy. One can infer that, given the sceptical challenge over the correct interpretation of Plato, the inclusion of the 'Platonic school' was particularly relevant in the epistemological debate but less so in the ethical one.

⁴ See also the numerous references in *Fin.* 5 to Peripatetic authority; in particular, Piso is chosen as a spokesperson of Antiochus by virtue of having the Peripatetic philosopher Staseas of Naples in his

are thereby conjoined and referred to collectively as the Peripatetic school.

The theme of the value of philosophy and intellectual endeavours is introduced early in the dialogue. The reason for the debate, cast through the personae of Cicero and Piso as a rivalry between Carneades and the 'Old Academy' of Antiochus,⁵ is the education of Cicero's young cousin, Lucius. The latter is being trained to become a politician, and like many members of the Roman elite of his time he is on an educational trip to Greece before returning to Rome to take up public office. Piso urges the young Lucius to engage with the philosophy of Antiochus, namely that of the 'ancients', since their writings contain the liberal teaching ('doctrina liberalis'), which is important for any career, whether in the political or intellectual sphere (*Fin.* 5.7).

Piso's remarks serve not only as an introduction to Antiochean, that is, in this case, Peripatetic doctrine, but also as an exhortation to philosophy in general addressed to a young man who is about to enter the public sphere. The dramatic context of the introduction thus appears to be integral to the theme of the book as a whole – and especially of the topic that interests us in this chapter, Antiochus' views on the contemplative life and intellectual activity in general. In the main section of the book Piso is assigned the role of expressing the Antiochean-Peripatetic views on this matter, which had also been treated, perhaps more fully, in the lost Ciceronian dialogue *Hortensius*.⁶

Piso's account deserves special attention, and not just because it is the only one in the Ciceronian corpus conveying explicitly the Peripatetic views on *theōria* and the appropriate mode of life; I shall also claim that some of the arguments in favour of *theōria* cited by Piso in *Fin.* 5.48–58 show signs of a protreptic to philosophy, which could have been based on a Peripatetic work of that genre.⁷ It will be further argued, on the basis of two parallelisms, that Antiochus' discussion of *theōria* resembles arguments from the 'exoteric' Aristotelian treatises. In

house for many years (*Fin.* 5.8). By contrast, Bénatouil 2009 claims that Piso's account of θεωρία is based more on Plato than on Aristotle, attempting to find support for the arguments in *Fin.* 5.48–58 in specific Platonic texts. There is, however, little support in the text for a Platonic interpretation of Piso's account, and Bénatouil does not address the lack of references to Plato in *Fin.* 5.

⁵ See Lucius' doubts whether to follow the New or the Old Academy in *Fin.* 5.6. This 'agonistic' motif is characteristic of New Academic scepticism.

⁶ There Cicero is said to have defended the life of philosophy against the attacks of a rival speaker. See *Fin.* 1.2, and cf. *Div.* 2.1.

⁷ See Piso's concluding remarks at *Fin.* 5.74, commending Peripatetic philosophy to both intellectuals and politicians. Works entitled *Protrepticus* were written not only by Aristotle but also by, among other Peripatetics, Theophrastus and Demetrius of Phaleron.

particular, I will discuss (i) what Antiochus understands by *theōria* and how he presents it as the highest human activity, and (ii) how in his philosophy intellectual activity forms part of an inclusive conception of a happy life which combines both *theōria* and *praxis*. I will finally attempt to connect Antiochus' views with developments in the post-Aristotelian Peripatos, and particularly with Theophrastus.

THE GENEALOGY OF *THEŌRIA*

The defence of *theōria* begins in *Fin.* 5.48 with a reference to the innate desire for knowledge ('innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae') that all human beings share.⁸ This is shown by the way in which children investigate everything around them for its own sake, without receiving previous instruction but led by a natural inquisitiveness and the pleasure they derive from it ('ut aliquid scire se gaudeant').⁹ The development of scientific and generally intellectual enquiry directed at 'higher' objects of study seems to be a natural development¹⁰ arising from this commonly shared inquisitiveness.

Antiochus here makes use of a 'cradle argument', which serves to show the natural basis of our striving towards knowledge for its own sake by means of observation of the first manifestations of desire and action in living beings. Thus Piso's account is characteristically backed up by detailed empirical examples, which exhibit an interest in children as bearers of the 'seeds' ('semina') of virtue (5.43). In this way Antiochus, probably following a trend in the post-Aristotelian Peripatos,¹¹ focused on children's natural dispositions for both knowledge and virtuous action, thereby stressing the 'natural' basis of moral behaviour. As Piso shows, those natural dispositions, although present from the beginning of one's life, would need to

⁸ Cf. *Fin.* 4.18: 'tantus est igitur innatus in nobis cognitionis amor et scientiae, ut nemo dubitare possit quin ad eas res hominum natura nullo emolumento invitata rapiatur.'

⁹ Pleasure is here considered to be something which necessarily follows upon things valuable for their own sake and not as a good in its own right. That means that we would choose those things even if no pleasure resulted from them, cf. *Eth. Nic.* 10.3, 1174a6–8. For the generally dismissive attitude of Antiochus towards pleasure, see *Fin.* 5.45.

¹⁰ Arist. *Metaph.* A 2, 982b12–17 sketches the transition from initial 'wonder' at obvious perplexities to enquiry into physical phenomena. However, Piso takes care in *Fin.* 5.49 to demarcate the merely inquisitive ('curiosi') from the 'leading men' ('summi viri') who are true intellectual enquirers.

¹¹ Piso asserts (*Fin.* 5.55) that Peripatetic philosophers most of all visit the cradle in order to learn the intention of nature. For evidence of such a trend in the Aristotelian corpus, see *Hist. an.* 7(8).1, 588a31–3. For an analysis of the use of 'cradle arguments' in the Epicurean and Stoic tradition, see Brunschwig 1986.

be 'cultivated' through education and habituation in order to achieve the ideal result which constitutes the *telos* of human beings.¹²

Piso's main discussion of *theōria* continues with an allegorical interpretation of an episode from the *Odyssey* (5.49). Here, the desire for theoretical knowledge is represented by the long travels of Ulysses, who appears not to be forced to endure many adventures before arriving back in Ithaca but to be travelling for the sake of the spectacle itself. In this way the hero is vindicated as an example of a wise man who devoted himself to the theoretical life and embarked upon journeys led by a desire for knowledge ('sapientiae cupido'). This relates to the traditional understanding of *theōria*, one form of which consisted in travelling abroad in pursuit of knowledge.¹³ Accordingly Antiochus, following his Peripatetic source, explained the allure that the Sirens exercised over the hero as primarily intellectual and not sensual: thus what seduced the travellers was not the sweetness of the Sirens' voices ('vocum suavitate') but the promise of knowledge which induced the natural (as Piso has shown) desire for learning ('discendi cupiditate').¹⁴ This allegorical interpretation of the Sirens' episode¹⁵ finds a parallel in the introductory remarks to *Tusculan Disputations* 1, where mythical figures such as Prometheus and Cepheus are explained as the original *theōroi* whose activity was distorted by the 'fairy tales of myth'.¹⁶

The Odyssean model of the wanderer who embarks on the acquisition of knowledge, as exemplified in his encounter with the Sirens, serves in *Fin.* 5 as a mythical archetype. It initiates the examples of old authorities and famous people of the past who devoted themselves to the theoretical life and could thus serve as role models. This is not unique to *Fin.* 5: journeys in search of knowledge were attributed widely to early Greek thinkers and philosophers. According to competing evaluations of 'lives', old authorities were ascribed either a theoretical or a practical-political life.¹⁷ The Antiochean protreptic at *Fin.* 5.50 represents a tradition which clearly depicts ancient authority as detached from the political sphere and devoted solely to theoretical activity:

¹² The relationship and complementarity between nature and art for the achievement of the best result in both plants and humans is exemplified with a vine analogy at *Fin.* 5.39–40.

¹³ Nightingale 2004: 63–8.

¹⁴ *Fin.* 5.49. That the desire for knowledge was the motivation of the hero of the *Odyssey* is presented explicitly as the intention of Homer himself.

¹⁵ The episode of which Cicero provides a Latin translation is from *Od.* 12.184–91.

¹⁶ *Tusc.* 1.7–8. That this recasting of the hero as θεωρός was followed by a wider Stoic tradition regarding the figure of Odysseus is clear from passages in Epictetus (*Dissertationes* 3.24.12) and Horace (*Ep.* 1.219–22) where Ulysses is taken to represent the Stoic *sapiens*. For Prometheus as the 'first to give men a share in philosophy', see Theophrastus, fr. 729 FHS&G.

¹⁷ Cicero testifies to this tradition at the beginning of *Rep.* 1.12 in his attempt to eliminate doubts about taking part in public life.

What can I say about Pythagoras, Plato and Democritus? Because of their desire for learning (*propter discendi cupiditatem*) they travelled to the remotest corners of the earth. Those who cannot understand this have never loved something lofty and worthy of knowledge.

Thus Pythagoras, Plato and Democritus are depicted as examples of wandering philosophers who travelled the world to acquire wisdom motivated by a desire for learning.¹⁸ I will examine briefly the Peripatetic tradition connected with those figures, and how Antiochus forms part of this tradition.

Pythagoras appears as an archetype of *theōria* already in (what is assumed to be) Aristotle's *Protrepticus*, where he is ascribed the view that one is born to be a contemplator of nature (θεωρὸς τῆς φύσεως).¹⁹ In Piso's account (5.87) he is assigned travels to Egypt and the Babylonian Magi²⁰ and is invoked in defence of the view that a philosophical life can guarantee happiness. By contrast, Dicaearchus presented him as a politically active man in Southern Italy (frs. 33–4). This is in line with Dicaearchus' general practical orientation and his depiction of the Seven Sages as practical politicians (fr. 30).²¹

Travels for the acquisition of theoretical knowledge are ascribed also to Democritus, who for the same reason is praised and called a sage (σοφός) in a fragment of Theophrastus.²² Piso makes use of a biographical tradition which attempts to present Democritus as someone totally devoted to a life of study (5.87), neglecting his paternal fortune and even putting out his own eyes in order to devote himself to the investigation of truth,²³ thus corroborating to the highest degree the Antiochean view that philosophy constitutes the secure path towards happiness. The use of Democritus in

¹⁸ The emphasis on *cupiditas* here may well mark an anti-Stoic point: in *Tusc.* 4.44 Cicero, expounding on the positive role of a *modicum* of natural emotions in Peripatetic theory, uses the very same examples to emphasize the role of ἐπιθυμία for one's devotion to a noble pursuit: 'philosophiae denique ipsius principes numquam in suis studiis tantos progressus sine flagranti cupiditate facere potuissent. ultimas terras lustrasse Pythagoran Democritum Platonem accepimus. ubi enim quicquid esset quod disci posset, eo veniendum iudicaverunt. num putamus haec fieri sine summo cupiditatis ardore potuisse?'

¹⁹ *Protr.* B18 Düring. This squares well with the anecdote about Pythagoras told by Heraclides of Pontus and cited at *Tusc.* 5.8–9. There, using a parable, Pythagoras describes the philosopher as someone who comes to a festival only for the sake of the spectacle ('visendi causa').

²⁰ Cf. Diog. Laert. 7.3.

²¹ Cf. fr. 31 Wehrli, where Dicaearchus exalts the ancient wise men who 'did not philosophize in words and by creating pithy sayings (but rather) by the practice of noble deeds' (ἀλλ' εἶναι τὴν σοφίαν τότε γοῦν ἐπιτήδευσιν ἔργων καλῶν).

²² Ael. *VH* 4.20 = 513 FHS&G. This presentation of Democritus corresponds to numerous testimonia which portray him as a wandering philosopher travelling to the East, e.g. Diog. Laert. 9.35; Clem. *Strom.* 2.43.13 Staehlin = DK 68 B299.

²³ Cf. Diog. Laert. 9.36.

this context is significant because he played an important role in the New Academic version of the history of philosophy and served as a model for the sceptical reading of Plato.²⁴

In line with the depiction of Democritus and Pythagoras, emphasis is laid at *Fin.* 5.87 on the alleged travels of Plato for the acquisition of theoretical *scientia*, the earliest reference to which can be found in Cicero's *De republica* (1.16). In *Fin.* 5, Plato is presented as travelling to Egypt and Southern Italy in order to learn from foreign priests and the Pythagoreans the truth about numbers and celestial phenomena ('numeros et caelestia'). This is incorporated into a 'dogmatic' reading of Plato according to which he combined in his writings the Pythagorean *disciplina* and the ethical discourse of Socrates.²⁵

In line with the examples invoked in the above-mentioned passages, Antiochus' conception of *theōria* is presented primarily as enquiry into nature, originating in the practice of the Presocratics. This is exemplified by the observation of the movement of the celestial bodies, but also, further, by the understanding of 'hidden realities' of nature ('eorumque omnium quae naturae obscuritate occultantur').²⁶ The word 'occultus' used by Piso in this context translates the Greek *adēla*, a term which comes to mean in Hellenistic philosophy everything that is not itself accessible to the senses but constitutes the underlying principles of perceptible phenomena.²⁷ Causes and principles of the natural world are the proper objects of *theōria* and can be further discovered through a process of reasoning which finds its starting point in perception (5.58). What Piso means is the attainment of theoretical knowledge through the process of demonstration (ἀπόδειξις or 'conclusio'),²⁸ a definition of which is provided by the Antiochean spokesman Lucullus at *Luc.* 26 in the context of an attack

²⁴ See, e.g., *Luc.* 73.

²⁵ The partly Pythagorean character of Plato's philosophy is absent from Varro's Antiochean account in *Ac.* 1, where in a more cautious way Plato is characterized as *multiplex* (1.17), the Platonic *disciplina* being rather a creation of his successors in the Academy.

²⁶ *Fin.* 5.51: 'ipsi enim quaeramus a nobis stellarum motus contemplationesque rerum caelestium eorumque omnium quae naturae obscuritate occultantur, cognitiones quem ad modum nos moveant.'

²⁷ Cf. *Fin.* 1.30, Sext. Emp. *Math.* 10.250ff., Lucretius 1.422–5. The use of the superlative 'occultissimus' in *Fin.* 5. could suggest the cause least accessible to the senses, i.e. the first cause of the cosmos. By contrast, Bénatouil 2009: 10 sees in the use of the word 'occultus' the influence of the New Academy on Antiochus. An alternative rendering of 'occultus' would be ἀφανής, see, e.g., Stob. 2.138.1–3 Wachsmuth: πρὸς δὲ τὴν ἐνδειξιν τούτου τοῖς ἐκ τῶν αἰσθήσεων μαρτυρίοις χρώνται, βουλόμενοι <ὕπερ> τῶν ἀφανῶν τὴν ἐκ τῶν φανερῶν παρέχεσθαι πίστιν.

²⁸ In *Luc.* 26 and *Fin.* 1.30 we find the metaphorical expression 'involuta aperire', which captures ἐκκαλύπτειν, used in Greek texts in connection with argument and definition.

on New Academic scepticism.²⁹ It is again described at *Fin.* 5.9 when Piso states that the Peripatetics in discussing the principles of the natural world employed ‘conclusive mathematical reasoning’ (‘necessaria mathematicorum ratione’) in order to reach knowledge of ‘hidden realities’.

Parallel to the presentation of *theōria* as enquiry into nature and its causes (including perhaps the first cause of the cosmos) we find a reference to liberal arts and sciences, such as geometry, music and philology, represented by great Greek intellectuals, for example Archimedes,³⁰ Aristoxenus and Aristophanes of Byzantium (50). However, alongside science, we meet in Piso’s account a broader notion of intellectual activity confined to the personal study of subjects such as history or fiction, which deal only with contingent facts or fictional characters (51–2). This broader conception of *theōria*, clearly more comprehensible to Cicero’s Roman audience, suggests the understanding of intellectual endeavours as including leisure activities, along with other practical or political actions, rather than as limited to activities which require complete devotion to study and enquiry.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE ISLES OF THE BLEST AND ‘DIVINE’ HAPPINESS

A characteristically Peripatetic feature of the advocacy of *theōria* by Piso is the idea that physical science and generally intellectual activity are valuable for their own sake (‘propter se expetenda’)³¹ and not because of the results they bring about (‘nulla utilitate obiecta . . . etiamsi incommodatura sit’).³² Thus *theōria* appears to be independent of the realm of politics and morality, being assigned an autonomous value as an activity choiceworthy in its own right. Piso concludes that the theoretical objects of learning and knowledge have an inherent value not defined by anything external to them. Towards such objects of enquiry we are driven not by any considerations of utility but by the belief that they are valuable for their own sake (*Fin.* 5.52).

The extreme dissociation of knowledge from the realm of practical affairs and politics, which finds in *Fin.* 5 its unique expression in the Ciceronian corpus, was first emphasized by Aristotle. In *Metaphysics* A (982b20–8)

²⁹ ‘itaque argumenti conclusio, quae est Graece ἀπὸδεξις, ita definitur: “ratio quae ex rebus perceptis ad id quod non percipiebatur adducit”.’

³⁰ Archimedes was invoked in *Nat. D.* 2.88 in an argument showing the Stoic views on the design of the cosmos. The fact that Antiochus uses him here as an example of disinterested *theōria* is telling. Gigon 1988: 267 claims that the example of Archimedes might have been taken from Posidonius.

³¹ The expression in all probability renders the Greek δι’ αὐτὸ αἰρετόν.

³² *Fin.* 5.50.

he defends the disinterested character of intellectual activity as something dissociated from the realm of need or use, being most akin to a free man as opposed to a slave. But also in the fragments of his *Protrepticus*³³ the superiority of the activity of philosophy is justified on the basis of a distinction between things ‘necessary’ (ἀναγκαῖα) and ‘goods in the strict sense’ (ἀγαθὰ κυρίως). The latter, unlike the former, do not result in anything external to themselves.³⁴

There is a further most interesting point of contact between Piso’s account and the *Protrepticus*. The *per se* choiceworthiness of *theōria* is reinforced by the depiction of a fully blessed life, free from necessities, in the imaginary Isles of the Blest (‘in beatorum insulis’).³⁵ This poetic haven of heroes³⁶ is used in *Fin.* 5 in a way that serves the exhortation to theoretical knowledge: sages are depicted as free from trouble and necessities, spending their time in investigating and acquiring knowledge of the physical world, and thus providing a model to which one should aspire by engaging in theoretical activity and the pursuit of natural science.³⁷ Thus, although the vision that the example conveys depicts an immortal state of the soul in the afterlife, it aims at promoting the value of *theōria* in one’s incarnate life:

The old philosophers also depict how the life of wise men will be in the Isles of the Blest. Freed from every trouble and not needing to care or provide for any of the necessities of life, they think that they will do nothing else but spend all the time, investigating and learning, in the knowledge of nature.³⁸

This depiction of an imaginary life devoted to the contemplation of nature is attributed directly to the ‘ancients’ (‘veteres . . . philosophi’) by whom one should understand, especially in *Fin.* 5, the Peripatetics. Indeed, the passage

³³ The idea that Iamblichus’ *Protrepticus* contains many arguments from a homonymous Aristotelian work has been forcefully argued, after Bywater’s first discovery, by Düring 1961, who offers a reconstruction and rearrangement of the chain of argumentation with a commentary. A new reading by Hutchinson and Johnson (2005) suggests that we find in Iamblichus pure blocks of quotation in a natural sequence as they appeared, allegedly, in Aristotle’s original work.

³⁴ Iambl. *Protr.* p. 82.20–7 des Places = B42 Düring.

³⁵ The similarity between the two passages has been already noted by Theiler (1930: 52) and Gigon (1988: 267), although the latter falsely attributes the relevant fragment in Iamblichus to the Aristotelian dialogue *On Philosophy*.

³⁶ Hes. *Op.* 170–2: καὶ τοῖ μὲν ναίουσιν ἀκηδέα θυμὸν ἔχοντες ἐν μακάρων νήσοισι παρ’ ὤκεανὸν βαθυδίνην, ὄλβιοι ἦρωες.

³⁷ The topos of the Isles of the Blest as the dwelling place of the wise men after death for the exercise of *cognitio naturae* featured also in the lost Ciceronian dialogue *Hortensius* according to the testimony of Augustine in *De Trinitate* 14.12.

³⁸ ‘ac veteres quidem philosophi in beatorum insulis fingunt qualis futura sit vita sapientium, quos cura omni liberatos, nullum necessarium vitae cultum aut paratum requirentis, nihil aliud esse acturos putant, nisi ut omne tempus inquirendo ac discendo in naturae cognitione consumant’, *Fin.* 5.53.

constitutes an almost verbatim quotation³⁹ from Aristotle's *Protrepticus*. The example makes use of the same vocabulary as its original, as it has come down to us in Iamblichus' *Protrepticus*, where it serves likewise as an argument in favour of contemplation. As in *Fin.* 5, the theoretical life is represented in the *Protrepticus* by the state of being enjoyed by the wise outside the earthly realm, according to the existing myths of the afterlife:

One could see that what we say is true to the highest degree if someone carried us, as it were, in thought to the Isles of the Blest. For in that place there could be no need for anything and no profit from anything, but there remains only thinking and contemplating, which even now we say is the free life.⁴⁰

The superiority of a purely theoretical life, but also the difficulty for humans to experience it fully as embodied beings, features most prominently in Aristotle's *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, a text full of Platonic overtones on *theōria* and its association with the divine.⁴¹ There it is stated that a life devoted exclusively to *theōria* would be superior to a human life, since someone will live it not in so far as he is a human being but in so far as he has some divine element in him.⁴² Such a life is further described in *Eth. Nic.* 10.7 as a divine life when compared to a human life, in the same way as *nous* is something divine when compared to the composite human being.⁴³ This makes the pursuit of a contemplative life an ideal,⁴⁴ but at the same time a paradox for humans, who would need to transcend their own human nature in order to achieve complete happiness consisting in contemplation.⁴⁵ Still, in a famous passage (*Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b33) Aristotle urges us 'to become immortal to the extent that it is possible' (ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν), suggesting a preoccupation with *theōria* as an 'immortal' state on earth.

³⁹ The remark 'ac veteres philosophi . . . fingunt' points to a direct quotation from an 'ancient' philosophical source.

⁴⁰ ἴδοι δ' ἂν τις ὅτι παντὸς μᾶλλον ἀληθῆ ταῦτα λέγομεν, εἴ τις ἡμᾶς οἷον εἰς μακάρων νήσους τῇ διανοίᾳ κομίσειεν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ οὐδενὸς χρεῖα οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τινὸς ὄφελος ἂν γένοιτο, μόνον δὲ καταλείπεται τὸ διανοεῖσθαι καὶ θεωρεῖν, ὅνπερ καὶ νῦν ἐλεύθερόν φαμεν βίον εἶναι, Iamb. *Protr.* p. 83, 4–8 des Places = B43 Düring.

⁴¹ The connection between the advocacy of the theoretical life in *Eth. Nic.* 10 and the *Timaeus* is discussed by Sedley 1999: 324–28.

⁴² *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b26–8: ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἂν εἴη βίος κρείττων ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπων· οὐ γὰρ ἡ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν οὕτω βιώσεται, ἀλλ' ἡ θεῖον τι ἐν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχει.

⁴³ *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b28–31: ὅσον δὲ διαφέρει τοῦτο τοῦ συνθέτου, τοσοῦτον καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετῆν. εἰ δὲ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον.

⁴⁴ The ideal state of such a life is expressed through the use of the superlative εὐδαιμονέστατος at 1178a8 and εὐδαιμονικωτάτη at 1178b23.

⁴⁵ Cf. also *Eth. Nic.* 10.8, 1178a20–2, where, contrary to the life in accordance with the 'practical' virtues, life and happiness in accordance with *nous* are called not human but 'separated' (κεχωρισμένη).

Antiochus' arguments clearly followed this Aristotelian tradition and, implicitly, its incorporated Platonic elements. Piso, as already suggested, aims with the example of the Isles of the Blest at promoting *theōria* as an 'immortal' activity on earth and, accordingly, makes reference three times in his account to the god-like character of human *nous*.⁴⁶ He furthermore, in his introductory remarks, presents the similarity of the theoretical life to the activity of the divine as the main reason why the Peripatetics (i.e. both Aristotle and Theophrastus) thought that a life devoted to contemplation and study is the one most worthy of the wise man.⁴⁷ The theme of the happiest possible life devoted to contemplation was explored, as Cicero attests, in a 'glorious' treatise:⁴⁸

However, those men [Aristotle and Theophrastus] gave the best approval to a quiet plan of living, devoted to the contemplation and examination of things. Since this was most similar to the life of gods, it seemed most worthy of the wise man. And concerning these matters their discourse is both brilliant and illustrious.

Although he recognizes the supreme happiness⁴⁹ enjoyed in continuous theoretical activity, Antiochus does not present it as an ideal *separate* form of life for humans but restricts himself to the depiction of such a life in the imaginary realm of the Isles of the Blest. Whereas, as will be shown later, he does not question the primacy of theoretical activity over other forms of activity, in the case of *human* life he incorporates it into an inclusive ideal, which centres around the notion of *actio*. It is to this that I now turn.

PHILOSOPHY AS *MEDICINA*

The transition from the divine realm of the Isles of the Blest to that of human affairs in *Fin.* 5.53 reveals a contrast between the incessant bliss

⁴⁶ *Fin.* 5.38: 'quod ex ratione gignuntur, qua nihil est in homine divinius'; 5.57: 'optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est, ingenii et mentis acie fruuntur.' In accordance with 'Old Academic' physics human *nous* is immortal, because it consists of indestructible aether, which is also the material of the heavenly bodies, see *Ac.* 1.26 and 1.39.

⁴⁷ This seems to reflect directly *Eth. Nic.* 10.8, 1178b21–3: ὥστε ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια, μακαριότητα διαφέρουσα, θεωρητική ἂν εἴη· καὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων δὴ ἡ ταύτη συγγενεστάτη εὐδαιμονικωτάτη.

⁴⁸ The *oratio* alluded to in this passage may well be a work of the protreptic genre, see Düring 1961: 167 or the title Περὶ τῆς θείας εὐδαιμονίας attributed to Theophrastus at Diog. Laert. 5.49. Fortenbaugh 1984: 205 is rightly cautious when drawing conclusions from this passage, and he notes that it should not make us think that Theophrastus excluded political and virtuous activity from his account of human happiness: 'Außerdem kann man aus unserem Text nicht folgern, daß Theophrast eine Auffassung der Glückseligkeit vertrat, welche die praktische bzw. Politische Aktivität ausschloß.'

⁴⁹ Notice the superlatives 'maxime', 'simillima' and 'dignissima' in *Fin.* 5.11. That the theoretical is the 'happiest' kind of life is supported by *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1178a8, but, as will become clear, it need not support the idea that *theōria* is the sole component of a completely happy life.

enjoyed by wise men in the heroic dwelling-place and the human domain where moments of theoretical activity are interrupted to pursue other affairs.⁵⁰ As Piso notes, for most human beings theoretical activity is not only the delight of a happy life ('*beatae vitae . . . oblectationem*') but also a very important means for the alleviation of the pain of misfortunes ('*levamentum miseriarum*'), such as exile, that can befall us at any time. This serves as an additional argument for advocating the intellectual activity that, given the political circumstances of the time, appealed to many members of the Roman elite, and specifically to Cicero himself, who explores the same theme – philosophy as *medicina* – in a personal tone in some of the prefaces to his philosophical works.⁵¹

The idea can with some plausibility be ascribed to Theophrastus. Aristotle's successor seems to have underlined the value of philosophy independently of any specific civic context, and to have urged people to be educated as a way of alleviating the blows of fortune. A passage from Vitruvius presents him as saying that 'of all men the educated man alone is neither a stranger in foreign places nor lacking in friends, when the members of his household and relatives are lost. Rather he is a citizen in every state, and able to disdain without fear the hard accidents of fortune.'⁵² A further association with the post-Aristotelian Peripatos is suggested by a reference to Demetrius of Phalerum, a pupil of Theophrastus, who after holding political office in Athens under Macedonian rule was exiled to Alexandria,⁵³ where he reportedly took to intellectual pursuits (*Fin.* 5.54). The fact that he wrote philosophy even when deprived of political office is cited in support of the non-utilitarian character of theoretical activity as disconnected from the realm of public affairs and as serving simply the ideal of *humanitas*. However, elsewhere Cicero praises Demetrius as someone who achieved the synthesis of *theōria* and *praxis* and 'excelled in both the pursuit of learning and the actual government of the state',⁵⁴ serving as the (Ciceronian) ideal of a politician-cum-philosopher. We turn now to indications that with his conception of a happy life Antiochus was envisaging a similar synthesis, whilst retaining the primacy of the value of theoretical activity.

⁵⁰ Notice the '*nos autem*' in *Fin.* 5.53. ⁵¹ E.g. *Div.* 2.7; *Ac.* 1.11; *Off.* 2.4.

⁵² The translation is from FHS&G. Vitruvius *De arch.* 6, prooem. 2 = fr. 491 FHS&G.

⁵³ The exile of Demetrius is referred to also in Plut. *De exilio* 601F.

⁵⁴ *Leg.* 3.14. We know that Demetrius wrote books *On Legislation* and *Constitutions in Athens*, and that he was a lawgiver: Diog. Laert. 5.80; cf. Strabo 9.1.20 on Demetrius' political activity in Athens during the time of Macedonian rule. However, no works on natural science of his are attested.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF *ACTIO* AND THE HAPPY LIFE

Last in the series of arguments for the *per se* value of theoretical knowledge is the example of sleep used in *Fin.* 5.54: Piso claims there that we consider sleep something contrary to nature because it deprives us of using our senses and also of any kind of action ('actionemque . . . omnem'):

Finally sleep: if it were not for the fact that it offers relaxation for our body and some sort of remedy for our toils, we would think that it is given to us contrary to nature; for it deprives us of perception and of any kind of action.⁵⁵

This remark is followed up at *Fin.* 5.55 by the statement that we would consider a fate of eternal sleep like that of Endymion as bad as death, even if it were to be accompanied by the sweetest dreams.⁵⁶ The invocation of sleep to suggest the intrinsic value of activity has antecedents in Aristotle, as sleep offers in Aristotelian ethics an argument for the contention that happiness is not a state (*hexis*) but some sort of activity (*energeia*).⁵⁷ Those activities which comprise happiness should be valued, according to the same passage, for their own sake without consideration of the results that they bring about. Again echoing Aristotle's *Metaphysics* A (980a21–6), the Antiochean spokesman asserts that seeing (or light)⁵⁸ is not valued because of the utility of its consequences, but in its own right.

As the final words in the quotation above indicate, the example of sleep marks a transition in the Antiochean account from the discussion of *theōria* and knowledge to that of the value of activity in general, thus placing knowledge itself in the wider context of an active life.⁵⁹ The notion of *actio* that the Antiochean spokesman employs here deserves some consideration.

⁵⁵ 'somnum denique nobis, nisi requietem corporibus et medicinam quandam laboris afferret, contra naturam putaremus datum; aufert enim sensus actionemque tollit omnem', *Fin.* 5.54.

⁵⁶ 'itaque, ne si iucundissimis quidem nos somniis usuros putemus, Endymionis somnum nobis velimus dari, idque si accidat, mortis instar putemus.'

⁵⁷ *Eth. Nic.* 10.6, 1176a33–6: εἴπομεν δὴ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἕξις· καὶ γὰρ τῷ καθεύδοντι διὰ βίου ὑπάρχοντι ἄν, φυτῶν ζῶντι βίον, καὶ τῷ δυστυχοῦντι τὰ μέγιστα. εἰ δὲ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον εἰς ἐνέργειάν τινα θετέον, καθάπερ ἐν τοῖς πρότερον εἴρηται. Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 10.8, 1178b18–20, where the example of Endymion is used to suggest the life and *energeia* of the divine: ἀλλὰ μὴν ζῆν γε πάντες ὑπειλήφασιν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἄρα· οὐ γὰρ δὴ καθεύδειν ὥσπερ τὸν Ἐνδυμίωνα, and *Eth. Eud.* 2.1, 1219b20.

⁵⁸ *Fin.* 5.54: 'equidem e Cn. Aufidio, praetorio, erudito homine, oculis capto, saepe audiebam, cum se lucis magis quam utilitatis desiderio moveri diceret.'

⁵⁹ One could explain this transition as a switch between Peripatetic sources on the part of Antiochus; for example from a 'protreptic' to philosophy he could have switched to another source on the 'happy life' in general. By contrast Gigon 1988 ascribes the Antiochean account as a whole to Theophrastus *On Happiness*.

That Cicero conveys with it the notion of *energeia* is already suggested above: it is on the basis of the example of sleep among others that Aristotle establishes in *Nicomachean Ethics* 10 that happiness is not a *hexis* but involves some sort of *energeia*,⁶⁰ whereas sleep is also standardly invoked to highlight the distinction between *dynamis* and *energeia*.⁶¹ However, elsewhere in the *Nicomachean Ethics* the example is invoked with regard to *praxis* and not *energeia*.⁶² This is reflected in the Antiochean account. In *Fin.* 5.54, after stating that sleep deprives us generically of action, the Antiochean spokesman adds more specifically that we wish to stay awake for the sake of action and learning ('agendi aliquid discendique causa'). This suggests that he has in mind a broad understanding of *actio* which involves both intellectual and other sorts of activities. In short, the term *actio* that Piso employs, in this part of the account, encompasses both the notions of *energeia* and *praxis*, of activity and action, without differentiating clearly between them.⁶³

Piso differentiates further lower types of activity from those virtuous ones which are constitutive of a happy life. Thus, at *Fin.* 5.55, after the reference to the activity of perception and learning, Piso expounds on the natural desire in both humans and animals to act on the basis of an impulse ('ut appetat animus aliquid agere semper'). That this urge for action ('cupiditas agendi') has a natural basis is shown by means of examples from observations of child behaviour in the same paragraph, as, for example, from their amusement when engaging in games ('lusionibus... delectantur'). The fact that this pleasant amusement is desired for its own sake is shown by children's not being deterred from it even by punishment ('ne verberibus quidem deterreri possint'). The 'cradle argument' is coupled with examples from the animal world. Thus natural desire for action is inferred not only from children's urge to move around and engage in games but also from the free movement of animals (55–6).⁶⁴

⁶⁰ *Eth. Nic.* 10.6, 1176a33–6. Cf. *Stob.* 2.133.12–13 W.

⁶¹ *Metaph.* Θ 1048a32–1048b6; *De an.* 2.5, 417a9–13.

⁶² For sleep as the deprivation of *praxis*, see *Eth. Nic.* 1.5, 1095b32–1096a1.

⁶³ This might be because of the unavailability of a terminological distinction in Cicero's Latin between the Greek notions of *energeia* and *praxis*, or of the later distinction between *actus* and *actio*. For the association of the two words in Aristotle, see *Eth. Nic.* 10.6, 1176b6–9, where actions in accordance with virtue are themselves *energeiai*: καθ' αὐτὰς δ' εἰσὶν αἰρεταὶ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν ἐπιζητεῖται παρὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν. τοιαῦται δ' εἶναι δοκοῦσιν αἱ κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις. Aristotle uses interchangeably in *Eth. Nic.* 10.6 the expression κατ' ἀρετὴν πράξεις and κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργειαι. Cf. also [Arist.] *Mag. mor.* 1.34, 1197a11 and *Stob.* 2.127.1–2 W. and 130.3–4 W.: πᾶσαν μὲν γὰρ πράξιν ἐνέργειαν εἶναι τινα ψυχῆς.

⁶⁴ The ascription of *praxis* to animals constitutes an anti-Stoic move, since the Stoics ascribe *praxis* only to rational beings, see Alex. Aphrod. *SVF* 2.1002.

The universal desire for different ways of being active is further shown with the example of non-paradigmatic agents⁶⁵ who, whilst not exhibiting any inclination towards higher forms of action, such as that of theoretical studies, still show signs of continuous bodily and psychic activity ('et corpore et animo moveri semper') exemplified in their seeking of social gatherings or pastimes (*Fin.* 5.56). Lacking the excellent activities resulting from virtue and *nous*, such people, when not engaged in necessary labour, prefer amusing activities which gratify the lower part of the soul: such activities are falsely conceived by most people to be the constitutive activities of happiness. Those activities are, however, contrasted in the Antiochean account with the interests of educated people who, in accordance with their proper state, choose activities not restricted to pleasant amusements but those in accordance with virtue.⁶⁶ In line with the observations of the previous paragraphs, their choice of a mode of life follows the universal desire for the pursuit of one's *negotium* as well.⁶⁷ The forms of life, however, that compete with each other as the most choiceworthy for ambitious people ('qui altiore animo sunt') are two: a life dedicated to public office and a life of *theōria*.⁶⁸ Despite stating the two main candidates for the best 'life', Piso does not at 5.57 offer a judgement as to which one is ultimately the best.

What follows at 5.58 is, rather, a hierarchical classification of kinds of activity ('actionum . . . genera') attributed directly to the 'ancients'.⁶⁹ The hierarchical scheme is preceded by the statement that 'we are born to act'. In line with that, Piso goes on to expand on the three kinds of virtuous activities which are *parts* of a happy life. In a hierarchical order, theoretical activity is followed by political and virtuous action:⁷⁰

⁶⁵ This shows the Antiochean and, further, Peripatetic interest in the προκόπτοντες, people who are progressing towards virtue, as opposed to the Stoic emphasis on sages.

⁶⁶ *Fin.* 5.57: 'itaque ut quisque optime natus institutusque est, esse omnino nolit in vita si gerendis negotiis orbatus possit paratissimis vesci voluptatibus.' The same point about the different activities of base and good people is made at *Eth. Nic.* 10.6, 1176b23–8, where Aristotle combats the thesis that happiness is found in amusement: εὐλογον δὴ, ὥσπερ παισὶ καὶ ἀνδράσιν ἕτερα φαίνεται τίμια, οὕτω καὶ φαύλοις καὶ ἐπιεικέσιν. καθάπερ οὖν πολλάκις εἴρηται, καὶ τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα· ἐκάστῳ δ' ἡ κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἔξιν αἰρετωτάτη ἐνέργεια, καὶ τῷ σπουδαίῳ δὴ ἡ κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν. οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία. At *Fin.* 5.57 Piso explicitly dissociates a life dedicated to study from the life of amusement.

⁶⁷ *Fin.* 5.57. Casting the desire for a life of action in terms of *negotium* clearly conveys a distinctively Roman point.

⁶⁸ *Fin.* 5.57: A direct parallel can be found at *Arist. Pol.* 7.2, 1324a29–32, where those who choose the political or the theoretical life are characterized as φιλοτιμώτατοι πρὸς ἀρετὴν.

⁶⁹ See *Fin.* 5.58: 'ut mihi quidem videtur et iis quorum nunc in ratione versamur.' For the three *genē* of virtuous actions in the same order as they appear in *Fin.* 5, cf. *Stob.* 2.51.3–4 W.

⁷⁰ An important parallel can be found in Arius Didymus' summary of Peripatetic ethics, where it is stated that the βίος is measured by political, social and contemplative actions, *ap.* *Stob.*

It is evident then that we are born to act. There are many kinds of action, however, so that one might lose sight of the highest ones amidst the less important. As to the most important, it is my view and that of the thinkers whose system I am discussing that these are: the contemplation and knowledge of heavenly things, and of those which are by nature hidden and obscure and which our intellect can explore; then the administration of public affairs, or knowledge of its theory; and lastly prudent, temperate, brave and just reasoning, and the rest of the virtues and the actions that are in accordance with them. Those are called by the one word 'morality'; when we are already mature, we are led to the knowledge and practice of those by nature's own guidance.⁷¹

Contemplation and knowledge of physical phenomena and of the first principles appear in the above passage as the highest activity and, we can assume, are considered the activity which makes the biggest contribution to happiness. The justification for that assessment is not provided here, but the frequent reference in *Fin.* 5 to the divine character of *nous*⁷² suggests a rationale similar to that provided by Aristotle in his defence of the theoretical activity.⁷³ Classified under this come the knowledge and administration of public affairs, which in Aristotle falls under the activity of the practical virtues.⁷⁴ Lastly, under political activity⁷⁵ come virtuous reasoning⁷⁶ and actions in accordance with the virtues. According to this last distinction, every virtuous action has two aspects, *cognitio* and *usus* (= γνῶσις and χρῆσις):⁷⁷ the emphasis on the exercise of virtue, as opposed to mere knowledge, restates the practical aim of ethics, in accordance with Aristotelian theory.⁷⁸ What is again noteworthy is the terminology: the use

2.125.19–21 W.: παραμετρεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸν βίον ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς.

⁷¹ 'ergo hoc quidem apparet, nos ad agendum esse natos. actionum autem genera plura, ut obscureretur etiam maiora minoribus, maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur et iis quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque rerum caelestium et earum quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta ratio reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi omnia honesta dicimus; ad quorum et cognitionem et usum iam corroborati natura ipsa praeunte deducimur', *Fin.* 5. 58.

⁷² For the god-like character of human *nous* in Antiochean passages, see, e.g., *Fin.* 5.57: 'perferunt optimaque parte hominis, quae in nobis divina ducenda est.'

⁷³ See, e.g., *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177a12–17.

⁷⁴ *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b6–7.

⁷⁵ At *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b16–17 it is stated that among actions in accordance with the virtues those in politics and war are 'pre-eminently fine and great': εἰ δὴ τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν.

⁷⁶ *Ratio* in all probability here conveys προαίρεσις, cf. *Eth. Nic.* 10.8, 1178a34–b1: ἀμφισβητεῖται τε πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὕσης.

⁷⁷ For a parallel for these terms, cf. Iambl. *Protr.* p. 86, 16–18 des Places = B79 Düring.

⁷⁸ Cf. *Eth. Nic.* 10.9, 1179b2–4: οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ ἀρετῆς ἱκανὸν τὸ εἰδέναι, ἀλλ' ἔχειν καὶ χρῆσθαι πειρατέον, ἢ εἰ πως ἄλλως ἀγαθοὶ γινόμεθα.

of the less technical *usus* (χρῆσις)⁷⁹ here to denote the actualization of virtuous reasoning suggests that probably the distinctions are drawn from the context of an ethical, and not a metaphysical, debate.

By presenting *theōria* as an *actio* (and indeed as the highest one) Antiochus bridges the gap between intellectual activity and other forms of action, a distinction drawn sharply by Aristotle in *Nicomachean Ethics* 6. In Antiochus' theory engagement with *theōria*, although it is admittedly the highest kind of activity, appears to be another expression of a human being's fundamental disposition towards action. As transpires from Piso's account, a happy life consists of all virtuous activities: thus theoretical activity and knowledge are part of a life aiming at *eudaimonia* and not the sole component of *eudaimonia* in the manner of some of the Aristotelian statements in *Eth. Nic.* 10.7.⁸⁰ It is telling that in the latter work, containing Aristotle's advocacy of the *theōrētikos bios*, the vocabulary of *praxis* is abandoned in favour of *energeia*, and *praxis* is used in its narrow sense.

A PASSAGE FROM THE *POLITICS* AND THE IDEA OF A *SYNTHETOS BIOS*

It is the same conciliatory attitude that one can discern in *Pol.* 7.3, with the employment of arguments which perhaps appeared in a more expanded form in the 'exoteric' Aristotelian works.⁸¹ There, in the framework of an examination of the best *bios* for both the citizen and the *polis*, we are presented with arguments pro and contra the political and the theoretical life. At *Pol.* 7.2, 1324a25–32, Aristotle introduces the controversy (ἀμφισβήτησις) over which life is the happiest:

But there is a dispute among the very people who agree that the most choiceworthy life is the life of virtue, about whether the political and active life is choiceworthy, or rather the life not tied to any external things – some kind of contemplative life, for example, which some say is the only one suitable for a philosopher. For it is these two lives that the people who are most ambitious for virtue have evidently chosen, both in the past and now. By the two lives I mean the political and philosophical lives.

⁷⁹ Cf. its use at *Eth. Nic.* 1.8, 1098b32, *Eth. Eud.* 2.1, 1219a17–18, and Stob. 2.50.11 W.

⁸⁰ At *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177a13–17 complete happiness seems to be identified *simpliciter* with the activity of *nous*: εἴτε δὴ νοῦς τοῦτο εἴτε ἄλλο τι, ὃ δὴ κατὰ φύσιν δοκεῖ ἀρchein καὶ ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ ἐννοῖαν ἔχειν περὶ καλῶν καὶ θείων, εἴτε θεῖον ὄν καὶ αὐτὸ εἴτε τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ θειότατον, ἢ τούτου ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν οἰκείαν ἀρετὴν εἶη ἂν ἡ τελεία εὐδαιμονία. It is telling that at *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b1ff. Aristotle constructs an opposition between θεωρία and πράξις by presenting political activity as un leisured and not choiceworthy for its own sake but only for the achievement of a further result (e.g. 1177b16–18).

⁸¹ *Pol.* 7.1323a21–3: νομίσαντας οὖν ἱκανῶς πολλὰ λέγεσθαι καὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς ἐξωτερικοῖς λόγοις περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης ζωῆς, καὶ νῦν χρηστέον αὐτοῖς.

After defending the political life against those who argued that it involved 'despotic' rule (1325a27–8) and preoccupation with merely necessary goods,⁸² Aristotle counters the arguments of those who argue that the only happy life is the political life, using to that end the definition of happiness as *eupragia* ('good action'). Contrary to a narrow conception of *praxis*,⁸³ Aristotle there differentiates between 'outward' actions which aim at something external to oneself and those contemplations and thoughts which are 'complete in themselves and for their own sake' (1325b16–21). He thereby uses as an argument in favour of contemplation the idea that even in the case of an action which aims at external results, such as the building of a house, the master-builder who uses only his thinking 'acts most of all' (1325b21–3). Rather than imposing a hierarchy on the two competing kinds of lives, the arguments in *Pol.* 7.1–3 aim at including both theoretical and practical actions in the conception of an ideal virtuous life. We may, then, hypothesize that the account in *Fin.* 5 builds on ideas already present in *Pol.* 7.2–3. As already shown, although explicitly recognizing in *Fin.* 5.11 the superiority of the theoretical *life* on the basis of its similarity to the divine, Antiochus' advocacy of this form of life in his main account rests on the depiction of the *post mortem* existence of the sage in the imaginary realm of the Isles of the Blest. Otherwise, his discussion of *theōria* in the remainder of the book rests on its superiority as a form of action connected with the fundamental desire of human beings to be active. Furthermore, practical or virtuous action appears in Piso's account as also choiceworthy for its own sake and not lacking in self-sufficiency in comparison with theoretical activity.⁸⁴

It was the justification of both *theōria* and *praxis* as components of happiness that probably gave rise in post-Aristotelian theory to the idea of a 'composite life', *synthetos bios*, which appears to be an attempt to offer an inclusive ideal, a life which does justice to the natural dispositions of

⁸² Even if in *Pol.* 7 political life is legitimized as noble, Aristotle clearly polemicalizes against this kind of life at *Eth. Nic.* 10.7, 1177b4–15, where it is stated that the life of the politician is un leisured.

⁸³ Such a view can be ascribed, for example, to Dicaearchus, see fr. 29 Wehrli.

⁸⁴ See 5.58 where the happy life is identified *simpliciter* with the virtuous life. The point about the sufficiency of practical action is made at *Fin.* 5.68. There the Antiochean spokesman seems to counter an argument made against the practical life in *Eth. Nic.* 10.7. In the latter it is argued that someone who engages in θεωρία is self-sufficient because he can engage in it by himself without other people. When an individual engages in practical virtue, by contrast, he needs other people – i.e. to be just, he needs people in order to practise justice, and to be temperate and brave he also requires externals. This means that his activities are not self-sufficient. Practical activity in short is not fully free since it is dependent on a variety of external goods and factors. Furthermore Aristotle claims in *Eth. Nic.* 10.7 that παρὰ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ brings about a by-product beyond the action itself. For example political activity aims at 'the happiness of the man himself and the citizens' as being something distinct from the political activity itself.

human beings towards both theoretical and practical pursuits. This corresponds to the conception of perfect virtue as a ‘composite’ one (σύνθετος) consisting of all three kinds of activity: theoretical, practical and ethical. Such a conception of virtue is ascribed to Aristotle in the second book of Stobaeus’ *Eclogai*.⁸⁵ According to this Peripatetic ideal, a virtuous person combines both theoretical and practical wisdom.⁸⁶ Incorporating both activities within a more inclusive ideal of life does away with the need to introduce a hierarchy between the *theōrētikos bios* and the *praktikos bios*, as Aristotle appears to have done in the last book of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Given the foregoing analysis of Piso’s account and the three kinds of virtuous activities referred to above, it is not surprising to find such an ideal of life connected with Antiochus, even though no explicit reference to it is made in *Fin.* 5: Varro, according to a testimony of Augustine (*De civ. D.* 19.3), asserted on the authority of Antiochus (‘auctore Antiocho’) that of the three kinds of life, the theoretical, the practical and the ‘mixed’ one (‘quod ex utroque compositum est’), the ‘Old Academics’ preferred the third (‘hoc tertium sibi placere adseverant’).⁸⁷

The same ideal of life emerges also from the summary of Peripatetic ethics contained in the *Epitome* of Arius Didymus.⁸⁸ Although the text is not dependent directly upon Antiochus,⁸⁹ it conveys in its main points the same version of Peripatetic ethics⁹⁰ as can be discerned in Piso’s account in *Fin.* 5. In the part of the summary dealing with the question of the *bios*, the expression ‘composed out of both’ (σύνθετος ἐξ ἀμφοῖν) appears alongside the ‘theoretical’ and the ‘practical’,⁹¹ designating a life which combines both political and theoretical activities.⁹² Although this part of the summary is extremely compressed, it transpires that Arius’ source defended the ideal of

⁸⁵ Stob. 2.51.1–5 W.: ἡ δ’ “ἀρετὴ” ἐξίς ἡ βελτίστη ψυχῆς “τελεία” δὲ τριχῶς, καὶ γὰρ ἡ σύνθετος ἐκ τῶν θεωρητικῶν καὶ πρακτικῶν καὶ ἠθικῶν (τρία γὰρ ὑποτίθεται γένη), ἣν ἂν εἴποις ἀρετὴν κατὰ σύνθεσιν.

⁸⁶ This is suggested also by [Plut.] *De placitis* 1, 874F–875A = Theophrastus, fr. 479 FHS&G, which attests that according to Aristotle and Theophrastus and almost all the Peripatetics ‘the perfect man must be one who both contemplates realities and engages in right actions’. Cf. *Fin.* 2.40.

⁸⁷ That Antiochus commended not only the theoretical but also the practical life is suggested by the fact that, according to Plut. *Cic.* 4.3, Antiochus encouraged Cicero to take up public office.

⁸⁸ For the question of the authorship of the account, see Hahm 1990.

⁸⁹ For example the text diverges clearly from Antiochus on the question of the sufficiency of virtue for a happy life, defending the view that misfortune can ruin one’s happiness (132.8–18 and p. 145.3–6 W.); this view, ascribed to Theophrastus in *Fin.* 5 (but also to Staseas of Naples at 5.75), is explicitly rejected by Antiochus.

⁹⁰ Fortenbaugh 1983: 216 characterizes this part of the summary as ‘Theophrastean in spirit’, and suggests possible links with the conception of happiness in the *Eudemian Ethics*.

⁹¹ Stob. 2.144.16–17 W.

⁹² Cf. Stob. 2.125.19–21 W.: παραμετρεῖσθαι γὰρ τὸν βίον ταῖς πολιτικαῖς καὶ ταῖς κοινωνικαῖς πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς θεωρητικαῖς.

a virtuous agent who will both 'accomplish and contemplate fine things'. In case the wise man is prohibited by circumstances from doing both, his life will be characterized by *alternate* periods of devotion to politics and intellectual activity. The former, beyond the traditional role of law-giving, involves ruling or living in the court of a king, whereas the latter is said here also to take the form of paid teaching:⁹³

The virtuous man will choose a life that involves virtue, whether as a ruler himself, if the circumstances promote him to that status, or if he has to live in the company of a king, or even be a legislator or in any other way involved in politics. If nothing of the above befalls him he will turn to the way of life of the common citizen, or to contemplation, or to teaching, which lies in the middle. For he will prefer both to do and to contemplate fine things (καὶ πράττειν καὶ θεωρεῖν τὰ καλά). In case he is hindered by circumstances from occupying himself with both, he will become engaged in one of the two, showing a preference for the contemplative life, but engaging himself also in political activities because of his social character. (Stob. 2.143.24–144.8 Wachsmuth)

We can speculate that, similarly to Antiochus, Arius' Peripatetic source regarded *theōria* as the highest human activity but at the same time made it part of an ideal happy life which also acknowledged the fundamental social nature of human beings.⁹⁴

CONCLUSION

After analysing Antiochus' conception of *theōria* and the way it ultimately forms part of an inclusive ideal of a happy life, it is perhaps apt to conclude with a comment on the author of the *De finibus*. Given his project of introducing Greek learning to Roman youth, Cicero would probably like to recognize in Piso's account his own ideal of a politician who also engages in intellectual activities. After all, he regarded his engagement with philosophy as an *actio*, albeit in the more literal sense of an alternative form of political action.⁹⁵ Even though the ideas of Antiochus may have informed Cicero's own perception of his philosophical endeavours in the direction of a compromise between *otium* and *negotium*, they still seem to be deeply rooted in the Greek philosophical world-view. The value of

⁹³ These ideas reflect post-Aristotelian political and historical developments.

⁹⁴ Notice the idea at Stob. 2.125.21–2 that virtue, according to the Peripatetics, is not selfish (φίλαυτον) but social and political (κοινωνικὴν καὶ πολιτικὴν).

⁹⁵ In the prefaces to the late philosophical works Cicero consistently treats philosophical activity as a second-best form of public service for a politician, cf. e.g. *Ac.* 1.11; *Luc.* 6; *Fin.* 1.10; *Nat. D.* 1.7; *Div.* 2.6–7; *Off.* 2.3.

Greek learning for educational purposes was increasingly gaining recognition in the Roman world, but *theōria* in the form of natural science, as Piso presents it, was scarcely practised by Romans of Cicero's day. Cicero would also hardly agree with a fully non-utilitarian concept of intellectual activity, independent of the historical and political context within which it is practised. Above all, he would object to its ranking as a superior activity, above political and moral action.⁹⁶

⁹⁶ In addition to the literature already cited above in relation to the present chapter's theme, and the general studies of Antiochus cited in the Introduction to this volume, the following items are prominent among the studies of Antiochus' ethics: Annas 1993: esp. 180–7 and 419–25; Prost 2001; Gill 2006: esp. 166–73; Bonazzi 2009. In particular with regard to the concept of *oikeiōsis* as found in the Antiochean passages in Cicero (and in connection with the Peripatetic tradition), one may consult Dirlmeier 1937, and Magnaldi 1991.

CHAPTER 7

Antiochus, Aristotle and the Stoics on degrees of happiness

T. H. Irwin

STOIC VERSUS PERIPATETIC ETHICS

One may well be doubtful about Antiochus' project of reconciling Stoicism with Plato and Aristotle. Syncretistic impulses often result from insufficient understanding of the philosophical point of the different positions one is trying to combine, and one can easily get this impression of Antiochus. I will point out some places where he makes it easy for himself by misunderstanding the Stoics or leaving out a vital point in their position.

This unfavourable picture is also unfair.¹ We can learn something about both Stoic and Aristotelian ethics by discussing Antiochus. In particular, it is instructive to consider his arguments to show that some Stoic claims may reasonably be understood as clarifications of Aristotle, rather than wholly un-Aristotelian. We can evaluate some of these arguments if we look more closely at the dispute between Stoic and Aristotelian ethics that Cicero presents in *De finibus* 5.² I will confine myself to the account of Antiochus' position as stated and defended by Cicero's Antiochean spokesman Piso, and to the criticisms that Cicero urges against Piso. If we want to know whether Piso offers a plausible account of an Aristotelian position, we need to understand how an 'Aristotelian' position is related to the position that Aristotle takes. In order to understand and to evaluate Antiochus' position as presented by Piso, it will be helpful to ask how well Piso defends this position against the criticisms that Cicero presents.³

¹ On this point my argument supports Jonathan Barnes's sympathetic account in Barnes 1989.

² I will not discuss the accuracy of Cicero's presentation of Antiochus' exposition of an Aristotelian position, or our various sources of information about Antiochus, or the place of this book in the overall plan of *De finibus*.

³ In Annas and Woolf 2001: 142n, Julia Annas affirms that Cicero has the better of the argument. In her view, Cicero 'produces a devastating critique' of Antiochus. (The translated excerpts below are based on Woolf's version.) In her view, 'Cicero surely intends us to see a contrast between "Old Academy" edifying rhetoric, and the sceptical Academy's insistence on probing all claims by argument' (143), and she agrees with the estimate of Antiochus that she ascribes to Cicero. These remarks summarize

Antiochus distinguishes the 'primary natural advantages' ('prima naturae') from virtue, and separates the Stoic from the Peripatetic view on this basis. The Stoics find the supreme good in virtue.⁴ The Peripatetics differ from the Stoics in so far as they combine the primary natural advantages with virtue.⁵ This appears to be a sharp difference between the Stoic and the Peripatetic position, as Cato has claimed in *De finibus* 3. But Antiochus takes the appearance to be misleading, because the Stoic position is a verbal variation on the Peripatetic.⁶ We may be surprised, then, that Antiochus first suggests a sharp substantive difference between the Stoics and Aristotle but then goes on to suggest that the difference is not really substantive. His reason for taking this line becomes a bit clearer as he proceeds.

We might try to separate three aspects of Antiochus' position: (1) his interpretation of Aristotle; (2) his interpretation of Stoic ethics; (3) his comparison of Stoic with Peripatetic ethics, and his attempt to reconcile them. It might seem best to discuss the interpretative questions about Aristotle and about the Stoics independently of the question about Antiochus' attempted reconciliation. For we might find either or both of his interpretations plausible, even if we reject the attempted reconciliation. Alternatively, we might agree with him that, if his interpretations were correct, the reconciliation would succeed, even if we reject his interpretations. I will try to separate the different questions to some degree, and so I will begin by discussing Aristotle, before turning to a few questions about the Stoics. However, the different questions are not wholly separable; for Antiochus' view about the substance of the Peripatetic position is influenced by his view about the substance of the Stoic position and by his view about the relation between the two positions.

THE SUPREMACY OF VIRTUE

Antiochus gives an account of *oikeiōsis*, attachment to the primary natural advantages, and he follows this with an account of the growth of one's

the generally unfavourable view of Antiochus that Julia Annas presents in Annas 1993. Reflection on the arguments of Piso and Cicero leads me to question Annas's conclusion about their relative merits. I doubt whether the 'devastating critique' devastates anything; it underestimates the strength of Antiochus' position.

⁴ 'However, the Stoics say that we should do everything in order obtain the things that are in accord with nature, even if we do not achieve them, and they say that this is right (*honestum*) and the only thing to be desired for itself and the only good' (5.20).

⁵ 'With rightness one can combine either pleasure, as Callipho and Dinomachus did, or absence of pain, as Diodorus did, or the primary natural things, as the ancients did, in whom we include both the Academics and the Peripatetics' (5.21).

⁶ 'There remain the Stoics, who took over everything from the Peripatetics and Academics, and reached the same conclusions in different words' (5.22).

awareness of the right ('honestum'). All this sounds similar to the Stoic view. In particular, Antiochus describes the right as what is desirable in itself apart from our love of ourselves.⁷ Each virtue regards its objective as desirable in its own right.⁸ Each has a characteristic form of concern that is directed to an external objective ('cura . . . quasi foras spectans') and treats other people as valuable in themselves. None of these external objectives is part of the highest good.⁹

We might infer that Antiochus takes the highest good not to be comprehensive, because it does not include everything that is choiceworthy for its own sake. Hence the goods pursued by the virtues are external to the highest good, though still valuable for their own sakes. If they were all included in the highest good, we could not achieve the highest good.¹⁰ Two kinds of things, therefore – eudaimonic goods and external goods – are desirable for their own sakes. The highest good is completed ('completur') by the first kind of goods, goods of the mind and the body, but external goods are no part of the highest good.

Why does Antiochus think the highest good would be unachievable if it included these other things? One reason appears in Piso's opening contrast between the positions of Aristotle and Theophrastus.¹¹ Piso believes virtue is sufficient for happiness, and that Theophrastus' contrary position is

⁷ 'At this point let us simply explain that these things I call right are desirable by their nature in their own right, apart from our love of ourselves' (5.61).

⁸ 'This combination and intermingling of the virtues is none the less unravelled by philosophers by argument. For, granted that they are connected and combined in such a way that each shares in all the others and none can be separated from another, still each has its own special function, so that bravery is recognized in toils and dangers, temperance in abstaining from pleasures, prudence in the discrimination of goods and evils, justice in giving to each his own. Since, therefore, every virtue has a concern that, so to speak, looks outwards and desires and embraces other people, it results that friends, siblings, relatives by blood and marriage, fellow-citizens, and eventually all people – since we take human beings to constitute a single society – are to be desired for their own sakes' (5.67).

⁹ 'But none of these is of such a kind that it is included in the end and the ultimate good' (5.67).

¹⁰ 'And thus it turns out that we find two kinds of things that are to be desired because of themselves. One kind is among those in which the ultimate good is completed; these are goods of the soul or of the body. The other kind consists of externals, belonging neither to mind nor to body, such as friends, parents, children, relatives, native land. The latter are certainly loved in their own right but do not belong to the same kind as the former. And indeed no one could ever achieve the highest good if all those things that are external, even though to be desired, were included in the highest good' (5.68).

¹¹ 'But when a question arises about the happy life, and this is one question that philosophy should consider and pursue, about whether it is entirely in the power of the wise person, or it can be damaged or destroyed by adverse circumstances, on that point they often seem to disagree and dispute. This is especially true of Theophrastus' book on the happy life, in which rather a lot is attributed to fortune. If that were right, wisdom could not provide a happy life. And so let us stick to Aristotle and his son Nicomachus, whose careful books on morals are said to be by Aristotle, though I do not see why the son could not have been like the father. Still, let us follow Theophrastus on many points, provided only that we maintain more strength and vigour in virtue than he did' (5.12).

‘weaker and softer’ (‘*delicior et mollior*’) than the character of virtue requires. Virtue has more force or power (‘*vis*’) than it would have if it were insufficient for happiness, and if happiness were not up to us.

The evidence for this strong claim about the power of virtue comes from Aristotle and his son Nicomachus. Piso acknowledges that the work of Nicomachus on ethics is sometimes attributed to Aristotle, but he answers that he does not see why the son could not be similar to the father. The remark about the similarity of the son to the father seems to rebut those who suppose Aristotle wrote the work on ethics that Piso has in mind. If that is what Piso means, his reference to ‘Aristotle and his son Nicomachus’ does not reflect a belief in joint authorship of the *Nicomachean Ethics* but implies that Nicomachus rather than Aristotle wrote this work. Since Piso none the less speaks of the views both of Aristotle and of Nicomachus, he finds Aristotle’s views outside the *Nicomachean Ethics* (henceforth *EN*). But he does not say where he finds Aristotle’s views. If he ascribes the *EN* to Nicomachus because of the title under which we know it, he would have equally good grounds for ascribing the *Eudemian Ethics* (henceforth *EE*) to Eudemus, if he knew it under that title. Perhaps, then, he believes Aristotle is not the author of the three Aristotelian ethical treatises. And so his source for the views of Aristotle may be the *Magna moralia* (henceforth *MM*).¹²

This passage suggests two useful points: (1) Piso believes that Theophrastus’ view departs from Aristotle’s. (2) His account of Aristotle is not derived entirely from the *EN*. The second point may help to explain the first. For if we find that some claim of Piso’s about Aristotle is difficult to reconcile with our reading of the *EN*, we should consider the possibility that Piso takes at least one other work to contain the authoritative account of Aristotle’s views, and that he therefore interprets the *EN* in the light of the other work or works.

The objection to Theophrastus illustrates this point. For we may be puzzled by Piso’s confidence that Aristotle does not share Theophrastus’ view about virtue, happiness and fortune. Aristotle rejects as a philosopher’s paradox the Socratic view that virtue is sufficient for happiness (1095b31–1096a2). His fuller treatment of happiness and fortune in *EN* 1.9–11 confirms his agreement with Theophrastus. Since the *EN* is much fuller than the other two treatises on the questions that Piso examines, we may want to evaluate Piso’s argument by comparing it with the *EN*. But this is not the right way to evaluate Piso’s claims. Since he appeals

¹² Barnes 1997: 58–9 presents this argument.

both to Aristotle and to his son Nicomachus, we should do the same.¹³ We should first consider what he might conclude from the other two ethical treatises and then ask how he might understand the *EN* in the light of these conclusions.

From *Fin.* 5.12 we might gather that if we follow Theophrastus and concede too much to fortune, we make happiness unstable, and that this is an unsatisfactory result. Perhaps, then, that is why we make happiness unachievable if we include all these external conditions in it.

DEGREES OF HAPPINESS

Piso seems to have introduced a conflict into Antiochus' position; for he has claimed both that happiness includes other goods besides virtue and that, contrary to Theophrastus, virtue is sufficient for happiness. He tries to remove any appearance of conflict by introducing a distinction to clarify Aristotle.¹⁴ When Aristotle says that virtue lacks something if it lacks external goods, he means that it is not the happiest life ('beatissima vita'). But this is consistent with treating virtuous life as happy ('beata').¹⁵ To defend this claim by appeal to Aristotle and Nicomachus (as Piso understands them), we need to see how Piso might argue from the *EE* and *MM* to his graded conception of happiness.

Nicomachus differs from Aristotle in his presentation of questions about happiness and fortune.¹⁶ Both the *EE* and the *MM* postpone the treatment of fortune to a much later chapter (*MM* 2.8, *EE* 7.14). Only a very short passage in each of the other treatises corresponds to *EN* 1.8–12 (see *MM* 1185a1–13, *EE* 1219a39–b16). The discussion and definition of happiness proceed without any full discussion of the role of fortune. Moreover, the *MM* seems to present Piso with a difficult task. For Aristotle (if he is the author) introduces the standard threefold division of goods (1183b19–37), and then affirms that happiness is complete (*teleion*) and lacks nothing (οὐδενὸς ἔτι προσδεόμεθα, 1184a11–12). Since the virtues are only a proper subset of goods, it follows that they are not sufficient for happiness.

¹³ I have discussed the three treatments of happiness more fully in Irwin 2003.

¹⁴ 'For those things that we have counted as goods of the body do indeed complete the happiest life, but in such a way that the happy life can exist without them. For these additions of goods are so small and slight that, just as stars are not noticed in the rays of the sun, so also these are not noticed in the splendour of virtue' (5.71).

¹⁵ Cicero uses only the positive 'beatus' and the superlative 'beatissimus' to mark grades of happiness. An intermediate grade is marked by the comparative 'beator' in Augustine, *De civ D.* 19.3, in the account of the good that Augustine derives from Varro, who ascribes it to Antiochus.

¹⁶ I will follow Antiochus by using 'Nicomachus' for the author of the *EN*. I will use 'Aristotelian' to refer to the three ethical treatises in the corpus.

In the light of these affirmations about the completeness of happiness and the incompleteness of virtue, we might be surprised to find that Aristotle defines happiness as living in accordance with the virtues (1184b36–1185a1). Aristotle adds that since happiness is complete, the happy person must have a complete length of time (1185a1–9). He also maintains that simply being virtuous is insufficient for being happy, since a happy person has to exercise his virtue (1185a9–13). But he does not discuss the question that naturally arises for readers of the earlier remarks on completeness: if a complete good has to include all goods, happiness is a complete good, and virtuous life does not include all goods, how can virtuous life be happiness?

Aristotle does not return to this question until *MM* 2.8, where he accepts the common view that the happy life is not without good fortune, on the grounds that one cannot be happy without external goods (1206b30–5).¹⁷ He concludes from the discussion of fortune that good fortune is a ‘co-worker’ (*sunergos*) with happiness (1207b18). If fortune is a co-worker, it is not identical to or part of happiness, but a necessary auxiliary.

It is difficult, therefore, to reconcile the definition of happiness as virtuous life with the role of good fortune in happiness. This difficulty cannot be ascribed to the incompetence of the author of the *MM*; for it is no less present in the *EE*. Admittedly, the chapter on good fortune in the *EE* does not affirm the necessity of good fortune for happiness. But we find a clear affirmation of this point in the common book *EN* 7 = *EE* 6, where Aristotle dismisses the view of those who think the virtuous person is happy when he is being tortured (1153b14–25).

In the face of these difficulties of interpretation a careful reader might suggest a graded account of happiness. The formal definition of happiness, on this view, affirms that virtuous activity is sufficient for first-level happiness, whereas the claims about external goods affirm that it is insufficient for second-level happiness. Second-level happiness is altogether complete, whereas first-level happiness is not.

If this is what Piso could derive from the works of Aristotle, what could he find in Nicomachus to confirm his view? Four passages seem relevant:

1. We suppose happiness is something of our own that is hard to take away.¹⁸

¹⁷ After reporting the common view, Aristotle adds καὶ ὁρθῶς ἴσως. The following sentence shows that we should render this ‘and presumably rightly’ rather than ‘and perhaps rightly’. Aristotle endorses the common belief without any mark of doubt.

¹⁸ ‘The cultivated and active people conceive of the good as honour, since this is more or less the end of the political life. This, however, appears to be too superficial to be what we are seeking; for it seems to depend more on those who honour than on the one honoured, whereas we intuitively believe that the good is something of our own and hard to take from us’ (*EN* 1095b22–6).

2. The virtuous person's actions expressing the virtues control happiness.¹⁹
3. A happy life can be made happier.²⁰
4. The happy person can never become miserable, though he may fall short of blessedness if he suffers severe ill fortune.²¹

On the basis of these passages Antiochus might reasonably construct a graded conception of virtue and happiness and ascribe it to Aristotle and Nicomachus. Three arguments might support him:

- (a) Since Nicomachus agrees that virtuous actions control happiness, virtue is in some way sufficient for happiness.
- (b) Since Nicomachus says that good fortune can make a happy life more blessed (*makarios*), something can be added to happiness to make it happier. Hence virtue is sufficient for being happy, but not for being happiest.
- (c) Since Nicomachus says that the happy person cannot become miserable but is no longer blessed if he falls into Priam's misfortunes, he distinguishes (i) the happiness for which virtue is sufficient from (ii) the degree of happiness for which virtue is insufficient. Nicomachus calls this higher degree of happiness 'blessedness'. That is what Antiochus calls the happiest life.

Why, then, should we regard virtue as sufficient for happiness, or 'in control of' happiness? Though Nicomachus suggests that something ought to be stable enough to make happiness stable, he does not explain why virtue fills this role. Antiochus tries to explain by appropriating a Stoic comparison. He suggests that virtue should be compared to the light of the sun, which

¹⁹ 'Or is it quite wrong to take our cue from someone's fortunes? For doing well or badly is not in them. A human life, as we said, needs these in addition, but activities in accord with virtue control happiness, and the contrary activities control its contrary' (EN 1100b7–11).

²⁰ 'It follows, then, that the happy person has what we are looking for and keeps the character he has throughout his life. For always, or more than anything else, he will do and study the actions in accord with virtue, and will bear fortunes most finely, in every way and in all conditions appropriately, since he is truly "good, foursquare and blameless" . . . But many major strokes of good fortune will make it more blessed; for in themselves they naturally add adornment to it, and his use of them turns out to be fine and excellent. Conversely, if he suffers many major misfortunes, they oppress and spoil his blessedness, since they involve pain and impede many activities. And yet, even here the fine shines through, whenever someone bears many severe misfortunes with good temper, not because he feels no distress, but because he is noble and magnanimous' (EN 1100b18–33).

²¹ 'And since it is activities that control life, as we said, no blessed person could ever become miserable, since he will never do hateful and base actions. For a truly good and prudent person, we suppose, will bear strokes of fortune suitably, and from his resources at any time will do the finest actions, just as a good general will make the best use of his forces in war, and a good shoemaker will make the finest shoe from the hides given to him, and similarly for all other craftsmen. If this is so, the happy person would never become miserable, but neither would he be blessed if he falls into fortunes such as Priam's' (1100b33–1101a8).

makes the lesser lights invisible even though they are still present.²² But does this comparison make the point that Antiochus intends? When he says that non-moral goods are not nothing but appear to be nothing, he might seem to suggest that virtue creates an illusion about the goodness of other goods. This surely is not his point, since it would not help to explain how virtue could be sufficient for happiness.

Perhaps we would express his point better if we said that when we are in the sunlight, we do not notice the light conveyed by the lesser light, because the sun gives us all the light we need. Though the lesser light is present, it is superfluous for giving us light. Similarly, perhaps, when virtue is present, the lesser goods are unnecessary for making us happy, though they still contribute to happiness, in so far as they contribute to making us happiest.

The 'force' ('vis') of virtue and the 'authority of the right' ('auctoritas honesti') make the lesser goods appear to be nothing. 'Authority' refers to the weight that someone's word would carry in a debate. If a speaker whose words carry weight speaks in favour of a particular proposal, his voice will sway opinion by itself, even if other people also speak in favour of it. Similarly, virtue alone carries enough weight to make us happy, even though it is not the only thing that contributes to happiness.

OBJECTION ON BEHALF OF ARISTOTLE

Is Antiochus right about Aristotle and Nicomachus? His position is worth considering, but it does not seem wholly satisfactory. Two points count against it:

1. When Nicomachus says that virtuous actions are in control (*kuriai*) of happiness, he does not seem to mean that they are sufficient for it. For when he says they control happiness, he also says that a human life needs external goods added (i.e. added to virtue).²³

²² 'And thus, while it is true to say that the weights of these bodily advantages towards living happily are slight, still it is too rash to say that they are nothing. For those who argue in this way seem to me to have forgotten the primary natural things that they themselves have established. And so we must allow something to these goods, as long as we understand how much should be allowed. For if a philosopher seeks true conclusions rather than conclusions that will make a reputation for him, he ought not to count as nothing those things that these same reputable people acknowledged as being in accord with nature, but still he ought to see that virtue has such force and that the right, so to speak, carries such weight, that the other things are indeed not nothing but are so small that they appear nothing. These are the right words for someone who does not reject everything besides virtue, but still magnifies virtue itself with the praises it deserves. And finally this is an exposition of the highest good that is in every way complete and perfect' (5.72).

²³ One might explain this passage by distinguishing a happy life from happiness – i.e. the feature of it that makes life happy. But it is difficult to see how virtue could be sufficient for happiness if it were insufficient for making a life happy.

2. It is not clear that Nicomachus distinguishes 'happy' and 'blessed' in the way Antiochus distinguishes 'happy' from 'happiest'. Admittedly, Antiochus' distinction fits some of Nicomachus' discussion. We can use it, for example, to see how misfortune takes away blessedness, but not happiness. But the distinction does not seem to fit the remarks that immediately follow the passage on the misfortunes of Priam.²⁴ These remarks seem to count against Antiochus, because Nicomachus acknowledges that severe misfortunes deprive us of happiness, not just of blessedness or of the happiest life. Similarly, he suggests that we cannot recover happiness without a run of good fortune. He adds that the happy person has complete virtue and an adequate supply of external goods. 'Adequate' suggests that even bare happiness requires enough external goods, contrary to Antiochus. The 'enough' suggests room for the addition that makes a happy life happier.

And so Nicomachus recognizes grades of happiness, but not the grades that Antiochus recognizes. Antiochus' two grades are these:

- (a) Virtue, which is sufficient for happiness.
- (b) Virtue plus external goods, which we need for supreme happiness ('beatissima vita').

Nicomachus' two grades, however, are different:

- (a) Virtue plus enough external goods, which is happiness.
- (b) Virtue plus a more than adequate supply of external goods, which makes a happy person happier.

These differences between Nicomachus and Antiochus suggest that Antiochus does not capture Nicomachus' doctrine. For Nicomachus does not affirm that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Antiochus derives this thesis from the Stoics, but not from Nicomachus.

This objection to Antiochus' interpretation rests partly on Nicomachus' failure to distinguish 'happy' (*eudaimōn*) from 'blessed' (*makarios*). But Aristotle does not always fail to distinguish them. The *MM* is no help on this point, since it does not use '*makarios*' at all. But the *EE* allows that it may be inappropriate to speak of a merely human life as *makarios* (1215a7–11), and that we should recognize that a human being has only a human degree of a *makarios* life (1215b13–14). The *EN* also recognizes that this qualification is proper when we speak of a human being as *makarios*

²⁴ 'Nor, however, will he be inconstant and prone to fluctuate, since he will neither be easily shaken from his happiness nor shaken by just any misfortunes, but by many great misfortunes, and from such as these he would not become happy again in a short time, but, if at all, in a long and complete life having gained great and fine successes. Then what prevents us from saying that the happy person is the one whose activities accord with complete virtue, with an adequate supply of external goods, not for just any time but for a complete life?' (1101a8–16).

(1101a19–20). On this basis then, we may interpret the *EN* in the light of the *EE*, so that we import a distinction between *eudaimōn* and *makarios* from the *EE*. This importation makes it more reasonable to find Antiochus' two grades in the *EN*.

If, then, we follow the policy of Piso and compare Aristotle with Nicomachus, we can find a reasonable case for understanding the *EE* and *MM* in Piso's way, and for interpreting the *EN* so as to fit the other two treatises. One might defend his interpretation on the basis of Nicomachus alone; indeed the correspondence is close enough to suggest that Piso or Antiochus knows *EN* 1.9–11 in detail. But reference to the other two treatises confirms this interpretation, since it gives a reason to interpret Nicomachus so as to make him fit a reasonable account of Aristotle. On one significant detail – the distinction between *eudaimōn* and *makarios* – it is plausible, though not certainly correct, to suppose he knows the *EE* as well as the *EN*.

I do not believe that this defence of Antiochus overcomes the objections I have raised to his account of Nicomachus, and I do not accept the graded interpretation of the other two treatises. If he holds it, it misleads him about Nicomachus.

DOES ANTIOCHUS CAPTURE THE ARISTOTELIAN SPIRIT?

But even if Antiochus is wrong about the actual view of Aristotle and Nicomachus, he might none the less have captured their real point, or seen what they are committed to. For their eventual conclusion, understood in the way I have suggested, may not meet their conditions for happiness. It seems to introduce a conflict between two elements in their position:

1. Antiochus claims that if we think happiness is vulnerable to fortune, our position is too weak ('delicior et mollior') for the force ('vis') of virtue. Aristotle – or Nicomachus at least – may seem to agree. For he emphasizes that we need a conception of happiness that makes happiness stable, and that if we aim at stability we should attend to virtue and its expression in action. Hence character and virtue should give us the stability that we are looking for in happiness.
2. But the Aristotelian solution makes happiness unstable after all. Aristotle and Nicomachus leave it subject to severe ups and downs of fortune. They maintain that the stable component of happiness is virtue, but the stability of virtue does not make happiness stable. All we can do to satisfy the initial demand for stability is to recognize that virtue is stable and that it is a component of happiness.

One might argue, then, that the position I have attributed to Aristotle and Nicomachus does not meet their conditions of adequacy. If we are to be guided by their intentions and by their criteria for happiness, perhaps we should agree with Antiochus.

One might answer, however, that Antiochus' case rests on wishful thinking, not on a reasonable view of happiness. Though we might reasonably prefer happiness to be stable, this preference does not justify us in modifying our conception of happiness to pretend that happiness is as stable as we would like it to be. Closer examination shows that we can satisfy the demand for stability only in part, by finding that happiness has a stable component that gives it whatever degree of stability it has. The result that happiness is less stable than we might have preferred it to be does not refute our account of happiness.

This defence of the actual Aristotelian position against the position that Antiochus represents as Aristotelian depends on our view about the assumption that happiness is stable. If we were entitled to treat this as a preconception (in Stoic terms, *prolēpsis*), or as one of the 'most important' (*kuriōtata*; cf. *EN* 1145a1–7) of our initial beliefs (in Aristotelian terms), we would be entitled to maintain it and to adjust our other views about happiness and fortune to fit it. Aristotle and Nicomachus suppose we should not proceed in this way but should adjust our belief about stability to fit our belief that some misfortunes take away happiness. If we could give a reason for preferring either Antiochus' procedure or the Aristotelian procedure, we could decide whether Antiochus is right about the Aristotelian position. For if Antiochus' reason for affirming the stability of happiness is an Aristotelian reason, he is right to say that his position gives a better account of the main Aristotelian doctrines than Aristotle and Nicomachus give. We need to return to this question later.

For the moment, we may reasonably agree with Cicero, who reminds Piso that not everyone agrees with Antiochus' version of the Peripatetic position. Cicero mentions Staseas of Naples, who emphasizes external goods and fortune (75). This is closer to the position that Piso initially ascribed to Theophrastus than to the position he ascribes to Aristotle. Moreover, it seems closer to the position that we have ascribed to Aristotle.

IS ANTIOCHUS CONSISTENT?

If we set aside questions about how well Antiochus captures the Aristotelian position, we may turn to Cicero's doubts about the coherence

of Antiochus' position. According to Cicero, Antiochus claims both that virtue is sufficient for happiness and that virtue is not the only good, and the consequences of the two claims reveal an inconsistency.

In Piso's view, these two claims are consistent if we interpret the sufficiency of virtue for happiness by reference to the 'force' of virtue.²⁵ Cicero answers that Antiochus' view of the force of virtue commits him to the Stoic position that there are no goods outside virtue.²⁶ If, as Antiochus claims, virtue is sufficient for happiness, happiness cannot include goods that virtue does not secure.

Piso answers that the force of virtue allows goods that are external to virtue. For if the force of virtue is strong enough, it can make us happy even if we are suffering some evils.²⁷ This answer exploits Stoic views about virtue and indifferents. The Stoics claim that virtue makes us happy even when we are in unwelcome circumstances that include non-preferred indifferents. Antiochus claims that, analogously, virtue makes us happy despite the presence of small evils. Apparently, then, the Stoic doctrine leaves room for Antiochus' position as well.

Antiochus might have supported this claim by adverting to Chrysippus' concession to those who want to describe preferred and non-preferred indifferents as goods and evils.²⁸ On the basis of this concession, one might argue that the substance of Stoic doctrine is not changed if we treat these indifferents as goods and evils. Hence, Antiochus may argue, the Stoics have no reason to reject his view that virtue makes us happy even if it is combined with small evils.

²⁵ 'Then do you not agree . . . that virtue has such force that it is sufficient in itself for living happily? Or if you agree to that, do you deny that it is possible that those who possess virtue are happy even if they are affected by some evils?' (5.77).

²⁶ 'I attribute the greatest possible force to virtue. But how great it is I will consider another time. At present I ask only whether the force of virtue could be as great as it is if anything outside virtue were counted among goods' (5.77).

²⁷ 'Still . . . if you concede to the Stoics that virtue alone, if it is present, makes a life happy, you concede it to the Peripatetics also. For the things that the Stoics do not dare to call evils but grant to be harsh, disadvantageous, and to be rejected, and unfitting to nature, these things we call evils, but small and almost minimal evils. And so if the one who is in harsh circumstances that are to be rejected can still be happy, then the one who undergoes small evils can also be happy' (5.78).

²⁸ 'And in *On Goods* he [Chrysippus] in a way concedes and allows anyone who wants to to call the preferred things goods and the opposites of them evils, in these words: "If someone wants in accordance with such distinctions to call one of them good and the other evil, being directed to these things (πράγματα), and does not go astray at random, it is to be accepted. For he will not be astray about the significates, and for the rest he aims at common practice in use of names." And so here he combines and unites the preferred with the good. But elsewhere on the contrary he says that none of these at all is anything to us, but reason pulls us back and turns us away from all these sorts of things' (Plut. *Stoic rep.* 1048A).

Cicero replies that Piso has missed the point and has overlooked the internal conflict in his position (78–9).²⁹ If we allow these non-moral goods to be good, we cannot, in Cicero's view, maintain the sufficiency thesis.³⁰ Piso suggests that we can maintain the sufficiency thesis if we distinguish happy from happiest. But, according to Cicero, this distinction is no help. He argues as follows:

1. If A is happy, then A is happy enough.
2. If x is enough, and y is added to x, then x+y is excessive (*nimis*).
3. But no one is excessively happy.
4. Hence, if A is happy, nothing can be added to his happiness.
5. Hence no happy person is happier than any other happy person.

The crucial claims in this argument are (2) and (3). But what do they mean? That turns on the meaning of *nimis*, rendered by 'excessive'. What is excessive is more than enough. But this might mean either of two things:

- (a) enough and to spare;
- (b) more than there should be, that is, too much.³¹

Which sense should be supplied here?

Neither sense of *nimis* seems to give Cicero a plausible objection. If (b) is intended, (3) is plausible; it says that we cannot be too happy. But if that is what (3) means, (2) seems to be false; for if we have enough, we can still add to it, without having too much. Admittedly, we cannot add to what is just right; if we make Baby Bear's porridge hotter, we make it too hot. But that is not the relevant parallel for Antiochus' claim about happiness. (2) is true if we understand *nimis* as (a) (enough and to spare) rather than (b) (too much). But if we supply (a) in (3), (3) seems to become false, or at least not obviously true. And so Cicero's argument against Piso is not cogent.

²⁹ This is the argument that Annas (Annas and Woolf 2001: 143) takes to be decisive: 'From here to 86 Cicero makes a devastating point which Piso fails to rebut.'

³⁰ 'You are indeed sparing about those external goods. But since these things are goods of the body, certainly those that produce them – friends, children, relatives, wealth, honours, power – you will also count among goods. Don't suppose I have anything to say against this view. My point is that if these things that can befall the sage are evils, being a sage is not enough for living happily. "On the contrary," he said, "it is indeed insufficient for living most happily, but it is sufficient for living happily." I noticed, I said, that you claimed this a little while ago, and I know that our friend Antiochus is in the habit of saying this. But what is less plausible than someone's being happy, but not happy enough? And if something is enough, whatever is added to it, the result is excessive; but no one is happy to excess; and so no one is happier than a happy person' (5.81).

³¹ On *nimis* see Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 119.4.1: 'sed aliquando Latina lingua hoc verbo sic abutitur ut nimis pro eo quod est valde, et positum inveniamus in litteris sacris, et ponamus in sermonibus nostris. nam et hic, *Tu praecepisti mandata tua custodiri nimis*, nonnisi Valde intelligimus, si recte intelligimus: et, *Nimis te diligo*, si alicui carissimo dicimus, non utique plus quam oportet, sed valde nos diligere intelligi volumus.'

Piso answers by giving an example of a lucky virtuous person, Metellus, and an unlucky one, Regulus. He suggests that Metellus is happier than Regulus by being luckier (82). Cicero answers that what we would intuitively say is irrelevant. All that matters is what the Stoics say, and the Stoics deny that Metellus is happier.³²

THE COMPLETENESS OF HAPPINESS

In Cicero's view, the Stoic position is inescapable once we agree, as Antiochus does, that virtue is sufficient for happiness. For, in Cicero's view, virtue is sufficient for happiness if and only if virtue is the only good.³³ Since Antiochus does not see the implications of this biconditional, but has no answer to it, it reveals the instability of his position.

How strong is Cicero's case for the biconditional? One of the two conditionals – if virtue is the only good, virtue is identical to happiness – is plausible. Cicero claims:

1. Virtue is the only good.
2. Happiness is composed entirely of goods.
3. Hence virtue is identical to happiness.

The argument for the second conditional – if virtue is identical to happiness, virtue is the only good – is this:

4. Virtue is identical to happiness.
5. All goods are included in happiness.
6. Hence virtue is the only good.

Since Antiochus accepts (4), the Stoic case, as Cicero presents it, turns on the comprehensiveness of happiness, affirmed in (5).

Should Piso accept this Stoic premiss if he tries to maintain an Aristotelian view? This question raises a familiar and difficult point of interpretation in Aristotle. The Aristotelian corpus includes two discussions of a question that seems to bear on the comprehensiveness of happiness. Both of them ask whether happiness is 'counted together' (*sunarithmoumenon*) with other goods. Do they give the same answer?

³² 'For in virtue alone and in the right itself the good is to be found, and neither virtue nor the right, in their view, increases. Moreover the only good is that whose possession necessarily makes someone good. Now since this thing in which alone being happy is found cannot increase, how can one person be happier than another? . . . Grant that nothing is good except what is right; then you must grant that the happy life is found in virtue. And consider it in the other direction: if you grant the latter, you must grant the former' (5.83).

³³ Again Annas (Annas and Woolf 2001: 144) believes that Cicero's objection is cogent: 'Cicero caustically points out that Piso's answer at 78 is off the point.'

The discussion in the *MM* is fuller, and it seems to support the Stoic claim about happiness; Aristotle mentions paradoxes that arise if we regard happiness as a good that can be counted together with other specific goods. We avoid the paradoxes if we recognize that happiness is comprehensive.³⁴ Some critics believe that Nicomachus takes a different view about counting together. According to this view, he actually denies that happiness is comprehensive, on the grounds that it can be counted together with other goods. If it is not counted together with them, it is the greatest good; but if it is counted together with them, it is a smaller good than the good that results from the counting together.³⁵

I find it difficult to see how the passage in the *MM* could support anything other than a comprehensive conception of happiness. The Stoics could fairly cite it in their support. I believe the passage in the *EN* implies the same conception. But since a non-comprehensive interpretation of the passage is defensible and has been defended, Piso might take it to show that a comprehensive conception is at any rate not the settled and unambiguous Aristotelian view.

This is a reasonable conclusion to draw from a comparison of the *MM* with the *EN* on comprehensiveness. But I conjectured earlier that Piso or Antiochus might rely on the *EE* (on the difference between happiness and blessedness) to help him with the *EN*. If that is right, then 'Aristotle' in 'Aristotle and his son Nicomachus' refers at least to the *EE*. But the *EE* contains no explicit parallel to the passages on 'counting together' in the other two treatises. If Piso read the *EE*, he might reasonably claim to have found no commitment to comprehensiveness.

These points bear on Cicero's step (5). They suggest that Antiochus could plausibly deny, on behalf of Aristotle and Nicomachus, that happiness is comprehensive. But even if he were to concede this step to Cicero, he might fairly point out that it needs to be qualified. If Nicomachus' overall position is consistent, his claim that happiness is complete should be consistent with the observation that one happy person can be happier than another and that a happy person can become more blessed (1100b25–6). If Aristotle and Nicomachus believe that happiness comprehends all goods, perhaps

³⁴ The details of the discussion in 1184a15–38 are obscure. I have tried to state their main point.

³⁵ 'Further [we think happiness is] most choiceworthy of all not being counted together, but being counted together (*sunarithmoumenên de*) clearly more choiceworthy with the smallest of goods; for the good that is added becomes a surplus of goods, and the larger among goods is always more choiceworthy' (1097b16–20). The non-inclusive reading takes *sunarithmoumenên de* to express an indicative conditional ('if it is counted together', or 'when it is . . .'). The inclusive reading attributes a counterfactual sense to the participle. The non-inclusive reading is defended by Kenny 1992 and Heinaman 1988.

he means only that we cannot achieve the happiest life unless we have them all. If this is what comprehensiveness means, we can still be happy even if we lack some goods. The comprehensiveness of happiness does not refute Antiochus.

This explanation of comprehensiveness relies on the interpretative strategy that I earlier ascribed to Antiochus and Piso. According to them, (1) when Aristotle says that happiness is comprehensive, he means that the happiest person has all goods, and (2) when Aristotle or Nicomachus denies that happiness is comprehensive, he means that the first level of happiness, which consists in virtue, does not include all goods. The graded conception of happiness allows Antiochus to explain apparently conflicting remarks in Aristotle.

Cicero adds a further point against Antiochus' graded view. He says that Zeno will say that the just person on the rack is both happy and happiest.³⁶ According to Zeno, therefore, neither virtue nor happiness has degrees. This claim about Zeno seems to rely on the argument that assumes the comprehensiveness of happiness. Cicero doubts Antiochus' claim that the just person on the rack is happy but not happiest. If Antiochus thinks the Stoic position is counterintuitive, must he not admit the same about his own position? The people who deny that the virtuous person on the rack is happiest will also find it incredible that the virtuous person on the rack is even happy.³⁷ Both the Stoic and the Antiochean position are counterintuitive, but the Stoic position is consistent.

This repeated charge that Antiochus is inconsistent relies on Cicero's claim that happiness is complete. But this claim does not justify his charge. And so his arguments to show that Antiochus is inconsistent are not cogent.

BETTER STOIC OBJECTIONS

We may suppose, however, that Cicero overlooks a better defence of the Stoics, because he leaves out one relevant difference between Antiochus' account of moral development and the Stoic account. In the first part

³⁶ 'Suppose that this same person is blind, disabled, suffering the most serious disease, exiled, childless, destitute, tortured on the rack. What do you call him, Zeno? "Happy," he says. And also happiest? "Yes," he will say, "because I have shown that happiness has degrees no more than virtue has, in which happiness itself is found"' (5.84).

³⁷ 'You find this incredible, that he is happiest. Well, then, is your claim credible? For if you call me before the people, you will never prove that someone who suffers in these ways is happy. If you call me before experts, perhaps they will be doubtful on the first point, about whether there is such force in virtue that someone who possesses it is happy even in the bull of Phalaris, but they will have no doubt on the second point, that the Stoic position is consistent and yours is inconsistent' (5.85).

of book 5, Antiochus and the Stoics begin from conciliation, proceed to the rational pursuit of the primary natural advantages and introduce the pursuit of rational guidance for its own sake. At this last stage we value the virtues for their own sakes. This seems to be common ground between the Stoics and Antiochus. But Antiochus leaves out one point that the Stoics introduce at the corresponding stage. At 3.22 Cato introduced the distinction between the end ('finis') and the objective ('propositum') of action, with his example of the archer aiming at a target.³⁸ In distinguishing the internal end from the external objective, Cato also distinguished 'choice' (appropriate for ends and means to them) and 'selection' (appropriate to objectives and means to them). Antiochus has nothing parallel.³⁹

The Stoic distinction does not require any non-Aristotelian conclusions. Aristotle recognizes that what we should aim at is not always the same as what we should hope to achieve through aiming as we do. But the distinction leads the Stoics to controversial conclusions because they add two claims:

1. All non-instrumental goods are ends.
2. Happiness is the comprehensive end and complete good.

These Stoic claims seem to be Aristotelian (with the reservations previously noted about the second claim). But Aristotle and Nicomachus do not endorse the Stoic interpretation of them, which rests on the Stoic distinction between ends and objectives. According to the Stoics, we achieve our complete good in rationally aiming at our objectives, not in attaining the objectives, and happiness does not consist in attaining our objectives. If the Stoics are right about ends and objectives, happiness does not consist in achieving external results. Cicero is right, therefore, to say that the Stoics' position is coherent, and that we cannot resist their conclusions about happiness and external goods once we accept their premisses. But he does not identify the crucial premisses.

From the Stoics' point of view, Antiochus overlooks the basic argument that shows why external goods cannot be goods and cannot be parts of happiness. They are not the right sorts of things to be goods, because they are not the right sorts of things to be ends. We miss this point if we say that though external goods matter less than virtue, they still matter. This vague

³⁸ 'But we must first remove the error of thinking that it follows that there are two ultimate goods. For take someone who has the objective of aiming a spear or an arrow straight at some target. Just as we speak of our ultimate end among goods, so also his ultimate end is to do everything he can to aim it straight. In this example, he must do everything to aim it straight; but still, his ultimate end is to do everything to achieve the objective. In a similar way we speak of the highest good in life. And that objective – hitting the target – is to be selected, not to be desired' (3.22).

³⁹ I have said a little more about this Stoic distinction in Irwin 2007: §§181–90.

idea of 'mattering', we might say, has no place in the Stoic system; for it overlooks the Stoic point that things may matter as ends or as objectives, and that these two ways of mattering imply different relations to choosing and aiming. This Stoic argument removes a vague element in Antiochus' claims. He defends the sufficiency thesis through some of his metaphors about the greater light making the lesser light non-apparent. This defence might not seem wholly satisfactory from a Stoic point of view.

If this objection to Antiochus is correct, we might expect the Stoics not to use metaphors of this sort. But in fact they use them. Cato introduces them in book 3 precisely in order to clarify the difference between the Stoic and the Peripatetic views of external goods.⁴⁰ Similarly, Cicero attacks these Stoic claims in book 4 (29ff.), in his criticism of Stoicism from a Platonic and Aristotelian point of view. Antiochus' position is surprising in so far as he argues that these Stoic metaphors suit a Peripatetic position on the value of external goods.

If this is true, the Stoics and Antiochus ought to explain these metaphors differently. The Stoics should explain them through their distinction between ends and objectives. They should say that preferred indifferents do not add any good to virtue, because they are not goods; nor do they make a more desirable end. There is no difference between being virtuous and doing all you can in the rational pursuit of preferred indifferents; that is just what virtue is. There is a difference between being virtuous but unlucky and being both virtuous and lucky; but that is a difference in preferability, not a difference in goodness or in happiness. This may suggest an argument against Antiochus from the Stoic point of view.

REPLY TO THE STOIC OBJECTIONS

If, then, Antiochus' argument does not capture the Stoic position, is it misguided of him to try to reconcile the Stoic with the Aristotelian position?

The Stoics endorse two Aristotelian assumptions: (i) Goods are ends. (2) Happiness is the complete good. These assumptions become controversial in the light of the Stoic distinction between ends and objectives.

⁴⁰ 'The light of a lamp is obscured and suppressed by the light of the sun; a drop of honey perishes in the extent of the Aegean sea; an addition of a penny in the wealth of Croesus; a single step in the distance from here to India. Similarly, given that virtue is the ultimate good, as the Stoics say, all that value of bodily things is necessarily obscured and suppressed and necessarily perishes because of the splendour and greatness of virtue. The opportune moment . . . does not increase by the length of time; for things we call opportune have their appropriate measure. Similarly, acting correctly . . . and likewise fitness, and finally the good itself that is found in agreement with nature, have no addition through a process of growth' (3.45).

For, since the Aristotelian treatises do not always mark that distinction, it is not clear whether they treat happiness as an end or as an objective, or as some combination of the two. If it is both, there may be no Aristotelian unified doctrine of happiness; there may be a series of claims some of which apply to a Stoic end and others of which apply to a Stoic objective. And so, if we accept the Stoic distinction, we have to look more closely at Aristotelian claims about happiness. Do they mean, for instance, that happiness rather than virtue is the ultimate end, in Stoic terms, or only that happiness rather than virtue is the ultimate objective? Similarly, we need to ask whether Aristotelian claims about goods are better understood as claims about Stoic ends or as claims about Stoic objectives.

Piso makes two claims that bear on the Stoic distinction between ends and objectives.⁴¹

1. He claims mistakenly that the difference between Zeno and him is just verbal, because Zeno chooses to call external goods 'to be selected' ('seligenda') rather than 'good', and says that the life of Metellus is 'to be preferred' ('praeponenda') and 'to be picked in preference' ('magis eligenda') but not happier ('beatior') or better. Zeno's choice of terms is legitimate, because it reflects the Stoic division between ends and objectives. Nor is it clearly counterintuitive; for it rests on the apparently obvious connection between ends, goods and happiness, as we saw above.
2. But Piso also maintains, more plausibly, that in calling the life of Metellus happier than the life of Regulus, he does not attribute any more to that life, in the slightest degree, than the Stoics do ('nec ullo minimo momento plus ei vitae tribuo quam Stoici'). We can express this point by saying that Aristotelian goods are not confined to Stoic ends but also include Stoic objectives. This is no more than Chrysippus allows (in

⁴¹ 'You now approve of this move of his; he escapes the charge of inconsistency by a change in the names of things, but we can't escape it! He denies that the life of Metellus is happier than that of Regulus but says it is to be preferred; it is not more to be desired, but to be taken in preference, and to be chosen, if the option were open, whereas the life of Regulus is to be rejected. The life that he says is to be preferred and more to be chosen, I call happier, but I ascribe not the slightest bit more to that life than the Stoics do. What is the difference between us, except that I use familiar words for familiar things, whereas they look for new words to say the same things? Just as there is always someone in the Senate who demands an interpreter, so also we have to rely on an interpreter when we listen to the Stoics. I call good whatever is in accord with nature, and evil whatever is against nature. I'm not the only one; you do the same, Chrysippus, in daily affairs and at home. But in your school you stop. What then? Do you think human beings should speak one way, and philosophers in another? Granted that the educated and the uneducated have different views on the value of things. But when the educated agree about the value of things, they would speak in the normal way, if they were human beings. Let them invent words as they please, as long as the things remain the same' (5.88–9).

his concession to common usage). We do not necessarily give greater weight to external goods by treating them as goods than the Stoics give them by treating them as preferred indifferents.

Piso's point (2), unlike (1), is reasonable. One might even go further. When we correct Antiochus, and we see the point of the Stoics' separation of goods from indifferents, we should conclude that Aristotle treats external goods in the way the Stoics treat preferred indifferents.

Piso now argues that he is consistent in claiming both that virtue is sufficient for happiness and that happiness includes external goods.⁴² He does not take the goodness of external goods to be a higher degree of value than Stoic preferability; hence he claims nothing more for them than the Stoics claim. Since they think preferred indifferents are 'eclipsed' by virtue, he can legitimately say the same thing and can therefore legitimately claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness.

Here as before, Piso seems to miss something in the Stoic position. The Stoics claim that their position is consistent for two reasons:

1. They take happiness to be the complete good and end, and hence they take virtue to be sufficient for happiness, because it is the only good.
2. But they do not take virtue to be sufficient for the objective, and so they do not take it to be the only valuable thing.

If, then, we follow Piso's previous suggestion, we should take Aristotelian happiness to be the objective, and goods to be valuable things. And so we ought not to take virtue to be sufficient for happiness, according to the Aristotelian conception.

One might, then, take Antiochus to be confused. Though he might reasonably claim that the Aristotelian conception of happiness fits the Stoic idea of the objective rather than the end, he seems to miss this point when he says that virtue is sufficient for happiness. If he had seen the force of his arguments, should he not have said that virtue is insufficient for happiness, understood as the objective, since virtue does not include all valuable things?

⁴² 'But I come to the charge of inconsistency, so that you don't say that I'm digressing too often. You take inconsistency to consist in words, but I thought it consisted in actual facts. Let us suppose it is firmly grasped – and here the Stoics are our best defenders – that virtue has so much force that all the other things, if they were placed on the other side, would not even be seen. Now all those things that they certainly regard as advantageous, and to be taken, and to be chosen, and as preferred (which they define as to be valued quite highly) . . . But when I call all these things good, all that matters is how great goods I say they are, and when I say they are to be desired, all that matters is how much I take them to be desired. But if I say they are no more to be desired than you say they are to be chosen, and if I, who call them good, suppose they are to be valued no more highly than you, who call them promoted, suppose they are, it is necessary for them all to be obscured and unseen when they encounter the rays of virtue, like the rays of the sun' (5.90).

Piso, however, defends his acceptance of the sufficiency thesis.⁴³ He argues that even if a life contains something bad, the life may still be good. Its overall goodness can be inferred from its predominant character. Hence a virtuous person is happy in so far as he is predominantly happy, even if he has not achieved all the goods that belong to happiness.⁴⁴

Antiochus need not represent this claim as a report of what Aristotle or Nicomachus says. He might reasonably represent it as a plausible Aristotelian interpretation of the sufficiency thesis, given what Aristotle says about the role of virtue in happiness. We might appeal to two of the claims we considered earlier in Nicomachus:

1. Virtue is decisive (*kuria*) in happiness.
2. The happy person will never become miserable, because he will never do anything hateful or base.

Antiochus suggests that Nicomachus maintains these two claims because he takes virtue to predominate in happiness. In his view, the Stoics have to accept an equivalent point; for they think the preferred indifferents add value to virtue, but they do not believe we ought to prefer a life that has more of them without virtue over a life that has virtue with fewer external goods.

According to this explanation of his view, Antiochus does not reject the completeness of happiness in the most important sense; for he believes that all non-instrumental goods are parts of happiness. But he rejects completeness in so far as he believes we can be happy without all these component goods. For he believes we can be called happy if we have the predominant good, which, by its predominance, makes our life predominantly happy. This is not what the Stoics mean when they say that virtue is sufficient for happiness. But it corresponds to a claim that the Stoics accept, since they take virtue to predominate in value over preferred indifferents.

Hence we might conclude that Antiochus captures the point of the Aristotelian and of the Stoic position. We should not agree that the Stoic view

⁴³ 'But (you say) a life that contains some evil cannot be happy. Then neither would there be any harvest, despite plentiful and rich stalks, if you could see a weed anywhere, and no business could be profitable if among the greatest profits it suffered some small loss. Or does one thing hold in other cases, and another thing in life? Won't you judge a whole life on the basis of its greatest part? And is it doubtful whether virtue has such a predominant part in human life that it overcomes all the other parts? And so I will dare to call goods those other things that are in accord with nature, rather than cheat them of their old name. And I won't look for some new name. I will place the greatness of virtue as though in one pan of the scales. That pan, believe me, will outweigh earth and seas. For always the whole is named after whatever contains its greatest parts and is spread most widely over it' (5.91–2).

⁴⁴ This argument from predominance is discussed in *Tusc.* 5.22–3. Cicero argues against it from the completeness of happiness.

is only a verbal variant on the Aristotelian view. We might think the Stoic view clarifies some points about virtue and happiness that Aristotle and Nicomachus leave obscure. But we might still agree that the clarification leaves the two positions in essential agreement on the points that Antiochus discusses.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ For further reading on Antiochus' view of happiness, see Ardizzone 1942, Giusta 1964, Dillon 1977, Glucker 1978, Huby 1983, Görler 1989, Annas 1990, Giusta 1990, Prost 2001.

CHAPTER 8

Antiochus on social virtue

Malcolm Schofield

In this chapter I argue that Antiochus' largely neglected theory of virtue is a subtle contribution to ethics in an Aristotelian mode. Despite flaws it perhaps shares with Aristotle's own theory of the *summum bonum*, it thinks through the implications of his fundamental thesis that humans are by nature social and political animals in a particularly interesting way, and it incidentally shows (if that still needed showing) that the idea of society remained a fundamental preoccupation for philosophy in the Hellenistic age. The main source of evidence is book 5 of Cicero's *De finibus*, in the account of Antiochean ethics presented there by Marcus Piso. The account is vouched for as a summary of Antiochus' views in explicit statements in the introduction (5.8) and again at its conclusion (5.75),¹ when on each occasion there is a contrast with the version of Peripatetic ethics favoured by Piso's teacher and house philosopher the Neapolitan Staseas. We shall be concerned with the part of Piso's speech that runs from section 46 to section 72. Here Piso moves from arguments to do with self-love and 'primary natural affection' ('prima commendatio naturae') to consideration of our natural powers and their exercise, and most importantly to reflection on the powers of the mind.

ANTIOCHUS' TRIPARTITION OF PHILOSOPHY

At 5.58 a conclusion is reached: 'It is evident, then, that we are born for activity.' Piso now explains what according to 'the thinkers whose system

¹ These indications seem to me strong against the scepticism about the Antiochean provenance of the greater part of Piso's speech argued by Giusta (1990: 45–9 in particular). His case for thinking 5.24–68 non-Antiochean rests on parallels with the doxographical material in Stob. 2.117.11–128.9 (usually ascribed to Arius Didymus). But while there are undoubted similarities there are in my opinion also very significant differences in argumentative style and in doctrine alike. Barnes 1989: 65–6 does not think that we can infer that Cicero is translating or paraphrasing a specific work by Antiochus. But for considerable tracts of exposition, particularly from 5.24 onwards, use of a single work by Antiochus seems the most economical hypothesis (in more than one sense of economical).

I am now discussing' are the most important among human activities. Three are listed: (1) contemplation and study of the heavenly bodies and the secrets of nature (presumably he means primarily the theory of the four elements); (2) 'the conduct of public affairs, or rather the theory relating to it'; (3) 'a plan of life ('ratio') that is prudent, temperate, courageous and just, the other virtues, and actions that accord with them'. In traditional divisions of philosophy (1) corresponds to physics, (2) to politics and (3) to ethics. In each case the focus is on the most important form of mental activity associated with these different spheres. Thus so far as concerns politics it is the theory or system of knowledge ('scientia') of the conduct of affairs ('administratio') that is stressed. In ethics what Piso highlights is *ratio* – the considered scheme of life manifesting the virtues in the actions that flow from them.

Here we may compare the beginning of book 4 of *De finibus*, Cicero's critique of Stoic ethics (in his own voice). The assault is launched from an Antiochean perspective, as is indicated by the trademark appeal at the outset to a tradition which embraces 'old' Academics and Peripatetics alike, and from which Zeno is represented as departing mainly by obscure and unnecessary variations in terminology (cf. e.g. *Ac.* 1.33–5).² The account of Academic and Peripatetic doctrine Cicero begins to sketch starts with the claim that these philosophers observed the following: a natural aptitude and passion for the moral virtues (cf. 3 above); an innate desire for knowledge (cf. 1); and a disposition to form communities and to recognize our kinship with the entire human race (cf. 3) (*Fin.* 4.4). On this basis, he says, they divided the whole of philosophy into three parts. Clearly these are again physics, politics and ethics,³ although this time ethics looks to have pride of place. Cicero adds that Zeno retained the division into three. This is perhaps a bit muddled or sophistical. If we take Cicero as meaning that Zeno too recognized *a* division into three, fair enough; but one might wrongly infer from the way Cicero puts it that Zeno's division recognized the same three parts, whereas in fact for the Stoics philosophy divided into logic, physics and ethics, with politics a subdivision of ethics. The reference to Zeno is in fact only incidental. Cicero next says he will defer his own treatment of ethics and turns to a quick look at politics (including rhetoric), clearly treated as a separate subject. This mostly consists in criticism of the Stoics, following some eulogy of how the Peripatetics and Academics handle

² On the treatment of Stoicism in book 4 of *De finibus* see Schofield 2002.

³ As Rackham 1914: ad loc. notes, although he thinks this only an 'appearance', corrected in what follows by the normal division into logic, physics, ethics (with politics and rhetoric treated as its subordinate disciplines).

the topic (4.5–7). Logic and physics are then discussed in turn (4.8–13): Cicero seems by now to have lost his grip on how many parts there are to philosophy. Finally we are ready for ethics (4.14).

Elsewhere Antiochus, like the Stoics, worked with the tripartition into logic, physics and ethics, and he claimed it originated with Plato, if we accept the Antiochean provenance of Varro's speech in book 1 of the *Academica* (see *Ac.* 1.19). Doubtless neither Antiochean division of philosophy actually predated Zeno. From the way in which Varro presents his material in the *Academica*, it sounds as though the version of the tripartition offered there represents Antiochus' standard stance on the issue. The variant version which surfaces in book 4 of *De finibus*, and could be taken to be implicit in book 5, was perhaps put forward only in the specific context of whatever ethical treatise by Antiochus Cicero is there exploiting. Nevertheless it is worth a little more discussion here.

Most interesting is the hierarchical ordering of physics, politics and ethics that *Fin.* 5.58 seems to suggest. In her note on the passage Julia Annas understandably comments that 'the place of study and contemplation in our final good is left very unclear'.⁴ When Piso returns to explicit discussion of the *summum bonum* in the closing sections of his speech, he will treat moral virtue as far and away its most significant constituent, without mention of study or contemplation (5.69–72). Here (5.71) as elsewhere (*Tusc.* 5.22) Antiochus is associated with the view that virtue on its own is enough for a happy life, if not the happiest. On the other hand, Piso has earlier stated (for example) that 'the ultimate good is to live in accordance with nature, interpreted as follows: to live in accordance with human nature as fully realized and needing nothing' (*Fin.* 5.26). That must mean above all living a life engaged in the most important activities in which we are naturally equipped to engage. As we have seen, these are mental activities (5.58), and the higher the powers or parts of the mind called into play, 'the more certainly they indicate the presence of nature' (5.48). Piso leaves us in no doubt that love of learning and knowledge is the highest of all our natural impulses. He devotes virtually all of the next ten sections to eloquent discussion of the topic. Mental acuity, he says towards its end, is 'the finest element of a human being, and one that should be considered divine' (5.57).

One might conjecture that Antiochus' position was a version of the sort of view we find Aristotle articulating in *Eth. Nic.* 10.7–8. The highest form of happiness is what we enjoy when the divine element in us, intellect

⁴ Annas and Woolf 2001: 137 n. 38.

(*nous*), engages in the activity of study and contemplation. But the form of happiness we enjoy as human animals consists in the activity of soul in accordance with the moral virtues, particularly where we are exercising practical wisdom in the management of the affairs of the city (something that might be suggested particularly by *Eth. Nic.* 1.1–2). The prominence in the sources for Antiochus' ethics of his distinctive stance on the relationship between virtue and happiness might reflect the extent to which many of his discussions of the *summum bonum* were designed to differentiate his position from the Stoic theory, rather than any lack of conviction in the ultimate superiority from another perspective of the life of study and contemplation. Of course, for him that study is the study of physics, not metaphysics (what Aristotle called 'first philosophy'). But that only stamps him as an Aristotelian of the Hellenistic age. It is true also that he makes a sharper distinction between politics and ethics than did Aristotle himself, for whom ethics was one part of the study of politics (that concerned with the character of the citizens), with the other the theory of social and political systems (*politeiai*, 'constitutions').⁵ His tripartition of philosophy as represented in books 4 and 5 of *De finibus* is closer to Aristotle, however, in its omission of logic from any such scheme.

HUMAN SOCIABILITY, JUSTICE AND THE OTHER VIRTUES

In book 5 there is no substantive discussion of politics as a subject distinct from ethics. However the disposition to form communities and recognize our kinship with the *genus humanum*, which seems to be associated with politics in the introductory material to book 4 (4.4), is taken as the starting point for the substantive treatment of the virtues and what is morally admirable ('*honestum*') at 5.64–72: Thus Piso says (5.65):

In the whole moral field that we are discussing, there is nothing so noble or wide-ranging as society between human beings, that alliance (*societas*), so to speak, of shared interests, and the mutual affection of the human species.

Nor is human sociability just the starting point. The whole account of the virtues and the good offered by Piso focuses on humans as social animals, to a quite remarkable degree, without parallel in other Hellenistic presentations of ethics. This focus is already anticipated in the preceding prefatory passage, in which Piso makes a highly rhetorical case – appealing mostly to examples, and presumably *not* deriving from Antiochus – for

⁵ See Schofield 2006.

the thesis that what is morally fine is something desirable in its own right (5.61–4). Section 62, in particular, names a selection of Romans and Greeks all of whom performed public-spirited deeds, or else betrayed public trust (cf. 70). And on the more anonymous section 64 Annas aptly notes:⁶ ‘a selection of Roman patriotic stories’ – mostly celebrating generals and consuls.

5.65 continues with a foundational passage, translated by Raphael Woolf⁷ as follows (the subject is mutual society and affection of the human species):

It arises from the moment of procreation. The new-born are loved by their parents, and the whole household is united by the bonds of marriage and family. From there affection spreads gradually outwards, first to blood relatives, then to relations by marriage, next friends, then neighbours, and then to fellow-citizens, and friends and allies in the public sphere. Finally, it embraces the whole human race. This attitude of mind [*affectio*: Rackham has ‘sentiment’] assigns each person their due. It preserves with generosity and fairness the cohesion of human society that I am speaking of. That is why it is called justice.⁸

This account of human sociability and of the solidarity of the human race itself, as what underpins the virtue of justice, is clearly indebted to Stoic theory, and particularly the Stoic notion of social *oikeiōsis*, as we find it worked out at *Fin.* 3.62–3 (cf. also *Off.* 1.11–15; Porph. *Abst.* 3.19). To be sure, Aristotle is insistent in the *Nicomachean Ethics* on the intimate relationship between love or friendship (*philia*) and justice, and the way *philia* promotes justice (e.g. 8.9, 1159b25–1160a8), but this perspective is not privileged in his main discussion of justice (in book 5), as in rather different terms it does come to be in Stoicism.⁹ None the less Antiochus’ account has distinctive features which suggest a rethinking of the Stoic theory in Peripatetic terms.

⁶ Annas and Woolf 2001: 139 n. 45.

⁷ Annas and Woolf 2001.

⁸ One might more literally translate the last three sentences as follows: ‘This attitude of mind, when it assigns each person their due, and when it seeks to preserve with generosity and fairness the cohesion of human society that I am speaking of, is called justice.’ This rendering brings out the point that if and only if the exercise of general benevolence satisfies the conditions specified will it be appropriately recognised as an act of justice.

⁹ This point is missed by Magnaldi 1991: 36–41, in an otherwise instructive discussion. In the Arius Didymus material she cites (Stob. 2.120.8–13; cf. 120.17–121.21, which develops the idea of our kinship with all humanity), the notion of justice does not figure at all (the formal definition of justice comes with the general treatment of the virtues much later in the text, is articulated in terms of the theory of the mean and makes no reference to assigning someone their due: 146.12–14). Perhaps the best text for documenting Aristotle’s suggestion that justice is grounded in friendship is *Eth. Eud.* 7.10, 1242a19–20, ‘Justice is a matter of how one behaves towards particular persons who are associates. Associates in one’s family or in one’s mode of life are friends. Therefore justice is a matter of how one treats one’s friends.’

First we may note an absence and a presence. Absent (perhaps deliberately) is the language of ‘concern’ (‘conciliare’, ‘commendare’) which Cicero employed to express Greek *oikeiousthai* (‘appropriate’), the verb corresponding to *oikeiōsis*, indicating the Greek idea of identifying with oneself or with others and their interests on which Stoic naturalist ethics is built (see *Fin.* 3.16 in particular, but also the use of ‘commendatio’ in the exposition of Antiochus’ theory of self-preservation: *Fin.* 5.33, 5.40, 5.41, 5.46).¹⁰ In the comparable Stoic passages, by contrast, this vocabulary is prominent (*Fin.* 3.63; *Off.* 1.12). What we do not find in those Stoic texts is a claim that is central to Piso’s exposition: the thesis that from the home ‘affection (*caritas*) spreads gradually outwards’. Piso is offering what one might call a genetic or diachronic account of how ‘the mutual affection of the human species’ actually develops. The Stoic theory articulated at *Fin.* 3.63 appears to be doing something rather different. It seems to be addressing the question: ‘How is it *possible* for any creature to identify with and be concerned for the interests of another member of the same species?’, and giving the answer: ‘Because – as the single example of parental love proves – nature has *programmed* animals that way.’¹¹

At this point it will be useful to look at the parallel account of the Academic and Peripatetic theory of the virtues in book 4 of *De finibus* (4.16–18). Section 16 reads like a quick summary of the main argument of *Fin.* 5.24–38 on self-preservation as what is natural for all animals, and for humans achieving above all the virtues of the mind. At the beginning of 17 wisdom (‘sapientia’) is identified as what we need to accomplish this, perhaps recapitulating the main outcome of *Fin.* 5.39–44. From the middle of section 17 onwards we are given something a bit fuller on the virtues of the mind. As in *Fin.* 5.65–6, the account starts with justice, and in that context talks of love of offspring, marriage and family affections. There is nothing here to suggest that Cicero is departing from what has in *Fin.* 4.16–17 so far been an Antiochean source.

That being the case, it is highly instructive for our purposes to note how *Fin.* 4.17 presents the points it makes, especially on the subject of parental love. Cicero writes:

They were the first of all philosophers to teach that the love of a parent for its offspring is given by nature. They declared that the union of a man and a woman, which is temporarily prior and the root of all family affections, is also ordained by nature.

¹⁰ The use of this vocabulary is well discussed by Magnaldi 1991: 9–12.

¹¹ For this view of the project of *Fin.* 3.63 see Schofield 1995: 195–9, 211–12.

This makes explicit what one suspects is implicit in the book 5 account of human sociability. The claim is that it was the Academics and Peripatetics ('these ancient philosophers', as they will be described a bit later in 4.17) – not the Stoics, therefore – who first drew attention to the ethical importance of the fact that humans are by nature social or political animals, the famous Aristotelian dictum (e.g. *Pol.* 1.2, 1253a2–3, *Eth. Nic.* 1.7, 1097b11) alluded to at 5.66 ('Human nature is so constituted as to have an innately civic and social nature – what the Greeks call *politikon*'). More specifically, Aristotle did indeed anticipate the Stoics in observing that 'parents love their children as if they were something of themselves' (*Eth. Nic.* 8.12, 1161b18, with the whole context 1161b16–32; cf. Plut. *Stoic. rep.* 1038b, for Chrysippus' similar thesis).¹² Cicero does not similarly claim any Academic and Peripatetic anteriority for the idea of the natural basis of the union of man and woman and its temporal priority (perhaps he means in the development of social institutions). But that idea is reminiscent of the famous opening sentences of *Pol.* 1.2 (1252a24–31; cf. *Eth. Nic.* 8.12, 1162a16–19). And one is led to wonder whether the notion of the gradual spreading of affection spoken of at *Fin.* 5.65 was in part prompted directly or indirectly by the main argument of the first part of the same chapter of the *Politics*.¹³

When Piso in 5.65 moves on from sociability to justice (defined like the Stoics, but as standardly in the Hellenistic period, as 'assigning to each their due'), he ties it to the idea of the 'cohesion of human society that I am speaking of' ('hanc quam dico societatem coniunctionis humanae', which seems to echo most immediately the previous mention of 'totius complexu gentis humanae' although doubtless the whole spectrum of relationships he has surveyed are meant to be included). I take this as an indication that, as with the Stoics, who talk of treating each human being as akin to oneself just because he or she is a human being (e.g. *Fin.* 3.63), Antiochus holds that the disposition of mind which constitutes justice is not fully achieved until

¹² Magnaldi 1991: 34–5 rightly draws attention to the importance of *Eth. Nic.* 8.12 for subsequent Peripatetic social philosophy (see also and especially Arius Didymus in Stob. 2.119.22–121.21, discussed also by Annas 1993: 279–84, although that the Stoics exploited Aristotle's discussion (as Magnaldi suggests) seems to me unlikely).

¹³ I do not want to pursue discussion of which works of Aristotle or other Peripatetics would have been available to Antiochus. Scepticism about knowledge of Aristotle's school treatises themselves has been a prevailing scholarly mood since the publication of Sandbach 1985. On the other hand I agree with those (e.g. Annas 1993: 420) who find it hard to believe that Antiochus' distinction between the happy and the happiest life did not rely on a reading of book 1 of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (specifically 1.8–10); Piso in fact refers to the *Ethics* (and to Theophrastus) at *Fin.* 5.12. I would guess that Antiochus also knew material corresponding to *Pol.* 1.2. Book 8 of the *Politics* certainly seems to have been read and used by the second-century Stoic Diogenes of Babylon: see now Delattre 2007: vol. 1, esp. 26–31, 325–8. Cf. also Irwin (this volume).

one reaches the point of responding to anyone at all fairly and generously, just because they too are human. 'Fairly and generously' clearly implies that for him, as for Panaetius (assuming that Cicero is following him in book 1 of *De officiis*), the virtue being specified comprehends both *iustitia* in a narrower sense and *beneficentia* or *liberalitas* (*Off.* 1.20). This is confirmed by the list of associated attributes Piso goes on to name, which besides *liberalitas* include *pietas*, *bonitas*, *benignitas* and *comitas*.

The most un-Stoic element in Piso's entire account is the implication that justice is fundamentally a matter of what Hume would have called sympathy. Rackham might actually be building this idea (or something like it) into his translation of *animi affectio* as 'sentiment' (though of course 'sentiment' has a considerable semantic range).¹⁴ I think *affectio* is as often in Cicero's Latin 'state' or 'disposition', here corresponding to Greek *hexis*.¹⁵ None the less when Piso says: '*This* is an attitude or disposition of mind (*quae animi affectio*) . . .', the '*this*' ('*quae*') resumes reference to 'affection for the human species' ('*ipsa caritas generis humani*'). The Stoics took justice to be purely a matter of reason (this is made particularly clear at *Off.* 1.12; cf. also *Leg.* 1.19). Antiochus would evidently have disagreed: not that justice does not crucially involve rationality, but that at bottom and most significantly it is the most notable and important form that human sympathy takes.

His theory of justice has been criticized by Julia Annas for two main and connected reasons: first, in so far as Antiochus tries to derive Stoic impartiality from the development of self-concern, he is attempting something well-nigh impossible; second, he fails to see the need the Stoics recognized for grounding impartiality in the requirements of rationality.¹⁶ Annas does not deny that 'Antiochus' picture of natural human development from the self-centred to the ethical is an intuitively acceptable one'. The problem is that once a Stoic conception of impartiality is built into what counts as the ethical, his developmental story acquires a hiatus which he does not recognize and cannot bridge.

I think this charge against Antiochus rests on a misidentification of where the main Stoic contribution to thought about justice is to be located. Impartiality or fairness – assigning each person his or her due – is integral to any concept of justice worthy of the name; there are reasons to think humans acquire it early in the normal course of development (children are

¹⁴ Mingay 1972: 263 apparently takes the expression to mean 'fellow-feeling' here.

¹⁵ See *OLD* s.v. *affectio*, 3. Two particularly indicative instances where virtues are described as *animi affectiones*, 'dispositions', are *Tusc.* 2.43, 5.41.

¹⁶ Annas 1993: 278–9; cf. 263–7.

notoriously keen on fairness); it is indeed a fundamental form of rationality. It did not need the Stoics to discover that, and if Antiochus does not talk about rationality in this context, that cannot be taken to show that he was unaware that without rationality there is no justice. What the Stoics insisted on – as no earlier thinker had done – is that impartiality is owed to *human beings as human*, irrespective (as we might say) of gender or race or creed. As I have suggested, Antiochus agrees with the Stoics in this and agrees also in thinking that it is something we can come to acknowledge in the ordinary course of human development. But for him it is teaching already implicit in the Aristotelian tradition, with *its* recognition of the natural sociability of the human species (cf. *Fin.* 4.17). Antiochus may distort things as a historian of philosophy. But in believing that Aristotelianism has the resources to generate a satisfying conception of morality in general and of justice in particular, I cannot see that he was wrong or, if wrong, wrong for the reason Annas suggests.¹⁷

Following his account of justice comes a striking treatment of the other cardinal virtues (*Fin.* 5.66–7). What Piso stresses (an idea not salient in most Stoic texts on the virtues) is that *all* the virtues have a social orientation, fundamentally because they are human virtues, and as has just been argued, humans are innately social and civic creatures.¹⁸ To put it in other terms, each of our moral attributes presupposes in its existence and its particular character our essential political identity. This is at any rate one way in which for Antiochus politics is prior to ethics.

The thesis about the social orientation of all the cardinal virtues is worked out by means of a particularly lucid application of the theory of the mutual implication of the virtues, an Aristotelian as well as Stoic doctrine, although here articulated in terms most familiar from Stoic texts (e.g. *Stob.* 2.63.6–24). Each virtue has its own principal function: ‘courage is discernible particularly in cases of great effort or danger, temperance in the forgoing of pleasure, practical reason in one’s choice of goods and evils, and justice in allocating each person their due’. But each has a share in every other. So not only justice but every virtue has ‘an outward-looking concern’, not ‘averse to community and to the affection and society between human beings I have been expounding’. And justice itself in turn, ‘as in its application it flows into the other virtues, so it looks for them’ – you cannot hold on to it unless you are brave and wise.

¹⁷ See also the discussion of external goods desirable for their own sake, pp. 182–7 below.

¹⁸ Here we may compare Arius Didymus (in *Stob.* 2.125.19–22: ‘The kind of life someone chooses is measured by activity that is political and communal, and again by activity that is contemplative. For according to this school [the Peripatetics] virtue is not self-loving, but communal and political.’)

Interestingly Piso seems here to envisage two different kinds of relationship between virtues. You cannot carry through your project of giving each person their due *unless* you have the courage to resist threats and the wisdom to see what someone's due is and arrive at a correct adjudication. But courage (for example) is *essentially* concerned for others. A courageous person counts as courageous above all because he fights for his country despite danger and to the limit of his strength. Courage requires noble objects, and if those objects do not include primarily defence of the interests of others with whom you have ties of concern (which means in the end any other human being whatever), you lack the kind of conception of the morally fine ('honestum') that courageous people possess. Whereas a cowardly or unwise judge may have a perfectly adequate and properly motivated *conception* of what it is to give someone their due, they will fail in justice because *in application* ('usu') that motivation does not deliver the goods. This asymmetry between justice and the other virtues in effect makes justice *the* cardinal virtue, confirming the priority accorded to it in Piso's exposition. Or if you like, the form of human sympathy that constitutes justice is simply virtue itself, considered (as Antiochus following Aristotle clearly thought it should be considered) from the point of view of how it affects one's relations with other social and political beings.¹⁹

A PROBLEM ABOUT EXTERNAL GOODS

If every virtue 'reaches out and embraces other people', we can draw an inference (5.67):

It follows that our friends, our siblings, our relations by blood and then marriage, our fellow-citizens, and finally – since we declare that humankind is a single community – all people are valuable in their own right.

The point Antiochus is putting is that we could not make sense of our valuation of courage (for example) as something exhibited most importantly in fighting to defend one's country, if having fellow-citizens were not desirable for its own sake. One way of expressing Antiochus' meaning is to say that *having* friends, family, fellow-citizens and fellow-humans is something desirable in and for itself. This interpretation is supported a little later by the formulation at 5.69, when Piso speaks of 'friendship, family ties and the other external goods'. We may note also the corresponding formulations in Arius Didymus, who speaks of the relevant forms of love or friendship

¹⁹ For Aristotle's view, see Schofield 2006: 313–18.

(*philia*) being desirable for themselves, for example when he says (Stob. 2.120.15–17):

If among our loves and friendships some happen to be more remote, others closer, that is nothing to the point. All love and friendship is desirable in itself, not just on account of our needs.

Does this interpretation threaten to emasculate what Antiochus and Arius are driving at? Antiochus talks (5.68) of friends, parents, children, and so on themselves being ‘intrinsically precious’ (*sua sponte cara*). Arius says that ‘all those who save another person are so disposed to their neighbours as to act for the most part not in accordance with their needs, but in accordance with what is desirable for its own sake’ (Stob. 2.120.20–121.3).²⁰ And Julia Annas suggests that in this last remark Arius envisages our acting ‘in recognition of a value which is . . . not dependent on whether we have a personal attachment’ to someone. She comments: ‘Here we come closest to the view which we find in its definitive form in Kant, namely that people are “ends in themselves”, and have a distinctive kind of value ‘which we recognise in acting morally’.²¹

Here we need to reflect on the notions of good and of external good in play in these texts. Something good is always conceived of as good *for the agent*. After the reference to ‘friendship, family ties and the other external goods’, for example, Piso comments that someone who dutifully looks after a friend or parent ‘is *benefited* (*prodest*) by the very fact that performance of the duty is a right action’: that is how the external good is *beneficial to us* (5.69).²² But Antiochus also wants to say that an external good such as friendship counts as desirable *in itself* because we want it not (or not solely) because friends give scope to the exercise of virtue or are a useful resource in one’s enterprises, but because – like goods of the mind or body such as knowledge or health and strength – we want to have them for themselves. A friend is an intrinsically attractive thing *to have and enjoy*.

So when Antiochus says of friends, parents and children that they are ‘intrinsically precious’, he means ‘intrinsically precious *to us* – *as* our friends, parents, children’. And when Arius talks of saving a neighbour or another

²⁰ The Stobaeus text is corrupt. The phrase ‘in accordance with their needs’ assumes an emendation along the lines of κατὰ τὰς χρείας (cf. 120.17).

²¹ Annas 1993: 283. But only Antiochus talks explicitly *about* the relationship between treating friends and family as external goods desirable for themselves and our duties towards them (5.69). The vocabulary of duty (*kathēkon*) and virtue is entirely absent from Arius’ discussion of *philia*.

²² This is of course tantamount to saying that friendship’s contribution to the supreme good is an instrumental one (a point to which we shall return). For the present, what matters is that the contribution is construed in terms of benefit.

human being in danger as according with what is 'desirable for its own sake', he means: because a neighbour and indeed a fellow-human is something intrinsically attractive to have. So far from wanting to say (with Annas) that this would be a case of acting 'in recognition of a value which is . . . not dependent on whether we have a personal attachment', Arius is explicit that it would occur *in consequence* of the kind of non-instrumental attitude of mind one has to one's neighbour *as* neighbour. By parity of reasoning, helping a total stranger find his way when lost would be an act done because we value our relationships with fellow-humans – not (or not just) because of what they can do for us, but because we find having fellow-humans *as* fellow-humans attractive in itself. Showing someone who is lost the right path is a way of responding to a fellow-human as someone we relate to simply as a fellow-human. A Kantian might think this falls short of recognition of moral duty. For a Humean or an Aristotelian, or a Humean Aristotelian like Antiochus, it is enough.

Antiochus' position is that the desirability of such relationships in and for themselves turns out to be something implicit in human nature – in our nature as social and political creatures. Nevertheless, he is quick to insist (5.69), none of these relationships 'falls into the category of the highest and ultimate good'. It is not immediately clear why not. Assuming the Aristotelian view that the supreme good is the life of happiness, why should it not be the case that to be truly happy one needs friends, family, fellow-citizens, and proper relationships of concern with other humans in general? Indeed one might think that was actually Aristotle's own position in book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, at any rate as indicated in a famous sentence where he says that the self-sufficiency that is a defining mark of the supreme good must be taken as including parents, children, wife and in general friends and fellow-citizens, 'since humans are by nature political' (*Eth. Nic.* I.7, 1097b8–11).²³

One reason that Piso indicates for Antiochus' refusal to make such relationships *constitutive* of the supreme good is briefly stated at the end of section 68: if all goods which, though desirable, are external to us were included in it, nobody could ever attain the supreme good. The key move is the classification of relationships with family, friends, and the like as *external* goods, in line with the familiar Aristotelian distinction between external goods, goods of the soul or mind, and goods of the body (e.g. *Eth. Nic.* I.8; *Pol.* 7.1). It was a long-standing and complex Peripatetic debate, fuelled ultimately no doubt by Aristotle's own discussion of the matter in

²³ See Schofield 2006: 311–13.

Eth. Nic. 1.8–10, as to whether having external goods (or ‘goods of fortune’) was constitutive of or a necessary condition for happiness (or neither), and an issue on which Staseas apparently took a stance a lot further from Stoicism than did Antiochus (*Fin.* 5.75).²⁴

Quite how Antiochus would have further substantiated his negative answer we can only guess. It might be, for example, that he took the Aristotelian line that if one considers a person’s complete life, the chances that one will enjoy throughout its duration the possession of friends, family, fellow-citizens are doubtful (Priam’s fate might be extreme, but only an extreme version of the sort of thing that happens to almost everybody). Additionally or alternatively, we might note that the point Piso makes is couched in terms of a claim about *all* external goods. These were standardly taken to include resources such as wealth, rank and power as well as friends and family (e.g. *Eth. Nic.* 1.8, 1099b1–2; *Pol.* 7.1, 1323a37–8). Piso does not specifically mention them here and indeed in the rest of the discussion about external goods (5.69) remains firmly focused on family and friendship. But the brief sketch of Antiochus’ ethics in the *Academica* (*Ac.* 1.19–23) lists wealth, power, reputation and influence as its examples of external goods (cf. also *Fin.* 5.81). Making all of those – as well as satisfactory relationships – constitutive of happiness, especially over a long life, would indeed be reaching for the sky.

But the fundamental reason why external goods are not for Antiochus constituents of the supreme good must simply be that they are not conceived by him as elements in human nature, nor consequently as perfections of human nature. He contrasts external goods with goods of body and mind, which do fall in the category of highest good. The argument of *Fin.* 5.24–45 and the sequel at 5.46–8 make it clear that humans are body as well as soul, and that the goods of the body – principally health, strength and freedom from pain – we seek ‘not just for their utility, but for their own sake’ (5.47).²⁵ Now, Antiochus made a notorious distinction (cf. *Ac.* 1.22; criticized at *Fin.* 5.77–86, *Tusc.* 5.23) between the happy life (for which virtue alone is sufficient) and the happiest, which requires more than that (5.71):

It is true that what we count as bodily goods do make a contribution to the happiest life. What they add in the way of good is so slight and insignificant that they are lost in the glow of virtue, like starlight in the ray of the sun.

²⁴ A good overview of the debate is Annas 1993: chs. 18–20. See further Irwin (this volume).

²⁵ See further Tsouni (this volume). I am indebted to Georgia Tsouni for comments and questions on the occasion of the oral delivery of a first version of this paper to the AHRC Project seminar in May 2008; I have also learned from her work on Peripatetic *oikeiōsis* theory in Arius Didymus.

However, health (for example) is quite different from wealth or friendship, in that health is a human perfection whereas that is not true of either wealth or friendship (that is why health but not either of them figures as an actual constituent of the happiest life). It is natural to want wealth or friends, but they are not part of our nature as are body and mind.

Antiochus now anticipates an objection (5.69):

How, then, you will ask, could everything be related to the supreme good, if friendship, family ties and the other external goods are not included in it?

This is a way of asking rather more sharply and explicitly than is often the case in Hellenistic ethics how the other-regarding orientation of moral virtue is to be reconciled with a conception of the *summum bonum* which interprets it as the agent's good. The presupposition of the question (accepted by Antiochus) is that other goods must somehow as goods be related to the supreme good. As Annas notes, this Aristotelian assumption – defended in book I of the *Nicomachean Ethics* – is mainstream thinking in ancient ethics.²⁶

Antiochus has a brisk way with the objection. In effect what he insists on is that a good does not have to be *included* in or a *constituent* of the *summum bonum* to be intimately related to it. We maintain external goods – certainly those like friendship and other relationships that have been under discussion²⁷ – ‘by performing the duties (*officia*) that derive from the class of virtue specific to each’. We might once again use courage as an illustration. In performing the duty of fighting for our country, we may find that our reserves of courage are required of us. Only by fighting in the face of danger to the limit of our strength can we maintain the security of the country, and so the possibility of maintaining relationships with family and fellow-citizens in a proper state. Thereby we engage in one of those right actions or virtuous activities which perfect human nature, and so bring it benefit or good. Indeed, if we *did not* act in this way when appropriate, we would fall short of what human nature is geared towards, and therefore fail to achieve the *summum bonum*. Once again, the point is that humans are by nature social and political animals, so our virtues themselves have an external focus. The external focus contributes to our supreme good precisely by being a focus. It does not need to be a constituent of it to make an essential contribution.

²⁶ See Annas and Woolf 2001: 141 n. 68, with xvii–xviii.

²⁷ It is not clear how he would handle the status of instrumental external goods such as wealth or power or influence. They do not in any event pose in this context the problem presented by external goods desirable in and for themselves.

Aristotle himself generated celebrated obscurities when he attempted to explain how external goods contribute to human happiness in the *Nicomachean Ethics* (1.8–11). Modern interpreters disagree about the best way to interpret him.²⁸ Antiochus' account has the merit of clarity and in fact comes quite close to articulating Aristotle's own position as interpreted by John Cooper. Cooper's Aristotle thinks

that external goods are a *second* component of *eudaimonia*, alongside virtuous activity, only because of the effect they have in enabling the virtuous person to live, and go on living, a fully virtuous life . . . But that does not mean that Aristotle does not regard friends as intrinsic goods for oneself at all, much less that he denies them their own kind of intrinsic value.²⁹

For all that, such a way of looking at things is deeply puzzling. For Antiochus friendship, family ties and our fellow-feeling with other human beings in general are relationships which – as external goods desirable for their own sake – are all *our* goods, attractive *to us* in themselves. They are so because we are by nature social and political animals. And it is as social and political animals that we derive benefit from them, not just because they give scope for the exercise of the virtues. However, they are excluded from 'the category of the highest and ultimate good' to which virtue and physical attributes like health belong – seemingly because they do not perfect our human nature. Why not? People who have friends are more fulfilled in their social nature than those who have none. We must conclude that social nature does not appear to count for Antiochus when it comes to his idea of natural perfection.

²⁸ A useful review of the issue is Annas 1993: ch. 18 ('Aristotle: An Unstable View').

²⁹ Cooper 1985. The quotations are from the expanded text in the 1999 reprint: 309, 310.

CHAPTER 9

Antiochus on physics

Brad Inwood

In considering Antiochus' physics, two preliminary issues need to be addressed. First, he clearly held to the Academic and Stoic view that philosophy divides naturally into three parts (logic, ethics and physics), a view apparently originating with Xenocrates and adopted by most Stoics.¹ Second, there are two aspects of physics to take into account when assessing the views of virtually any Hellenistic philosopher. For physics as a distinct part of philosophy deals most obviously with issues such as the theory of matter, cosmology and cosmogony, the nature of the heavenly bodies and the gods, the nature of plants and animals, and so forth. Under one or more of these headings we expect to find accounts of the principles governing the world; it is here too that a Hellenistic system might be expected to address some of the more abstruse themes relegated to metaphysics by Aristotle, and key issues about the nature of mathematics and the entities it studies. But physics is the study of nature in all its aspects, so it is also clear that it should encompass our efforts to understand the basic facts about human nature and its relationship to the rest of the natural world. That humans are rational, in contrast to other animals, that they have certain innate capacities, and (most important) that they are teleologically designed: these are theses in 'physics' which play a fundamental role in the elaboration of ethical theory as well. Hence the Stoic doctrine of *oikeiōsis* and its counterparts in Epicureanism and in the thought of others such as Antiochus, Peripatetics and various Platonists, and the various views taken in the period about the nature and relationship of soul and body, are topics

I am grateful to many colleagues and friends for discussion of this chapter, especially those gathered at the workshop in Cambridge, July 2007. Many have been helpfully sceptical of the general approach taken here, but all have been generous and insightful. As always, I owe a special debt to David Sedley for prompt, incisive and critical reaction. On this occasion I am particularly grateful to Charles Brittain and George Boys-Stones for just the right blend of constructive feedback and encouragement.

¹ Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.16. Even Aristo of Chios, who disparaged the contributions of logic and physics compared to those of ethics, accepted the tripartition.

which belong to physics in some degree as well as to the study of ethics. We might call this a form of 'human physics'. The issues raised by this part of Antiochus' physics will be dealt with for the most part in other chapters, but its significance for the understanding of his physical theory as a whole is such that I will briefly address the issues here as well.

Antiochus' human physics is in fact more securely documented than his general physics. Because Cicero thought ethics so important, his accounts of the ethical theory of Antiochus and the 'Old Academy' are extensive, and it is relatively clear what can be attributed to him. The same cannot be said of Cicero's (or anyone's) information about Antiochus' general physics. It is desirable to have the better-documented part of his theory in place first. I shall begin, then, with a quick overview of the human physics we can attribute to Antiochus before moving on to the rest, which will be a much more contentious and difficult topic.

Two works by Cicero give us reasonably good information about Antiochus' views of human nature, the *De finibus* (books 4 and 5) and to a lesser extent the *Academic Books*.² But even the most explicit Ciceronian evidence for Antiochus is in need of very careful handling. Even in books (like *Fin.* 5) which are unequivocal about their Antiochean sources and inspiration, Cicero still writes in dialogue form, allowing his characters to develop their views in the context of discussion with others, and this inevitably raises questions about the impact of Cicero's literary adaptation on the presentation of Antiochus' actual doctrines. More worrisome, perhaps, is the fact that Cicero is himself a very learned man, with his own views on philosophical matters, and that his aim throughout is philosophical rather than merely historical or doxographical. His own intelligence, learning and goals must have had an impact on his 'reports' of Antiochean doctrine, even when we cannot be at all sure what that impact may have been.

But despite these concerns, the Antiochean character of some of Cicero's reports is secure. This is clearest if we think first of *De finibus* 5, which gives us (at *Fin.* 5.8) a particularly explicit assurance about the reliability of the report to follow. We are first told that the speaker, Piso, is exceptionally qualified to offer a precis of Antiochus' own opinions; and second, Cicero as author directly challenges Brutus, the dedicatee of the work, outside the fictional framework of the dialogue, to determine whether there are any

² For the fragmentary remains of the *Academic Books* the best current resource is Brittain 2006a. In common with other contributors to this volume, I refer to book 1 of the *Academici libri* as *Ac.* 1 and to the *Lucullus* under its own title. The *Lucullus* is sometimes referred to as book 2 of the *Academic Books*, but that is potentially misleading as the two partially surviving books come from different versions of the work. On the versions, see Brittain 2006a: xiii–xix and Griffin 1997: 1–35.

discrepancies; Brutus' own qualifications to judge what is Antiochean and what is not are also explicitly stated.

'... My cousin Lucius is keen to find out the views of the Old Academy that you mention, and also of the Peripatetics, on the question of the highest goods. We think that you are the one to explain them most fluently, since Staseas of Naples has been a member of your household for many years, and we know that you have been pursuing the same topic with Antiochus in Athens these past few months.'

'Alright, alright,' said Piso with a smile, 'You wanted me all along to start off our discussion. Let me see if I can give the young man a lecture...'

Quintus and Pomponius also gave their assent, and Piso began. Please concentrate, Brutus, and see if his talk adequately captures the philosophy of Antiochus. I know that you are a particular adherent of his views, and have often heard lectures by his brother Aristus. (*Fin.* 5.8, trans. Woolf)

It is hard to imagine a more explicit assurance by an author to his readers about the accuracy and authenticity of the views to be given. To the extent that other reports of Antiochean views are coherent with what we are told in *De finibus* 5 they are confirmed by this remarkable passage.

Let us begin, then, with the one of these other reports, at *Lucullus* 30–1, where Lucullus represents the anti-sceptical views of Antiochus. Here (with my emphasis), Lucullus says:

The topic that comes next is wide-ranging, but somewhat more recondite, since it includes a bit of physics, so that I'm afraid that I may be granting greater liberty and licence to the speaker who is to oppose me. For when hidden and obscure matters are at issue, what else am I to expect of someone whose goal is to rob us of the light? Still, it was possible to argue in detail about *the great artistry with which nature had created, first of all, every animal, and secondly man in particular*, namely, what power the senses have... [31] Since, then, the human mind is supremely well adapted for knowledge of the world and constancy of life, it embraces knowledge above all things...

This teleological view of how nature operates in the design and construction of all animals is used to support confidence in the soundness of human sense perception. This is the approach to human nature and its relationship to the physical world in general that one might expect of any philosopher who looked to the *Timaeus* for insights into the nature of human capacities and their place in a larger cosmological scheme; this teleological conception of animal nature and capacities is also characteristic of Aristotle,³ although he typically avoids explicit language of craftsmanship such as we see here in

³ And this teleological approach is asserted by the Socrates of Plato's *Phaedo* and the Socrates of Xenophon's *Memorabilia* 1.4, 4.3.

the *Lucullus* ('quanto quasi artificio natura fabricata esset'). So a follower of Plato, like Antiochus, would naturally adopt this general teleological view, just as the Stoics did.⁴ That Antiochus attributes this general approach to the early Academy as well is only to be expected and is probably not far off the mark historically.

As is apparent to any reader of the *De finibus*, this teleological conception of human nature and its capacities is at the heart of the 'human physics' presented in *De finibus* 4–5. It is apparent in Cicero's broadly Antiochean remarks about the innateness of certain capacities at, for example, *Fin.* 4.3–4. Though Antiochus is not named here, *Fin.* 4.3 expresses characteristically Antiochean views and these overlap closely with the parts of *De finibus* 5 which attribute the doctrine of the 'Old Academy' to him by name.

[3] Here then, Cato, is my view: Plato's original disciples, namely Speusippus, Aristotle and Xenocrates, and then their pupils Polemo and Theophrastus, put together a system of thought full of richness and refinement. So there was no reason at all for Zeno, as a pupil of Polemo, to dissent from Polemo and his predecessors. I shall set out this system below. If you think that any of my exposition needs correction, then draw my attention to it and do not wait until I have made a complete reply to your own treatment. I suspect that every point of this system will need to be brought into opposition with every point of your own.

[4] The philosophers I am discussing realized that we are naturally constituted to be (*ita nos esse natos ut*), in general terms, well-adapted for acquiring the familiar and noble virtues . . . These philosophers also realized that we pursue the virtues with a particularly sweeping passion; that our desire for knowledge is something ingrained or rather innate (*insitam . . . vel potius innatam*); and that we are naturally disposed to form societies and to promote community and partnership among the whole human race. (*Fin.* 4.3–4, trans. Woolf)

The teleological conception of human nature and its capacities is not augmented here by the language of craftsmanship derived ultimately from the *Timaeus* which appears in the *Lucullus*, but the basis in 'human physics' for the ethical theory which follows is much the same. The anti-Stoic argument that runs right through *De finibus* 4 (esp. 14–17 and 26–36) depends essentially on this teleological conception of human nature. The good for humans is what corresponds to and fulfils the innate natural

⁴ Though we cannot be certain of the relationship (direct or indirect) which the Stoics had with the *Timaeus*. The teleological inspiration of Xenophon's Socrates cannot be neglected (though it cannot be properly assessed either). It is impossible to assess the significance of Zeno's *Pythagorika* (Diog. Laert. 7.4) on this issue, though the teleological commitments of Socrates in the 'Pythagorean' *Phaedo* cannot be ignored.

capacities of humans,⁵ which are built into us by a craftsmanlike power; we might note, for example, the reference to 'institutio illa prima naturae' at the end of 4.15, followed immediately by the highly intentional language of 4.16: 'omnis natura vult esse conservatrix sui'. Woolf's translation of this latter phrase ('every nature wishes to preserve itself') brings out the teleology quite clearly, though his translation of the equally intentional *institutio* does not ('nature's basic constitution', which might better be rendered 'nature's basic arrangement' or 'organization').

It follows from this teleological construction of human capacities that any conception of the *telos* which does not correspond to our full set of natural powers will be to that extent defective. And this is just the criticism advanced against the Stoics by the Antiochean spokesman, that their conception of the *telos* ignores important aspects of our complex nature. This criticism will be successful only if one holds that those built-in natural capacities have normative value; otherwise, why would it matter to what we *should* do that we are set up in a certain way? (One might, after all, think that human beings have built-in natural capacities that are irrelevant to how we ought to behave or even conflict with how we ought to behave. An inborn capacity to enjoy the suffering of innocent children, if we had such a thing, might well be thought to lack the normative weight of our inborn capacity for the pursuit of knowledge.) Now, in order to hold that our built-in natural capacities have this kind of normative weight one does not have to believe that there is or was an actual, individual divine craftsman behind the rational plan for our nature – in fact, not even every Platonist took the *Timaeus* literally, and not every Stoic took literally the language of Zeus as a craftsman of the world's organized layout.⁶

Although critics do not need to be committed to the premises used in their dialectic, in this case it is clear that Antiochus himself does hold a strongly teleological theory of human nature and is not advancing it for merely dialectical purposes. This anti-Stoic argument works, to the extent that it does, precisely because Antiochus and the Stoics alike share a commitment to a teleological and even providential conception of human nature, whether or not they take literally the language of craftsmanship deriving ultimately from the *Timaeus*. A Stoic response to Antiochus could not be based on a denial of the teleological starting points of the argument.

⁵ At *Fin.* 5.18 the basic values which are supposed to guide human life are said to be derived from nature, in the sense of human nature.

⁶ The religiously inclined Cleanthes *may* have leaned to the literalist side, whereas the more sceptical Panaetius evidently was at the other end of the spectrum.

The Antiochean critique rests on the claim that Stoic conceptions of the *telos* unreasonably neglect some of the capacities which we have by nature. This criticism becomes most direct at 4.45–54. In 4.54 Zeno is charged with having misdescribed human nature: ‘Your founder Zeno abandoned nature when he initially set things up’ (trans. Woolf, modified: ‘in prima igitur constitutione Zeno tuus a natura recessit’) in order to retain the appropriate teleological fit between human nature and their allegedly procrustean moral theory. It is worth noticing as well that this fit between our conception of human nature and the associated moral principles is also supposed to work ‘from the inside’ as it were, as a factor in our deliberations. Hence at *Fin.* 5.44 (as at *Leg.* 1.58–62, which is less reliably Antiochean) correct moral deliberation is said to depend on the deliberator’s having a correct understanding of our human nature (which is what I mean by ‘human physics’) and that this in turn depends on having the right view of general physics as well.

It seems, then, that at least in his defence of dogmatic epistemology and of his ethical theory Antiochus asserted a teleological and providential conception of human nature, derived no doubt ultimately from Plato’s *Timaeus*. All the more reason, then, for Antiochus to emphasize how much ground in general physics the Stoics shared with the early Academy. Hence in *Fin.* 4.11–13 and in *Ac.* 1.39 Cicero has his characters, who are again speaking for Antiochus, emphasize how similar Stoic physics is to the physics of the Old Academy; *Fin.* 4 presents the early Academic theory as being more similar to Peripatetic natural philosophy, and in that it is typical of the presentation in *De finibus* 5 as well.⁷ This might lead us to think that this theory is less directly linked to the *Timaeus*, but given the many similarities between that dialogue and Aristotelian physics that need not have unduly concerned Antiochus (though whether Antiochus *ought* to have been concerned turns on what view we take of Aristotle’s relationship to the *Timaeus* and indeed to the issue of the literalness of the *Timaeus*). To judge from Cicero’s account (on the perils of which, see below), Peripatetic physics was alleged by Antiochus to have included more detail but not to be in basic conflict with Stoic theory. The main points of disagreement with the Stoics are the question of a fifth element and the make-up of the mind (*Fin.* 4.12; *Ac.* 1.39) and the issue of whether there could be causal interaction between something non-corporeal and the corporeal (*Ac.* 1.39).

⁷ At *Fin.* 5.9–10 the comprehensiveness and accuracy of Peripatetic physics is emphasized and co-opted for the Old Academy.

Minimization of the divergences in physics was clearly an important part of Antiochus' argumentative strategy; it served to highlight the unreasonableness (as he saw it) of departures from the early Academy in other areas of doctrine. By purporting to support the view that in both ethics and epistemology the authentic position of the early Academy has integrity and internal cohesion, this approach supports Antiochus in his rejection of any views which diverge from what he presented as the general early Academic philosophy, most obviously Academic scepticism and Stoic ethical rigorism. It is an interesting confirmation of the fact that Antiochus put great weight on general early Academic agreement on physics that Cicero, speaking as a character on behalf of the New Academy in *Lucullus* 116–24, uses disagreement and undecidability about physical doctrines as a cudgel with which to beat his dogmatic opponents.⁸ Cicero's emphasis on the importance of a school's sharing fundamental positions in physics reflects the positive claims about the role of physics made by Antiochus (on behalf of the Old Academy) and, quite possibly, the doctrinal stance of the Stoics as well, who treated physics as central to their philosophy as a whole.

This teleological understanding of the way in which physics underpins ethics is not merely the basis for Antiochus' critique of Stoicism. It is also the defining feature of his own positive theory as presented in *De finibus* 5. Thus at *Fin.* 5.24 the starting point for ethical theory is, predictably enough, an account of the initial inclinations and behaviour of newborns. Their self-preservatory actions are based on desires *given to them by nature*, and throughout the account which follows there is an unusually strong emphasis on the integration of human natural capacities with the rest of the natural world. Hence at *Fin.* 5.25 Piso says:

But since every living creature has its own nature, it is also necessary that all share the goal of fulfilling their nature (for there is no reason why all non-human animals should not share some common features, nor why humans should not have some things in common with them, since they all share a common nature); but those ultimate and supreme goods that we are investigating will be distributed variously from species to species. Each species will have its own particular ones, suited to the requirements of its particular nature. (Trans. Woolf, slightly modified)

Here and in the sections which follow (*Fin.* 5.26–8) the Antiochean-Peripatetic account of human nature is integrated into a more coherent general account of the natural world than what we see in *De finibus* 3 (though we need not conclude from this that Stoic accounts elsewhere were not integrated in this way). Even plants are included, and as Piso

⁸ This no doubt reflects the claims for physics made by Lucullus at *Luc.* 13–15.

says, 'we may embrace the whole living world under a single heading' (*Fin.* 5.26, trans. Woolf). A similarly broad integration is invoked at *Fin.* 5.33, culminating in the statement by Piso that 'on this issue I tend to agree with the view that the whole system (*haec omnia*) is regulated by nature, on the grounds that, if nature just ignored it, she herself would be unable to survive' (trans. Woolf, modified). It is clear that on Antiochus' view the teleological fitness characterizing human beings is just one instance of the plan for nature as a whole, and that a cosmology of essentially teleological⁹ character underlies his conception of human nature. The emphasis in what follows (*Fin.* 5.35–40) on particular fitnesses of human body parts is even more reminiscent of the broad sweep of natural philosophy in the *Timaeus*. That the teleological fitness of human beings and their parts is not unique but rather a general feature of physics as a whole emerges again from the climactic counterfactual comparison of humans and plants at *Fin.* 5.39–40 ('imagine that the vine acquired senses . . .').

It is clear, then, that Antiochus' basic position on physics included at least these two pivotal claims: that human nature was based on teleologically and providentially embedded capacities whose fulfilment was both natural and right; and that in general physics the early Academy took a comprehensive teleological approach to cosmology that embraced both the Peripatetic and the Platonic points of view, one which the Stoics altered on only a small number of issues.

So much, then, for the parts of Antiochus' physical theory about which we can have the greatest confidence. It includes some quite strong claims about the relationship of physics to other parts of philosophy, the importance of physical theory as a basis for general doctrinal agreement within a school, and the reliance on a teleological conception of human nature integrated within a rational cosmology as a critical component of ethical theory. When we turn to what I have called 'general physics' we face a greater challenge with regard to our sources of information, which in this case are limited to what we are told by the Antiochean spokesman, Varro, in *Ac.* 1.24–9. Varro is here describing what he takes to have been the doctrine in physics of the early Academy, and since we have no reason to think that Antiochus distinguished his own views from those that he claimed for

⁹ This teleological cosmology could reflect the views of the *Timaeus*, with 'nature' replacing the demiurge, it seems, as the creative agent (a possible reflection of Stoic influence), or an Aristotelian commitment to the teleological character of (sublunary) nature as a whole (a point which would hold whether or not we think that his claims that nature does nothing in vain are merely metaphorical).

the early Academy we can conclude that the account given here is a good representation of Antiochus' own theory as well.¹⁰

As we approach this material as our only serious evidence for his physical doctrine, it is worth comparing the credentials of Varro's speech (*Ac.* 1.15–42) with those of Piso in *De finibus* 5. Recall that Cicero gives to Piso's speech extraordinary credibility as a presentation of Antiochus' views and that this was reinforced by the sensitivity of Piso to subtle differences between the views of the early Academy and those of the Peripatetic school, which was openly acknowledged as the other influence on Piso (*Fin.* 5.8, 5.75). By contrast, Varro's credentials as a faithful and well-informed expositor of Antiochus' views are less forcefully presented.¹¹ The introductory conversation between Cicero and Varro has as its main theme not the differences between schools but the difficult task of Latin philosophical writing. Cicero begins by noting that he has 'started to put on record the subjects I studied along with you and to elucidate in Latin the ancient philosophical system stemming from Socrates' (*Ac.* 1.3). This is an authorial task to which Varro has so far not devoted himself. In his reply Varro notes how difficult the task is: 'But if we're going to follow the Old Academy, which as you know is the school I endorse, think how subtly we'll have to expound its stance, and how artfully – obscurely even – we'll have to argue against the Stoics!' (*Ac.* 1.7). And then he is back to dealing with philosophy in general again in the paragraphs which follow, registering a certain diffidence about his own success in handling philosophical themes in his *Antiquities* (*Ac.* 1.8). Cicero eventually invokes comparison with Brutus as a way of urging Varro to take on this new challenge:

Our friend Brutus, at any rate, who is pre-eminent in every field of merit, is so adept a Latin writer of philosophy that you could not feel the need for Greek writings on the same subjects. And he follows the same position as you do, since

¹⁰ In his introductory remarks at *Ac.* 1.6 Varro expresses a commitment ('nostra tu physica nosti') to a view of the basic principles of physics that closely anticipates that of Antiochus: everything is produced by two principles, *effectio* and *materia*. As a character, Varro has not yet declared for Antiochus and the Old Academy philosophically (though he does so soon, in *Ac.* 1.7, 'quam nos ut scis probamus'); in this introductory discussion the 'we' seems to refer to Romans who face the challenge of writing philosophy in Latin (*Ac.* 1.5), whereas his own commitments are so far expressed in the first-person singular. But it need not be doubted that this doctrinal statement is more personal than the general stylistic ones which precede. The key point is the presence in *Ac.* 1.6 of a brief anticipation of a primary feature of Antiochean physics (the two principles, cause and matter) followed by Varro's assertion of his Antiochean commitments in *Ac.* 1.7; this confirms what we learn from the later passage about the provenance of this doctrine.

¹¹ Cicero often shows sensitivity to the authority of his characters as spokesmen for the views they present. This is especially clear in the *Academica* (see Brittain 2006a: xv–xvi and xviii).

he spent a long time studying in Athens with Aristus, whose brother Antiochus you studied with. That's why I appeal to you to devote yourself to this field of literature too. (*Ac.* 1.12)

After noting that he will need Cicero's assistance (or at least company) in this endeavour, Varro prods his friend about having 'abandoned the Old Academy' and 'dealing with the New' (*Ac.* 1.13).¹² Cicero then invites Varro to refresh his memory about the controversy between Old and New Academies, between Antiochus and Philo, as well as about 'the whole issue of the Old Academy' – as Brittain renders 'totam veterem Academiam' at *Ac.* 1.14.¹³ And as Varro begins his speech he does not explicitly assert his intention of summarizing Antiochus' views.

This introduction clearly constitutes a less forceful assertion of fidelity to Antiochus' theory than what we are given in *De finibus* 5. Varro is presented as less qualified than Piso and the central theme of his speech is less obviously a simple exposition of Antiochus' doctrine. But despite any doubts which this might occasion, it is nevertheless clear that his speech in *Academica* 1 is intended to be a version of Antiochus' views. It has, of course, most of the hallmarks of Antiocheanism; furthermore, after the first phase of the speech and before Varro outlines those alterations to the original doctrine (which he describes as being handed down by Plato) that he is aware of ('quas acceperim'), the Epicurean Atticus claims that Varro has indeed been giving 'an outstanding exposition of the canon upheld by the Peripatetics and early Academy' (*Ac.* 1.33). Atticus is not, perhaps, as authoritative as Cicero himself would be in distinguishing between Peripatetic and Old Academic features of the doctrine, but these remarks are clearly intended to validate Varro's summary. Furthermore, Varro's Antiocheanism is also reflected in the letter Cicero wrote to him explaining that he had given him that role in the new version of the *Academica* (*Fam.* 9.8), a role he suited better than Lucullus, who played it in the first version of the dialogue. This epistolary remark is outside the fictional framework

¹² This does not, of course, mean that Cicero ever thought of himself as an Antiochean Old Academic, though this point is controversial. Varro need mean no more than that, in his view, anyone in the Socratic tradition who is not an Antiochean can be regarded as having fallen away from the 'original' doctrine of the school.

¹³ If Brittain's translation catches the sense well, as I think it does, then Varro's task is not so much to expound the substantive system of the Old Academy as it is to review the debate between Philo and Antiochus; but it should be conceded that Varro's remark can be construed as an invitation to summarize the doctrine of Antiochus' school. This issue matters because to the extent that the central goal of Varro's speech is to summarize doctrine we ought to have more confidence in its accuracy; to the extent that its aim is to account for inter-school disagreements our suspicion that there might be broad, even inaccurate summary of doctrine is increased.

of the dialogue, which gives it additional credibility; however, as Brittain notes, Cicero may also be aware of disagreements between Varro and the Antiochus he represents, at least with regard to Socrates.¹⁴ And even here in the letter Cicero forestalls a concern which he thinks Varro might have about the words put into his mouth by Cicero: 'I gave you the Antiochean side, which I thought I had understood to be what you approved of; and I took the side of Philo. I think that when you read it that you might be surprised that we say in dialogue what we have never actually uttered; but you know how it is with dialogues.' Cicero can hardly think that Varro expected his dialogue to be a transcription of some previous conversation (which, of course, they may never have actually had in real life). It would be insulting to presume such naivety in a friend of such literary distinction as Varro. So here too Cicero's remarks reveal that the actual content of the characters' speeches has been treated with some authorial licence.

It is important to devote at least this level of attention to the question of the accuracy we can expect from Varro's account of Antiochean general physics in *Academica* 1; for there is virtually no other information available from any source about the topic. It has, of course, been thought that we do have other evidence, but since the appearance of Jonathan Barnes's classic essay on Antiochus in *Philosophia Togata* this fond hope has had to be abandoned.¹⁵ Barnes's trenchant analysis of our available evidence and its value reminds us of how little, beyond what we learn from the speech at *Ac.* 1.15–42, we can claim to know about Antiochus' general physics.

Barnes's summary of what we can know about Antiochus' substantive views on physics is set in the context of his account of the speech of Varro in *Ac.* 1.15–42. The framework of Varro's Antiochean material is epistemological. Here is Barnes's summary:

Then Plato dogmatized, and his Academic and Peripatetic successors maintained his dogmatic attitudes (17–19). The dogmatic philosophy had three parts, and Varro describes in turn its ethics (19–23), its physics (24–29), and its logic (30–33). After Aristotle, various differences and dissensions arose (33–35), but Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, reworked the old philosophy: Varro describes his 'corrections' in ethics (35–39), in physics (39–40), and in logic (40–42).

Thus Antiochus, as we should have expected, discussed each of the three traditional parts of philosophy (cf. *Luc.* 116). We know little about his views on physics. He held, traditionally enough, that physics is relevant to ethics; for in

¹⁴ Brittain 2006a: xviii n. 30.

¹⁵ Barnes 1989.

order to know ourselves we must know the whole of nature (*Fin.* V. 44).¹⁶ But if we may judge from Cicero's remarks at *Luc.* 29 the subject played a minor role in Antiochus' system.¹⁷

If we share Cicero's view about the centrality of ethics in philosophy (and it is important to note that we have no particular reason to think that Antiochus himself shared that view with Cicero) then we might want to quibble about Barnes's claim that physics played a minor role in Antiochus' system. For as we have seen, 'human physics' at least does play a crucial role in it.

As becomes clear with a survey of other evidence and argument on the topic, this relatively short passage from Cicero (*Ac.* 1.24–9) is very nearly the entire sum of our information about Antiochus' views on general physics. In a note Barnes mentions the rather more expansionist views about our evidence for Antiochus' physics (incompatible with each other) of Dillon and Dörrie. But on this point as on others Barnes finds that the evidence used by others, not least Donini, as discussed in his Appendix E on 'Antiochus and Plato's Forms,' fails to *be* proper evidence about Antiochus and his views. Barnes's short section on *Quellenforschung* merits rereading today, more than twenty years after publication.¹⁸ In fact, his whole essay bristles with careful and restrained analysis on all aspects of Antiochus' thought. While duly respectful of the expansionist tradition in Antiochean scholarship associated most forcefully with historians of later Platonism, Barnes's trenchancy shows no quarter. For example, while discussing the possible content of the attested work *On Gods* Barnes not only sets aside Cicero, *De divinatione* 1 and Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 7.6 as evidence for Antiochus – and rightly so – but he also sums up John Dillon's highly influential presentation of Antiochus:

Dillon is a circumspect scholar who does not indulge in fancy flights of *Quellenforschung*; but of his 44 pages on Antiochus' philosophy, 22 are by my reckoning dubiously Antiochian.¹⁹

¹⁶ If this is a clear reflection of Antiochean views, there are important implications for the relevance of physics to ethics and I have discussed them above. One further point remains. The issue of whether the Stoics or Old Academy were responsible for this theory was, of course, debated thoroughly a generation ago and I do not propose to reopen it here. The 'Antiochean' theory of *oikeiōsis* found in Cicero is much more clearly dependent on the Stoic theory than on anything for which we can identify a source in the early Academy. This topic might, then, be used to support the position of the retrojection theorists (see below).

¹⁷ Barnes 1989: 82. ¹⁸ Dillon 1977, Dörrie 1987, Donini 1982; Barnes 1989: 64–8.

¹⁹ Dillon 1977; Barnes 1989: 63 n. 50.

Apart from the main views on physics sketched in Varro's speech, and the purported views about the gods and Platonic Forms which some historians of Platonism claim to find in a range of passages where there is no mention of Antiochus nor any strong reason to suppose his tacit presence, we know virtually nothing about Antiochus' views on physics in general (as opposed to human physics). And as far as I can see, no significant advances on this question have emerged in the scholarship since Barnes assessed the situation.

It is worth noting at this point the contribution made to the question of our sources for Antiochus' physics by Ludwig Fladerer in his *Antiochus von Askalon*.²⁰ Since methodological issues play such a powerful role in all reasoning about Antiochus' doctrines, let me take a moment to situate Fladerer's work methodologically. Fladerer, very much to his credit, devotes a good portion of his introduction to the review of earlier approaches to the identification of Antiochean materials from the mass of alleged evidence about his views and to the explicit statement of his own approach. Thus Luck and Mette are considered and found wanting, not least because of their over-inclusiveness in the assessment of relevant evidence. And yet Fladerer himself, after invoking the obvious methodological parallel of Theiler's and Edelstein and Kidd's approaches to Posidonian reconstruction, takes a view about recovery of Antiochean thought which still seems far too generous; he is concerned about the excessive influence of what he terms 'philological scepticism'. Such scepticism seems to consist in the insistence (embraced by Kidd and Barnes among others) that there be some specific reason for believing that each bit of information offered as evidence for the target philosopher's views really is evidence.²¹ Following, as he says, the lead of Schadewaldt, for a reconstruction of the thought of a lost target Fladerer wants not just to retain the secure core of unmistakably attested material, but also to include (of course, in some suitable way) the indirect evidence of later thinkers who are deemed to have been influenced by the target philosopher. He concludes:

²⁰ Fladerer 1996: 126–7 is (despite his attempts at caution, discussed in the next paragraph) typical of the state of the art on the question of Antiochus' views on general physics. Here he considers the Platonizing passage at *Orator* 8ff. and reviews recent discussions of it; on the basis of its alleged similarity to *Luc.* 30 he follows the *communis opinio* and declares that it seems that we *ought not to doubt* that Antiochus is the authority behind the *Orator* text. Despite the weight of received opinion, though, Antiochus is nowhere mentioned in connection with this text and the similarities between the two passages are not great, certainly no more than what one might expect of texts whose authors are inspired by Plato's doctrines – and of course Cicero himself was so inspired.

²¹ Edelstein and Kidd 1972: xv–xix; the approach of Barnes 1989 seems to rest on some such principle as well.

But in fact in the case of philosophers whose teaching has reached us via a larger number of sources there is, it seems to me, less reason for philological scepticism, because the specific distortions of their original thought due to these intermediaries can be exposed with the aid of comparative studies. What remains is a reliable nucleus, as the intersection of reports that are themselves only partly credible.²²

That is: when considering a range of later philosophers thought to be influenced by Antiochus but known or suspected to have altered or 'coloured' his views owing to their own interests, one may use a kind of Baconian analysis to isolate the elements which are common and so form a reliable core of views that can be attributed with confidence to Antiochus. To change the metaphor, from a number of contaminated ore samples one may extract the pure gold of credible conclusions.

This is certainly a better historical method than mere aggregation of passages which are presumed to represent in some way or another the target philosopher. Even so, two problems, each in my view fatal, remain. First, Fladerer assumes that we know in advance which later works contain the influence of Antiochus, even when there is no explicit indication of that influence in a given passage. And second, the comparative method is presumed to be able to isolate separate bits of data from complex textual environments, while for all we know the data sample may be contaminated not merely by the addition of masking agents which can be identified by a compare-and-contrast exercise but also by a deep-seated and polemically or philosophically motivated presentation which permits no 'good data' to be extracted by the comparative method.

Hence it is not surprising that Fladerer, despite his attempt to focus on a narrow and well-attested set of evidence for Antiochus,²³ also includes the Varronian passage of Augustine's *City of God* book 7 as *certain* evidence for Antiochus, solely on the basis of its similarity to material attributed to Varro in Cicero; Varro, of course, has been identified as a follower of Antiochus. Yet being a follower of Antiochus hardly shows that Varro must have been speaking for him in the passages which inspired Augustine (Varro also read and thought about the issue for himself and may well have been familiar with similar Stoic 'allegorical' theorizing). More worrisome is the way Fladerer applies his own criteria.²⁴ When we cannot find direct evidence for Antiochus' views, he says, we need to consider substantial similarity between passages attested as Antiochean and those which are not so attested – and then we can include the latter in our set of evidence. Of course, Fladerer does not want to rely on mere similarity of content; he

²² Fladerer 1996: xi.

²³ Fladerer 1996: xiii–xiv.

²⁴ Fladerer 1996: xiv.

insists also that the common content be of exclusively Antiochean provenance. Here the application of his own method lets him down. For how much similarity and of what sort will suffice? And how could anyone possibly have confidence in the ‘Ausschliesslichkeit ihrer antiocheischen Herkunft’ when we are missing so much of ancient philosophical literature? At any rate, his argument for including this traditional bit of pseudo-evidence for Antiochus is weak, violates his own stated methodology and fails to grapple with the rejection of it by Barnes as well as with the sober assessment by Brunt that Varro was following ‘an unidentified Greek thinker’ – there must have been a lot of those around, and even more for us than for Varro, alas.²⁵ So the judgement, endorsed by Fladerer, that Antiochus is the *only possible source* for these views is a clear example of the kind of tunnel vision about sources and method which has vitiated so much otherwise admirably learned work on the history of ancient philosophy.

It is a significant part of Fladerer’s argument for the importance of Antiochus to what he sees as emerging middle Platonist doctrine that in one key passage of the *Academica* (1.30) all scholars to date have misread the claim made about the Forms.²⁶ The fact that the demonstrative pronoun introducing the parenthesis (‘hanc’) is feminine makes it certain, he says in defiance of previous scholarship, that its referent is the *mens*. That is, Fladerer thinks that if we avoid mistranslating the parenthesis there is clear textual evidence of a novel and important doctrine in Antiochean physics: the human mind *is* the Forms, that is, that he interpreted the Platonic Forms as the conceptual content of human minds.²⁷ If true, it would be astonishing that so many fine Latinists have missed this point. But in fact Fladerer’s point is unfounded. The assimilation of the demonstrative pronoun to the gender of its predicate is textbook Latin syntax.²⁸ So there is no reason at all to torture the obvious sense of *Ac.* 1.30 to reveal a new Antiochean doctrine on the Forms and the human mind.²⁹

If this text said what Fladerer claims, then it would constitute a newly appreciated Antiochean doctrine, drawn from the only reliable source we have. And, if so, then perhaps we could use it to validate as Antiochean some other ‘evidence’ about theories of the Forms. But in fact this interpretation of *Ac.* 1.30 will not work and we are left with the evidentiary situation as Barnes assessed it twenty years ago.

²⁵ Brunt 1989: 175.

²⁶ On Antiochus and the Forms, see also Boys-Stones (this volume). ²⁷ Fladerer 1996: 112–13.

²⁸ See, e.g., Gildersleeve and Lodge 1895: 149 (section 211, exceptions (b) 5), where *Fin.* 2.70 and *Livy* 32.21.33 are cited as examples of the usage.

²⁹ The same complaint and correction is made by Karamanolis 2006: 62 n. 56, and by Blank, p. 274 n. 45 below.

We might turn next to the judicious assessment of the situation with general physics made by Charles Brittain:

The problem is worst in the case of physics, where we have very little external evidence for Antiochus' views. Varro mentions only two Stoic 'corrections' here – the mind is corporeal and constituted by fire (*Ac.* 1.39) – and both are to Peripatetic or Old Academic views that are not mentioned in the original 'Platonic' exposition [in *Ac.* 1.24–9]. We do not have direct evidence to determine whether Antiochus accepted these or not (though he probably did), since Cicero's criticism highlights only the disagreements between dissident Peripatetics and the Stoics (*Ac.* 2.119–21). A second problem in this case is that we do not have independent evidence for Varro's account of 'Platonic' physics. The 'Platonic' doctrines of 'force', 'matter', and god are surprisingly close to the views the Stoics adopted. It is unclear whether this is evidence that Antiochus was right about the near identity of Stoic and Old Academic views, at least on this topic, or a sign that his history is a fabrication, retrojecting Stoic physics into the late Academy.³⁰

This raises a distinct issue about Antiochus' general physics: whether it is actually a restatement of a physical theory from the early decades of the Academy or whether it is a new creation by Antiochus,³¹ reflecting the philosophical interests of the first century BCE. The historical reliability of Antiochus' claims about the early Academy has long been a controversial issue,³² and although the origin of his theories is from one perspective irrelevant to the content of his doctrines, it is difficult to assess the evidence we do have without giving some attention to the issue of the intellectual environment from which the doctrines in question emerged (early Academy or first century BCE). A consideration of the historical origins of the doctrines would also tell us something about the way Antiochus worked, which is of interest for developing an appreciation of his philosophical achievements. I return to this issue towards the end of this chapter.

I remain sceptical on the question of the historical accuracy of Antiochus' claims about the physical theory of the early Academy (as represented in Cicero). Although Sedley's argument for Antiochus' veracity is refreshingly free of dependence on the more dubious evidence sometimes employed, even his account remains precarious in its complexity; to date his is the only

³⁰ Brittain 2006a: xxxii–xxxiii.

³¹ This view is summarized in Sedley 2002a: 48 with n. 17.

³² Brittain 2006a: xxxiii n. 57 helpfully lines up the recent supporters for the two options with regard to Antiochus' historical accuracy. The supporters of the view that Antiochus was right about the history and that the theory of *Ac.* 1 is in its essentials a product of the early Academy include most prominently Sedley 2002a: 41–83, supported recently by John Dillon (here represented by Dillon 2003, while the Dillon chastised so courteously by Barnes in his essay is the author of Dillon 1977). Adherents of the view that the theory of the *Academici libri* represents a form of adaptation and retrojection of Stoic views back onto the early Academy include Woldemar Görler (1994: 949–51) and Gretchen Reydam-Schils (1999: 127–33).

fully developed case for this position.³³ The inevitably speculative nature of source-critical argument about an author for whom no works survive and for whom our best information comes through an author like Cicero puts the burden of proof on those who hold that the substance of Antiochus' views really does go back to the early Academy.³⁴

In my view the initial balance of likelihood favours the thesis that Antiochus' account of the physics of his early Academy relies in some measure on the integration of Stoic views into those of the early Academy. There is, after all, a certain economy in supposing that the man who syncretized about the *history* of his school (as Barnes sees it), for comprehensible and even laudable reasons, might be inclined to play fast and loose (or simply to be in a state of sincere error) with his presentation of aspects of its *doctrine* as well.³⁵ In other areas of his Old Academic doctrine, such as logic and epistemology, Antiochus manifestly drew on Stoic and other Hellenistic theories to construct his own doctrines; even if he in fact convinced himself that such later developments, which emerged in the debate between Stoics and Academics, really did represent the essential doctrines of Plato's school,³⁶ our historical doubt remains in place. It seems very likely, on balance, that the situation with Antiochus' physics is similar to that in epistemology;

³³ Dillon 2003: 168 n. 33 admits that it took the force of Sedley's arguments in Sedley 2002a to convince him that it was acceptable to argue for a view that he had been reluctant to advance in Dillon 1977. Dillon does contribute arguments of his own, but the significant move is clearly his acceptance of Sedley's case. The impact of Sedley's views on the discussion of Stoic theology by M. Frede (2005) is considerable, but complex, and I am myself unconvinced that Sedley provides the support for his views that Frede thinks it does. Unlike Frede, I doubt that there could be a meaningful 'generally shared' view about early Academic physics (that is, their understanding of the visible world of the *Timaeus*) that was accessible to Antiochus *and* is also accessible to us through the multiple literary mediations of Antiochus' works or lectures, the presentation by the character Varro, and the framing by the author Cicero himself. Further, it is not clear to me how carefully Frede has distinguished between the now relatively uncontroversial view that the Stoics were influenced in some measure by Plato in setting up their physical theory (and that Antiochus could take this for granted) and the much stronger view that Antiochus was right to attribute to the early Academy the account attributed to him by Varro in Cicero, the account which has so often seemed to be the product of retrojection. After all, acceptance of the retrojection thesis can coexist with the realization that Zeno learned a lot from Plato's dialogues, directly or indirectly.

³⁴ See Inwood 2007b: 149–67.

³⁵ Note, however, that this is just what Sedley denies and argues against (2002a: 48–9). The important question here may simply come down to establishing where the burden of proof lies.

³⁶ The great speech in *Luc.* 13–62 integrates the results of Academic–Stoic debate into an account of what Antiochus held that the *true* Academic philosophy consisted in. Without claiming that Plato or his earliest followers actually held such views in just this form, the unmistakable impression is created that Plato's *perfectissima disciplina*, consisting of Peripatetics and Academics, who differ only in *nomina* not *res*, and Stoics, whose divergences were in *verba* not *sententiae* (*Luc.* 15), were committed in substance to the epistemology outlined in this speech. Those who think that Stoicism and the debate with Academics brought something substantially novel to epistemology must, I think, agree that Antiochus' claims about the true Academic philosophy descended from Plato's *disciplina* involve historical revisionism, whether deliberate or not.

in this area of doctrine Antiochus was doing a great deal more than just recovering the authentic pre-Stoic views of the early Academy when he presented his doctrines. The similarities between Antiochus' approach in physics and in epistemology suggest that the physical theories of *Ac.* 1.24–9, 1.39 should not benefit from any special presumption of historical veracity.

The presentation of Old Academic physical doctrines by Varro in *Academica* 1 is in some ways unsatisfactory as a source even for Antiochus' views. Many aspects of the theory as presented seem unclear and the tensions within the account are palpable; this becomes particularly evident when Varro deals with those philosophers who diverged from the general early Academic theory. Brittain points out that 'Varro mentions only two Stoic corrections here – the mind is corporeal and constituted by fire (*Ac.* 1.39) – and both are to Peripatetic or Old Academic views that are not mentioned in the original "Platonic" exposition', as might have been expected.³⁷ We should add that in *Ac.* 1.39 Varro registers a further disagreement with the Old Academy, concerning the Stoic principle that causal relations can only hold between corporeals. This is perhaps meant to complement the 'correction' with regard to the mind but is of course of more general import; the mind mentioned in the early part of the chapter, where the disagreement with Peripatetic theory is noted, is the *mens*. In the subsequent account of the causal principle Varro seems to deal with the soul as a whole (here called 'animus'), as is indicated by his engagement with Xenocrates, who is known for his definition of soul (*psuchē*) as a self-moving number. Let us look more closely at these two points.

In *Ac.* 1.39 Varro reports that Zeno declined to accept 'that fifth nature his predecessors imagined as the source of the senses and the mind' and held instead that fire itself is the mind. He also held that fire, not the fifth element, is the element which generates each and every thing (this is a clear reference to the Stoic *pur technikon*). We should recall, though, that the fifth element had earlier (at *Ac.* 1.26) been singled out as an Aristotelian position rather than a general early Academic view, so this 'departure' by Zeno really only appears to be departure from an innovation by Aristotle;³⁸ in fact, however, an all-creative fire might well be thought to be a divergence from Plato as well. Yet this Aristotelian view is clearly presented at 1.39 as being the view of all Zeno's *superiores* (note too 'discrepebat ab isdem', which confirms the assertion that at *Ac.* 1.39 the fifth element is being

³⁷ Brittain 2006a: xxxii.

³⁸ I set aside the question whether Cicero or Antiochus is responsible for the mistaken claim that Aristotle used the fifth element to account for the senses and the mind as well as the heavenly bodies; see Brittain 2006a: 97 n. 24.

treated as a general early Academic doctrine). There is evidently some unclarity in Varro's (and for all we know Antiochus') mind about how general the doctrine of the fifth element was in the early Academy.

The second major change to early Academic doctrine which Varro says was made by Zeno is also a well-attested Stoic doctrine: he held that incorporeals cannot exert causal power or be the recipient of such causation ('nullo modo . . . quicquam effici posse ab ea quae expers esset corporis; nec vero aut quod efficeret aliquid aut quod efficeretur posse esse non corpus'). The Stoic commitment to the principle that only bodies can cause or be causally affected was a primary argument for their claim that the soul is a body. Although his predecessors also held the view that the soul ('animus') was just such an incorporeal cause, it is Xenocrates who is singled out; indeed, he had been notorious since Aristotle's day for his view that the soul is a self-moving number (see the evidence collected as fr. 60, Heinze). Xenocrates' theory was certainly not the only incorporealist account of the soul, but it is a striking version of that position;³⁹ nevertheless, it is hardly typical of early Academic theories of soul and certainly not one shared by Aristotle (see *De an.* 1.2, 404b27–30). The picture of Zeno departing from a *general* Old Academic theory is dubious, even when one has allowed for the Peripatetic discrepancies which Varro notes.

These mentions of Stoic departures from the early Academy, then, are clearly accurate in their portrayal of the Stoic doctrines in question though questionable in their portrayal of a general early Academic theory. But can we be confident about Antiochus' own attitude to these Stoic doctrines? I am not as sure as Brittain is that we can. He goes on from the previously quoted text to say: 'We do not have direct evidence to determine whether Antiochus accepted these or not (*though he probably did*) [my emphasis], since Cicero's criticism highlights only the disagreements between dissident Peripatetics and the Stoics (*Ac.* 2.119–21).'⁴⁰ But in *Ac.* 1.39 Zeno is contrasted not just with Xenocrates but also with his predecessors (the *superiores*). Are we to suppose that Xenocrates' striking theory of soul as a self-moving number was thought by Antiochus to be the original early Academic theory? Or that Xenocrates' characteristic views about soul as a self-moving number were only trivially different from those of Plato or even Aristotle in the *De Anima*? Perhaps, but that is not clear from this passage, which is compatible with a recognition that Xenocrates' definition of soul was indeed an outlier within the Old Academy.

³⁹ It is hard to see why Xenocrates would be singled out by Cicero here if not for this well-documented and distinctive position.

⁴⁰ Brittain 2006a: xxxii.

To have confidence about the views to which Antiochus is committed requires more argument than Brittain supplies; we would have to be clear in our minds about the attitude Antiochus had towards the Peripatetics when they disagreed with the Stoics. Brittain assumes that Antiochus aligned the Stoics with the Old Academy and treated the Peripatetics as the dissidents. But if we think back to the complicated situation in *De finibus* 5,⁴¹ then certainty will be harder to achieve. For there we found a Peripatetic touted as a particularly reliable spokesman for Antiochean views; when the Peripatetic Staseas strayed from Academic orthodoxy we are told so explicitly (*Fin.* 5.75).⁴² The standing of the Antiochean account in *De finibus* 5 is complicated, but apparently quite reliable. But in the *Academica* the character Varro is presented as a *less* reliable guarantor of Antiochean views, and the relationship between what he puts forward as the views of the authentic Old Academy, the Peripatetics' unorthodoxies in physics, and Stoic views is far less clear; one might even call it confusing.

At this point it makes sense to recall as well that Cicero himself, the author, is the one giving Varro the character his positions (some of which he thinks Varro, the real person, might find surprising). The inferences we would have to make to come up with Antiochus' own views in this case (the question of whether he sided with the Stoics against Aristotle and attributed the denial of the fifth element and the corporeality of mind to the early Academy, on the grounds that mind had to interact causally with body) are simply too tenuous. We cannot be sure what view he gave to the early Academy on these issues; and we cannot be sure what his own views were (if in fact they were in any way different). And at both *Ac.* 1.39 and 1.26 we have even less reason for confidence about the historical accuracy of Antiochus' view about the general early Academic view.

The doubts we may well have about Antiochus' own views on these matters (as opposed to those of his spokesmen in Cicero) are serious. But since, as Brittain has suggested, *Ac.* 1.39 is not in fact well integrated with the general account of Old Academic physics at 1.24–9, we are still in a good position to assess that account on its own merits. A few remarks about its relationship with the account of human physics in the larger cosmological setting as we know it from *De finibus* 5 are in order (bearing in mind that this seems to be the most secure account of Antiochean physical doctrine that we have). On even the most cursory examination it emerges that in the

⁴¹ And indeed to the summary account of physical principles introduced by Varro in *Ac.* 1.6, aspects of which could as easily be Peripatetic as Academic in inspiration.

⁴² Similarly Cicero often notes the particular proneness of Theophrastus to overestimate the value of external 'goods' in the happy life (e.g. *Fin.* 5.77, 5.85; *Tusc.* 5.23–4, 5.85; *Off.* 2.56).

main account at 1.24–9 we find very little that overlaps with, determines or is determined by the human physics found in *De finibus*. There is no need, of course, to expect a particularly tight fit, but it is worth stressing that the emphasis on providence at 1.29 stands out in this context for its relevance to the cosmology and teleology which lie behind the Antiochean theory of the *De finibus*. What does not fit quite so obviously with the *De finibus* account, though, is the emphatic introduction of determinism in *Ac.* 1.29. Nothing in the account of human physics is openly inconsistent with it, but no aspect of that account addresses the issues inevitably raised by a form of determinism more familiar from Stoicism than from what we otherwise know of fourth-century philosophical thought.⁴³

This brings us at last to Varro's account of the Old Academic theory of basic physics and the relationship of its basic entities to the rest of the material world in *Ac.* 1.24–9, clearly the most interesting and contentious part of what we can learn about Antiochus' physical theory. It is in many respects frustratingly vague, and interpreting it without reliance on extraneous assumptions about its character or origin is difficult – we might resolve ambiguities differently if we believed that it was essentially a Stoic-inspired text than we would if we held it to be a straightforward report of early Academic doctrines. It seems unreasonable to make either of these assumptions, so I will attempt a relatively neutral description. In summarizing the account, I will generally follow Britain's translation; my goal is to sketch its content, assuming that this is a respectable outline of Antiochus' own theoretical commitments (to which the character Varro is also committed, of course).⁴⁴

1. [24] Nature is divided into two things or entities ('res'), one active or effective and the other acted on by it. The latter is described relatively to the former: it 'lends itself to' the active entity. There is no suggestion that this second entity could be understood or could exist without the active entity. We may note as well that the characteristically Stoic emphasis on the bodily nature of anything engaged in causal interaction is missing here (contrast its presence at 1.39, where the same term 'efficere' is used extensively). This pair of entities is described very

⁴³ Though see the discussion of Sedley 2002a: 73–6. Contrast the rather more open-textured discussion of Sorabji 1980.

⁴⁴ Somewhat tentatively, of course; if we had more extensive reports of Antiochus' theory or if Varro had dealt more extensively with the divergent views of various Old Academics we might find more reason to suspect Cicero's authorial hand at work, as we did with the features of physical theory discussed above. On Varro's remarks at *Ac.* 1.6 see above.

briefly in *Ac.* 1.6 as *effectio* (= 'res efficiens' here) and the *materia* which is shaped and formed by the *effectio*.⁴⁵

2. The active entity has *in it* a force. Its activity is indicated by the verb *efficere*, which is quite neutral. At *Ac.* 1.6 the active factor (called 'effectio') is said to shape and form ('fingere' and 'formare') the matter.
3. The entity acted upon by the active entity has *in it* nothing but a certain kind of matter. (At *Ac.* 1.6 the *materia* is the passive entity; here, the *res* contains the *materia*. It is not clear what difference this makes.) The emphasis here is on how limited the contents of the passive entity (as we may call it for convenience) are.
4. The active and passive are nevertheless 'in' each other. The reason for this claim is given promptly, but one aspect of the reason is certainly that at this primal stage of analysis there are only two entities and so if each must be 'in' something ('nihil est enim quod non alicubi esse cogatur'), it must be in the other. (Compare the evidence at *Diog. Laert.* 7.134 that in Stoic theory the active power (*to poioun*) is *in* the matter.)
5. Matter itself (it is hard to say exactly what the force of the emphatic 'ipsam' is here) could not be cohesive if it were not contained by a force of some sort.
6. Force could not be cohesive if it did not have some sort of matter, since everything has to be somewhere. The implication is that force has to have matter to be *in* as a location; this may not be the only reason for its dependence on matter, but it is the one emphasized here. The reciprocal dependence of force and matter on each other in order to achieve cohesion suggests that neither is a recognizable, physically bounded entity in isolation from the other. The sense, then, in which they are *res* is somewhat attenuated if neither is capable of independent, spatially determinate existence. This leads naturally to the next point.
7. The product of these two entities or things ('res') is the first (in some sense; note 'iam') thing that could be labelled a body and a 'sort of quality'.⁴⁶ If the passive entity is *materia*, it follows that matter is a pre-bodily kind of entity.

⁴⁵ Two apparently distinctive features of the sketch in *Ac.* 1.6 should be noted. In 24 *natura* is said to be divided into two things; in 6 *physica* (physical theory) is said to be made up of ('contineantur ex') the two factors, *effectio* and *materia*. It is not clear what difference, if any, is intended by this. More significant, perhaps, is the pertinence of *geometria* mentioned at *Ac.* 1.6. Its relationship to the two 'principles' is unclear and it may be mentioned more in connection with the challenge of Greek–Latin translation than with doctrinal issues.

⁴⁶ At this point Cicero introduces an apologetic digression on the employment of such novel terms as 'qualitas', making clear that it is his own translation for the Greek philosophical coinage *poiôtēs* (we know it to be a Platonic coinage, but Cicero does not say so here).

8. Presumably each of the qualities mentioned is a body, since the implication of the singular predications in (7) is that the body generated by the active and passive entities is itself properly called a quality of sorts, rather than the bearer of a quality. A quality, then, is a primitive body; bodies are not bearers of qualities; neither force (neither the active nor the passive entity) considered on its own is either a quality or a body.
9. [26] Some qualities are primary; each of these is simple ('*unius modi et simplicis*'). Earth, air, fire, water are listed.
10. Other qualities are derived from them; these are differentiated and multiform. Plants and animals of various kinds ('*formae*') are listed. The observation that the derivative qualities are *variae* and multiform may refer to the fact that plant as a genus and animal as a genus have multiple species ranged under them (dandelions, oak trees; rabbits, elephants). Alternatively, it may refer to the internal variety and differentiation within each species (dandelions and rabbits are pretty complex internally compared to the simplicity and uniformity of earth, air, fire, water). In favour of the former option is the occurrence of *formae*, which seems to refer to species, right after *multiformes*. It would be nice if the root *form-* had the same sense in both cases. In favour of the latter is the fact that the simplicity of the primary qualities is clearly a matter of internal structure and that the initial assertion of variety among derived qualities seems to be set in contrast to this feature of the primary qualities. Of course, both senses of 'multiform' could be intended. Both are certainly applicable.
11. Primary qualities/bodies are called principles ('*initia*') and elements ('*elementa*'). These terms are meant to be equivalent to each other and seem to represent the Greek *archai* and *stoicheia*. It follows from this that the active and passive entities are not regarded as principles (*archai*) by Antiochus. If his physics is based on a basic dualism, it is not a dualism of principles but rather of more fundamental active and passive entities. According to Diog. Laert. 7.134, the Stoics described the active and passive factors (*to poioun, to paschon*) as *archai*.
12. Air and fire (which are primary qualities) have the force (or capacity, '*vis*') to move things or act on them. Earth and water are described as the remaining parts (presumably of the cosmos) and have the capacity ('*vis*' again) to receive (what?) and to be acted upon. Brittain here translates *vis* as 'function' and Sedley says 'power'. The important question is whether *vis* should be understood similarly here and in (2) above. I suspect the answer should be 'no', since the pre-elemental forces ('*vis*') above seem to be completely subsumed in the quality/bodies which

they underlie and seem not to be differentiated in any way beyond the one being active and the other passive. At the present level of analysis, the forces must differ among the four elements (or at least between the active pair and the passive pair). This higher-level differentiation could, of course, be the product of features of or facts about the underlying forces (the active force being somehow more dominant in one pair of elements compared with the other). But it must be stressed that no feature of Cicero's text actually suggests this. The relationship of this *vis* to (18) below is also in question.

13. Aristotle's belief that there was a fifth type of body/quality ('quantum genus'), distinct from these four and the source of celestial bodies and minds is mentioned. Presumably it too is a product of the active and passive entities. It is not endorsed as part of the Old Academic theory.
14. [27] The 'certain kind of matter' mentioned in (3) is reintroduced and described as not having any form ('species') or quality (presumably quality is still equivalent to body) of the sort just mentioned.⁴⁷ This may just mean that it is not yet (either analytically or temporally) combined with the active force so that neither is a body yet, but the focus here is emphatically on the standing of the passive entity. Yet the phrasing here ('materiam quandam . . . carentem qualitate') suggests that the quality itself is the active force and that both the raw material and the shaping agent could be specified independently (as was not the case with the two entities introduced above). This non-bodily or non-quality matter is that out of which everything is shaped and produced. The idea that this *materia quaedam* is made into something by being *shaped* ('exprimere') is new here, though anticipated by *ingere* and *formare* at *Ac.* 1.6. (Brittain does not pick up on the new force of this term.) Above, mention is only made of its being acted upon.
15. This 'certain kind of matter' taken as a whole can receive ('accipere', the term used of earth and water in (12) above) everything and can change utterly.
16. This makes it susceptible of perishing – but not of perishing into nothing, but rather of passing away into its parts. The reason for this way of perishing is given forcefully: the way this kind of matter perishes is explained by the fact that nature contains no indivisible minima. However, *that* it perishes at all seems rather to be explained by the fact that this kind of matter can receive everything and can change in all respects ('omnibus modis').

⁴⁷ This seems to be the force of 'illa' in 'carentem omni illa qualitate'.

17. Moved objects are moved in intervals which are subject to infinite division.
18. [28] The force ('vis') termed 'quality' (presumably in (12) above), which seems to be the force found in air and fire, moves as described in (17) and moreover moves in this way 'back and forth'. As a result, matter itself as a whole (as mentioned in (15)) is thoroughly changed, again as described in (15), and thus qualified things are produced.
19. These qualified things are what makes up the single unified cosmos in nature as a whole. There is no leftover matter and no bodies outside this cosmos.
20. Everything *in* the world is a *part of* it and the whole is held together by a sentient and rational nature, which is eternal because it is the strongest thing there is.
21. [29] This 'nature' which holds things together is a force ('vis'), the mind of the world, perfect wisdom, a god. It is not clear which *vis* of those above (if any) this is equivalent to. At Diog. Laert. 7.134 the Stoic active principle is called the *logos* in it, that is, god.
22. This nature or force is also providence that governs celestial and (in the terrestrial realm) even human affairs.
23. It is also called 'necessity' because nothing can come about otherwise than as it decides. There is a kind of fated and immutable sequence in its eternal ordering of events.
24. It is also called 'chance' for epistemic reasons (what people cannot foresee they regard as matters of chance).

The main problem in interpreting this theory as set out here is the unclarity of its presentation of the various forces ('vis') involved. There are three possibly distinct levels: *vis* is used for one of the two primal entities; it is used of the more active pair of the four elements; and it is used of the globally cohesive nature identified with god towards the end of the passage. Cicero's account allows the relationship of these 'forces' to remain unclear. One would hope that in the original Antiochean theory these relationships were more clearly distinguished, but we in fact have no way of telling whether his theory achieved this level of clarity or, if it did, *how* it resolved these uncertainties. It would seem presumptuous to force a definite interpretation on the text by interpreting it on the assumption either that it retails Stoic theory (which it in many respects resembles)⁴⁸

⁴⁸ A few points of comparison and contrast with Diog. Laert. 7.134 are mentioned above, but a systematic treatment of all possible similarities to Stoic theory (including the question of whether the back-and-forth movement, 'ultro citroque', of *Ac.* 1.28 is like the Stoic *tonikē kinēsis*) is not possible here.

or that it represents an early Academic theory which we would at any rate have to reconstruct on independent grounds if it were to help us with interpreting this text.

Let us consider another aspect of this frustrating text. Whatever standing Varro's account of physics has, it undeniably has a large number of features in common with Stoic physics as preserved for us in other sources. It is marked, however, by absence of the most characteristic feature of Stoic foundational physics, the emphatic claim that only bodies can interact causally, a doctrine which is later picked out as a key Stoic innovation at 1.39 (see above). On the other hand, as an Academic theory (and many features tie it to the Academy, such as the references to *formae* and *species*, which Cicero elsewhere uses to describe Platonic Forms, and use of a literal translation of the Platonic coinage *poiōtēs*), it seems to lack one feature that one might expect to see emphasized more heavily, an emphasis (whether the basic principles are two or three in number) on the claim that the most fundamental causal factor in the system (what I have called the active entity) is incorporeal rather than bodily. The absence of a clear hierarchy here (the two entities seem at first sight to be strikingly parallel in their ontological standing: in 1.24 neither can be what it is without the other) should attract our attention. Both primal entities seem to be pre-corporeal in just the same way, although one is active and the other receptive. What is produced by the interaction of these two entities is 'corpus et quasi qualitatem'. Antiochus' version of Academic physics is importantly non-hierarchical. In what sense can it still be thought of as 'Platonic'?⁴⁹

Yet, as Sedley emphasizes in his lengthy discussion of this passage, there are many features of this account which are found in Platonic dialogues and in other evidence we have for early Academic physical theory. The primary features of this doctrinal summary which he thinks go back to the early Academy include its reliance on a two-principle foundation – often thought to be distinctively Stoic but also found, according to Sedley, in a Theophrastan interpretation of Plato's doctrine, as reported by Simplicius (fr. 230 FHS&G).⁵⁰ If this report is reliable evidence for Theophrastus' views (and Simplicius normally reports this early Peripatetic accurately), he held that Plato's *archai* (in physics, presumably) were two in number: the

⁴⁹ I am setting aside the issues raised by the summaries of Platonist doctrine at Diog. Laert. 3.69 and 3.75–6 (two *archai* and two basic causes respectively), since their relationship to Stoicism is rendered uncertain by Diogenes' late date (the doctrine in Diog. Laert. 3 could itself have been influenced by Stoic theories). At any rate, they are not in my view appropriate evidence for Antiochus' views and can best be seen as indications of an unidentifiable and effectively undatable Platonic interpretation of the *Timaeus*.

⁵⁰ Sedley 2002a: 42–6.

material substrate, which he called *to pandeches* (he is interpreting *Ti.* 51a–b), and the cause and mover which Plato connected to god (presumably the demiurge) and the good. This interpretation of the *Timaeus* by Aristotle's associate and successor has the effect of conflating the demiurge and his aim (the good, which is treated by Simplicius himself as a final cause, *telos*, distinct from the active cause, *to poioun*).

Though it is possible that some subtleties in Theophrastus' interpretation of Plato's physical principles may have been blurred, it is reasonably clear that Plato's *Timaeus* was interpreted along the same lines as the physical *doxai* of earlier *phusikoi*⁵¹ and that it was taken to be advancing a two-principle theory of fundamental physics. As Sedley emphasizes, it is striking that Antiochus is the next proponent of this kind of theory – though whether he would have called his basic entities *archai* as Theophrastus did is left unclear by the rather murky account in Cicero, in which the two basic entities are clearly not designated as principles (*archai*) and the items labelled as principles are clearly posterior to the two basic entities. And in advancing a two-‘principle’ theory of this general sort, Antiochus is purporting (according, as always, to Varro) to give us a general account of the unified early Academic doctrine (recall the plural ‘dicebant’ at *Ac.* 1.24, for example) which they developed on the basis of the ‘threefold theory of philosophy inherited from Plato’.⁵² In view of the well-documented tendency of Antiochus to incorporate Peripatetic physical theories as part of his understanding of the early Academy, it is tempting to think of Peripatetic influence here too. If in his grand overview of earlier physical theories Theophrastus argued (no doubt against some of Plato's closer followers) that Plato's physics rested on two principles (god conjoined with the good on the one hand and ultimately malleable matter on the other) and if a similar theory was advanced by Stoics (with god and qualityless matter being the two basic principles), it would be very much in line with Antiochus' inclinations to embrace this as ‘the’ interpretation of Plato and the early Academy. This interpretation might not have been the most obvious reading of the *Timaeus*; indeed, it may not have suggested itself at all if not for the way Theophrastus interpreted the *Timaeus* in the context of his grand historical sweep of early physical theories and for the seductive, apparently confirmatory parallel found in Stoic theory.⁵³

⁵¹ The quotation from Theophrastus begins τούτοις ἐπιγενόμενος Πλάτων (fr. 230), which suggests that he saw the *Timaeus* as continuing the same project as that pursued by the earlier natural philosophers; according to Theophrastus, though he dealt mostly with first philosophy Plato also devoted himself to περὶ φύσεως ἱστορίαι.

⁵² ‘iam accepta a Platone philosophandi ratio triplex’ (*Ac.* 1.19, trans. Brittain).

⁵³ The relationship of early Stoic theory to the *Timaeus* is a matter for separate investigation.

Sedley's analysis⁵⁴ led him to the suggestion that the Theophrastan report points to a particular moment in the history of the early Academy, Polemo's reaction to Xenocrates. Given how little we know of either Platonist's theory one might well have doubts about this. The Theophrastan report, after all, converges with other indications that Antiochus leant towards a more Peripatetic-looking interpretation of early Academic physical doctrines. Given our ignorance not just about the works of early Academics, but also about what Antiochus knew about those works, it is probably impossible to be certain about what else, besides Theophrastan and Stoic precedents, inclined Antiochus to advance the views that he did. It is tempting to squeeze as much information as possible out of Cicero's reports, and to support this attempt Sedley offers further considerations to solidify our confidence that what we see in Varro's speech represents Antiochus' representation of the real Polemo. The most important of these comes from Aëtius (1.7.29 = Stobaeus 1.1.29), who attributes to Polemo the claim that god is the cosmos. I am less confident than Sedley that this one sentence (whose credibility must ultimately be judged by the company it keeps in its doxographical context) is enough to justify attribution to Polemo's Academy of the kind of interest in physics otherwise attested for his predecessor Xenocrates and for Crantor. Sedley quite rightly notes that our evidence supports the view that 'the *Timaeus* was intensively studied . . . in the era of Polemo's headship' rather than that it was studied by Polemo himself.⁵⁵ Still, given the slender basis of our knowledge of this exact moment in Academic history it is difficult to disprove the *possibility* at least that Polemo really did have extensive physical theories. It would certainly have been more convincing if we had more evidence that anyone else in antiquity knew and cared about his efforts in this field, but on a topic where virtually all available evidence is circumstantial there is something rather mean-spirited about demanding more favourable circumstances to support one's case.

Unless we go further with Sedley than I think is reasonable in the hypothetical reconstruction of early Academic physics, then the most we can do is to make a few general observations about Antiochus' theory as presented by Varro and to urge that we keep an open mind about the

⁵⁴ Sedley 2002a: 67–77.

⁵⁵ Sedley 2002a: 48. Charles Brittain has pointed out to me that Proclus' information about Crantor's engagement with the *Timaeus* suggests pretty strongly that Polemo himself did not say anything interesting about that dialogue – at least nothing that Proclus could find out about. See too the remarks in Frede 2005: 218. The blurry ascription to the Polemonian Academy needs to be broken down in rather more detail.

ultimate origins of that theory. As the summary outline above indicates, there are many features of the Old Academic theory presented by Varro which are highly reminiscent of Stoicism (the rough parity of two basic principles, the emphasis on *vis*, which I assume renders the Greek *dunamis*, the close linkage of body and quality); other features are common to the Stoics and at least some versions of Platonism (e.g. four basic elements, rejection or omission of the fifth element, infinite divisibility, possibly the doctrine of divine providence) or indeed to Stoicism, Platonism and Aristotle taken together (such as the teleological approach to nature); others seem clearly Platonic (such as the use of familiar language for forms – ‘forma’ and ‘species’ – and the translation of the Platonic coinage *poiotēs*); and one feature, at least, the two-principle theory which Theophrastus found in Plato’s *Timaeus*, is common to Peripatetic and Stoic theory and not otherwise attested for members of Plato’s own school in the early period.

Whatever the details (and it is quite difficult to be confident about many of them) it still seems that what we see in Antiochus’ physical theory is a mixture: on some points the early Stoics will have learned from the Academy, while on others Antiochus felt justified in projecting some feature of early Stoic physics onto the Academics whose physics he may have known relatively poorly. It is tempting, of course, to assume that Antiochus was well informed about early Academic theory, and that assumption certainly facilitates reconstruction of earlier theory. But our direct evidence for Antiochus, for what it is worth, does not indicate that he had particularly good access to early Academic philosophical works.⁵⁶

If we consider the possibility that Antiochus might not have been ideally informed about early Academic philosophy, then it is tempting to return to the picture of Antiochus in relation to his history sketched by Barnes in *Philosophia Togata*. Perhaps Antiochus did present an Old Academic philosophy that was a blend of authentic early Platonism and his own best guess about what that distant past ‘must have’ been like. No doubt Antiochus has too often been despised for a lack of originality and the kind of refashioning of his own tradition which renders him less useful to us in our modern endeavour to uncover reliable historical truths. But

⁵⁶ We do not know very much about which early Platonist texts on physics were available to Antiochus in the early decades of the first century BCE. Two hundred years is a long time in the history of philosophy. Perhaps a proper appreciation of the first century BCE demands an independent survey of the evidence about availability of early Academic books in Athens, Alexandria, Rhodes and Rome. There seems to be no reason to doubt that any text of Plato we possess was available then, but the same does not apply to the works of minor Academics any more than it does to the treatises of Aristotle.

creative reappropriation of one's own dimly recalled tradition is not such a bad thing and we should be ready to appreciate it for what it was: no mean accomplishment. And if we find it difficult to distinguish what he learned about the early Academy from reliable sources and what he had to supply in good faith from the Peripatetics or from Stoicism, that should not be surprising.

In considering the intractable question of what sources for the early Academy Antiochus may have had, let us consider briefly one further feature of Sedley's reconstruction. Much of the similarity of Stoicism to early Platonism is explained, it seems, if the source for Antiochus' theory is Polemo (or that shadowy entity, the Polemonian Academy, though not Crantor and not Xenocrates). Yet in Cicero's account, our best source for Antiochus' physics, his spokesman Varro, does not report that Antiochus attributed the *development* of this theory to Polemo. Rather, even as Sedley presents it, Antiochus' notion was that Polemo was a *transmitter* of the views (especially in ethics plus, at most, the human part of physics) of his predecessors to Zeno. And no particular mention is at any point made of Polemo in connection with what I am calling general physics. According to Varro, the source for Antiochus' theory was in fact the generic early Academy rather than any particular philosopher taking up any particular position in an interesting philosophical debate about Plato's legacy or how to handle it. The fact that nothing in our Ciceronian evidence suggests that Polemo was a source for views on Academic physics ought to encourage us to be quite open-minded about how creative Antiochus would have needed to be in developing his views on physics and the range of philosophical inspirations he may have felt inclined to draw on. This strengthens the appeal of Barnes's suggestion that *if* we situate ourselves in Antiochus' own place and time then we might find his creative reappropriation of the tradition to be a merit rather than a sign of intellectual dishonesty. And if (as seems to be generally agreed) Antiochus really does not care all that much about general physics then it is all the more understandable that he should fill in the gaps of his knowledge of early Academic physics with materials from Peripatetic interpretations of Plato and from Stoicism, a school which he sincerely and probably correctly thought owed a great deal to the Academy anyway.

But in conclusion, we should perhaps focus instead on the need to form an understanding of the intellectual life of the first century BCE, on the relatively rare and charitable assumption that it is a period genuinely worth close and careful study in its own right. From *this* point of view (one too seldom adopted), what should we make of Antiochean physics?

I think that if one puts the issue in those terms, different questions arise than have normally come to the fore. Antiochus portrays himself as a revivalist, a champion of the *archaioi* over the less grand johnny-come-lately innovators. To do so he makes a range of claims about their views, some of them clearly integrating later epistemological developments into his account of the authentic early Academy, some of them quite plausible in broad outline (as in the case of ethics) and some of them (in physics) quite a bit harder to get clear about. The broad strategy he pursued seems to be captured nicely by Barnes – philosophically respectable and intellectually defensible syncretism. What stands out as being most important in the present context is a set of questions about the *impact* of his philosophical work. Limiting ourselves for now to physics, we can set aside the question of how historically true Antiochus' account is and ask instead whether there is any indication that anyone in the first centuries BCE or CE challenged the soundness of Antiochus' version of early Academic physics, or that anyone made a point of rejecting it? Did Platonists, Stoics, or others learn anything from Antiochus? If they did, did they learn from him *because* they regarded him as an authority for the early Academy? Or because he was an authority in his own right? Or (as seems actually to be the case) is there really no reason to think that anyone beyond Cicero, perhaps Varro, and maybe a few others who have left no trace, reacted to his work in physics at all? Sadly, there seems to be very little direct evidence on the question.

How, finally, should we assess the significance of Antiochus' physical theory? It certainly seems to have left very few traces in later antiquity and if it made an important contribution to the tradition of Platonic thought that is both surprising and a fact about which explicit sources are silent. So either (a) Antiochus portrayed early Academic physics in an historically accurate way or (b) he did not. If his account was historically accurate, either (a-1) his sources were available to others in later antiquity or (a-2) they were not. If (a-1) his sources were available to others, then the original sources would surely be preferable. Later silence about Antiochus makes sense – why pursue the *rivuli* when the *fontes* are available? But if (a-2) his sources were not available (or lay unused owing to sloth or ignorance) then the failure to draw on his work explicitly is baffling, for in that case Antiochus' account (which *we* know only second-hand from Cicero's version of his oral or written teaching) would have been of signal importance in later antiquity. Silence about Antiochus suggests that this was not the case. So we may tentatively rule out (a-2). The silence is explicable, then, either because (b) he was in fact later understood to be a syncretist, doing something important in his own place and time (hence

Cicero's interest) but pretty pointless when the philosophical agenda of the day had moved on, or because (a-1) the availability of Antiochus' own sources made him redundant.

Choosing between (a-1) and (b) is not easy. Either way, we learn quite a bit about the first century BCE; and if (b) is closer to the truth then we learn, perhaps, that evidence for the early Academy was scarce for everyone, not just for Cicero, and we also gain an appreciative understanding for yet another instance of the creative task of reinvention which philosophers engaged with their own history have always undertaken.

Antiochus' metaphysics

G. R. Boys-Stones

I

Speaking of the capacity innately possessed by members of natural kinds to preserve themselves as such, Antiochus' spokesman Piso says this in Cicero, *Fin.* 5.33:

I agree with those who think that they are all governed by nature (*haec omnia regi natura*), though I'll allow anyone who disagrees with this to think what they like: in their case, when I talk about 'human nature', they can take me to be saying 'a human', it makes no difference.

It makes no difference, that is, to the ethical discussion in hand. But it makes a difference in metaphysics. This passage gives us, in fact, one thing we can say with reasonable certainty about Antiochus' metaphysical views: that he did not believe in the ontological priority of individuals. In contrast to those who thought that a word like 'human' represented no more than a universal, a concept which generalizes over individual men, Antiochus thought that it named a certain nature, that is, the nature of the species, man. (The context makes clear that the same goes, *mutatis mutandis*, for every animal and plant.) But what, we want to know, is 'nature' (species-nature and nature in general)? How does it come to be constituted in such a way that it preserves the individuals that fall within its purview (the immediate objects, namely, of 'physics')?¹ There is general

I would like to record my debt, in revising this paper for publication, to the participants in the 2007 Cambridge conference, but especially to comments (encouraging and otherwise) from Charles Brittain, Ingo Gildenhard, Brad Inwood and David Sedley.

¹ The primary evidence in this area includes Cicero's *testimonia* through various Antiochean mouth-pieces (Varro in *Ac.* 1; Lucullus in the *Lucullus*; Piso in *Fin.* 5), and information on views held by Antiochus' pupil Varro (esp. material on the gods in *De agricultura* 1.5; *De lingua Latina* 5 [x] 57ff.; also Augustine's report of Varro's views at *De civ. D.* 6; 7.6, 7.28). My discussion also considers Cicero, *Orat.* 8–10, 101, and *Tusc.* 1.57–8, often assumed to be based on Antiochus. More speculative identifications of his influence (which I do not address directly) include: Cicero, *Off.* 1.15; 3.69 (see Long 1995: 46); *Leg.* 2 (see Theiler 1930: 47–8); *Fin.* 4.42 (see Görler 1990: 131); *PVindob* 29800

agreement that Antiochus' answers to these questions must lie in one of two broad directions: either he took a more or less 'Stoicizing' view of the matter and argued that nature is constituted by an immanent deity; or else he developed what I shall call (without prejudice to the question of what Plato actually thought) a 'Platonizing' metaphysics, one which relied on the use of transcendent 'Forms' for the purpose.² The latter view is undoubtedly the more romantic, in so far as it bolsters Antiochus' image as founding father of the Platonist revival which played such an important role in the post-Hellenistic era. It is also, I shall argue, quite likely to be wrong.

II

The single most important text for the 'Platonizing' view of Antiochus' metaphysics is a passage of Cicero's *Academica* (1.30–2) whose principal concern is actually the question of epistemology. Varro, Cicero's spokesman for Antiochus in this work, is here describing the view he believes was held in common by members of the early Academy:

The criterion of truth is not found in the senses, though it arises from the senses. They thought that the mind was the judge of things, and reckoned that it alone was fit to be believed, since it alone could perceive what was always simple, unambiguous and self-qualifying. (Their word for it,³ a word which Plato had used in this sense, was *idea*: we can say 'Form'.) (Cic. *Ac.* 1.30)

Advocates of the 'Platonizing' view of Antiochus argue that this passage is very straightforward evidence that Antiochus ascribed to Plato and the early Academy (and therefore held himself) a 'two-world' view of reality, encompassing on the one hand the shifting, perceptible realm of nature and on the other the stable, intelligible realm of transcendent 'Forms' on which it relies for its ontological underpinning. Unfortunately, things are not nearly so straightforward as they assume.

I do not want to quibble with the inference from the account of philosophical history here put in Varro's mouth to the views held by Antiochus himself. In the absence of any explicit indication that Antiochus objected

(see Luck 1953: 24); Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.141–4 (see Sedley in this volume). For a useful survey of earlier bibliography relating to Antiochus' metaphysics, see Fladerer 1996: 101–6.

² Somewhere in between lie those who see an Aristotelian bent to Antiochus: cf. e.g. Donini 1982: 75, and further references in n. 17 below.

³ On the construal of 'hanc' here, cf. Inwood, p. 202 above.

to the views described, the inference seems perfectly reasonable.⁴ The problem is rather with the assumption that what is described in this passage is a two-world view of reality in the first place. True, there is a clear evocation of Plato's *Timaeus* in what Varro says,⁵ and his appeal to Plato's theory of Forms is quite explicit. But to assume that Varro understood Plato to be presenting a two-world view of things in the *Timaeus*, or to be talking about 'Forms' as transcendent entities, is simply unwarranted. It may look to us like the 'natural' reading of Plato, but that could be because of exegetical suppositions that we have no right to assume we hold in common with Antiochus. For example, one school of modern Platonic scholarship sees the doctrine of transcendence as a distortion introduced by the Neoplatonic tradition.⁶ Whether it is a distortion or not, it is certainly the case that Varro and, more to the point, those to whom Varro's speech is addressed have no comparable exegetical tradition in their immediate background. The dominant 'live', mainstream tradition of interpreting the dialogue with which they would have been familiar was, precisely, the Stoic tradition, and we should rather assume that an unqualified reference to the *Timaeus* at this time would be Stoicizing in its assumptions.⁷ It is testimony to the fact that Cicero's own translation of the *Timaeus*, albeit post-Antiochean in date, non-Stoic in authorship and written by someone who elsewhere shows that he knows a theory of transcendent Forms, gives Plato no scope for the interest in transcendence that much modern exegesis thinks axiomatic.⁸ If Varro's account of the *Timaeus* really did assume transcendent Forms, it is very surprising that he failed to make this explicit.

But what about the way that Varro zooms in on the word *idea*? Surely this signals an anti-Stoicizing bent to his interpretation? Again, and for similar reasons: no. To us (that is, to most modern readers) the word itself is closely associated with the notion of transcendence. But a first-century reader of Antiochus would have been just as familiar with what the Stoics had made of the word. And the Stoics did not assume that the word was inalienably associated with transcendence: instead, they thought of it

⁴ It will become apparent below that there are those who do doubt it, in favour of the view that Antiochus embraced the metaphysical innovations of Aristotle. It will also become apparent why I do not agree with them.

⁵ Cf. David Sedley in this volume. ⁶ An example is Rowe 2007 (esp. chs. 6–9).

⁷ On the Stoic reception of the *Timaeus*, see esp. Reydam-Schils 1999. (The Stoics, by the way, were not consciously 'remodelling' Plato, but evidently believed that he was in agreement with them: see esp. SVF 3 Antipater fr. 56.) This is not to be blind to the possibility (a) that people might have distinguished Plato's own thought from his reception; or (b) that Varro's speech is addressed to people who knew interpretations of the *Timaeus* (perhaps Pythagorean interpretations) that are largely lost to us. But nothing about the *Academica* invites us to consider either possibility.

⁸ Cf. esp. Lévy 2003: 100–4. For transcendent Forms in Cicero, see *Tusc.* 1.57–8, discussed below.

as the word used by pre-Stoic philosophers to refer to a certain sort of mental entity – concepts, in particular universal concepts.⁹ What is more, this meaning happens to fit the immediate context perfectly. Remember that *Ac.* 1.30–2 is Varro's discussion of epistemology in the early Academy, not metaphysics, and that what is ascribed to Plato here is *only* the view that there are objects of thought ('Forms') which are not at the same time objects of perception, and which are perfectly stable.¹⁰ Those are conditions adequately satisfied by concepts.¹¹ If we further consider that Varro has shortly before this passage affirmed his explicit belief in the principles (a) that 'nothing exists that is not somewhere', and (b) that *being somewhere* in turn requires materiality (*Ac.* 1.24),¹² the imperative to posit a 'realm' other than the sensible realm for these concepts to be concepts *of* loses much of its appeal.¹³

In the face of all this, it might seem extraordinary that a 'Platonizing' reading of *Ac.* 1.30–2 could ever have taken hold in the first place. One of the reasons it did has to do with something that Varro goes on to say later, at *Ac.* 1.33 (sometimes actually identified by commentators as the really decisive text).¹⁴ For, given the right assumptions (or what I shall argue are,

⁹ See *SVF* 1.65, 2.360, 2.365. A famous passage of Syrianus (*On Aristotle's Metaphysics* 105.19–106.13 Kroll, encompassing *SVF* 1.494, 2.364, 3 Archedemus 13) shows that the meaning of the term 'idea' was the subject of lively theoretical debate and discussion throughout the Hellenistic school and beyond.

¹⁰ It might be objected that the phrase 'semper esset' implies the sempiternity of form, and hence its independence of any individual human mind. But this does not establish that Forms are not concepts (let alone that they are transcendent). Concepts too may be sempiternal if, for example, they are guaranteed as 'natural' concepts by the sempiternal intention of god (consistently with the position I shall be arguing for below). Note, in any case, that Cicero's translation of the *Timaeus* at this point also has 'semper' ('quod unum atque idem semper est') – though transcendence is not in his mind (see above with n. 8).

¹¹ Cf. Bonazzi in this volume, pp. 323–4; Görler 1990: 129–31.

¹² Compare, most pertinently, Eudorus *ap.* Simplicius, *In Cat.* 206.10–15 Kalbfleisch: 'Every substance – that is, *perceptible* substance – exists in some place and at some time'. Reid points out that Varro's claim can be taken as an echo of something that Plato says in the *Timaeus*, and the *Timaeus* nevertheless finds room for transcendent Forms (Reid 1885: 125, with reference to *Ti.* 52b). But Plato may be taken to be saying that the 'receptacle' is needed as a place for created entities, not that it is the only kind of 'place' there is (cf. Kahn 1966: 258–9). In any case, there is no ground for confusion in Plato, as there would be in Antiochus, since Plato at the same time explicitly affirms a contrast between the Forms on the one hand and the receptacle and its contents on the other. (Reid himself in fact goes on immediately to argue that Antiochus was indeed a materialist; cf. also Reydam-Schils 1999: 129–32.)

¹³ There is, that is to say, no reason why these things should not be *of* the sensible world – even if *individual* sense objects cannot be objects of knowledge. In support of the 'two-world' reading of this passage, Sedley translates the phrase 'hanc omnem partem rerum', applied at *Ac.* 1.31 to the objects of sense perception, as 'this entire realm' (see p. 84). To my ears, the phrase rather implies that objects of sense perception are a *subset* of the very same ontological 'realm' as the mental objects distinguished from them.

¹⁴ E.g. Donini 1979: 276 ('passo decisivo'); Karamanolis 2006: 61.

in fact, precisely the wrong assumptions), it can look as if Varro himself licenses a metaphysical understanding of the 'Forms' introduced in 1.30. Moving on from a description of the philosophical system established in the first generation of the Academy to the modifications ('immutations') made to it by Plato's successors, this is what Varro says of Aristotle in particular:

Aristotle was the first to destabilize those Forms which I mentioned a little earlier (*species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit*), which Plato had taken to heart so passionately as to say that there was something divine in them.¹⁵

The usual reading of this passage approaches it in the following way. Aristotle is here accused of attacking ('destabilizing': 'labefactavit') Plato's Forms in some way, but we know from our own reading of Aristotle that he attacked Plato's Forms above all for being removed from the realm of nature where their effects were supposed to be felt (esp. e.g. *Metaph.* Z8).¹⁶ For his own part, Aristotle avoided the problem by substituting 'forms' which were immanent in the natural world. Since Aristotle's forms in all other respects are fairly similar to those of Plato (they are for example unchanging, and grasped by the mind rather than the senses), the conclusion must be that it is the issue of transcendence that Varro has in mind. His thought would be that, while Plato, and indeed the early Academy as a whole, believed in transcendent Forms, Aristotle overturned the theory in favour of immanent forms.¹⁷

The obvious flaw in a reading such as this, it seems to me, lies in its failure to explain why Varro has suddenly become interested in the issue of transcendence. For whether or not the 'Forms' ascribed to Plato back in *Ac.* 1.30–2 were transcendent, it was not their transcendence that was

¹⁵ This last clause has often been taken in itself as evidence that Varro has transcendent Forms in mind for Plato here. Karamanolis, for example, infers from it a specific reference to 'the Form of the Good . . . which was often taken to be Plato's God' (2006, 61). But in its strained circumlocution, Varro very precisely and carefully *avoids* saying that Plato believed Forms to be divine (let alone gods, or God). Indeed, it looks to me more as if he is explaining (almost *apologizing for*) the language of divinity used by Plato in a way that would hardly be necessary if he thought it literally meant: it is, he suggests, just Platonic hyperbole, a manner of speaking (note 'diceret') which reflects Plato's enthusiasm, not the nature of its object.

¹⁶ Reid 1885 ad loc., suggests *Eth. Nic.* 1.4; Dörrie 1987: 480 hints (in his use of the word *μυθῶδες*) at *Metaph.* 991a22 (κενολογεῖν . . . καὶ μεταφορᾶς λέγειν ποιητικᾶς). Brittain 2006a, ad loc. (100 n. 35) gives *Eth. Nic.* 1.6, *Metaph.* A9, and the lost *On Ideas*.

¹⁷ The argument over the degree to which Antiochus is Platonizing turns, on this basis, on whether the 'tone' of the passage implies criticism of Aristotle (cf. Reid 1885: 141 ad loc.; Theiler 1939; Merlan 1967: 54; cf. Dörrie 1987: 480; Görler 1990: 133 n. 27) or ironical distance from Plato and the adoption of a roughly Aristotelian metaphysics (cf. Witt 1937: 57–8; Barnes 1989: 95; cf. Dillon 1977: 92–3 n. 1). The best argument that Varro is criticizing Aristotle here is surely the fact that Theophrastus 'shattered more violently' ('vehementius fregit') the authority of the early Academy (*Ac.* 1.33). The clear implication is that Aristotle had shattered it too: cf. e.g. Donini 1979: 277.

the immediate point at issue on anyone's account: the immediate issue was epistemological.¹⁸ This means that Varro has business worrying about the immanence of Aristotle's forms in this context only if he can establish that their immanence affects their ability to act as guarantors of knowledge – yet he makes no attempt to do so. Since the link is far from self-evident,¹⁹ this means that one of two things must be true. Either Varro has wandered from the point, and his back-reference is simply misleading; or this way of taking the passage misreads his reference to Aristotle. My view is that it misreads the reference. In fact, it is worse than that: it misreads the Latin in which it is couched.

Aristotle, we are told in *Ac.* 1.33, 'labefactavit' the Forms ascribed to Plato back in 1.31. On the conventional understanding of the passage (the one that makes it about the transcendence of those Forms), this is taken to mean either that Aristotle 'eliminated' Plato's Forms, wiped them, so to speak, off the philosophical map; or else that he 'undermined' them, but in the sense that what he actually 'undermined' was *their credibility*.²⁰ The trouble is that the verb 'labefactare' does not mean 'eliminate'. Indeed, it is typically *distinguished from* the idea of complete eradication.²¹ Nor is the word used to mean 'undermine the credibility of something'. One can 'labefactare' definitions: Arcesilaus tries this at *Lucullus* 16 (where the point is not that their credibility is called into question, but that they become unsuitable foundation stones for the erection of doctrinal structures);²² and one can 'labefactare' belief claims (for example, the belief that F is true of

¹⁸ In this context it is important to note that 'Forms' are conspicuously absent from the detailed account of Antiochus' physics at *Ac.* 1.24–9.

¹⁹ Varro could hardly have *believed* that the link did not need spelling out, given the primary thematization of epistemological issues in the *Academica*. If he did, he was mistaken: there could be no serious debate now over whether Varro is on Aristotle's side or not (cf. again n. 17) if it were a trivial inference from Aristotelian immanence to the impossibility (or, conversely, to the possibility) of knowledge.

²⁰ E.g. Merlan 1967: 54 ('weakened') (cf. Long 1974: 227; Donini 1979: 283); Dörrie 1987: 480 ('zum Einsturz gebracht'; 'erschüttert'); Barnes 1989: 95 ('exploded'). Rackham and Brittain in their respective translations have 'undermined' (so too Gersh 1986: 132; Dillon 1977: 92–3 n. 1). Sedley 2002a: 62 glosses as 'abandoned'. It has been suggested to me that we should take our cue for the meaning of 'labefactare' from the evident connection of thought between this passage and the 'vehementius fregit (auctoritatem)' of 1.33 (cf. n. 17 above). But while I readily concede that we can use this later passage to infer an attack on the tradition from 'species labefactavit', it brings us no closer to knowing what this subversive act of labefaction consisted in. (If I write a letter to *The Times*, and someone else does *even more* to bring down the government, nothing follows about the meaning of the verb 'to write'.)

²¹ Just for example, compare Cic. *Har. resp.* 6.8 ('etenim ut P. ille Scipio natus mihi videtur ad interitum exitiumque Carthagini, qui illam a multis imperatoribus obsessam, oppugnatam, labefactam, paene captam aliquando quasi fatali adventu solus evertit . . .'); or *Fam.* 5.13.2 ('quae cogitatio, cum mihi non omnino excidisset, etenim penitus insecderat, vi tamen tempestatum et concursu calamitatum erat aliquantum labefactata atque convulsa').

²² See esp. *Lucullus* 16.

x): by doing so one makes them uncertain.²³ But there is no parallel for the idea that one can *labefactare* an object (some *x*) as a way of casting doubt on *beliefs concerning* that object.

It would be too bold to say that there could not be such a usage as this, but since the present passage is contested it also seems to me unreasonable to assume that this is the one place where we find it – unreasonable, at least, where there is a more natural alternative. For ‘Aristoteles species quas paulo ante dixi labefactavit’ already means something quite straightforward: Aristotle made the Forms unstable. In other words, the clause does not naturally suggest that Aristotle *cast doubt on* Plato’s theory of Forms, but that he somehow *made Plato’s Forms into unstable entities*. The idea might be, for example, that Aristotle took on the theory of Forms himself but made alterations to it such that, where the forms used to be stable, they were now unstable entities.

There is an obvious objection to this way of taking the passage, but before I address it, let me review what it has in its favour. First of all, it brings the use of ‘labefactare’ in *Ac.* 1.33 into line with uses of the verb elsewhere. Secondly, it produces a meaning which makes sense of Aristotle’s attack being against the Forms *as these are described* in *Ac.* 1.31 (‘quas paulo ante dixi’). Those Forms were unchanging (‘unius modi et tale quale esset’); Aristotle’s are, on the contrary, unstable. Finally, this reading has in its favour the fact that it is directly relevant to the *epistemological* context in which the Forms were introduced. The conventional reading places all of the emphasis of the passage on the supposed shift from Platonic transcendence to Aristotelian immanence, a shift which is of purely metaphysical interest, of no immediate epistemological relevance. On my reading, there is a metaphysical point too, of course (Aristotle is committed to the existence of ‘unstable Forms’), but it is justified here by a transparent epistemological pay-off. Since Varro established that it was precisely the *stability* of Plato’s Forms that made them available as objects of knowledge, it follows trivially that Aristotle’s forms, being unstable versions of Plato’s, are no longer available as objects of knowledge. Aristotle’s innovation, in other words, is worth mentioning precisely for its epistemological implications.

There is, in fact, only one possible objection I can see to this way of taking *Ac.* 1.33. It makes Varro (sc. Antiochus) say that Aristotelian forms are unstable: surely such a gross misrepresentation of Aristotle’s theory is too much to saddle him with?

²³ Indicative examples: Cic. *Clu.* 6 (also 57: a legal judgement); *Div.* 1.8.

The answer to this is simple. It might strike *us* as a misrepresentation of Aristotle to say that his forms were 'unstable', but there is very good evidence that critics of Antiochus' period thought that they were.²⁴ The reason for this has to do with the way in which Aristotelians themselves had come to understand Aristotle's theory.²⁵ There was a strong tradition within Peripatetic metaphysics which took it that 'forms' depended on individuals rather than vice versa – for example that forms were identical with, or epiphenomena of, the physical structures of individuals. But if so, then one can see how, as a matter of reasonable polemical inference, these forms could be thought of as subject to change – when the individuals themselves underwent change, or anyway change due to extrinsic causes. The idea is nicely illustrated in an argument preserved by Nemesius, which spells out the implications for species definition if we apply such a view to the soul (the soul being understood, of course, as form in the case of things alive).²⁶ Suppose, he says, that we identify the soul with bodily 'temperament' (i.e. the precise mixture of humours that make up the physical constitution of a creature):

If the soul is a temperament, and temperaments change according to age, season and diet, then the soul changes. And if it changes, we do not have the same soul but, according to the temperament, sometimes that of a lion, sometimes that of a sheep, sometimes that of something else. Which is absurd.

The sort of view satirised here is perhaps best known to us from Alexander (late second to early third century CE),²⁷ but it had become a widely accepted interpretation of Aristotle much earlier, and Andronicus and Boethus, in particular, attest its acceptance in mainstream Aristotelianism

²⁴ A little later on, anti-Aristotelian Platonists were able to argue that Aristotle's failure to adopt Platonic (*sc.* transcendent) Forms must commit Aristotle, willy nilly, to forms which were subject to change: cf. esp. Lucius and Nicostratus (T5 Gioè and T12 Gioè respectively), who attacked Aristotle's *Categories* on the grounds that, if it is not to be taken as ignoring Platonic Forms, then what it does in effect is confuse them with sensible substances. Lucius and Nicostratus do not pretend that it is a consequence Aristotle would endorse, but they can argue that he runs the risk of making Forms subjects of (the categories of) suffering and relativity. But the relevance to Antiochus of this way of reading Aristotle would depend, of course, on whether one thought that Antiochus himself held a theory of transcendent Forms – and that is precisely the question at issue.

²⁵ Note, then, that in *Ac.* 1.33 Aristotle was only the 'first' ('primus') to 'labefactare' the Forms. Whatever we have Antiochus attribute to him had better be something that Antiochus could plausibly attribute to others following in his wake.

²⁶ *De natura hominis* 2.24.21–4 Morani. There is an analogue to this argument in Galen: see *On Seed* 2.1.40–2, IV 603.10–15 Kühn.

²⁷ Tweedale 1984 argues against a strictly conceptualist reading of Alexander's universals; but even he stops short of according them the full ontological priority that Aristotle's critics might demand.

of the first century BCE.²⁸ It is, in fact, not only credible but perhaps even natural to think that Antiochus (and, just as importantly for us, his Ciceronian avatar 'Varro') would have read Aristotle in this way.²⁹ And it certainly lends point to the choice of the word 'labefactare'. Varro has already told us that the objects of sense perception, as opposed to the 'Forms', are unstable – 'laberentur' (*Ac.* 1.31). When he says, shortly thereafter, that Forms are 'made unstable' – *labe-factavit* – this might be exactly the way to tell us that they have been subordinated to perceptible entities.³⁰

III

The case for Antiochus' subscription to a two-world metaphysics, or even for his ascription of such a metaphysics to Plato, turns out to lack the explicit support of Cicero's *Academica*, which, as I have argued, rather leans on the natural assumptions of contemporary readers that the 'Forms' Varro there ascribes to Plato are the sort of mental concepts familiar from Stoicism (and previous Stoicizing readings of Plato). In this light, it is worth revisiting some further Ciceronian texts which have sometimes been brought into

²⁸ For Boethus: Dexippus, *In Cat.* 45.12–31 Busse; Simpl. *In Cat.* 78.4–20 Kalbfleisch; Syrianus, *In Metaph.* 106.5–7 Kroll. The ascription of the view to others – going right back to the first generation of Aristotle's school – can reasonably be inferred from their position on the soul (for the reason given above, that soul is understood as form in the case of living things). See, then, Dicaearchus, frs. 14–28 Mirhady (= 7–12 Wehrli); Aristoxenus, frs. 119–20 Wehrli; also Strato, fr. 118 Wehrli; Andronicus (Galen, *QAM* IV 782.15–783.3 Kühn); Nicolaus of Damascus (Stob. 1.353.12–354.18 Wachsmuth); Alexander, *On the Soul*. (For discussion: Gottschalk 1986 and, more generally, Caston 1997.) The position is explicitly attributed to Aristotle by at least one commentator who is not himself a Peripatetic: Galen, at *QAM* IV 791.6–798.6 Kühn.

²⁹ Which works of Aristotle might Antiochus have had in mind? An obvious possibility might seem to be that Antiochus read the *Categories* in much the same way as Lucius and Nicostratus read it (cf. n. 24 above); and, as it happens, we know that Antiochus' renegade pupil Aristo commented on the *Categories* (Simpl. *In Cat.* 159.32 Kalbfleisch). But if one thinks of Antiochus in more or less Stoic terms, it seems unlikely, for Stoics we know of (including Cornutus and Athenodorus) read the *Categories* as a work dealing with language, not metaphysics (cf. Gottschalk 1987: 1103). A more attractive possibility is that Antiochus had Aristotle's biological works in mind. After all, this is where Galen goes to argue for a non-teleological Aristotle (*QAM* IV 791.6–798.6 Kühn); and it so happens that we are told, in a context reviewing Peripatetic physics in general, that Antiochus associated the study of biology quite specifically with Aristotle (Cic. *Fin.* 5.10: 'persecutus est Aristoteles animantium omnium ortus, victus, figuras'). *Ac.* 1.33 is, by the way, the only direct evidence for Antiochus' acquaintance with Aristotle's metaphysical thought (the only evidence for Cicero's acquaintance with it too): see Madvig 1869: 844–5; also Görler 1989, Long 1995, and Barnes 1997: esp. 14–15, 46–7 (with n. 185 for further bibliography).

³⁰ It is possible that the pun replicates something familiar to Cicero from a Greek source. Plutarch uses the word κινεῖν when describing Aristotle's attack on Plato's theory (*adv. Colotem* 1115B): according to him, then, Aristotle 'removes' the Forms – or is that he 'sets them in motion'? (Out of interest, the only text we have in which we know that the word 'labefactare' is rendering a Greek word is Cicero's translation of *Ti.* 33a, where, at 17.3, it renders λύει, used of 'loosening' the component parts of bodies.)

the picture as ancillary evidence for Antiochus on Forms: *Orator* 8–10 and 101; and *Tusc.* 1.57–8. Neither actually names him, but the idea is that, if we are predisposed to suppose that Antiochus believed in transcendent Forms (of the sort we would think of as Platonic), then it might be reasonable to see his presence as a source behind them. At *Orator* 8–10, Cicero talks about a Form of beauty, residing in the mind, which is much more beautiful than any sensible beauty could be; in *Orator* 101 he speaks of 'eloquence itself', visible to the mind not the senses; and at *Tusc.* 1.57–8, Cicero reports Plato's theory of recollection as a theory dealing with the memory of 'Forms' seen by the soul while it was not enclosed in a body.

Although these texts are commonly taken together, one of the things to be said straight away about them is that they actually rely on rather different theories about the relationship between Forms and the mind.³¹ In the *Tusculans* we are told that the soul can access Forms only when it is released from the body, and the suggestion seems to be that they, therefore, exist outside the mind, which is hindered from viewing them by the body. But in the *Orator* there is no hint that the 'Forms' referred to have any existence outside the mind of the individual whatsoever. *Orator* 8–10, in fact, is clear that we have to look inside ourselves to find the Form of the beautiful: 'in mente insidebat species pulchritudinis'. It might be possible to make the argument that the Forms *also* exist outside the mind, being accessible to us only when, by some means, they have entered it.³² But that would be an elaborate and question-begging reconstruction of the evidence here. What is more, the choice of 'eloquence' as an example of a 'Form' in *Orator* 101 only increases the sense that Cicero is really thinking of Forms as concepts, or mental abstractions – not as distinct or ontologically prior entities at all.

As far as Antiochus is concerned, one implication at least should be obvious: he is not behind both the *Orator* and the *Tusculans*.³³ But I would venture a further claim as well. If we had to choose, it seems to me even *less* likely that the *Tusculans* provides evidence for anything that Antiochus said than the *Orator*. The reason for this is that it is possible to think of at least two alternative and, arguably, more plausible sources

³¹ Pace Gersh 1986: 149–51, who reconstructs a single theory (which he attributes as such to Cicero, but with some Antiochean influence) from these passages along with *Ac.* 1.30–2.

³² Cf. perhaps Long 1995: 48–9.

³³ If he is behind both, then the fact does us no good for a reconstruction of his views. Conceivably, for example, Antiochus changed his mind (cf. Sedley in this volume); or conceivably one text draws on his own views, the other on his report of Plato. But when we remember that the only thing that would license us to speculate that he lay behind either text in the first place was similarity with views we already had reason to ascribe to him, such additional speculation becomes an exercise in futility.

for the *Tusculans*. First of all, the *Tusculans* passage is part of a sceptic's survey of opinions on the soul, so if one wanted a source for Cicero at this point at all, it would surely be more natural to suppose that he drew on a sceptical source.³⁴ Secondly, the fact that the discussion in the *Tusculans* relies very specifically on the *Meno* makes it easy to think that Plato himself is Cicero's source here.³⁵ One might suppose that it is the less direct, less precise generalizations of the *Orator* passages that are more likely to come indirectly through the reports of others.³⁶

To summarize, then, the evidence for a two-world metaphysics in Antiochus is, if anything, more elusive outside the *Academica*, where he is not named, than in it, where he is: (i) Antiochus cannot lie behind all other unattributed discussions of 'Forms' in Cicero; (ii) if he is behind any at all, those in the *Orator* probably have the most plausible claim; but (iii) if he is behind the *Orator*'s theory of Forms, the information adds nothing new, since it is consistent with the 'Stoicizing' account of *Ac.* 1.30–2 proposed above, according to which Forms are no more than mental constructs.

IV

If I am right, then the one new thing we can say for certain about Antiochus is that he could not have thought of himself as following Aristotle in his metaphysics. This is not just for the reason often alleged (his tone in discussing Aristotle at *Ac.* 1.33: cf. n. 17 above), but because Antiochus needs something prior to individuals in virtue of which they can be said to have a certain nature (*Fin.* 5.33). Epiphenomenal forms (which are posterior to individuals) are not adequate to this task, and (as it appears from *Ac.* 1.33) Antiochus associates forms like this with Aristotle. Furthermore, if my reading of the *Academica* evidence is correct, there turns out to be no one in our evidence for Antiochus' history of philosophy who supplies him with the idea of immanent forms – that is, immanent forms of the sort that *we* ascribe to Aristotle. In this case, there is no reason at all to believe that Antiochus' metaphysics included immanent forms of this sort. Finally, I have argued that there is nothing in the evidence for Antiochus which gives any hint at all that he believed in the existence of transcendent entities of any kind (or, indeed, that he believed that any of his predecessors believed in such a thing). His commitment to materialism, that is, to the

³⁴ In any case, the fact that Cicero is straining for a diversity of views will explain why he develops the theme of the immaterial here when he shows no real attraction towards it elsewhere.

³⁵ Cf. Long 1995: 46.

³⁶ Though cf. Fladerer 1996: 130, arguing that both passages reflect Cicero's own reading of Plato.

view that everything that exists is bound up with matter (evidenced at *Ac.* 1.24), makes it impossible for him to have thought of the Forms *or* god as transcendent entities.³⁷

All of these considerations make a more or less Stoicizing interpretation of Antiochus' metaphysics increasingly hard to avoid – at least in the sense that any questions that fall under this heading will be answered by entities which form part of the world they shape.³⁸ In fact, there seems to me just one final move that could be made to save something that looks a little bit more like Platonism for Antiochus (even if not like Plato as we normally understand him). While conceding that the force which governs and determines nature is immanent, we might yet suppose that its own constitution conforms to a roughly 'Platonizing' view of the divine mind. We could, for example, speculate that this immanent force (for which compare *Ac.* 1.28–9) is a mind *constituted* by 'Forms', in such a way that these Forms can be considered determinative of all that might exist and all that might be thought.³⁹ This would represent a subtle but significant difference from the Stoics, for whom the thoughts god has are *posterior* to his substance (something Varro himself tells us, at *Ac.* 1.36).⁴⁰ Depending, again, on the details, this could have significant knock-on effects elsewhere in Antiochus' system. In epistemology, just for example (and however one takes *Ac.* 1.30–2), there might be scope to say that the thoughts that

³⁷ Anyone who wishes to pursue the possibility that Antiochus was committed to the existence of transcendent Forms, if those Forms are imagined as substances independent of god's mind as well as the natural world, should further consider what role they would play in his system. They would not be the answer to the question I opened with – what it is that governs nature and secures the identity of natural individuals (*Fin.* 5.33). Autonomous Forms, if they existed, would be merely paradigmatic in their relationship to nature: they would be what the divine mind looks to when it creates and governs the natural world (cf. *Ac.* 1.28–9), not themselves part of what does the creating or governing. Nor could one plead that they 'govern' in a looser sense, for example by acting as the immediate reference points for the identity of natural individuals. The immediate reference points for the identity of individuals in the realm of god's government will be the thoughts god has when he thinks about Forms, not the Forms themselves. One could, perhaps, posit such Forms under the understanding that god needs them in order to have the creative thoughts that constitute his mind. But now the hypothesis has become that there exist in Antiochus' system entities for which there is no positive evidence, which are homonyms of at least one class of different entities for which there is evidence, and which blatantly contradict Antiochus' commitment to materialism (evidenced at *Ac.* 1.24). One would have to ask at this point whether the hypothesis was worth the money.

³⁸ It is also relevant in this context that the historical Varro was happy to associate his 'naturalized' view of the gods with that of Zeno (*Ling.* 5 [x] 57ff., esp. 59; cf. also *De agricultura* 1.5; and *ap. August. De civ. D.* 6; 7.6).

³⁹ Cf. Fladerer 1996: 112–14 (to be read with Inwood's commentary in this volume, pp. 200–2).

⁴⁰ One could appeal, then, to the fact that Varro, *ap. August. De civ. D.* 7.6, talked of a god as 'world soul' ('anima mundi'); though the temptation to hear a distinctively Platonic ring in the phrase should be tempered by the occurrence of the phrase in Stoic texts as well: cf. *SVF* 2.635, 2.1076; Cornutus, ch. 2.

constitute the divine mind are directly accessible to human cognition, and so the ultimate guarantors of knowledge (as transcendent Forms are in later Platonism).

The trouble, in the end, is that this speculation has no support other than, once again, prejudice – namely the prejudice that Antiochus fails to accommodate Plato if he does not accommodate Plato as ‘we’ generally read him. There is, it is true, also no counter-evidence that one would characterize as decisive; but at least there is *some* counter-evidence that stands, as it were, on its own feet. One thing to consider is that the ‘Platonizing’ view I have just outlined has some affinity with a view ascribed by Varro to Aristotle, who, he says, introduced his ‘fifth element’ precisely to provide a distinctive material substance out of which one could suppose the mind was constituted (*Ac.* 1.26, 1.39). In saying this, he could be taken to imply that no one else in the early Academy had considered the possibility that thinking was a quality essential to the substance of mind. If that is right, then he did not view this as something Plato believed after all.⁴¹ What is more, Varro (*Ac.* 1.36) appears to reject this view, and to reject it in favour of the Stoic view which (as I also noted above) quite explicitly makes the substance of god *prior* to any thoughts he might have. This, anyway, is another of what Varro characterizes as Zeno’s ‘corrections’ of the original system. If we take that word (‘correction’) seriously, as I am inclined to do, we are bound to align Antiochus with Zeno on this question too.⁴²

V

I conclude, then, that there is every reason to think, and no concrete reason to doubt, that Antiochus was as closely aligned with Stoicism in his metaphysics as it was possible for him to be. But that still leaves one small problem: it is not altogether clear what the Stoics themselves thought. In particular, we do not know with any certainty or in any great detail, precisely how the Stoics themselves organized their view of god as the guarantor of nature – for example, how they squared the fact that

⁴¹ Remember that Antiochus thinks that only what has material substance exists; so it would not help the ‘Platonizing’ interpretation to suggest that the accent is on Aristotle’s provision of a material, as opposed to a non-material, substance for the mind.

⁴² I disagree with Bonazzi’s view (this volume pp. 313–14) that *correctio* does not, all things being equal, convey a positive sense. In fact it seems to me generally to bear its etymological sense of ‘straightening out’ (and so ‘getting right’; contrast the more neutral ‘immutationes’ of *Ac.* 1.33); and where the text gives us nothing else to steer by, it would be foolhardy to let go of this rudder without definite reason.

they were, formally, nominalists with the fact that they talked freely, and normatively, about 'nature' in general, and 'human nature' in particular (just as Piso does in *Fin.* 5.33). But if I am going to claim that Antiochus 'Stoicized' in his metaphysics, I need to be able to show at least that the evidence for the Stoics could be interpreted in a way that would serve the needs of Antiochus as well. I end, then, with a brief reflection on this.

One thing that we can be sure of for the Stoics is that 'forms', at least in the sense of natural patterns, are not *given* in the mind of the Stoic god – for example, constitutive of it. The reason for this is that the Stoic world is a nominalist world: everything is, in the technical sense, *sui generis*, and not the instantiation of some prior exemplar. (In any case, as we have seen, Zeno said that thoughts were not part of god's substance: *Ac.* 1.39.)⁴³ So if the Stoics (like Antiochus) found it meaningful to talk about 'human nature' as something that is shared by individual humans, and by which every human can be judged, the explanation must be that god has, to whatever extent, common intentions for the individual humans he creates. In general, it should be no surprise that god does not create piecemeal: we know that he plans the cosmos as a well-ordered system. It is true that most of our texts, more interested in the idea of divine planning, focus on the systematic nature of the world at the level of species.⁴⁴ But since the created world (*sc.* the *diakosmēsis*, *Diog. Laert.* 7.137) is finite in extent and governed by strict laws of causality, we can be sure that, in god's mind, this means a well-ordered system of individuals first and foremost.⁴⁵

If all of this is a reasonably safe assumption, then it seems to me that the easiest way in which the Stoics could find themselves talking about natural 'kinds' is to suppose that god was aware of – and intended – the distribution of commonalities between individuals that we find among groups that

⁴³ I would go further than this and say that all of god's thoughts must be posterior dispositions of the matter which constitutes god – matter which, in itself, is said to be lacking in any determination or quality. Quite how god acquires determinate thoughts is one of the things left unclear in our evidence: I assume, in the absence of any counter-indication, that it happens through some sort of empirical process at least analogous to the process of cognitive development in human beings. The generation of cognitive activity through primitive self-awareness, discussed at some length by Hierocles in the *Elements of Ethics*, may provide the apposite model: god's thinking begins in his immediate awareness of his own capacities for action.

⁴⁴ E.g. Cic. *Nat. D.* 2.99: 'quae vero et quam varia genera bestiarum vel cicurum vel ferarum!' etc.

⁴⁵ Cosmological arguments in systems which posit a creator who cannot have individuals in mind (whether for metaphysical or epistemological reasons) have to appeal to the orderliness of creation at a generic level: of 'nature' conceived as a system of species, for example. But the Stoic god is able to know each individual and everything that will happen in the world he creates, which is why the orderliness of the world principally embraces individuals as such. (From this perspective, the theories of fate and recurrence turn out to play an important role in making coherent the Stoic commitment to nominalism and teleology.)

we call 'kinds' or 'species'. (Presumably this distribution is part of the artful design by which he guarantees orderliness among individuals.) In other words, natural 'kinds' or 'species' *are* properly considered universals, generalizations over sets of individuals, but licensed in a special way, namely by the fact that they correspond to god's intentions for the groups of individuals they cover. When we talk, for example, about 'human nature' (cf. *Fin.* 5.33), we will mean whatever it is that god intended to be true of every human being. And it is in this sense that these universals can be natural, and indeed normative: that the Stoics can be nominalists and yet think that individuals are governed by a natural order. Strictly speaking, it is the *thought* corresponding to each concrete individual that has priority with respect to nature (including god's plan for 'nature'). The created individuals inherit their ontological uniqueness from this fact (they are not merely instances of a general rule) – though at the same time they are realized within, and governed by, the system as a whole, that is, by nature.⁴⁶

There may be some direct support for the account I have just outlined in a curious view ascribed to Chrysippus (never, as far as I know, adequately explained) in Proclus' commentary on Euclid. This is what Proclus says (starting with the lemma):⁴⁷

Parallelograms on the same base, and drawn between the same parallels, are equal to one another [Euclid, *Elements* I prop. 35] . . . Geminus says that Chrysippus likened theorems like this to the Forms (ταῖς ἰδέαις). For just as Forms encompass the generation of an unlimited number of things within limited boundaries, so these theorems encompass the generation of an unlimited number of figures in limited spaces and demonstrate their equality through the definition. For one can imagine an infinite number of parallelograms on the same base, and with the same height, and it shows that they are all equal.

The emphasis here on carefully circumscribed generation (γένεσις) as a something enabled by 'Forms' could well make one think of the task facing the Stoic god, who has to craft an orderly world system, one which turns out to involve a limited number of species-groupings into which individuals fall but has to do this without benefit of real essences. In fact, he does not need real essences after all, any more than Euclid needs such things to bring about new parallelograms. God can create any number of ontologically discrete individuals while ensuring that they fall into orderly groups

⁴⁶ It might be appropriate to think of these thoughts, in so far as they are the creative principles underlying nature, as the *logoi spermatikoi*: cf. Calcidius 294 (p. 296.11–16 Waszink) with Long 1974: 228; Sharples 1989: 233; Dillon 1977: 95.

⁴⁷ Proclus, *Commentary on the First Book of Euclid's Elements* 394.8–10 (lemma) + 395.13–21 Friedlein = SVF 2.365.

(of 'equals') simply by endowing them with appropriate common traits. Just as Euclid's theorem *shows* or *expresses* the 'equality' of parallelograms of a given base-length and height – not itself having determined either measurement – so the 'Form' will be what shows or expresses (but does not determine) the 'nature' shared by members of such groups.

Incidentally, if this is right, then it would be evidence that the understanding of Forms as 'thoughts of god' (sometimes ascribed to Antiochus: see below) was not an innovation of the post-Hellenistic Platonist movement, as is often thought;⁴⁸ but it has its roots in Stoic thought about the question of divine epistemology bequeathed to them by Plato.⁴⁹

VI

At *Lucullus* 85, Antiochus⁵⁰ is reported to believe the Stoic view (it is characterized as such) that 'everything is *sui generis*: nothing is the same as any other thing' ('omnia dicis sui generis esse, nihil esse idem quod sit aliud'). A deflationary reading of this passage would have it say no more than that Antiochus, like the Stoics, thought that no two things are qualitatively identical. But it could be intended to make the stronger claim that Antiochus, like the Stoics, was actually a nominalist: everything is in a class of its own.⁵¹ If that is right, then we would have the same task as we

⁴⁸ E.g. Rich 1954. The assumption tends to burden the question of who introduced later antiquity to the formula with the whole weight of the search for the origins of the Platonist revival. See, just for example: Boyancé 1955: 78; Kristeller 1989; Tarrant 2000: 67 (Antiochus); Witt 1930: 198, de Vogel 1954 (Posidonius); Radice 1991 (Philo of Alexandria). (I say 'later antiquity', because many people, no doubt rightly, see more or less explicit precedents in the early Academy: e.g. de Vogel 1954: 119; Witt 1937: 71; Donini 1982: 76; Dillon 1993: 94–5; 2003: 120–1. Kristeller 1989: 13 is a determined exception.)

⁴⁹ The suggestion has been made also by de Vogel 1954: 120; and Reydam-Schils 2006. Corroborative evidence includes Seneca, *Ep.* 65.7 (on which cf. Boys-Stones forthcoming); and (more obliquely) the fact that later on the Stoics share with Platonists the use of the image of Athene's birth from the head of Zeus to represent the relationship of god to his thoughts (explicitly, for Platonists, Ideas). (This is all the more striking since the Stoics do not believe that thought has its seat or origin in the head.) See Chrysippus (*SVF* 2.908–11); Diogenes of Babylon (*SVF* 3 Diogenes 33: aether at the outermost part of the cosmos; note the parallel with Varro's Minerva, located 'supra . . . caelum' at August. *De civ. D.* 7.28); Cornutus (20, 35.6–36.1 Lang). Philo gestures to the connection between the Athene myth and the 'Forms' when, in a passage premised on the very Stoic notion that there is a single cause to the cosmos, he says: 'Forms are derived without a mother from God alone' (*Questions and Answers on Genesis* 4.160). Cf. also Justin, *1 Apol.* 64.5 = *SVF* 2.1097 (mocking those – Stoics? – who represent the *logos* according to which the world was made as Athene). All of this might be the relevant background for Augustine's report that Varro identified Athene (Minerva) with 'Forms' (see again *De civ. D.* 7.28). The ultimate basis for the connection will presumably be Plato, *Cra.* 407a–c. See further, Blank, this volume, pp. 272–9.

⁵⁰ To be accurate, this is what Lucullus, as spokesman for Antiochus in the book, is reported to believe by Cicero's character 'Cicero'.

⁵¹ Cf. Görler 1990: 131, who offers a more oblique argument for nominalism in Antiochus.

have with the Stoics in explaining how he squared this with the strongly normative view of nature we saw at the beginning of the chapter. But even if it is not (and the passage is too weak to build an argument on, or I should have introduced it earlier), it seems to me that Antiochus has everything he would need if he adopted the view I have ascribed to the Stoics that the causal guarantors of the stability of things were thoughts generated by the creator intellect – a view which he could have taken to be derived by them from Plato and the early Academy. What is more, if this is right, it is likely that he understood these thoughts to be what Plato had in mind when he talked about the ‘paradigm’ used by god in creation (*Ti.* 28ab), so that he would after all subscribe to the formula so often associated with him, according to which *Forms are the thoughts of god*.⁵² But the formula would not mean quite what it comes to mean for Platonists later on: and what makes it likely more than anything that he adopted it is what will make it less interesting than ‘Platonizing’ commentators assume: it is that this too was inherited through the Stoics.

⁵² See Varro *ap.* August. *De civ. D.* 7.28 with e.g. Theiler 1930: 15–40; Boyancé 1955: 78; Donini 1982: 76; Sharples 1989: 233; Dillon 1977: 95 n. 1. Karamanolis 2006: 63 is a surprising exception (he thinks that the formula implies a greater concession to the Stoics than he is prepared to allow).

CHAPTER II

The neutralizing argument: Carneades, Antiochus, Cicero

Malcolm Schofield

CARNEADES ARBITER

At the very end of the *Tusculan Disputations* Cicero has some final words to say on the proposition book 5 has been debating: the thesis that virtue is sufficient for a life of happiness. After an extensive discussion on the Epicurean view of happiness in the latter part of the book, he returns to 'those philosophers who go back to Socrates and Plato'. These are at once divided into two camps. One says that the superiority of the goods of the soul is so great that they eclipse goods of the body and external goods. The other holds that such things are not goods at all – all goods reside in the soul. The two camps are named in the immediate sequel as the Peripatetics and the Stoics respectively (*Tusc.* 5.119–20).

A self-appointed adjudicator of the controversy is mentioned: Carneades. Cicero tells us that Carneades used to deny that the divergence in views he reports constituted a real disagreement. The Stoics agreed that whatever the Peripatetics called 'goods' were 'advantages' ('commoda'), while the Peripatetics did not attach more weight to external things such as wealth, or bodily conditions such as health, than the Stoics did. So the dispute was over words ('verba'), not things ('res') (*Tusc.* 5.120).

Some readers have hardly been able to believe their eyes at this point.¹ (1) Is not the neutralizing view of the argument between Peripatetics and Stoics one that Cicero mentions elsewhere and regularly ascribes to Antiochus, not Carneades (*Leg.* 1.54–5; *Ac.* 1.37; *Fin.* 5.22; *Nat. D.* 1.16)? (2) Why is Carneades suddenly and belatedly wheeled in at this late stage in the dialogue? (3) Moreover, did not Carneades' famous *divisio* of the various positions that had been or could theoretically be held on the ultimate goal of life treat the Stoics and what Antiochus called 'the ancients' (i.e. early Academics and Peripatetics) as taking quite distinct stances on the matter (*Fin.* 5.16–21)?

¹ See Glucker 1988: 64 n. 81.

Let me try to put these doubts to rest. To begin with (1), the *Tusculans* 5 passage is not the only evidence we have that Carneades really did habitually argue ('solebat . . . iudicare') that there was no substantial difference between Stoic and Peripatetic positions (no talk, naturally, of the 'Old Academy', which is Antiochus-speak). We have been told the same thing already in the Stoic book 3 of *De finibus* ('pugnare non destitit', *Fin.* 3.41). John Gucker, it is true, finds that statement, too, hard to credit: 'Why, in *Fin.* 3.41, do we have this crucial "judgment of Carneades" only referred to in passing?'² To Gucker's complaint there is a simple reply. The reference to Carneades at this point in *De finibus* 3 is no incidental remark. It is in fact strategically placed at the start of the third and last main instalment of Cato's exposition of Stoic ethics.

After an intervention from Cicero, Cato now for the first time refers to controversy about the Stoic system: the great debate ('magna contentio') about what count as goods, and whether all of them contribute to happiness. The Peripatetics' defence of their line on this was, he says, rather flabby ('mollius'): they did not know how to do dialectic. It was the Academic Carneades, 'with his quite extraordinarily successful training in dialectic and consummate eloquence', who 'brought the matter to a real head'. Carneades' claim that the difference between Stoics and Peripatetics is merely verbal is duly reported, only then to be rebutted by Cato over the next three paragraphs (*Fin.* 3.42–4). Naturally enough, Cato is not represented as having any interest in explaining the basis for the claim at length. He acknowledges just that it is a serious charge, which he can then use as a launching pad for his own development of the opposite case. Yet it is important for him to emphasize that the point at issue is one only a sharp and accomplished dialectician was capable of raising. The mention of the great Carneades is precisely fit for purpose.

(2) Carneades' late introduction into the argument of book 5 of the *Tusculans* is similarly to be explained in terms of the overall structure of the book. The first and longer part of the book is devoted to a critique of the Peripatetic position, a position explicitly identified early on as that of Antiochus (*Tusc.* 5.22), from the Stoic point of view, which is then itself expounded and advocated. Following this, in the second part Cicero takes up the challenge of showing how the sufficiency of virtue for happiness maintained by Stoicism is something consistent none the less with the theory of the Peripatetics and early Academy *too*, or as one might say, *after all* (using the liberty of enquiry he claims as the unique patrimony of the

² Gucker 1988: 64 n. 81.

sceptical Academy: *Tusc.* 5.82–3). Or rather, he reinterprets the challenge as an invitation to demonstrate that virtue is sufficient for happiness *whatever* view a philosopher takes as the goal of living. And after using a version of the *Carneadea divisio* to survey the main views on the topic of the ultimate goal, Cicero suggests that it looks as though only hedonism or positions akin to hedonism have difficulty in making the case. With that he settles into an extended and increasingly rhetorical *tour de force* designed to show that even on Epicurean premises the *wise* (if not the virtuous) person will remain happy whatever extremity of pain or misfortune he suffers.

On the last page of the book he returns (as we have noted) to ‘those philosophers who go back to Socrates and Plato’. He is now in what we might call a *fortiori* mode: if even Epicurus, who thinks virtue in and of itself has no power, accepts that the wise person will always be happy, what are philosophers of a nobler tradition to do (*Tusc.* 5.119)? That is the question which prompts the reference to Carneades’ neutralizing move. Cicero does not offer any explicit answer to it for himself, nor does he comment on the Carneadean claim. Perhaps he wants to leave us with the thought that *if* it were accepted that (as Carneades was suggesting) Peripatetics and Stoics are in truth united in making virtue the only thing really worth having, and *if* they were to acknowledge their unanimity, the nobler tradition could with a single voice utter more truth, and still more eloquently, than Epicurus (*Tusc.* 5.120).³

It should by now be obvious both why introduction of the neutralizing move is deferred to the end of book 5, and why it is ascribed here to Carneades, not Antiochus. Difference between Stoics and Peripatetics is what occupies the first and more philosophically demanding part of the argument. Neutralization of that difference becomes timely only after hedonism has had its say, and when a final reckoning is called for. Antiochus was not the man to mention at that juncture. When in other Ciceronian dialogues he is cited as propounding the view that Stoic ethics differs only in terminology from the ethics of the early Academy, he does so as a partisan of the Peripatetic line. If book 4 of *De finibus* counts as Antiochean, that is implicit in book 5 of the *Tusculans* itself (*Tusc.* 5.32). What Cicero needs at the end of the book is the voice of a major figure in philosophy who can be represented as standing above that particular fray: an arbiter not party to the controversy, helping us to see the need, if possible, to transcend it. Once again, Carneades fits the bill. And it is of course serendipitous that Academic scepticism has the final – although

³ I return to the passage at the end of the chapter: p. 248 below.

on Academic principle not authoritative – word in the entire sequence of dialogues that make up the *Tusculans*.

(3) Nor is it a difficulty that the *Carneadea divisio* recognizes that the Stoic and Peripatetic positions are formally distinct. One can allow the formal point while judging them not significantly different in their philosophical commitments – once those are teased out. Antiochus, we are told, himself liked to make use of the *divisio* (*Fin.* 5.16), but that did not inhibit him from treating the Stoic theory as in the end equivalent in all but verbal expression to the Peripatetic position to which he himself subscribed (cf. *Fin.* 5.22). That might be a tendentious view of Stoic ethics, but there is no inconsistency in maintaining it while granting at the same time that the Stoic and Peripatetic theories can be formally differentiated along the lines Carneades proposed in his *divisio*.⁴

How did Cicero know that Carneades took the neutralizing line he did on Stoic and Peripatetic ethics? Here we can only guess. But a good possibility is that the information came from nobody other than Antiochus. Subsequent to Carneades we hear of no thinker other than Antiochus who took up the idea that the Stoics differed only in terminology, not in substance, from the Peripatetics. It was the subject of a book Antiochus dedicated to Q. Lucilius Balbus, very probably in 77 or 76 BCE (*Nat. D.* 1.16). That makes it more than likely that he was discussing and lecturing on it in 79 BCE, when Cicero listened in Athens to ‘that supreme mentor and teacher’ (‘summo auctore et doctore’, *Brut.* 315), ‘the most polished and acute of all the philosophers of our time’ (*Luc.* 113). Cicero tells us in the preface to book 5 of the *Tusculans* that he engaged often in dispute with Antiochus, presumably during his stay in Athens, because he could not see how happiness can be secured by virtue unless nothing except virtue is a good (*Tusc.* 5.21–2). One can well imagine Antiochus mentioning in these conversations that the great Carneades himself had taken just the same line on the purely verbal character of the disagreement in ethics between Stoics and Peripatetics as was now being objected to by the Academic sceptic that the young Cicero seems already to have become (cf. *Inv. rhet.* 2.9–10, probably to be dated before 81 BCE).

ANTIOCHUS’ ANTI-STOICISM

We are used to thinking of Antiochus and his talk of the ‘Old Academy’ as wanting nothing to do with the outlook of the ‘New Academy’ of Arcesilaus

⁴ See further Algra 1997: 126 n. 50.

and Carneades. But in ethics it looks as though we need to tell a different story. It is theoretically possible that Antiochus viewed the *Carneadea divisio* of the possible positions philosophy could take on the goal of living as a purely dialectical resource, which thinkers of whatever persuasion could use for their own argumentative purposes.⁵ On that scenario, his own liking for it need imply no recognition, beyond that of any shared purpose in its deployment common to him and Carneades. But this theoretical possibility is not supported by the evidence. We hear from Cicero several times that Carneades used his scheme to oppose the Stoics. Thus he championed for dialectical purposes ('disserendi causa', *Fin.* 5.20) the idea that the goal is enjoying the things to which we are naturally attracted in the first instance, in order 'to oppose the Stoics' (*Luc.* 131; *Fin.* 2.42; *Tusc.* 5.84; cf. 5.83).⁶ Opposing the Stoics seems similarly to have been exactly the job to which Antiochus, too, applied his version of the scheme. What he shares with Carneades is an anti-Stoic posture.

We are used to thinking of Antiochus as to all intents and purposes a Stoic. In Cicero's famous words (*Luc.* 132): 'Though he was called an Academic, he was actually an out-and-out Stoic – or would have been with very few changes.' His epistemology was 'undoubtedly Stoic', as the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* puts it. And he made a version of Stoic *oikeiōsis* theory fundamental to his ethics. But Antiochus clearly did not think of himself as a Stoic. Part of the point of his construction of the idea of an 'Old Academy' was to insist that Stoicism was to be seen not as an independent system of thought opposed to the Academy, but like the philosophy of Aristotle, Theophrastus, Polemo and other successors of Plato, as just one version of the original Academic teaching (as Arcesilaus' and Carneades' was not, for all that they taught in the Academy itself). Zeno had introduced not 'some new system' ('novam aliquam disciplinam'), but a 'correction' of the *ratio* of the early Academy (*Ac.* 1.43; cf. 1.35).⁷ In some areas, the variations he introduced were indeed new, notably in epistemology (*Ac.* 1.41), where Antiochus was prepared to follow him. In others, as notably in ethics, Zeno did little more than retain the substance of the early Academy's views in their Peripatetic version, while introducing obfuscating new vocabulary (e.g. *Ac.* 1.37; *Fin.* 4.20–3).⁸ In ethics Antiochus thought 'the ancients' had got it right from the start. It is clear that much of the account of

⁵ For a full discussion of Cicero's various presentations of the *Carneadea divisio*, see Algra 1997.

⁶ We are also told that he used to defend Callipho's position – which made the goal a combination of pleasure with the morally honourable (e.g. *Luc.* 131, *Fin.* 5.21) – with great enthusiasm (*Luc.* 139). It is difficult to know what to make of this piece of evidence.

⁷ See further Bonazzi, this volume pp. 313–14.

⁸ See further Schofield 2002.

his Peripatetic system in book 5 of *De finibus* is primarily a reworking of earlier Peripatetic ethics.⁹ Even the decision to make *oikeiōsis* foundational to ethics is represented as the practice of the *antiqui*, albeit replicated by the Stoics (*Fin.* 5.23; cf. 4.19).¹⁰ Most of the anti-Stoic book 4 of *De finibus* is often and rightly seen as a critique of Stoic ethics from an Antiochean standpoint, whether or not it actually derives from a work of Antiochus himself.

So in ethics Antiochus was paradoxically no less anti-Stoic than Carneades. Of course, there are some major differences. Carneades did not himself commit to the non-Stoic position on the goal that he adopted as his own in the context of his *divisio* ('enjoying the things that primarily accord with nature'), whereas Antiochus certainly did hold the different non-Stoic position in the scheme to which the name of the Peripatetics (or in his own version the Old Academy) is attached: in the most intelligible formulation, 'living honourably (*honeste*) while enjoying the primary objects recommended by nature to humans' (*Luc.* 131; cf. *Fin.* 5.21) – which is palpably if subtly different in formulation from the Stoic view that the goal is 'living honourably, something which is derived from the recommendation of nature' (*Luc.* 131), or better, that it *is* 'the honourable, which consists in doing everything we can to secure the things that accord with nature, even if we don't succeed in this' (*Fin.* 5.20). More interestingly, perhaps, Carneades' anti-Stoic use of his *divisio* appears to have been a quite separate exercise from his neutralizing argument to the effect that the Stoic and Peripatetic views on the good can, when further examined, be seen to differ only in terminology, not in substance. By contrast, when Antiochus employed the *divisio*, he combined it with the neutralizing argument.

At any rate, the exposition of the *divisio* in Antiochus' version is followed by a brief indication of how positions other than that of the Peripatetics and Academics must be rejected, concluding with the statement (*Fin.* 5.22): 'There remain the Stoics, who borrowed everything from the Peripatetics and Academics and reached the same conclusions using different terminology.' And at the very end of the long exposition of the ethical system of the 'ancients' which follows, the Antiochean spokesman Piso offers some final comments which constitute a partial reprise of the *divisio*, with some concluding remarks on the Stoics designed to echo the words I have just quoted. Piso begins them like this (5.74): 'There remain the Stoics. They have transferred not one or other small part of our philosophy over to

⁹ This is well argued by Georgia Tsouni in this volume and more fully in her 2010 Cambridge Ph.D. thesis 'Antiochus and Peripatetic Ethics'.

¹⁰ See further Schofield, this volume pp. 178–9.

themselves, but the whole of it.' How was what is then represented as pure theft effected? As one can see from the *divisio*, the Stoic position *looks* different from that of the Peripatetics. But that is only because 'the Stoics have changed the names for the actual things in order to treat our views as their own' (5.74).

Precisely how Antiochus would have argued that the Stoic formula for the goal of life collapsed in reality into that of the 'ancients' is not made explicit in these passages. One might guess that the core of the Stoic position was taken to be the idea that the morally honourable is all that really matters (note the version of the *divisio* at *Fin.* 2.35: on the Stoic view the goal consists wholly 'in the appropriate, that is, in what is morally honourable'). Then it would have been observed that the Stoics' reference in their formulation to 'the things that accord with nature', albeit as merely 'preferred', not 'good', represents what is *de facto* a weakening of that position. Zeno, says the Antiochean critique of Stoic ethics in book 4 of *De finibus*, in language which anticipates the terminology of Carneades' arbitration at *Tusc.* 5.120, 'began to admit that it is more advantageous (*commodius*) to the wise person, that is, the supremely happy person, if he also has those things which he does not dare to call "good", but allows to be "suited to nature"' (*Fin.* 4.56). This is just 'playing with words' (4.56). Once Zeno makes his crucial admission, the Antiochean will claim that his position is in fact exactly the same as that of the ancients (4.57): 'He spoke differently from everyone but thought the same. Nor in fact did he set any lower value on the things he denied were good than did those who asserted that they were good. So what on earth was his purpose in changing the labels?'

CICERO'S STANCE

Did the neutralizing argument represent Cicero's own considered stance on these issues? Answering that question requires the telling of a thoroughly tangled tale.

The first appearance in Cicero's writings of the topic of the difference between the ethics of Zeno and of the Old Academy is in book 1 of *De legibus*, probably to be dated to about 51 BCE. Cicero has there already aligned himself with the Old Academy, the Peripatetics and the Stoics on the question of whether anything which is not praiseworthy in and of itself can be reckoned a good, or at any rate a great good (*Leg.* 1.37–8). But he returns a little later to discussion of the difference of view on the matter between Zeno and the Old Academy. Though the issue of whether

virtue is the only good or not looks at first sight like a point involving *dissensio* 'on the whole philosophy of human life', Antiochus was right to hold that the disagreement is really about words ('verba'), not substance ('res') (*Leg.* 1.54–5). In fact in mentioning Zeno back at *Leg.* 1.38, Cicero had said nothing specific about Stoicism other than to assert already that it had changed the vocabulary of the Old Academy without altering the substance.

The Antiochean position Cicero takes on the matter here cannot be explained or explained away by proposing (with Glucker and Steinmetz)¹¹ that *De legibus* belongs to a phase in his philosophical thinking when he had abandoned scepticism and was prepared to make more positive philosophical commitments without the qualifications characteristic of the New Academy. In an important and influential article of 1995, Woldemar Görler demonstrated convincingly that the *De legibus*, like the *De oratore* of 55 BCE, contains clear indications that Cicero does take care to introduce the characteristic talk of the Academic sceptic in these dialogues.¹² The crucial passage in *De legibus* comes at 1.36. Here Cicero explains to Atticus that in devoting a special section of his discussion of law to showing that justice is something natural, he is following systematic philosophers who have 'built workshops, so to speak, for the production of wisdom'. To which Atticus makes the wry comment: 'Obviously you have lost your freedom of speech (*libertas dicendi*); or perhaps you are not the sort to follow your own judgement (*iudicium*) in debate, but rather to yield to the authority of others.' The buzz expressions of Academic scepticism as Cicero understood it (cf. e.g. *Div.* 2.150) – 'suum iudicium', 'libertas', 'nulla auctoritate adhibita' – are all sounded here: pointlessly, if he was not wanting to signal that he professes to be an Academic.

He then gives himself an interesting reply to Atticus. He does not always yield to authority, he says (meaning, presumably: almost never). But this is a disquisition with a *political* object: to put backbone into commonwealths ('res publicae'), to make cities secure, to cure the diseases of peoples. So Cicero will look for carefully considered principles that have commended themselves ('probari') to those who set a high valuation on what is morally praiseworthy: in other words, the philosophical schools listed above (*Leg.* 1.37). He will not look for a contribution from the self-indulgent Epicureans, nor from the Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades, who throw all these things into thorough confusion – although he would like to have the Academy on board and does not in any event dare to

¹¹ See Glucker 1988, Steinmetz 1989.

¹² See Görler 1995.

exclude it from discussion (*Leg.* 1.39). In other words, Cicero is taking a break from scepticism for the purpose in hand, and undeniably distancing himself from it in no uncertain terms. He begs it not to speak – while registering that since they are *philosophizing*, albeit for the public good, not for private understanding, scepticism must retain the right to do so. That is to say (I take it), he retains the right as an Academic to ask sceptical questions, even though he will not exercise it. As for his attraction in this context to the neutralizing move, the motivation must at least in part be that it suits his agenda for political philosophy.¹³

When next we encounter Antiochus and Antiochean ethics in Cicero's writings, sceptical questions are the order of the day. In the ethics section of his reply to the Antiochean Lucullus in the *Lucullus*, he decides to take the line that the whole question of the supreme good, and with it the entire issue of how we should live our lives, is up in the air, because there is such radical disagreement between the Stoics and the Old Academy. There is no hint now of Antiochus' view that the disagreement was no more than apparent, due simply to Zeno's innovations in vocabulary. Instead Antiochus is portrayed as embarrassed by the need to try to agree with both camps, but ending up having to equivocate: virtue alone brings happiness – but not the *happiest* of lives. At the end of an economical and allusive but particularly vigorous representation of the kinds of debate typical in the ethics of these schools, Cicero claims for his part that he is dragged in different directions: now one view seems to him more deserving of approval ('probabilius'), now the other. Yet unless it is one or the other, he is clear that he thinks virtue lies prostrate (*Luc.* 132–4).¹⁴

It starts to look as though the view Cicero takes on the neutralizing argument on any one occasion turns on the differing – perfectly serious – argumentative concerns that are preoccupying him at the moment: in *De legibus* construction of a political philosophy, in the *Lucullus* scepticism's need or duty to emphasize philosophical disagreement and its ethical consequences – with the 'confusion' *De legibus* associated with the Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades duly materializing. The *De legibus* and *Lucullus* passages do have one thing in common: the idea that if the question of the good is not settled by philosophy, human life – whether communal or individual – is in danger.

¹³ I am grateful to Jed Atkins for discussion of this passage of *De legibus*, on which he wrote in his 2009 Cambridge Ph.D. thesis, 'Cicero's political thought in *De republica* and *De legibus*'.

¹⁴ But not much further on in the *Lucullus* we find him saying that he is 'not easily torn away' from the Antiochean position, and as of now holds 'nothing more deserving of approval' (*Luc.* 139).

The major works in the Ciceronian corpus on the foundations of ethics are, of course, *De finibus* and the *Tusculan Disputations*, written in that order subsequent to the two versions of the 'Academic books'. The structure of *De finibus* is interesting. First come two books dealing with Epicureanism, where Cicero himself in book 2 delivers the critique of Torquatus' exposition and defence of the system in book 1. Then follow the two books devoted to Stoicism, with Cicero again himself in book 4 taking on the critique of Cato's argument for the Stoic theory in book 3. There is just one final book, in which Antiochean ethics is expounded by Piso. Against this there is no countervailing critique – no book 6. Following Piso's *oratio*, Cicero himself questions whether a philosophy that recognizes other goods than virtue and other evils than vice can consistently maintain the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. To this Piso is permitted a reply. Some of those present then offer final remarks, and the conversation is over.

What is striking about this sequence is its overall Antiochean trajectory. It is not simply that there is no book 6 to constitute a systematic response to the Antiochean theory developed in book 5. Book 4 is already a thoroughly Antiochean construction. Its *Leitmotiv* is precisely the neutralizing argument to the effect that Stoic ethics differs only in its eccentric innovative vocabulary from the views of the 'ancients'. Indeed, book 4 is the neutralizing argument's Ciceronian field day. Antiochus' name is not mentioned, but it is significant that late on in the book reference is introduced to Piso's witty deployment of his own variant of the argument, and particularly his use of it to attack Zeno's treatment of wealth as something 'preferred' but not 'good' (*Fin.* 4.73). Cicero and Piso are here allies in the same cause – building an expectation that when Piso turns out to be the main speaker in book 5, that will continue to be the case. Thus the whole work moves to an Antiochean climax, enhanced by the unusual care Cicero takes to paint an evocative setting for the conversation of book 5: the Athens of his own youthful visit of 79 BCE, when he heard Antiochus and made friends with him, a place where at every turn there are 'reminders of great men in the actual places they lived'.

Nevertheless Antiochean ethics does not go unchallenged. Although most of his system gets no discussion, the closing pages of book 5 are a vigorous debate about one point. And even though Piso is allowed a final sustained response, where incidentally the neutralizing argument makes its one and only appearance in the book (*Fin.* 5.90), Cicero gives himself, his brother Quintus, and his friend Atticus the last words (5.95–6) – all

disagreeing urbanely with each other. For his own part Cicero insists that Piso's case will need strengthening again and again if he himself is to be persuaded.

So what is his sticking point? A difficulty about *consistency* (*Fin.* 5.77, 5.83–5), as Piso eventually appreciates (5.89, 5.90, 5.95).¹⁵ If there are other evils than vice, *must* it be the case that, if you are virtuous, you are happy? Could not extreme pain or disability or misfortune make you unhappy? On Stoic premises the logically consistent answers are respectively 'Yes' and 'No'. But the Peripatetics ought to answer 'No' and 'Yes'. Which conflicts with their stated view that virtue is sufficient for happiness.

How big a difficulty for Antiochean ethics, and for the neutralizing argument, does Cicero take this issue to be?¹⁶ I suspect that when he was planning *De finibus* he did not anticipate that it would prevent Antiocheanism from emerging as more deserving of acceptance ('probabile') than Stoicism. Otherwise it is hard to understand the rationale for the overall plan of the work. But if so, the consistency question evidently came to loom unexpectedly larger in his thinking as he prepared book 5. When he returns to the topic of virtue and happiness in book 5 of the *Tusculans*, the problem now takes centre stage, and Stoicism emerges as the more robust ethical system.

Cicero tells us early on in the book (*Tusc.* 5.21–3) that in numerous conversations he had with Antiochus (presumably in 79 BCE), they found themselves disagreeing on the sufficiency of virtue for happiness. He mentions as specific focuses of the disagreement Antiochus' distinction between 'happy' and 'happiest' (cf. *Fin.* 5.81–5), and his related attempt to use the notion of predication by predominance (x can be truly said to be F , even if F is only predominantly true of it: cf. *Fin.* 5.90–1). But the critique he then develops is explicitly levelled at the Peripatetics and the early Academy in general, and concludes with the ringing declaration that philosophers must be judged by their consistency ('constantia', *Tusc.* 5.31).

At which point (32–3) the interlocutor amusingly questions Cicero's own consistency. Did he not himself take the neutralizing line back in book 4 of *De finibus*? And if (as the neutralizing move represents) there is no difference between Zeno and the Peripatetics except in novelty of vocabulary, then if Zeno is entitled to claim that virtue is sufficient for happiness, are not

¹⁵ For much fuller discussion of the topic, see Irwin, this volume.

¹⁶ Annas in Annas and Wolf 2001: 142 n. 52 thinks it a 'devastating criticism'. She has a stimulating sequence of notes on the whole passage under discussion here.

the Peripatetics entitled to make the same claim? Cicero's main response (though it comes in an intricate sentence difficult to interpret) is in effect to say: I will allow the Peripatetics their claim if you like (not however the Antiochean distinction between 'happy' and 'happiest'), and let them sort out *for themselves* a defence of their consistency (*Tusc.* 5.33–4; he refers back to an earlier passage where more critical examination of consistency was deferred to 'another place': 5.22).¹⁷

The sequel is rather interesting. Cicero will continue to insist that, on the Stoic premise that the good – virtue – is entirely within a person's own power, its sufficiency for happiness is a necessary consequence (*Tusc.* 5.82). He will allow that the Peripatetics *can* consistently maintain, but presumably as only a contingent truth, that a preponderance of good (i.e. the virtue that constitutes the chief but not sole good) will always so outweigh misfortune and bodily ills – even if, as Critolaus said, you throw in land and seas as well – that a happy life will be the result (*Tusc.* 5.85–6; cf. 5.39, 5.51). But he clearly treats them as distinct positions, differing in substance, not just in their articulation.

If we now come full circle and consider again Cicero's decision to close the book with a reference to Carneades' use of the neutralizing argument to comment on the controversy between Stoics and Peripatetics (*Tusc.* 5.120), it takes on a piquant aspect when viewed against the background I have been sketching. In this conclusion to the dialogue, Cicero would like to be able to represent 'those philosophers who go back to Socrates and Plato' as united on the key thesis maintained by the dialogue: virtue suffices for happiness. He does not want any suspicion that, despite all the nobler philosophers' best efforts, virtue 'lies prostrate' (to quote the *Lucullus* again: *Luc.* 134). Carneades' neutralizing argument, if valid, would provide a strong basis for achieving unity. And it seems to me highly likely that Cicero was still strongly attracted to the argument. He has in effect allowed what he represents as the mainstream Peripatetic tradition to maintain as *true* its claim that external and bodily goods make no more contribution to happiness than the Stoics' 'things preferred'; and there is every reason to think that he remains as irritated by Stoic linguistic innovations in ethics as he wanted book 4 of *De finibus* to suggest.¹⁸

¹⁷ For further comment on this passage, see Schofield 2008: 82–3.

¹⁸ Here we should recall the attack on Zeno's denial that pain is an evil at *Tusc.* 2.29–30.

But he was not in the end, I think, prepared to endorse Carneades' verdict in his own name. At any rate, on the one later occasion in his philosophical writings when he returns to the difference between the Stoic and the Peripatetic positions, there is no mention of the neutralizing argument. The two are seen as real alternatives – and Cicero says (just as he had back in the *Lucullus*) 'now one view, now the other seems to me more deserving of acceptance' (*Off.* 3.33).

*Varro and Antiochus**David Blank*

After Cicero, Antiochus' second most famous Roman student was the polymath Marcus Terentius Varro (116–27 BCE). Varro wrote an astonishing number¹ and variety of books on subjects from agriculture to religion, and in genres from 'Menippean' satires to treatises and handbooks. Central to his interests was Rome, its customs and their history, and central to his methods was research into the language used by Romans and the history of its vocabulary. Born in the Sabine town of Reate, Varro was educated in Rome, where he studied with L. Aelius Stilo, the first philologist who applied himself to the scholarly study of Latin texts. Varro's political career progressed slowly, beginning with the plebeian tribunate, then the offices of quaestor (c. 85 BCE) and curule aedile, and rising as far as the praetorship (c. 68 BCE). He followed Pompey and served under him as proquaestor in Spain (76–71 BCE) and then legate, commanding a fleet in Pompey's campaign against pirates (67 BCE), and again in the last Mithridatic War. He wrote a satiric attack on the First Triumvirate (Appian, *B. Civ.* 2.9) and was ill treated by Antony after Pompey's defeat, though Caesar granted him clemency, restored much of his property and commissioned him to collect a library of Greek and Latin works. He was proscribed by Antony during the second triumvirate (43 BCE) but was protected by Fufius Calenus (App. *B. Civ.* 4.47) and continued to write until his death in 27 BCE.²

Varro was a friend, though not necessarily a close friend, of Cicero, who in a well-known tribute at *Ac.* 1.9 professed admiration for his learned writings on Roman history, religion and institutions, as well as on Latin

I am grateful to Catherine Atherton for reading and improving the final draft of this chapter, as well as for many helpful discussions of its content. I am also indebted to David Sedley for valuable suggestions and encouragement.

¹ He had written 490 books (that is, papyrus rolls, each roughly the length of an article or book chapter) according to his own count, by the age of seventy-seven (Gell. 3.10.17), and over 600 by his death (Auson., *Prof. Burd.* 20.10).

² For detailed discussion of Varro's life and works, see Dahlmann 1935.

language and literature.³ Cicero made Varro the spokesman of Antiochus' Old Academy in the second edition of his *Academica*, and dedicated the work to him. From this circumstance we learn that Varro studied with Antiochus, presumably in the late 80s in Athens, and considered himself an adherent of his school. Varro was probably the best-read, most learned Roman of his time, and there were many influences on his thought and work. He was also an original thinker, if not an original philosopher, and was capable of adapting ideas from various sources to the needs of his specific interests.

There is little reason to assume that all of Varro's philosophical ideas came directly from Antiochus. Indeed, Varro refers to Antiochus in just one passage of his work. None the less, it is usually taken for granted that, as his pupil, Varro will have taken many of his own philosophical presuppositions and doctrines from Antiochus. Certainly Antiochus is likely to have been an important source, particularly of Stoic ideas, for Varro. But given that Antiochus' thought borrowed heavily from the Stoa while establishing an Academic-Peripatetic pedigree for Stoic philosophy, this broad principle cannot be used to infer that this or that particular thesis in Varro was taken from him, rather than directly from a Stoic source. Again, some scholars have taken Varro's citation of Pythagoras or his use of what is arguably a Pythagorean doctrine to point to Antiochus as a likely source. But to my knowledge there are no good grounds to think that Antiochus was particularly influenced by Pythagoreanism, unless perhaps through Speusippus' and Xenocrates' adoption of (what they took to be) Pythagorean ideas, and I do not find much of Pythagoras in Varro's theology or etymology, despite a reference to him in *On the Latin Language*. Similarly, resemblances to Xenocratean doctrine have been thought to indicate the source of certain Varronian theological ideas in Antiochus. But I find those resemblances too general to weigh against the specifically Stoic elements in Antiochean thought.

The ground for inferring influence is firmest where a thesis is couched in terms of, or embedded in, the typically Antiochean history of the 'Old Academy'. When we lack such a context, we may look for a peculiarly Antiochean doctrine, such as that of the hierarchy of the 'happy' and the 'most happy' lives, or the contention that, without offering its own criterion of truth and its own definition of the highest good, no school of thought should be called a philosophical sect.⁴ Such peculiarly Antiochean doctrines are rare, and we find them especially in the one Varronian passage which is

³ For a treatment of Varro and Cicero as 'parallel lives', see Baier 1997: 15–30.

⁴ For these points, see below pp. 257 and 258.

explicitly Antiochean. But we may also suspect the influence of Antiochus where a Platonic term crops up in an otherwise Stoicizing context, or where a basically Stoic idea is reported in a way that sounds un-Stoic.

In the present chapter, after a brief discussion of what we know of Varro's relation to Antiochus, I shall begin with Varro's exposition of ethics, the only context in which we know that Varro explicitly cited Antiochus. Then I shall discuss a point in Varro's theology where it is plausible to think that one version of his basically Stoic conception of god and the world relies on an Antiochean reconciliation of the epistemologies of the early Academy and the Stoa. My explanation of this will differ from that of other scholars, who have tried to see in Varro's theology an early version of the Platonic Forms as thoughts in the mind of god. Closely related to his theology is Varro's study of etymologies. I shall argue that Varro has developed a method to reconstruct, not only the world as a manifestation of god, but also the distant Roman past, which is of course not susceptible to immediate examination, using the etymological study of large numbers of related words and the things they name. This method, too, which has its roots in Stoicism, may plausibly be seen to reflect an Antiochean theory of scientific knowledge. I shall conclude with a small suggestion about possible Antiochean influence on the design of Varro's *On the Latin Language*.

VARRO AND ANTIOCHUS

Cicero provides our only information on the personal relationship of Varro and Antiochus, and it is hard to tell from what he says how intensely we are meant to think Varro studied with Antiochus. Although Cicero goes to some lengths to emphasize the close and familiar relationship of himself,⁵ Atticus,⁶ Piso⁷ and Lucullus⁸ to Antiochus,⁹ he does little of the kind with

⁵ Cf. *Brut.* 315: 'When I got to Athens, I spent six months with Antiochus, the finest and most intelligent philosopher of the Old Academy, and with this excellent teacher I renewed the study of philosophy, never interrupted and pursued since my youth and constantly increased', *Fin.* 5.1 (Cicero and M. Piso heard Antiochus lecture in the Ptolemaeus gymnasium); *Fin.* 5.7; *Ac.* 1.13 ('our friend Antiochus'); *Ac.* 1.43; *Tusc.* 5.22 (Cicero argued frequently with Antiochus and, recently, with Aristus).

⁶ *Leg.* 1.54: 'Thus, I should agree with my friend Antiochus (for I dare not call him my teacher), with whom I lived and who practically plucked me from my gardens and brought me the few steps down into the Academy.'

⁷ *Fin.* 5.8: '... and we see that you have been enquiring of Antiochus about these things for several months'.

⁸ *Luc.* 11 has Lucullus say that Antiochus was with him when he was proquaestor at Alexandria, and that he often heard him arguing with Heraclitus of Tyre; at 2.61 he reports what Antiochus said many times in Alexandria and later, shortly before his death, when he was with him in Syria; at 2.98 and 2.137 he also speaks of studying with Antiochus.

⁹ Note too his portrayal of Brutus' relation to Antiochus' brother Aristus, as at *Fin.* 5.8 (he listened to Aristus frequently) and *Ac.* 1.12.

Varro. In the letter in which he announces to Varro his dedication of the second version of the *Academica* to him, Cicero merely says: 'I have given you the Antiochean role, which I thought I understood you would approve; I have given myself the role of Philo' (*Fam.* 9.8.1). In one letter to Atticus he indicates that Varro very much approves the position of Antiochus (*Att.* 13.12.3), in another that he thinks 'the Antiochean position suits no one better than him' (*Att.* 13.16.2), in a third that he hopes Varro will approve his part in the new *Academica*, but that if Atticus thinks otherwise, he will give the part to Brutus, who is also an Antiochean (*Att.* 13.25.3). The only mention Cicero makes of Varro's study with Antiochus is at *Ac.* 1.12: 'Our Brutus, however, who excels in every area, is doing philosophy in Latin so well that you could have no need of Greek works on the same topics; yet he follows the same teaching as you, since he heard Aristus at Athens for some time, whose brother Antiochus you heard.'

Support for Cicero's assumption that Varro would be pleased to represent Antiochus comes from Augustine's statement that Varro rejected the views on the highest human good of all the other 287 possible schools of philosophy to accept instead that of the 'Old Academy' (*De civ. D.* 19.1). As for Augustine's notice that Varro took the description of the best life in his *De philosophia* 'on the authority of Antiochus, Cicero's master and his own' (*De civ. D.* 19.3), we may suspect that Augustine has lifted the master-pupil relation from Cicero, in the light of his mention here of Cicero, and of his note that Cicero apparently contradicts the portrayal of Antiochus as an Old Academic when he makes it clear that Antiochus was more often a Stoic.¹⁰

This is the only reference to Antiochus in what survives, directly or indirectly, of Varro, and I shall examine it before turning to two areas in which Varro's position may be conjectured to reflect that of Antiochus, theology and etymology.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE *SUMMUM BONUM*

Source

In the nineteenth book of his *City of God*, Augustine prepares for his discussion of the supreme good for human beings, which he says is peace, by summarizing in his own words Varro's exposition of all the possible

¹⁰ Contra, Tarver 1997: 139: 'the context of that reference, embedded in Augustine's summary of the *De philosophia*, suggests a provenance from that source, thus from Varro's own pen'. For the charge – made in the same context – that Antiochus was really more of a Stoic, cf. *Luc.* 132: 'he was called an Academic but was, though he changed a very few things, an absolutely authentic Stoic'.

‘sects’ (‘sectae’) of philosophers from his book *On Philosophy*. This book probably belonged to the seventy-six works which Varro called *logistorici*, treatments in dialogue form of various subjects of ‘historical’ research, as in the fragmentary *Logistoricus Curio de cultu deorum* (*Curio: On the Worship of the Gods*).¹¹ Augustine’s summary begins with a grand division (‘divisio’) of philosophical schools or ‘sects’ on the basis of how they view the supreme human good. He shows how Varro set up this great scheme and arrived at 288 *sectae*, and then eliminated from consideration all but the one he himself chose, that of the Old Academy (*De civ. D.* 19.1–3). At the end of the process of elimination, the single view left standing is summarized, and at that point Augustine says (19.3, 2.355.24–30 Dombart-Kalb) that ‘Varro asserts, on the authority of Antiochus (Cicero’s teacher and his own, although Cicero has it that in many points he appeared rather a Stoic than an Old Academic), that the Old Academics believed and taught these things (*haec*).’ How much of the preceding material, then, did Varro take over from Antiochus?

Analysis of Augustine’s excerpt and its dependence on Antiochus

A simple answer begins from Augustine’s closing statement itself: what he says has been cited on Antiochus’ authority are the Old Academics’ own doctrines, *not* the classification system whose exposition preceded theirs. Augustine’s citation procedure is consistent with this. Everything in the exposition and reduction of the 288 *sectae* is attributed to Varro and stated using third-person-singular verbs (about fifteen of them in 19.1–2). The final selection is made on the basis of an understanding of the nature of man (19.3, 2.353.13–354.3), whereby Varro chooses his third possibility, that man is neither soul alone nor body alone, but soul and body together, and hence thinks that the ‘first things of nature’ (‘prima naturae’) and

¹¹ Tarver 1997: 148–9, relying partly on the findings of Heisterhagen in Dahlmann and Heisterhagen 1957: 9–20; the fragments of *De philosophia* have been collected and commented upon by Langenberg 1959, those of the *Curio* by Cardauns 1960. Near the beginning of his revised *Academica*, Cicero chides Varro (1.3) for never having expounded in Latin the ancient philosophy which arose from Socrates, as Cicero himself was doing, but rather omitting this *genus*, despite his own pre-eminence in it and its own pre-eminent importance. Varro replies (4–8) that philosophy has been well explained in Greek treatises, which would be preferred by Romans who were really interested in the subject, while those who were not interested would not accept it from Latin authors either. He also says (8) that in his early imitations of Menippus he humorously mixed many things taken from the recesses of philosophy and many things said *dialectice*, these same things he made more intelligible in his *laudationes* to less learned readers who might be tempted to read them by an attractive style, but that in the prefaces of his *antiquitates* he wrote for philosophers. The passage has been much discussed (e.g. Tarver 1997: 143–5) and used (Wilmanns 1864: 9 n. 2) to put any ‘philosophical’ work of Varro’s after the date of the revised *Academica* (i.e. 45 BCE).

virtue itself are to be sought for their own sake. Here Augustine continues using singular verbs (eight times) to describe what Varro thinks. The activity of virtue, or the art of living, is described next, without attribution to authority, but rather as a consequence of the choice which has been made.

But when he comes to the life which enjoys virtue and the other goods of soul and body, Augustine reports (19.3, 2.354.23–5) that ‘this life is said to be happy’ (*‘beata esse dicitur’*), and this passive usage seems unobtrusively to mark a transition. For a little later there follow explanations which again go unattributed, while what comes next is something quite new (2.355.8): ‘This happy life they show to be social too’ (*‘hanc vitam beatam etiam socialem perhibent esse’*). Augustine continues to use this unattributed third-person plural until the end of his account of the chosen life (2.355.16–17): ‘such as they call “gods”, who they claim are friends of the wise man’ (*‘sicut esse dicunt deos, quos volunt amicos esse homini sapienti’*); then (2.355.17–24):

They deny (*negant*) that there can be any doubt about the ends of goods and, contrariwise, evils, and this they claim (*adfirmant*) distinguishes them from the New Academics, nor does it interest them at all whether one philosophizes while adopting Cynic or any other clothing or cuisine in the ends which they think (*putant*) true. Then, of the three kinds of life, the leisured, the active, and that which is compounded of both, they affirm (*adseverant*) that it is the third which they prefer.

These sentences immediately precede Augustine’s statement (2.355.24), quoted above, according to which Varro says, on Antiochus’ authority, that the Old Academics believed and taught ‘these things’, and it is clear that Augustine’s statement regards only the summary of the happy life, beginning just after the last third-person-singular sentence, when Augustine begins to make inferences from Varro’s choice (2.354.8–17). The view that the happy life is social, one in which a person is surrounded by friends and family, fellow-citizens and men everywhere in the world, is also present in Piso’s Antiochean account of ‘Peripatetic’ ethics in *De finibus* 5,¹² although this is equally a Stoic thesis.¹³ That the early Academics should be described as preferring the life compounded of leisure and activity seems at odds with Piso’s statement that Aristotle and Theophrastus awarded the palm to the quiet life of contemplation and study of the universe, which, as it was

¹² See *Fin.* 5.65–6 on justice, the ties among all human beings and the fact that human nature innately possesses the *politikon*.

¹³ On the other hand, Lehmann 1997: 372 says that Varro has ‘rediscovered the fundamental values of the Roman consciousness’ in his emphasis on the social nature of the good life.

most like the life of the gods, was also most worthy of the wise man (*Fin.* 5.11). It has been argued that what Augustine reported from Varro was not Antiochean, but rather a Roman departure from his philosophy;¹⁴ or it may be that this statement comes from a different context, in which Antiochus tried to reconcile the Peripatetic ideal of contemplation with an early Academic view more suited to the derivation of the happiest life from the duality of human nature, at once body and soul.¹⁵ With such an attempt at reconciliation, Antiochus may be trying to overcome the same difficulty that we have reconciling the apparently contradictory views of *Nicomachean Ethics* 1–9 and 10.

Of course, there are signs of Antiochean influence in other parts of Augustine's summary of Varro's *De philosophia*. Relatively early in his multiplication of *sectae*, Varro introduced his second *differentia* – whether a philosopher held his opinion about the highest good as certain or as only probable – which is said to come 'from the New Academics' (*De civ. D.* 19.1, 2.348.24) and which doubles the number of sects to forty-eight, since one person may hold and defend the views of each of the *sectae* as certain, another defend them while thinking them uncertain, just as the New Academics defended the view that seemed to them like the truth, though not certain. A little further on (2.349.15), Augustine speaks of Varro's refutation of all the *sectae* but the one he chose, that of the early Academics (2.349.22). Varro, he says, wants us to regard these early Academics, from Plato to Polemo, as holding certain 'doctrines' ('dogmata'), and because of this doctrinal stance he distinguishes them from the New Academics, for whom everything is uncertain. Varro also thinks the *secta* of the Old Academics was as free from any error about this matter as it was from doubt.¹⁶ Augustine (2.349.24ff.) then quickly goes through Varro's removal of all the *differentiae* with which he had multiplied the *sectae*, reducing the *sectae* first to the original twelve (19.2, 2.351.31), then to the three from which the final choice is made, those postulating that: we seek the first things of nature for the sake of *virtus*, *virtus* for the sake of the first things of nature, or both for themselves.

This final choice is also tinged with Antiochean colours. The first step is to consider that the choice of a highest *human* good must be in accordance

¹⁴ Tarver 1997: 152.

¹⁵ See Bénatouil 2009. For a different view of the issue, see Tsouni, this volume, p. 147 above.

¹⁶ These points recur at the end of Augustine's summary, as well, where we are told that 'they deny that there can be any doubt about the ends of goods and, contrariwise, bads, and this they claim distinguishes them from the New Academics . . .'; here it is evidently the Old Academics, whose view is given on the authority of Antiochus, who are source and subject.

with the nature of man. This is the second point made by Piso in his Antiochean account of the highest good, once he has finished with the Carneadean division of all moral philosophies and discarded some irrelevant ones; the practice is there said to be that of the ‘ancients’ (‘veteres’), and one which the Stoics also used (*Fin.* 5.24). Varro’s choice, that man must be considered as both soul and body, is again that made by Piso (5.34), though Augustine (and perhaps Varro) omits the self-love which introduces and plays so large a role in Piso’s account, by motivating the deduction that at the height of the development of our human nature is the perfection of our body and our reason (5.40, 5.44). Immediately after this point Augustine places the sentence (*De civ. D.* 19.3, 2.354.8: ‘quapropter eadem virtus . . .’) which introduces the happy life, using a passive verb, and which I identified as pivotal between the citations of Varro in the singular and those of the Academics in the plural. In this section Augustine moves from Virtue’s enjoyment of all the goods of body and soul and also of herself, to the consequences that the ‘happy’ human life enjoys virtue and the other goods without which virtue cannot exist, while the life which enjoys one or more other goods, without which virtue can still exist, is ‘happier’, and that which enjoys all goods, so that no good of mind or body is absent, is ‘happiest’. This, too, is an Antiochean point, very close to what we see in Piso’s speech, where at any rate the ‘happy’ and ‘happiest’ lives are described (*Fin.* 5.71–2).¹⁷

Differences between Varro and Antiochus

Yet it does not seem that the entirety of what Augustine saw in Varro’s *De philosophia* was already in Antiochus. Piso begins (5.16–18) the version of Carneades’ division of ethical ends which he says Antiochus liked to use with the thesis that *prudentia*, or the art of living, must have as its subject matter one of the three things which naturally first excite our appetite: pleasure, freedom from pain or the first things according to nature. A different definition of the right and fine (‘existet recti etiam ratio atque honesti’) then springs from each of the three possibilities in turn: the ‘fine’ (‘honestum’) will be to do everything for the sake of pleasure, for the sake of not being in pain, or for the sake of getting the things which are according

¹⁷ For the question of whether Antiochus has taken up Carneades’ usage of ‘enjoying’ (‘frui’), as opposed to merely ‘using’ (‘uti’) the *prima naturae*, and thereby changing the Stoic view to make it more compatible with Aristotle’s, see Bénatouil 2006: 155–8 and 222–31. For the view that Varro has in some way ‘Epicureanized’ a Peripatetic ethics, and that an emphasis on combining *frui* and *uti* is particularly Varronian, see Baier 1997: 31–5.

to nature, and this will hold even if you do not in fact get hold of whichever of these three you have chosen to pursue in your actions, though 'others', Piso adds, will direct every appropriate act ('officium') only to the actual acquisition of their chosen goal (5.19).¹⁸

The leading exponents of each of the six opinions ('sententiae') obtained by this division are then named: Aristippus, the acquisition of pleasure; Hieronymus, the acquisition of freedom from pain; Carneades, the acquisition of the *prima naturae*, though he argued for it only for dialectical purposes; no one espoused the mere pursuit of pleasure or of freedom from pain; the Stoics, the attempt to get the *prima naturae* (5.20).¹⁹ To these six *sententiae* are then added three which advocate a compound end, that is, the *honestum* or the pursuit of the goal together with its attainment (5.21). Six of the nine possible opinions arrived at by Carneades have found champions: in addition to the three above, and discounting Carneades' purely dialectical position, we find that the goal of the *honestum* plus pleasure is endorsed by Callipho and Dinomachus, that of the *honestum* plus freedom from suffering by Diodorus, and finally that of the *honestum* plus the first things according to nature by the *antiqui*, namely, the Academics and Peripatetics.

There are important and obvious differences between this version of Carneades' division of ethical ends and Varro's division as reported by Augustine. Varro's is a division of philosophical schools or sects ('sectae'), not of opinions ('sententiae') about what the highest good consists in. Second, when Varro comes to reduce the 288 *sectae*, he uses what might appear to be an Antiochean principle: that *sectae* are to be distinguished only if they hold different views on the highest good (*De civ. D.* 19.1, 2.349.28–350.1).²⁰ But what we know of Antiochus' view on this matter points to a significant difference: 'The two greatest things in philosophy are these, the judgement of truth and the end of goods.'²¹ That is, it is difficult to believe that Antiochus would not have conceded that denying (or at least arguing against) the possibility of knowledge of the *summum bonum*

¹⁸ On the *Carneadea divisio* see especially Algra 1997; Lévy 1992: 354ff.; and now Annas 2007.

¹⁹ On Carneades' insistence on the distinctness of a craft and its objects as a reflection of Chrysippus' argument against Aristo and perhaps also as a reply to Stoics who rejected Antipater's analogy of virtue and the stochastic crafts (noted in *Fin.* 3.24), and on his point about pursuing, as opposed to obtaining one's chosen object as arguments against Antipater's remarks about the goals of stochastic crafts, see Striker 1991: 51–2 (1996: 262–3).

²⁰ See especially 2.349.28–30: 'For he does not think that one should speak of a sect of philosophy which does not differ from others in this point, by having a different end of goods and evils' ('quod diversos habeat fines bonorum et malorum').

²¹ *Luc.* 29: 'etenim duo esse haec maxima in philosophia, iudicium veri et finem bonorum.' See also *Luc.* 23–5.

puts one outside the *secta* of one who claims to know what the highest good is (and, as we have seen, Varro twice says that the Old Academy was free from doubt on this score). Yet this is what Varro does, for he first introduces the '*differentia* from the New Academics', between those who are certain of their view and those who are not, then he promptly abolishes it and does so precisely on the grounds that it does not contain an account of the end of goods and evils. Varro treats what to Antiochus must have been a cornerstone in the same apparently cavalier fashion as he treats the distinction between holding one's view of the end of goods while wearing a beard and while clean-shaven. This 'New Academic' *differentia* must therefore be Varro's own invention: Antiochus would not have considered the New Academy to be a *secta* at all, since it had no account to offer of the criterion of truth or of the end of goods.

Thus Varro seems to have made a division of *sectae* then applied the principle that genuinely different *sectae* must each propound a different vision of the highest good. And Augustine's account of Varro's book begins, not with Piso's three natural objects of desire, but four: pleasure ('voluptas'), by which the sensation of the body is pleasantly moved; repose ('quies'), by which it comes about that one suffers no bodily discomfort; the combination of these two, which Epicurus called pleasure; and the first things according to nature ('prima naturae'), which include goods of both body and soul (2.347.12–19). From these natural objects, Augustine reports, Varro has omitted *virtus* as something evidently learned, an art of living (2.347.9–12), but he brings *virtus* back into the picture in a second principle of division: education subsequently implants virtue in us in such a way that we then desire virtue for the sake of one of the primary objects, or one of the primary objects is desired for the sake of virtue, or else each primary object is desired for its own sake along with virtue which is also desired for its own sake (2.347.19–348.9). The reintroduction of *virtus* brings the number of Varro's *sectae* from four to twelve.

This treatment of virtue is significantly different from that in Piso's exposition of Peripatetic ethics. There the art of living was defined as practical wisdom ('prudentia') and kept outside the division, while the fine ('honestum') was introduced to capture the difference between pursuing and actually acquiring the chosen end. Making *prudentia*, not *virtus*, the art of living seems the correct choice for Antiochus, as it enables him to gather all the opinions together under the banner of discovering the subject matter of *prudentia*, and *virtus* would have been too closely tied to Stoicism to be useful for this purpose. In Piso's account, too, the first natural things of the intellect ('animus') are 'like sparks or seeds of the virtues' ('quasi virtutum

igniculi et semina': *Fin.* 5.18); later, he distinguishes among the intellectual virtues ('virtutes animi') those which arise in us ('ingenerantur') from the mind's own nature and are non-voluntary, such as the abilities to be taught and to remember, and those which are voluntary, the virtues properly so called, which are born ('gignuntur') from reason (5.36, 5.38); *virtus* itself is defined as the 'perfection of reason' ('rationis absolutio': 5.38). Varro's own classification of the philosophical schools also makes room for that of Epicurus, excluded by Carneades, although, given Epicurus' insistence that the pleasures of the mind are superior, it is certainly unfair in portraying Epicurus' ethical goal as a purely bodily state.

But the largest difference between Piso and Varro is that between Varro's thesis that *virtus* is 'implanted' by instruction and Piso's urging that

human capacity is so generated by nature that it appears to be designed to grasp every virtue, and for this reason children are moved without instruction (*sine doctrina*) by likenesses (*simulacra*) of the virtues, whose seeds (*semina*) they have in them; for these are the first elements of nature (*prima elementa naturae*), by whose growth the bud (*germen*), so to speak, of virtue is made. (*Fin.* 5.43)

Piso adds that our intellectual capacities grow and develop as we mature: 'virtue itself she (i.e. nature) only began, nothing more; therefore it is up to us, by which I mean it belongs to art (*artis est*) to seek out what follows upon the principles which we have received, until that which we desire is achieved' (*Fin.* 5.60). His is the Stoic view.²² Now the fact that Varro uses the metaphor of 'planting' ('*insita*') suggests he may be responding to talk of 'seeds' or 'elements of virtue' which nature implants in us 'without instruction' ('*sine doctrina*', also at 5.59). It looks very much as though Varro has modified what he knew of Antiochus' view to make it serve in a new division and for a new purpose.

Even before he added the *differentiae* by which the total number of *sectae* was so much inflated, then, Varro's organization, while indebted to Antiochus' formulations of some points, was his own. What is more, Varro's *differentiae* bring about an arithmetical expansion in a way that is purely mechanical. It also, in one respect, actually runs counter to what we can be confident Antiochus would have maintained. I have already noted that Antiochus would hardly have considered it irrelevant to one's

²² We are told that Cleanthes held that 'all men have from nature starting points towards virtue' (Stob. 2.65.7 = SVF 1.566). We are also told that Chrysippus, Cleanthes and Posidonius held virtue to be 'taught' (Diog. Laert. 7.91 = SVF 1.567) and that men are naturally inclined to virtue but do not have it by nature (SVF 3.214–17).

philosophical allegiance whether one thought one's choice of ethical goal certain or uncertain, while Varro, in contrast, introduces, then dispenses with this distinction (*De civ. D.* 19.1, 2.348.23–35). What Varro seems to have done is to make use of Antiochus' account of the elements which go to make up a good life, as that is reported by Piso, as a source for the *differentiae* put to work in order to classify philosophical schools. Thus, in Piso's account of his ethics, Antiochus derives a certain view of the choice among the three lives (active, contemplative, combined) from his view of the nature of man and of the human good: we are born to be active, and the most important form of activity is the contemplation of the heavens and of the hidden things of nature which reason can investigate; after this come political practice and science, then the reason which consists in the virtues and also the actions suited to the virtues (*Fin.* 5.58). In Varro this hierarchy has become a distinction between sects, which may each be 'observed and pursued by men who love' a leisured life, or one busy with affairs, or one composed of both.

Another consequence of Antiochus' reasoning is that the highest good is sought both for oneself and also for others: 'The nature of man is made in such a way that it has something congenital which is, so to say, civic and sociable, what the Greeks call *politikon*' (5.66). This conclusion is embedded in a number of references to 'society' or 'comrades and friends' ('societas, socii atque amici' 5.65–7); its Varronian correlate is the 'differentia of social living' ('differentia socialis vitae'), based on whether the chosen goal is to be pursued only for oneself or also for one's friend ('socius') (*De civ. D.* 19.1, 2.348.15–24). These questions crop up once more in Varro's own swift survey of the ethics of the Old Academics, quoted at the end of Augustine's summary: they demonstrate that this happy life is social; they deny there can be any doubting the ends of goods and evils and say that this is how they differ from the New Academics; they say it makes no difference to them whether one does philosophy in Cynic or any other garb; and of the three types of life they say they prefer the one which is compounded of leisure and activity (19.3, 2.355.8–24). Of these considerations, only that about the Cynic mode of dress does not appear in Piso's speech. It may be Varro's own gift to the Old Academy, included in the summary of their views because of its earlier role as one of Varro's *differentiae* (2.348.35–349.3).

So, while Augustine presents Varro as determined to narrow the range of ethical choices to three, then to one, Varro turns out not to have structured his division in the dialectical manner used by Carneades to embarrass the Stoics and by Antiochus to reconcile the Stoics and Peripatetics. Instead,

he has utilized the headings of Antiochus' ethical theory to unfold a grand tree of possible philosophical *sectae* springing from three rival conceptions of the nature of man and four corresponding ideas of what human beings first desire by nature (Varro's wish to include Epicurus complicates things a little). It seems likely, as Tarver has suggested, that Varro's motive was to create a great system of pigeonholes, into which he could fit every philosopher's ethical opinions, an antiquarian method applied to doxography and yielding a capacious and flexible framework to organize all relevant information. We do not know much of anything about Varro's *De philosophia* other than what is in Augustine's summary. We do not know whether it included many interesting facts about some of the *sectae* for which Varro has created a place, other than the Old Academics, whose choices he apparently approved. Certainly, he could have found many interesting and paradoxical things to report, if we may go by a fragment of his Menippean satire 'Eumenides': 'Finally, no sick man can dream anything so outrageous that some philosopher would not say it.'²³

THEOLOGY

Sources

Varro wrote forty-one books of *Human and Divine Antiquities*: twenty-five of human ones and sixteen of divine. Each set was organized according to a quadripartite scheme which also appears in his books *On the Latin Language*, *On Agriculture*, and elsewhere: who is acting, where they are acting, when they are acting, what they are doing. The *Rerum divinarum antiquitates* (*RD*: 'Archaeological investigations of things relating to the gods') were dedicated to Julius Caesar as Pontifex Maximus. They comprised, after an introduction, three books each on the persons, places, festivals and rites involved in cultivating the gods, followed by three books on the gods themselves. Varro's most widely read work in antiquity, the *Antiquities* survives only where others quoted it. The *RD* was the main authority for Roman religion used by Augustine in the *De civitate Dei*, which is, in consequence, a major source of citations from Varro. Further sources for the *RD* include other Christian authors, such as Lactantius, and ancient commentators on Virgil, such as Servius.

²³ *Saturae Menippeae* 122 Astbury (Nonius Marc. 56M): 'postremo nemo aegrotus quicquam somniat | tam infandum, quod non aliquis dicat philosophus.'

Different types of theology

Varro distinguished (e.g. *De civ. D.* 6.5, 252.17ff. = *RD* I fr. 6 Cardauns)²⁴ three different kinds of accounts of the gods, those according to: fable and poetry ('mythical'), natural philosophy or science ('physical'), and politics ('civic'). His *Divine Antiquities*²⁵ was concerned mostly with the political approach, and thus with the ways in which the worship of the gods had been instituted and their cults celebrated in early Rome. The old-style religion, according to Varro, was endangered by neglect and oblivion: religion was not much use if people no longer knew to which gods they should turn for particular purposes (*De civ. D.* 4.22 = *RD* I fr. 3). By rediscovering the old institutions, Varro hoped he would save Roman religion, accomplishing something even more useful to the Roman people than Aeneas' rescue of the Roman *penates* or 'household gods' from burning Troy or Metellus' rescue of the Palladium from the flames of the Temple of Vesta (*De civ. D.* 6.2 = *RD* I fr. 2a). Much of the evidence for the institutions of the older period, however, was found by him in the works of early poets, and what was said by the poets sometimes reflected ancient wisdom, either their own or that of older tradition. The poets, then, offer evidence of the philosophical and civic truths underlying cult. Ancient wisdom is also reflected in the older institutions of Roman religion, especially those established by the kings, who invented that religion. This wisdom is explained or decoded with reference to philosophical truth as found in the scientific interpretations of the institutions, their monuments and their names. But the kings were not merely encoding philosophical truths in their cultic institutions, nor were they concerned to encode the whole truth and only the truth: they gave clues which would allow some people to understand lessons which would be useful to the state.

In his earlier work, the *Logistoricus Curio: On the Worship of the Gods*, Varro portrays the main interlocutor Curio conversing with the Pontifex Maximus Scaevola, who claims that three kinds of gods have been handed down to the Romans, one kind by poets, one by philosophers and one by the civic leaders. Of these three authorities Scaevola, who (Augustine says) represents the same point of view as Varro does elsewhere (i.e. in the *RD*), condemned the poets for retailing unworthy fictions about the gods, and the philosophers for making empty debates and statements which might be harmful, should the mass of the people come to know of them, such as

²⁴ Varro's *Rerum divinarum antiquitates* (*RD*) will be cited by reference to the fragment numbers in the collection of Cardauns 1976.

²⁵ For brief accounts of Varro's theology, see Cardauns 1976: 242–4; 2001: 53–60.

that Hercules and other gods had once been mortal, or that cities did not possess true images of the gods, since in reality they have no gender, age or distinct body parts (*De civ. D.* 4.27 = *Curio* fr. v Cardauns).

Philosophical theology: Stoic influences

Most of what Varro is cited as saying about the natural philosophers' 'physical' interpretation of the gods is rather Stoic in its overall character. That, of course, would not prevent its being ascribed to Antiochus. Varro said that only the wise seemed to him to have perceived what god is, believing him to be the soul which governs the world 'by motion and reason' ('motu ac ratione': *De civ. D.* 4.31, 186.11–14 = *RD* I fr. 13). In the *RD* (16 fr. 235) he said that Jupiter is the source of efficient causes of things that happen in the world, and in the *Curio* that Jove was the world and that he both 'sends out from himself and also receives into himself all seeds' (*De civ. D.* 7.9, 285.7–287.13 (the latter part is *Curio* fr. II Cardauns)). Again, the world-soul and its parts, Varro says, are the true gods (*De civ. D.* 7.5, 281.9–13; 7.9, 286.13 cited in *RD* 16 fr. 225); the world-soul is a god and that god is the world, which (286.23), like a 'sage', is called 'god' from its higher part, its mind ('animus'); he seems to Augustine to admit that this god is one, but none the less to divide the world into various parts in order to introduce a plurality of gods (*De civ. D.* 7.6, 281.31–82.17 = *RD* 16 fr. 226; cf. *De civ. D.* 4.11 = *RD* I fr. 27).

Stoic influence can also be felt in Varro's contention (*De civ. D.* 7.23, 301.21–302.8 = *RD* 16 fr. 227) that there are three levels ('gradus') of soul in all of universal nature ('in omni universaque natura'): one which goes through ('transit') all the living parts of the body and has no sensation, but just the power of life, the force ('vim') which penetrates ('permanare') into our bones, nails and hair, in the same way that trees are nourished and grow and, in their own way, live; the second level of soul has sensation, and this force penetrates ('pervenire') into the eyes, ears, nose and mouth; the third level is the highest, what is called mind, in which intelligence comes first, and which is possessed among mortal beings only by humans, in whom it is called 'genius', while in the world-soul it is called 'god'. The stones and earth in the world, which we see but which are not permeated with sensation, are like the bones and nails of god; the sun, moon and stars, which we sense and with which god senses, are god's sense organs; the aether is god's mind, and its force extends into the stars making them gods and through them into the earth, making it a god, Tellus, from whom it pervades the sea and ocean, making them the god Neptune.

This Varro fragment has been taken by some scholars²⁶ to be irreconcilable with the usual Stoic assignment (e.g. Cic., *Nat. D.* 2.33; *SVF* 2.714–16) of ‘reason’ to humans and god alone and ‘soul’ to animals and the world as a whole, while plants have only ‘nature’ (*SVF* 2.708, 2.710, 2.711) and rocks and suchlike are limited to ‘disposition’ (ξξ15). These scholars see an affinity between the tripartition of soul here in *RD* 16 and Varro’s interpretation of Jupiter, Juno and Minerva from *RD* 15 (see below), ascribing both to Antiochus as transmitter of the thought of Xenocrates. However, the Stoics could describe matters differently for different purposes and from different points of view (cf. *SVF* 2.458 for another description). In our passage of Varro, the description is of the nature of the cosmos itself and its soul, and the replication of that structure in every nature. All matter is permeated with god for the Stoics and is part of the cosmos, which is itself a living animal, a god indeed, as is each of the parts of the cosmos. The resulting picture is like that for a human being, held together by disposition, nourished by nature, and using reason and thought (Plut. *De virtute morali* 451B–C). Varro also plays with the dual point of view in *Ling.* 5.102, where he discusses the ‘animals (*animalia*) which are said to live and not to have soul’ (or ‘breath’, ‘life’: ‘*anima*’), by which he means plants. In *Nat. D.* 2.29–30 Cicero’s Stoic spokesman Balbus speaks of the commanding part (‘*principatus*’ for ἡγεμονικόν) of plants, located in the roots, which is ‘mind’ in humans, and in lower animals something analogous to mind, the source of appetite; he also says that in the parts of the world – and nothing which exists in the whole world (‘in omni mundo’) is not a part of its universality (‘*universi*’) – there is sensation and reason. Cicero’s wording (2.30: ‘*nihil est enim in omni mundo quod non pars universi sit*’) strongly recalls Varro’s (‘in omni universaque natura’) and, together with the content of the two passages, suggests a close relationship between them.

Philosophical theology and cult practice

One story told in the *Curio* is particularly significant for Varro’s conception of the relation between philosophy and cult. It regards Numa Pompilius, the King of Etrurian origin who was credited with having founded Roman religious observance. In 181 BCE the scribe Cn. Terentius discovered, on his own land near Numa’s tomb, priestly books by Numa which he duly brought to the Praetor. When the Praetor had scanned the openings of these

²⁶ Kleywegt 1972: 44–5, also Fladerer 1996: 108–11.

books, which gave the reasons ('*causae*') for Numa's cultic institutions, he brought them to the Senate and showed them to the leading senators, who read some of them and, 'agreeing with the dead Numa', ordered them burnt (*De civ. D.* 7.34, 317.5–15 = *Curio* fr. III Cardauns).²⁷

Varro's source for this story was probably the earliest annalist, Cassius Hemina (Pliny, *HN* 13.87 = *HRRel* 1.109–110 F 37 Peter, fr. 39 Santini),²⁸ who said that the books contained 'Pythagorean philosophy' and were burned for that reason (the incident was placed in 181 BCE, shortly after the Bacchanalian scandal of 186). According to Pliny, the slightly later annalist Calpurnius Piso said that the find consisted of seven books of pontifical law and the same number of Pythagorean books. Pliny also reports, apparently, that Varro, in book 7 of the *Human Antiquities*, and the first-century annalist Valerius Antias said there were twelve Latin pontifical and twelve Greek philosophical books. However, in the *Curio*, if Augustine is to be trusted, Varro did not mention the 'philosophical', indeed 'Pythagorean philosophical', books reported by others. Perhaps he confined himself to the priestly or institutional books because of the contemporary tendency to debunk the widely held notion that Numa had studied with Pythagoras. As Cicero insists, Numa had been dead for 140 years before Pythagoras' arrival in Italy and could not have been the philosopher's 'pupil' (*De or.* 2.154, *Rep.* 2.29). For his part, Varro went on to give an alternative source of Numa's wisdom, hydromancy: he saw the images of gods in a basin of water he had himself drawn from a well and heard instructions from these gods on the institution of cult (*De civ. D.* 7.35 = *Curio* fr. IV Cardauns). This method of prophecy was also used later, Varro said, by Pythagoras. Apparently Varro wanted to give a rationalization for the supposed connection between Numa and Pythagoras, so he had them gain their knowledge of the divine from the same source, one which was neither Italian nor Greek, but rather Persian in origin.²⁹

²⁷ For a discussion of Varro's report, see Cardauns 1960: 19–28. On the political and cultural significance of this incident engineered by the rulers of Rome, see Gruen 1990: 158–69.

²⁸ At least in Augustine's version Varro omitted any indication of the date and spoke of 'a certain Terentius', with no *praenomen* or specification of his profession. Hemina gave these and many other details omitted in Augustine's report of Varro, including that Terentius found Numa's coffin, which contained the books. It is possible that Varro's version was originally fuller, but that Augustine omits details of it, since his interest is to make a case that the causes of Roman sacred rites were so shocking they had to be hidden.

²⁹ Cicero says that Pythagoras visited the Persian *magi* (*Fin.* 5.87). In *Tusc.* 4.3 he attributes the false tradition that Numa was a student of Pythagoras to the Pythagoreans' admiration for Numa and his institutions. It appears that, in the later *Human Antiquities*, Varro goes back to the report that both pontifical and philosophical books were found, while dropping Pythagoras from the context. Unfortunately, the text of Pliny is somewhat ambiguous at this point (*HN* 13.87).

This story can hardly have served Varro to ground Roman religious institutions in Greek, and specifically in Pythagorean, philosophical speculation. If Varro had wanted to make out that Roman religious institutions had had their origin in philosophy, he would surely not have explained Numa's wisdom by reference to hydromantic revelation. Moreover, Varro appears not even to have mentioned philosophy in this context at all, although he did mention Pythagoras, who was well known as a religious thinker and reformer, and who had various forms of magic associated with his name. Even if Antiochus could be seen as a source of Pythagorean influence on Varro, as some scholars would have it, I think it most unlikely that Varro used the story of Numa's books as a basis for interpreting Roman religious institutions as exemplifying Pythagorean (and hence Academic) ideas. Varro's understanding of the relation between the philosophical and civic versions of theology must have been more indirect: Pythagoras' philosophy and Numa's institutions reflect similar mantic experiences which each has interpreted in his own medium, but Numa's institutions for Rome are pre-philosophical and directly inspired by mantic revelation. Varro's story should also have implications for his view of the relation between Pythagoras' theology and that of later philosophers, whose insights presumably came from observation and philosophical method, rather than from mantic inspiration.

Reading the theological code

When Varro detects facts about the gods and about Roman cult in the names of gods and of religious antiquities, as well as in statues, his position is that the names and suchlike were given to point to these facts or to act as signs of them, but not to make them too obvious.³⁰ In the case of anthropomorphic statues of the gods, Varro seems to think that the message is fundamentally a rather simple one, that the gods, like humans, have a rational soul (*De civ. D.* 7.5, 280.8–21 = *RD* 16 fr. 225):

First, Varro praises these (i.e. physical or philosophical) interpretations, saying that the ancients created ('finxisse') images, attributes and ornaments of the gods so that, when those who approached the mysteries of learning ('doctrinae

³⁰ See the remarks of Augustine about Varro at *De civ. D.* 4.31 (185.32–186.5): 'One would have to think I was conjecturing these things, if he had not himself said in another place [i.e. in the *Curio*], when speaking about religions, that there are many true things which are not only not useful for the crowd to know, but even that it is expedient for the people to think differently, even if falsely, and that it was for this reason that the Greeks enclosed their initiations and mysteries in silence and behind walls.'

mysteria³¹) considered the statues with their eyes, they could see with their mind the soul of the world ('animam mundi') and its parts, that is, the true gods. Those who made the images of the gods in human form appear to have intended to convey this, the fact that the mortal mind which is in the human body is very like the immortal mind. It is as if vessels were set up to signify the gods and a wine-jar were placed in the Temple of Liber to indicate wine, that which is contained being indicated by that which contains it. Thus by an image which had a human shape a rational soul would be indicated, because in that vessel, so to speak, that nature is usually contained, the nature of which they say god or the gods are.

The special attributes and gifts of the gods, which are seen in their statues, cults and myths, will presumably have more particular messages for those who can interpret them.

Varro's theological schemes

In book 16 of the *Divine Antiquities* Varro dealt with twenty 'select' or 'special', major gods, to whom the Romans had dedicated temples decorated with statues; what Varro says here, by his own admission, is conjecture, rather than knowledge (*De civ. D.* 7.17, 295.22ff. = *RD* 16 fr. 228). Here Varro took up from what he had said in his fifth book, *On Small Open-air Sanctuaries* (*De sacellis*):

As was noted in my first book *On Places* [i.e. book 5 = fr. 63], there are two beginnings (*principia*) of the gods, from sky (*caelum*) and earth (*terra*), and hence some gods are called 'celestial' (*caelestes*), others 'earthly' (*terrestres*). As in the earlier books we began from sky, when we spoke of Janus, whom some have said is sky, others the world, so we now write about the females starting with Earth (*Tellus*). (*De civ. D.* 7.28 (310.27–311.2) = *RD* 16 fr. 263)

But in book 16, Augustine points out, Varro will maintain that the first gods were rather Jupiter and Juno, that is, Sky or Heaven and Earth, from whom the other gods were born, although there was in another sense only one god, the world-soul or the world. These Varro also divided into two parts – the sky into an upper and a lower part, 'aether' and 'aer', the earth into water and soil (*De civ. D.* 7.6, 281.31–282.17 = *RD* 16 fr. 226). Of these four parts or aspects of god or the world's soul, Varro's emphasis fell on the three worshipped and represented on the Capitol: Juno, the air, including

³¹ By 'doctrinae mysteria' Varro must be referring to philosophical theology. Cardauns 1976: 226 compares the 'initia regis' of the fourth and final level of etymology in *Ling* 5.8, a passage discussed below; but the parallel does not hold, for 'initia regis' there, even interpreted as 'initiatory rites or mysteries of the king', cannot refer to philosophical interpretation, which is on the third level.

earth; Jupiter, the lower aether, the sky; Minerva, the uppermost air or aether (*De civ. D.* 7.16, 294.33 = *RD* 16 fr. 272).

In reconstructing Varro's theological speculation we should always bear in mind Augustine's hostility to it, which extends to an attempt to show it up as 'wholly inconsistent' internally. He cites Varro's bipartition of the world and the gods in books 5 and 16, and he says (*De civ. D.* 7.28, 311.3–7) that based on the plausible reasoning that sky is that which acts, and earth that which suffers, Varro assigned these masculine and feminine force ('vis') respectively, and (as a heathen) failed to see that it is rather the god who made both of these forces who does these things. He then contrasts a passage in which Varro dealt with the mysterious 'Samothracian gods':

Thence³² too in his previous book [i.e. 15] he interprets the celebrated mysteries of the Samothracians in this way and he promises, as if with utmost religious fervour, that he will expound in writing things which are not known even to their priests, the 'Sai', and send these to them. For he says that he has understood there³³ from many indications that among the statues one signifies sky, another earth, another the exemplars of things, which Plato calls 'ideas'; 'sky' he wants to be understood as Jove, 'earth' as Juno, the 'ideas' as Minerva: sky, that by which something is made; earth, that out of which it is made; the exemplar, that according to which it is made.

Hinc etiam Samothracum nobilia mysteria in superiore libro sic interpretatur eaque se, quae nec Sais [*coni. Wissowa: suis codd.*] nota sunt, scribendo expositurum eisque missurum quasi religiosissime pollicetur. Dicit enim se ibi multis indiciiis collegisse in simulacris aliud significare caelum, aliud terram, aliud exempla rerum, quas Plato appellat ideas; caelum Iovem, terram Iunonem, ideas Minervam vult intellegi; caelum a quo fiat aliquid, terram de qua fiat, exemplum secundum quod fiat. (*De civ. D.* 7.28, 311.7–27 = *RD* 15 fr. 206)

Augustine complains: 'In this book about the select gods [i.e. book 16], he abandoned the scheme he gave of the three gods, by whom he, as it were, embraced all things. For to the sky he assigned the male gods, females

³² The point of 'thence' ('hinc') is unclear. Most scholars say that Augustine means 'from the initial division of sky and earth as active and passive'. Kleywegt 1972: 33–4 counters that Varro could hardly be thought to have come up with a tripartition on the basis of what he previously took as a bipartition. He argues that *hinc* refers to Augustine's objection to the division into sky and earth, maker and sufferer: as a heathen, Varro did not see that 'what makes' is rather he who produced both sky and earth. This explanation is reinforced by Augustine's objection to the tripartition: 'In this matter I omit to say that Plato says the ideas have such power that, in accordance with them, rather than the sky making anything, the sky itself was made' (*De civ. D.* 7.27, 352.15–18).

³³ By 'there' ('ibi') Varro may mean Samothrace, where he may have visited and even been initiated while serving under Pompey in 67 (Cole 1984: 93), or the Roman Circus, where he saw the three statues and the inscriptions on their bases which he referred to the Penates and therefore to Samothrace (Kleywegt 1972: 34).

to the earth, and among the latter he has placed Minerva, whom he had earlier placed above the sky itself (*supra ipsum caelum*).³⁴ Moreover, Varro does not even follow through on his assignment of male gods to the sky: for example, Neptune is surely male, although he is in the sea, which belongs more to the supposedly female earth than to the male sky (*De civ. D.* 7.28, 311.27ff.).

Varro also connected the 'Great Gods' of Samothrace with Earth and Sky when speaking of Roman monuments in the *Logistoricus Curio*:

There are three altars in the Circus by the columns, on which stand statues (*signa*): on one altar is inscribed 'To the great gods', on another 'To the powerful gods', on the third 'To the [strong] gods' [that is],³⁴ to Earth and Sky. The world (*mundus*) is divided into these two [i.e. Earth and Sky]. Just so, they are two first ones, from whom all things were born, and these are called 'Great Gods' in Samothrace. (Probus in Virg. *Ecl.* 6.31 = *Curio* fr. 1 Cardauns)

The bipartition into two gods, Sky and Earth, structured the whole of *RD* 16, and it plays a structuring role in *De lingua Latina* 5 too, where it is again linked to Samothrace (5.57–9):

I have spoken about what regards places and the things connected with them; now, of these things which are in places, I shall explain the immortal ones and the mortal ones in such a way that I shall first tell what pertains to the gods. The first gods were Sky (*Caelum*) and Earth (*Terra*). These are the same gods who in Egypt are called 'Serapis' and 'Isis', even if Harpocrates signal me with his finger to keep silent. The same first gods in Latium were 'Saturn' and 'Ops'. [58] For Earth and Sky, as the mysteries (*initia*) of the Samothracians teach, are great gods (*dei magni*), and *these*, of whom I have spoken with many names, are not the 'Great Gods' which Samothrace has set up before the city-gates as two male statues of bronze, nor, as the common people think, are these the Samothracian gods, who are Castor and Pollux; but *these* are a male and female, and *these* are the ones the Augurs' Books write of as 'Powerful Deities' (*divi potes*), translating what the Samothracians call 'Powerful Gods' (*theoi dunatoi*). [59] These are two, Sky and Earth, as soul and body (*anima et corpus*).

Both passages explain the Samothracian 'Great Gods' as Earth and Sky, who were called respectively 'Saturn' and 'Ops' in Latium, Saturn's name reflecting his role as the 'sower' ('sator') and thus as father, Ops' name indicating that she, as mother Earth, contains every work ('opus') and that there is need ('opus') of her for living (*Ling.* 5.64), and Varro goes on to say that the same two were also Jupiter and Juno (5.65). Both passages treat the

³⁴ 'valentibus, hoc est' was added by G. Wissowa 1887: 47 (cf. Tert. *De spect.* 8.3), who then says that Earth and Sky explain all three dedications, not just the last.

Samothracian divinities as only two in number, not three, but it cannot be that Varro has simply changed his mind: the *Curio* probably antedates the *Divine Antiquities*, while *On the Latin Language* postdates it.³⁵

Varro's book 15 dealt with gods whose identity was uncertain ('de dis incertis'), including the Penates or 'household gods' of the city of Rome and, in conjunction with these, the 'great gods' of the Samothracian mysteries. There was a Roman tradition connecting the Penates with Samothrace, and Varro's own interpretation of the evidence had Tarquinius Superbus establish the three deities Jupiter, Juno, Minerva in one temple – on the Capitol, while the Penates were housed in the Temple of Vesta – once he had been initiated into the Samothracian cult ('Samothraciis religionibus mystice imbutus'). That the Penates were also identified with the Samothracian gods seems to have been because the Penates were called 'great gods', while the usual way of referring to the Samothracian deities, as we have seen, was as the 'Theoi Megaloi' ('Great Gods'); in addition, both the Penates and the Samothracian Great Gods were often thought to be the Dioscuri, in part owing to statues in the Circus and in Samothrace which represented them, a view which Varro explicitly rejects (*Ling.* 5.58) at least partly because the Dioscuri are two males and do not include a female. Rather, he took both the Penates and the Samothracian gods to be the same as the Capitoline triad of Jupiter, Juno and Minerva.³⁶ As Varro is here dealing with the unidentified gods through their cult statues, and there were three statues dedicated to the 'Great, Powerful, Strong Gods' in the Circus, as we saw in the *Curio*, Varro now interprets them as three gods or aspects of the deity.³⁷ The 'Penates' or household gods Varro understood (Servius auct. *ad Aen.* 2.296 = *RD* 15 fr. 205) as 'those through whom we breathe inwardly (or 'live entirely': 'penitus spiramus'), have our body ('corpus habemus') and possess the reasonings of our mind ('animi rationes possidemus')', identifying them as Jove, the middle aether ('aethera medium'), Juno, the lowest air together with earth ('imum aera cum terra') and Minerva, the highest summit of aether ('summum aetheris cacumen').³⁸

³⁵ Cardauns 1976: 132 dates the *RD* to c. 47/6 BCE. Jocelyn 1982: 204 wants to push the date back, towards 58 BCE at the outside; he is interested in debunking the *communis opinio* that Varro intended his work to usher in a religious restoration, in the face of the troubles of the late Republic.

³⁶ On the 'Theoi Megaloi' of Samothrace, see Cole 1984: esp. 100–2 on Varro.

³⁷ See Kleywegt 1972: 33–5.

³⁸ Varro's statement of the functions of the Penates gives a tripartite anthropology, in line with his identifications of the Penates and their place in the world or macrocosm: the animating spirit or *pneuma* ('spiramus'), body and mind: *anima*, *corpus*, *animus* as Jove (the world-soul and lower aether/upper air), Juno and Minerva.

Antiochean influences?

This interpretation of the Samothracian gods, particularly the interpretation of Juno as earth, rather than air, and that of Minerva as ‘the exemplars of things, which Plato called “ideas”’, has often been thought³⁹ to pinpoint Antiochus, rather than a generic Stoicism or Diogenes of Babylon’s famous book *On Athena*, as the source of Varro’s natural theology. The Athena/Minerva interpretation has been argued⁴⁰ to go back ultimately to Xenocrates and to indicate that Platonic Ideas are already being understood as thoughts in the mind of god, a key tenet of ‘Middle Platonism’.⁴¹ I think that Antiochus may indeed be involved here, but not in the way these scholars have thought.

Varro’s thesis that there are gods of the sky and gods of the earth, the former male and the latter female, may sound a little odd, given that his own natural theology holds that god is one and does not have gender (e.g. *De civ. D.* 7.6, 281.31–282.17). But the oddity is only superficial: when the one god is seen in its active aspect or as Zeus, it is masculine, when seen as passive, it is feminine, so that the division of gods into the two genders is just another way to show the kernel of truth in popular and official religion.⁴² The same thought should also go some way towards explaining Varro’s emphasis on the division of the world into sky and earth. One Stoic way of understanding the cosmos was as ‘a system of sky and earth and of the natures in them’, and another was as the god of cosmogony (cf. Stobaeus, *Anth.* 1.184.8 Wachsmuth = *SVF* 2.168). Augustine said (*De civ. D.* 7.6, cited p. 264 above) that Varro divided the world, all of which was god, into sky and earth in order to introduce a multiplicity of gods, and that seems a reasonable interpretation of Varro’s desire to account for the gods of state religion within a natural theology.

³⁹ Since Hirzel 1877–83: vol. III, 499 n. 1; see also Theiler 1930: 19, 37ff., who argued against prior attempts to ascribe Varro’s interpretation to Posidonius and proposed Antiochus instead, and Cardauns 2001: 59; see now Dillon 2003: 105 and 120.

⁴⁰ See, e.g., the review of this material in Fladerer 1996: 102–11. Boyancé 1955: 74–8, followed by Kleywegt 1972: 43–5 made Antiochus the faithful transmitter of Xenocrates’ teaching on this point; Lévy 1992: 147–8, 554–7, while admitting that Antiochus is probably behind Varro’s interpretation of Minerva, argues against the influence of Xenocrates on Antiochus’ physics.

⁴¹ This notion is sometimes linked to Antiochus via the passage in Varro’s speech (*Ac.* 1.30), where a mistranslation of Cicero’s text has led some to believe that *mens* is said to have been called ‘idea’ by the Old Academy, a name already given it by Plato. See below, n. 45, and above, Inwood p. 202, Boys-Stones pp. 221–4, 235 n. 49.

⁴² For the Stoics in a similar vein, see Diog. Laert. 7.147 = *SVF* 2.1021 and Servius *ad Aen.* 4.638 = *SVF* 2.1070: ‘Note that the Stoics say there is one god, whose names vary with his actions and duties. Whence too divinities are said to be of two sexes: when they are in action (*in actu*) they are males; when they have a passive nature (*patiendi habent naturam*), they are females.’

The bipartite scheme itself appears to be justification enough for the idea that Juno might be equivalent to the earth, since her opposite or partner is the sky. But we should also remember that Varro is not particularly concerned to identify Juno as earth, as opposed to air. In the *Curio* he does not assign any goddess's name to the counterpart of sky, other than 'Earth' itself; in *On the Latin Language*, Varro insists that the two original gods have many names, including not only Saturn and Rhea, but also Jupiter and Juno (*Ling.* 5.58, 5.65). Further, in the course of his explanation of the Penates, Varro apparently identified Juno with the 'lower air together with earth' ('imum aera cum terra': Servius auct. *Aen.* 2.296 and Macrobius, *Sat.* 3.4.7 = *RD* 15 fr. 205; in August., *De civ. D.* 4.10, she is given the *aer*). Thus, it appears that Varro only calls Juno 'earth' when placing her opposite the sky, not when looking at her place in the cosmic ordering of material.

In any case, none of this is a bar to seeing a generally Stoic origin for Varro's interpretation. While the Stoics, along with others, often interpreted Hera as air (Greek ἄήρ, Latin *aer*), an interpretation suggested by an etymology of her name, Chrysippus also interpreted a painting in Samos which portrayed Hera fellating Zeus as a representation of the way in which, having received the seminal principles (σπερματικοὶ λόγοι) of god (Zeus) into itself, matter (ὕλη; Hera) contains them for the establishment of the universe (Origen, *C. Cels.* 4.48 = *SVF* 2.1074). In a scheme where the sky is active Jove, surely this would make earth passive Juno, all the more so when we think that it is earth which receives seeds. We should also note the context of Chrysippus' statement – he is interpreting a painting – and compare it to Varro, who is interpreting statues.

What, though, of the Minervan 'Ideas' as *exempla rerum*? There is certainly very little reason to believe that Varro's interpretation of the Capitoline Minerva owes anything to a theory about the Platonic Ideas which Antiochus supposedly acquired from Xenocrates. For this is the only passage which can be taken to support the attribution of such a theory to Antiochus, and it has nothing in it of the arithmetical forms of the 'monad' and 'dyad' which characterized what we know of Xenocrates' thinking on the subject.⁴³ Neither does Xenocrates' identification of cosmic elements or

⁴³ Monad and dyad are, after all, the starting points of the most extensive account of Xenocrates' cosmos (Aëtius 1.7.30 Diels = fr. 213 Isnardi) and they feature, along with the odd and even and triangles, in various fragments of his cosmology (Plut. *De def. or.* 416Dff. = fr. 222 Isnardi). Xenocrates also called Zeus the 'highest', or 'captain', 'consul' (ὑπαρκτος; Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 1007F = fr. 216 Isnardi), not reserving that place for Athena, apparently. When Xenocrates is quoted directly, he sounds less like Antiochus than when his teaching is summarized. This is not surprising, given Antiochus' influence on the doxographical tradition. The account in Aëtius 1.7.30 even ends with the assertion that Xenocrates supplied these theological points to the Stoa.

regions with members of the Olympian pantheon, which is shared by the Stoa, imply that Antiochus, rather than the Stoa, was the source of Varro's doctrine, even though, as already observed, Antiochus could certainly have been a major source of Stoic thought for Varro.⁴⁴ In fact, we shall be able to discern Antiochus here only if we do not attempt to find here the theory of Forms and their location in the mind of god. And indeed there is good reason to attribute Varro's interpretation of Minerva to Antiochus' influence, for this can be supported from Cicero's account of Antiochus' epistemology in the *Academica*.

Platonic Forms, incorporeal, eternal, paradigmatic entities, played no role in the summary of Antiochus' physics given by Cicero's speaker, Varro. His first mention of Forms or Ideas comes in his summary of 'the original system of philosophy inherited from Plato' (cf. *Ac.* 1.33):

Although the criterion of truth arose from the senses, [they, i.e. the original Academics and Peripatetics said that] it was not in the senses: they wanted mind to be the judge of things: they thought that mind alone should be trusted, because it alone discerned what was always simple and of one kind and just what it was. This they called 'Idea' (so named already by Plato), and we can rightly speak of it as 'Form'.

quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus: mentem uolebant rerum esse iudicem: solam censebant idoneam cui crederetur, quia sola cerneret id, quod semper esset simplex et unius modi et tale quale esset. hanc illi ἰδέαν appellant, iam a Platone ita nominatam, nos recte speciem possumus dicere. (*Ac.* 1.30)⁴⁵

He goes on to enumerate changes ('immutationes': *Ac.* 1.33) to the Platonic system made by the Peripatos, the first of which was Aristotle's attack on the 'Forms, which I mentioned a little while ago and which Plato had so marvellously embraced (*mirifice Plato erat amplexatus*) that he claimed there was something divine in them' (*Ac.* 1.33). The qualifier 'marvellously' or 'wondrously' (which might be rendered 'exceedingly', or even

⁴⁴ It is very odd to take a passage such as *Luc.* 119, where Cicero prefaces the Antiochean position he proposes to attack with the assertion that Antiochus' sage will think this because he is a Stoic, and where there appear typically Stoic features such as the permeation (cf. 'permanet et transeat') of the cosmos by the intelligent world-soul and the doctrine of the conflagration, as showing that von Arnim was wrong to include the passage in his *SVF*, on the grounds that Xenocrates too identified the elements with the traditional pantheon (Fladerer 1996: 111 n. 324).

⁴⁵ The move to think of the 'Forms' here as the 'mind of god' was fostered by scholars (cf. Fladerer 1996: 113–14) who took *mentem* to be the antecedent of *hanc* and ἰδέαν, so that Plato is made to have called the mind 'Form'; but the passage gives much better sense if *hanc* is taken as a replacement for *hoc*, by assimilation to the gender of ἰδέαν. On this last point, cf. Inwood, Chapter 9 above, p. 202. On the question of identifying Forms with the thoughts of god, cf. Boys-Stones, Chapter 10 above, esp. p. 236 n. 52.

‘singularly’) emphasizes the very point that Aristotle changed – correctly – in Antiochus’ view: he eliminated the Forms’ divine status,⁴⁶ that is, their eternal, incorporeal and ‘separate’ existence. The physics attributed to Antiochus by Cicero’s Varro, with its strong Stoic influence, could certainly not have countenanced incorporeal, separate Forms.⁴⁷ Yet Varro’s tone here is critical of both Plato and Aristotle: Aristotle was perhaps wrong to undermine the Forms entirely, and the function performed in the original system’s epistemology by the Forms, as the basis of knowledge – which the Platonists ‘thought existed only in the concepts and reasonings of the mind’ (‘in animi notionibus atque rationibus’), could have remained unchanged for Antiochus even as he assigned new and different items to perform it.

How this works is not spelled out in the speech Cicero assigns to Varro, but can be fleshed out with the aid of these passages from the *Lucullus*:

Such are the things which we say are apprehended by the senses, and such are those which follow them too, which are not said to be apprehended by the senses themselves, but in a certain way by the senses, for example: ‘that is white’, ‘this is sweet’, ‘that is tuneless’, ‘this is fragrant’, ‘this is rough’. We have our comprehension of these now by the mind (*animo iam haec tenemus comprehensa*), not the senses. Next, ‘that is a horse’, ‘that is a dog’. Then follows the other series, weaving together greater things, such as these, which embrace, so to speak, a complete comprehension (*comprehensionem*) of things: ‘if something is human it is a mortal animal partaking of reason’. From this kind (of impressions) the conceptions of things (*notitiae rerum*)⁴⁸ are impressed in us, and without them nothing can be understood, investigated or debated. (*Luc.* 21)

Indeed, how can there be any expertise (*ars*) which does not consist, not of one or two, but of many apprehensions of the mind (*animi perceptionibus*)? But if you eliminate that, how will you tell the expert (*artificem*) from the layman? For we will not just say randomly that one man is an expert while denying it of another, but only when we see that one has knowledgeable apprehensions (*percepta et comprehensa tenere*) and the other does not... The same is true for the related expertises whose job consists in making and doing (*faciendo atque agendo*): what could be accomplished by expertise, if the person who will use it will not have apprehended many things (*multa perceperit*)? (*Luc.* 22)

⁴⁶ Compare Cicero’s usage when alluding to the Forms in the Antiochean critique of Stoic ethics at *Fin.* 4.42: ‘ut quidam philosophi, cum, a sensibus profecti, maiora quaedam et diviniore vidissent, sensus reliquerunt...’ (‘As some philosophers abandoned the senses, when, beginning from the senses, they saw certain greater and more divine things...’).

⁴⁷ This point is made in the context of a fine discussion of Antiochus’ epistemology by Görler 1990: 129–33 and 1994: 951–3.

⁴⁸ At the beginning of 22, Lucullus uses the term ‘notitiae’ again, ‘because you [*sc.* Cicero] were apparently calling ἐννοιαί *notitiae*’.

Most of all, the understanding of the virtues confirms that many things can be apprehended and comprehended (*percipi et comprehendī*). In these things alone do we say that scientific knowledge (*scientiam*) consists, which we believe is not a mere comprehension (*comprehensionem*) of things, but a secure and unchangeable (*stabilem et immutabilem*) one. The same goes for wisdom (*sapientiam*), the art of living, which derives its consistency (*constantiam*) from itself. (*Luc.* 23)

Here Lucullus has described an entirely Stoic theory of knowledge, but his terminology is clearly reflected in *Academica* 1 by the briefer report of the Academy assigned to Varro. What is here described in Stoic terms – scientific knowledge as a system of cognitive impressions – is there represented as knowledge of the Platonic ‘Ideas’, so that knowledge’s characteristic immutability and stability are provided, so to speak, by the objects of knowledge, rather than by some condition of the knowledgeable mind. None the less, just as Platonic knowledge exists only in ‘the concepts and reasonings of our mind’, so Stoic or Antiochean knowledge consists in a solid system of ‘conceptions of things’ which the mind has hold of unshakeably.

Let us now try to apply what we have learned about Antiochus’ epistemology to Varro’s theology, and in particular his accommodation of multiple, civic, traditional deities, such as Minerva, within a basically Stoic framework.

Given Varro’s identification of Minerva as the mind, it is reasonable to look for possible influences on him in the role in creation played by the mind. For Antiochus, as we saw, this role was defined in terms of artistic expertise: what separated the expert from the layman was the expert’s possession of *percepta* and *comprehensa*, based on many sensory experiences and leading ultimately, in the sage, to *scientia*. Concepts and acts of comprehension arose from the senses but were not themselves sensory: they were in the mind, and they were the basis for judgements. Now in Stoicism, of course, expertise is also a divine attribute. For Chrysippus, god or Zeus was identifiable with the seminal principles of the cosmos (Diog. Laert. 7.136), and under the name of Hephaestus, the expert or artistic fire (πῦρ τεχνικόν: Diog. Laert. 7.147, Aëtius 1.7.33 = *SVF* 2.1027), the substance of nature (φύσις) itself (Diog. Laert. 7.156), nature itself being ‘a disposition moved by itself, accomplishing and sustaining the things which come from it in accordance with seminal principles at fixed times and doing the sort of actions by which those things were made; moreover, it aims at benefit and pleasure, as is clear from human craftsmanship’ (Diog. Laert. 7.148–9). Comparing Varro’s Antiochean reconstruction of the Academy’s epistemology in *Academica* 1 with the characteristic Stoic

blend of epistemology, theology and metaphysics, we can see that what Antiochus appears to have done, in an attempt to make Platonism compatible with this scheme, is to interpret Platonic exemplars as correlates and forerunners of the Stoic seminal principles. Admittedly, the fit is not exact, since the seminal principles are self-moving, developing into things on their own by virtue of the spirit (πνεῦμα) they contain, rather than serving as exemplars to be copied by some other active principle.⁴⁹ But of course the Platonic Forms were soon discarded as unsatisfactory (a sign of philosophical progress) and ultimately replaced by the self-moving, self-fulfilling *spermatikoi logoi*. Antiochus' contribution to the historiography of philosophy was then adapted by Varro as a contribution to the historiography of religion: the three oldest known gods are to be interpreted as representing the ancients' portrayal of the three aspects of the cosmic creative process, and Minerva in particular as the stable Forms according to which things came to be. This portrayal was imperfect, but perhaps it was intentionally so, in order that the cosmic process could be represented in terms more closely evocative of the process of artistic creation than the description usually given by the Stoa.

It might be objected that Varro could just as easily have made Jupiter the world-soul's reason or mind, which would have been no less Stoic than casting Athena/Minerva in that role.⁵⁰ However, the three statues he saw in the Circus induced him to interpret the civic figures of the Penates – and hence their Samothracian correlates – as three deities, and to modify his usual bipartition of divinity into Jove and Juno, giving the objects of god's expert, craftsmanlike knowledge their own name: Minerva. We do not know whether Antiochus preceded him in this tripartition of the world-soul, but the high theological status Varro gives to 'exemplars of things, which Plato called ἰδέαι' is good evidence that he got his understanding of the nature of knowledge and artistic creation from Antiochus' epistemology and from his history of philosophy.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Indeed, as David Sedley reminds me, Calcidius (294, p. 296.11–16 Waszink) says that the Stoics made pretty much this criticism of Plato, that there was no need to have god create the sensible world using exemplars, since the *spermatikoi logoi* were all that was needed.

⁵⁰ See, e.g., Diog. Laert. 7.147 and Philodemus, *On Piety* col. 361 Obbink (*PHerc.* 1428.15), where Athena is associated with the reaching of the 'commanding part' of Zeus into the aether; in the latter passage, she is also said to be 'wisdom' (φρόνησις), which consists of the three discourses of physics, ethics and logic.

⁵¹ It may also be that Antiochus' interpretation of the relation between the senses and the judgements which we base on them but actually make in our minds owes something to Xenocrates and the Academic idea of 'scientific perception' (ἐπιστημονικὴ αἴσθησις), but the differences from Xenocrates' theology seem to me to bar the attribution of Varro's theology to him.

One other inference can safely be made. As Antiochus did not think the *percepta et comprehensa* were incorporeal, since they were impressed on our mind, neither did Varro. When Augustine claims that Minerva was ‘above the sky’ (‘super ipsum caelum’) he is not alluding to a Platonic ‘place above the heavens’ (the ὑπερουράνιος τόπος of *Phaedrus* 247c3), as has been argued.⁵² Rather, it forms part of Augustine’s now-familiar complaint that Varro’s theology was inconsistent: he abandoned his tripartite scheme, ‘for to the sky he assigned the male gods, females to the earth, and among the latter he has placed Minerva, whom he had earlier placed above the sky itself’ (*De civ. D.* 7.28).⁵³

There is another kind of indication that the proximate source of Varro’s understanding of theology may have been Antiochus, rather than the Stoics: his openness to doubt and uncertainty in this area. Cicero’s Antiochus castigates the Academics for believing that everything is ‘hidden’, owing to their refusal to see the light which nature has given us in the form of the apprehensive impression (*Ac.* 1.45). He nevertheless acknowledges that some things are hidden, especially in the philosophy of nature (1.15, 1.19), though they are susceptible to rational enquiry. Similarly, Varro confesses that he does not have knowledge of the select gods cultivated at Rome: ‘but as Xenophanes of Colophon writes, I shall put down what I think (*putem*), not what I should argue for (*contendam*): it is for a man to have belief (*opinari*) about these matters, for a god to know them’ (*De civ. D.* 7.17, 295.22ff. = *RD* 16 fr. 228). He also says that he will write ‘doubtful opinions’ (‘dubias . . . opinionones’) about the ‘uncertain gods’ who are the subject of book 15, and that he could sooner be led to call into doubt what he said in his first book than take everything he will write in this book and organize it into some sort of system (‘ad aliquam dirigam summam’: *De civ. D.* 7.17, 295.12 = *RD* 15 fr. 204).

Jocelyn appositely contrasts Cicero’s Stoic spokesman Balbus in *Nat. D.* 2.2:⁵⁴ ‘A philosopher, a pontifex or a Cotta should not have a

⁵² Most particularly by Boyancé 1955: 74, followed by, e.g., Kleywegt 1972: 42–3.

⁵³ Servius *ad Aen.* 4.201, where Minerva is said to be ‘above the aether’, which is Jove (‘[ignis] est autem in templo Iovis, qui aether est, et Minervae, quae supra aethrem est; unde de patris capite procreata esse dicitur’), must not be taken as confirmation of the thesis that Minerva is above and outside the heavens. It seems to be a version of what Augustine at *De civ. D.* 4.10 (158.10–15) argues about Minerva. She is not allocated one of the three or four elemental regions of the world, so where is she? If they say she occupies the upper part of the aether, which is why the poets invented her birth from Jove’s head, then why is she not made queen of the gods, as being above Jove? (‘Simul enim cum his in Capitolio constituta est [sc. Minerva], cum ista filia non sit amborum. Aut si aetheris partem superiorem Mineruam tenere dicunt et hac occasione fingere poetas quod de Iouis capite nata sit: cur non ergo ipsa potius deorum regina deputatur, quod sit Ioue superior?’).

⁵⁴ Jocelyn 1982: 202.

wandering, shifting (*errantem et vagam*) view about the immortal gods as the Academics do, but a firm and certain (*stabilem certamque*) one, as we do.' Certainty is also attributed to Antiochus in various passages, for example in Varro's account of his stance on the highest good in *De civ. D.* 19.1, on which the Old Academy is said to have doctrines which are 'certain' and 'to be as free of error as from doubt', and this echoes Antiochus' affirmation of Zeno's thesis that opinion is weak or false assent (*Ac.* 1.41). Such certainty belongs only to the sage (and the gods) and, when one is not a sage, perhaps one can be certain only about central points of doctrine, such as the highest human good. Varro is embarked on a new study, the understanding of Roman antiquity, which has been lost from sight, and he is surely justified in expressing doubt about such matters, as Antiochus did, for different reasons, about some of the problems thrown up by natural philosophy. For Stoic or Old Academic doctrines themselves are not in play, although Varro's interpretation ultimately relies on such doctrines. One area in which uncertainty of belief and obscurity of subject matter go hand in hand is the etymology of divine names, as we shall now see.

ETYMOLOGY

The role of etymology in Varro's theology

For the first 170 years of its existence, according to Varro, Rome had no anthropomorphic gods. He said that those who introduced images of gods both removed fear from their cities (since gods are more easily despised in corporeal guise) and added error (*De civ. D.* 4.31, 186.21–31 = *RD* 1 fr. 18). Images of the gods were first introduced to Rome by Tarquinius Superbus, who as a son of the Corinthian Demaratus had been initiated into the Samothracian mysteries and brought to Rome the Greek practice of symbolizing immaterial realities by rituals involving material objects. As we have seen, Varro said that only the wise understood the true nature of god as the world-soul and he praised the scientific understanding of the gods.

It thus makes perfect sense for Varro to affirm (*De civ. D.* 4.31, 185.18–29 = *RD* 1 fr. 12) that, were he founding the Roman state anew, he would establish the gods and their names 'following nature's system' ('*ex naturae potius formula*'). But as it is, since he finds himself in a long established nation, 'he is obliged to preserve, in the form in which it has been transmitted, the *historia* ("research", "investigation", "history") of the

gods' names and appellations which has been received from the ancients'. That is the method he will use to enable the Romans to worship their gods. One of the main tools of Varronian theology is etymology, which he pursues by the method of *historia*, in order to discover and investigate the divine and cultic things from which and for which names were invented by Rome's founders; and the ultimate aim of this scholarly attempt to recover the wisdom of the ancients was, Augustine reports, to revive the traditions of popular worship of the traditional deities. Varro thinks of the information thus revealed as mysteries belonging to the kings who invented the words, and he also seems to have had a classification of four kinds of etymology which could be seen as parallel to the tripartite theology he espoused. For this reason, Varro's theological and etymological theories and practices have often been viewed together, and both have at times been traced back to the Stoa and to Antiochus.⁵⁵

Methodology in the study of language

Varro's etymological inquiries, theological and not, must be understood first of all in the context of his broader conception of the tripartite nature of language, as set out in *De lingua Latina*. It embraces names and their origins; their derivations and inflexions; and their combination to express a complete thought: hence the three disciplines of etymology, inflectional morphology, and syntax. The central fact about each of Varro's three parts of language is their dependence upon reason, *ratio*. But the dependence is different in each case, and as a result the methods applied by the investigator will receive a different emphasis in each discipline.

Inflexion – what Varro calls 'natural inflexion' ('declinatio naturalis') – follows the *ratio* of nature, and hence needs to be studied by an *ars*, which comprises brief rules applicable to myriad cases. In contrast, 'coinage' or 'imposition' ('impositio') of each of the 'first-born words' ('verba primigenia'), an individual act of invention ('fingere'), has to be studied by *historia*, research into each particular coinage, its manner and its reasons. And even with the other kind of 'inflexion', that of derivative forms (Varro's 'voluntary inflexion' ('declinatio voluntaria'), so called because each is a coinage made in an individual act of will by the coiner), *ars* does not seem to get us as far as it does with inflectional forms of the first type. We can fairly reliably guess the case or tense forms of a word we have just heard for the first time;

⁵⁵ The case for Antiochus has been put especially by Boyancé in a series of articles spanning two decades, to which the last two (Boyancé 1975 and 1976) provide good introductions; he is supported by, e.g., Cardauns 1978: 84–5 and 2001: 55–60.

we can guess the form of a derivative using the same kind of proportion or ‘analogy’ (ἀναλογία, ‘analogia’, ‘similitudo’, ‘ratio pro portione’) as we use for case forms, since the coiner has usually derived one word from another in a rational manner, on the analogy of other, similar words: ‘legere: lector :: scribere: scriptor’ (‘read is to reader as write is to writer’, 8.57). But if, say, we try to guess what citizens of Parma are called, we may well be wrong. If we are wrong, it is because the ‘Parmenses’ were named by someone who chose a different model from, for example, that used to invent the more familiar name ‘Romani’ for the citizens of Roma (8.6–7, 8.21–2; cf. 8.52–7, 10.15). In practice, investigation of both inflectional and derivational morphology would adopt similar methods; but whereas in the former *analogia* would supply most of the answers, and we would resort less often to *historia* – appealing to what were called *vetustas* (‘antiquity’) and *auctoritas* (‘authority’) by Roman grammarians – and to *usus* (‘common usage’, also called *consuetudo* or συνήθεια), the *ars* which treats derived forms would assign *historia* a rather greater role, while still using a number of different canons or criteria.

Crucially, then, the study of derived words introduces an unavoidable element of uncertainty; and we can again detect Stoic influence here, not only in the details of its etymologies, but also in the structuring of the world which serves in turn to structure his exposition of etymologies. Admittedly, it is not at all clear that etymology had its own place in the Stoic system; indeed, Chrysippus’ works on it are ranged under ‘the articulation of ethical concepts’ in the bibliography preserved by Diogenes Laertius. But we do know something of his application of etymology, for in well-known passages regarding fate and the location of human thought and consciousness, where we do not have perceptions such as to allow us to produce proofs, he turns to etymologies, along with other linguistic and para-linguistic indications such as citations from poets: these are referred to as ‘witnesses’ or ‘co-testimonials’ and as ‘plausibilities’ (πιθανά). As such, these witnesses lend persuasiveness to theses and make us more likely to assent to them, but they are not proofs and the points they make are not necessarily true ones.⁵⁶ In the same way, I think Varro avails himself of etymologies as part of his *historia*, relying on them, along with poetic testimony, old documents, inscriptions, monuments, and so forth, to reveal the long-lost antiquities of Rome, which are necessarily unavailable for direct study.

⁵⁶ See Atherton 1993: 92–7, esp. 95–6, 103 n. 72; Tieleman 1996: 202–3, 267–73.

Etymological practice

What, then, does the etymologist do? Space forbids my arguing all the following points here, but I want at least to give an idea of what I think Varro is doing when he talks about etymology.⁵⁷ At the beginning of his etymological books, Varro explains (*Ling* 5.2) that each word has two *naturae*, namely, the thing from which ('a qua re') it was coined and the thing for which ('in qua re') it was coined. For example, the etymologist shows what thing the word 'pertinacia' comes from when he shows that it is from being obstinate (a predicate), and he shows what thing it is coined for by showing that there is *pertinacia* ('obstinacy') wherever there is unwarranted persistence, because if persistence is rightly present, that is *perseverantia* rather than *pertinacia*. The study of the things from which words are coined is called by the Greek name *etumologia*, while the study of the things for which they are coined is called *peri sēmainomenōn* ('about things which are signified'), and Varro says he will deal with both topics without differentiation, though the latter will be treated less fully. He goes on to explain (5.3) that these matters are rather obscure for a variety of reasons: not every coinage survives, since age has destroyed some; not every coinage which survives is correct; not every correct coinage remains correct since many words have had their letters (that is, letter-sounds) changed; not every word-origin begins from native Latin words; and many words now signify something different from what they signified before.

Since Varro's books 5–7 centre on the methods which investigate the two *naturae* of words, his double investigation will be fundamentally about things, and about words as pointing to these. And since his subjects – ancient Roman institutions, their gods, and the like – are not available to our senses in a straightforward manner, given that they are obscured by time or by nature, he is justified in using words to investigate them, as we saw above (pp. 279–81); and this holds good despite Socrates' insistence in the *Cratylus* (438d–439b) that we do better to investigate things through themselves and their relations than through words. But in some sense Varro is still following Socrates.⁵⁸ For what he investigates is what he thinks of as the family relations of words and of the things signified by those

⁵⁷ For detailed argumentation, see Blank 2008.

⁵⁸ *Crat.* 438e: 'Through what else, then, do you expect to learn about things? Through anything other than through that very thing which is fitting and right, through one another, if they are somehow kin (συγγενῆ), and through themselves?'

words.⁵⁹ By showing how the members of an entire family of words are related to one another, Varro shows the ways in which the things named are related as well, and we see both the things from which certain names are derived (the ‘sources’) and the things signified by these derived names (the ‘targets’), along with the relation between the source and target things. He thinks (7.4), for instance, that by showing that *equitatus* (‘cavalry’) comes from *equites* (‘cavalrymen’), *equites* from *eques* (‘cavalryman’), and *eques* from *equus* (‘horse’) he has taught something valuable, even if he cannot find the origin of *equus* itself. If he is claiming to have revealed something merely about the words themselves, whose relation was already clear, that seems a rather banal revelation; but it is perhaps less so, if Varro thinks that something is thereby revealed about the formation of the Roman cavalry. Thus when he studies words and their relationships, he reconstructs the antiquities themselves, too, reinforcing the necessarily uncertain information provided by individual etymologies by the accumulation of many related ones.

Influences

The Stoic affiliations of many of Varro’s etymologies, as well as of his ordering of the world, according to which he orders the etymologies he gives, were shown in some detail by Dahlmann, who never mentions Antiochus.⁶⁰ Varro himself mentions Cleanthes in addition to the grammarian Aristophanes as those whose works he studied. So, why look further? One possibility is that Varro’s privileging of *analogiae* or *similitudines* between word-forms over *consuetudo*, or ordinary usage, as guides to correctness in language was taken to put him, at least in the doctrine of flexion, on the opposite side from Chrysippus, who is taken to have been an advocate of *anomalía*, ‘irregularity’ in word formation. Once this connection was made, unless one wanted – *absit omen* – to emphasize Varro’s

⁵⁹ See, e.g., *Ling* 8.3: ‘Inflection has been introduced not only into Latin speech, but that of all men because it is useful and necessary. For if this had not been done, we should be able neither to learn such a vast number of words (for there are infinite natures into which they are inflected) nor would what we learn from them be clear, namely what kinship there is of things among themselves (*quae inter se rerum cognatio esset*). As it is, we can see this, because the offspring is similar [to its source]. When *legi* (“I have collected”) is inflected from *lego* (“I am collecting”), two things are clear at once: they are said to be in some way the same, and it is not done at the same time. But if, just to have a word, one of them was called “Priamus” and the other “Hecuba”, that would not signify in addition a unity, which is clear in *lego* and *legi* or in *Priamus* (nominative) and *Priamo* (dative).’ See also 8.4 (kinships among words), 5.13 (community of words).

⁶⁰ Dahlmann 1932.

originality, one might want to go looking for a source who could advocate analogy but still take over Stoic etymology, perhaps because it ultimately stems from the etymological theory and practice of Plato's *Cratylus*. Such a person might be Antiochus.

An argument for tracing Varro's method to Antiochus was made in a number of papers by Pierre Boyancé. He starts from Varro's description of the four levels or 'steps' ('gradus') of explanation of the origins of individual words:⁶¹ the lowest is that which the people ('populus') can do, for even they can see the origins of compound words such as *argentifodinae* ('silver mines'). The second is that of 'old grammar', which showed how a poet created ('finxit') a particular word which he derived ('declinavit'), as with Pacuvius' *incurvicervicum pecus* ('incurved-necked flock'). The third is the level to which philosophy ascended and began to reveal even the words which were in common usage, such as what *via* ('way', 'road') gets its name from. The fourth (and, while the previous three had some textual problems, here the text is truly miserable) is that where the entrance ('aditus') – or 'sanctuary', ('adytum') – is and the beginnings – or 'mysteries', *initia* – of the king. Varro's own ambitions are modest (5.8). If on the highest level he cannot achieve scientific knowledge ('scientia'), at least he will cast about for opinion ('opinionem aucupabor'), as does a physician at times when we are ill,⁶² and if he will not have reached the highest level, he will certainly still go beyond the second level, since he has spent late nights not only by the lamp of Aristophanes, but also by that of Cleanthes (5.9). He wants to do more than merely expound how the words of the poets were invented, and we may infer that that is why he added something he had taken from Stoic philosophy to what he had learned from Alexandrian grammar. He could not content himself by seeking the source for a word made by Ennius, while ignoring that which King Latinus made long before, given that he gets pleasure rather than utility from many poetic words, but more utility than pleasure from ancient words. In fact, those words he has inherited from King Romulus are more Varro's own than those left behind by Livius Andronicus.

So Varro seems to be quite confident of performing on the third, philosophical level of etymological explanation, but uncertain of the extent to which he can achieve a complete and systematic mastery of the mysterious

⁶¹ The text of this much-discussed passage is notoriously poor; the version of Kent 1938 seems to me broadly acceptable. For comment and further possible emendations, see R. Schröter 1963: 79–100, with group discussion in 101–16.

⁶² For physicians' conjectures, see below on Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.179; for *opinio*, note the places mentioned above, where Varro casts doubt on the results of his investigations into the gods.

fourth level. With 'the mysteries of the king', and the role of ancient kings such as Latinus as namegivers, it is easy to connect the claims Varro makes in the *Divine Antiquities* that only the wise understand the true nature of the gods⁶³ and that the ancients set up the images of the gods so that those who entered these mysteries of teaching, when they saw the images with their eyes, would see with their minds the true gods.⁶⁴ Boyancé goes beyond this, however, to view the king who gave names and saw the truth about things as a double of the 'legislator' (νομοθέτης), the ideal namegiver of the *Cratylus*. But the level of 'the mysteries of the king' is *not* the level of scientific interpretation: that was the third level, which Varro learned from Cleanthes. The highest level is rather the level of lost Roman antiquity: it is the level at which the etymologist explains how the kings encoded their insights into the gods' nature and civic use in the traditional names and titles of civic religion. It may be cast as the highest level because it requires a great deal of careful research into ancient Roman monuments, inscriptions, poetry and customs, as well as knowledge of Stoic natural philosophy. Of course it is evident that Stoic etymology borrowed extensively from the *Cratylus*, both in general and in specific etymologies. But Socrates' legislator and the dialectician who is needed to direct his work are simply not the same as Varro's king(s) and etymologist (his own role), and that in two ways: Varro does not work by a knowledge of dialectic, by 'cutting reality at the joints'; and he tries to learn about reality by examining words, which is Cratylus' dream, not Socrates' project.

Varro goes on to cite (5.11) a doctrine of Pythagoras to the effect that the principles of all things ('omnium rerum initia') are pairs, as finite and infinite, good and bad, life and death, day and night. Therefore, he says, 'rest and motion' ('status' and 'motus') are also two, and these form a quadripartition into 'body, place, time, action' ('corpus, locus, tempus, actio'), for example: the runner ('cursor'), the course where he runs ('stadium'), the time when he runs ('hora'), his running ('cursio'). Since these are the elementary classes ('genera prima') of things, says Varro, they will also be the elementary classes of words, and he will order his etymologies following this scheme, dealing with places and things which are in them first, then with times and the actions which take place in them. This appeal to Pythagoras is taken by Boyancé to link Varro's namegiving wise kings to the legislator of the *Cratylus* again, but also to Pythagoreanism or to Pythagoras himself, for whom the saying is recorded that 'the wisest is number, second is that which gave names to things' (Iambl. *VP* 18.82;

⁶³ *De civ. D.* 4.31, cited above, p. 264.

⁶⁴ *De civ. D.* 7.5, cited above, pp. 267–8.

cf. Cic., *Tusc.* 1.62).⁶⁵ Boyancé says that the most likely person to combine Pythagorean with Stoic doctrine was Antiochus, who was therefore Varro's source. In the same way, he thinks that the combination of Plato and Pythagoras originated with Speusippus and, especially, Xenocrates, and was transmitted to Varro by Antiochus. Boyancé further supports the attribution to Antiochus by citing Philo of Alexandria's ranking of Adam and Moses as kingly namegivers (*Quaest. in Genesin* 1.20, *De op. mundi* 148), which he says came from Antiochus to Philo via Eudorus.⁶⁶

It is true that Varro was heavily influenced in various ways by (what he took to be) Pythagoreanism.⁶⁷ Varro wanted to be buried with Pythagorean rites, mentions Pythagoras elsewhere (as we saw in the *Logistoricus Curio*) and was interested in the powers of numbers.⁶⁸ But I doubt that we should give much weight to this particular appeal to Pythagoras. Others have noted that Varro used much the same quadripartite scheme of organization in other works and have therefore concluded that the scheme is not specifically related to etymology; it may rather go back to rhetorical schemata which will have formed part of Varro's education and to which he could therefore easily tend to recur whenever he needed to organize large quantities of facts.⁶⁹ Varro's quadripartite scheme also has a close resemblance to the organization of *historia* proposed by Asclepiades of Myrlea, and it would not be at all surprising to find that Varro took over a method of organizing historical facts to allow him to order the world of things whose names he is investigating.⁷⁰ Further, the **quadripartition** is not actually attributed to Pythagoras at all; it is constructed by Varro on the Pythagorean principle of the **bi**partition of the elements of things, which perhaps gives a philosophical *cachet* to the historical theory. Boyancé also overlooks the fact that it is Posidonius (Sen. *Ep. mor.* 90.5ff.) who is attested to have attributed names to kings, while Pythagoras' saying is non-committal on the namegiver's identity, and when Iamblichus expands on it (*VP* 11.56) he speaks of the namegiver as a god, daemon, or divine man, but not as a king.

I think that scholars have felt emboldened in their ascription of a large role to Pythagoras in Varro's thought about etymology because of the importance of analogy in the analysis of *ratio* in Varro's books on flexion.

⁶⁵ Besides the reference to the namegiver, Boyancé also refers to Goldschmidt's theory that the doctrine of Euthydemus in the *Cratylus* rested on a Pythagorean theory of analogy (Goldschmidt 1940: 65; Boyancé also refers to his own 1941: 172–3; see also Michel 1965: 70 and 1978: 165).

⁶⁶ He reached a similar conclusion regarding the ideas in the mind of god, which he found in Varro's *Minerva* and in Philo. A summary of both arguments is found in Boyancé 1976.

⁶⁷ See, e.g., Görler 1994: 975.

⁶⁸ On Varro and Pythagoreanism, again with Antiochus as middleman, see, e.g., Grilli 1979.

⁶⁹ See, e.g., Skydsgaard 1968: 92ff. and Tarver 1997.

⁷⁰ See Sext. *Emp.*, *Math.* 1.253 and 1.257, with Blank 1998: 268; also, Cicero, *De or.* 2.52–3.

Since these scholars are convinced that Stoics could not have advocated analogy, they are happy to see someone else – namely Pythagoras – behind Varro's mathematical description of the analogical procedure and also to see Antiochus between him and Varro. Yet not only does Varro not cite Pythagoras in his description of analogy (*Ling.* 10.36ff.), he does not always refer to analogy as such and under the guise of proportion: it is also a matter of 'similarity' ('similitudo'), which could also have a methodological, indeed an epistemological interpretation, as we shall see. In fact, there is every reason to think that the Stoics were themselves advocates of analogy's role in language and that Varro's description of a battle between 'analogists' and 'anomalists' has been thoroughly and disastrously misunderstood.⁷¹

On the other hand, one aspect of Varro's etymological enquiries may point to Antiochean influence in an unexpected area. Take Lucullus' description of the power of mind in *Lucullus* 30–1. This is summarized in *Ac.* 1.42 by the speaker Varro's description of how Zeno the Stoic corrected Plato: nature has given us apprehension as a kind of measure and starting point for scientific knowledge of herself ('quasi normam scientiae et principium sui'); this is the source of our (pre)conceptions and in turn not only of starting points but of 'certain broader roads to the discovery of reason or method (*ratio*)'. Now the guide throughout *On the Latin Language* is *natura* and her *ratio*, and the goal is following this *ratio* and the way in which those who gave names understood it; and Varro's method and rationale for etymology in particular seem to me in accord with what is ascribed to Antiochus in the *Academica*, although there is nothing in it which could not already have belonged to Chrysippus. But elsewhere there is evidence of a special Antiochean twist. When speaking of the original Platonic philosophy Cicero's Varro (*Ac.* 1.32) defines etymology as 'the explanation of words, that is, for what reason things were given their names' and classifies it as a tool by which reason can learn the truth. Such tools were needed because Plato held that we could not trust our senses, only the mind. That view was of course abandoned by Aristotle and Zeno; Antiochus should therefore no longer assign the same role to etymology as he said Plato did. What, then, was Antiochus' alternative?

One strong possibility is that he, like Varro, would have reserved etymology for the investigation of things of which we cannot, for whatever reason, get apprehensive impressions. Varro's doubts about his ever attaining knowledge of the words and institutions of the distant Roman past, and his claim to have only opinion about them, may well license us to think that he is putting a Stoic method of etymology to use within an Antiochean

⁷¹ See Blank 2005 for further details and references.

framework. Investigation of such material will not yield certainty, at least not immediately. But thinking about kinship groups of words and things and their interrelations (their similarity, dissimilarity, and so on) may help the etymologist to organize – to ‘co-exercise’, to use the Stoic jargon (*SVF* 1.73, 2.93–7, 3.214) – his apprehensions and other, non-cognitive impressions, in such a way as to encourage the development, if possible, of a true expertise. This will demand the construction of a network, rather than a mere list, of explanations, some certain, some less so, of words and the ways they are adapted to the things they name. Admittedly, a variant on this way of assessing one’s appearances, by a process of cross-checking, seems to have been constructed in the ‘sceptical’ Academy. Sextus’ report (*Math.* 7.179) of Carneades’ πιθανόν or ‘plausible’ criterion of action (166; but cf. 172) uses the paradigm of physicians’ conjectures: they draw their conclusion about the patient’s fever not from any one symptom, such as temperature, alone, but from a whole ‘syndrome’ or confluence of related symptoms: temperature, pulse, soreness, flushing, thirst, and the like. The Academic likewise makes his judgement of what to do in response to an impression by considering a syndrome of related impressions: when none of them draws him away or pulls him back (περισπώσης) by seeming false, he accepts it. There was, however, a similar move in the later Stoa to treat appearances not in isolation, but against a background of other appearances (*Math.* 7.253–6), and, while Varro, as we saw, casts doubt in advance on the results of his investigations into the gods, he does not indicate that uncertainty is always and everywhere to be expected and accepted by the etymologist. Rather, like Antiochus, he carefully circumscribes the area within which doubt is legitimate.

EXPOSITION

One last point remains to be made, about Varro’s way of writing the whole of *De lingua Latina*; and here too Antiochean influence may be at work. If we can judge from the surviving examples of books 8–10 and from what Varro says about the lost books 2–4, then for each of the three divisions of language – the imposition of names, their inflection, and their combination – he began with one book which argued against the possibility and the usefulness of the expertise required – etymology, analogy, and logical syntax, respectively. Each such book was followed by a book of arguments in favour of each expertise; and each of these in turn was followed by an exposition, by Varro himself, of the structure (‘forma’) and content of the expertise, on the assumption that its right to existence

and its usefulness alike have now been established. This scheme has been described as arguing 'on both sides of the issue' ('in utramque partem'),⁷² and to some extent that is what it is. But Varro's practice seems somewhat different from what Cicero does in the dialogues where he follows that technique, which, he says, he learned from Philo of Larissa. In some of the dialogues he introduces the discussion; in some he actually takes one of the parts; but, although he may have the final word, he does not claim to have resolved the issues under discussion and he does not take on Varro's magisterial tone.

The standard New Academic method seems to have met with nothing but contempt from Antiochus. Cicero's speaker Lucullus, in the last argument he advances in Antiochus' name, criticizes the Academic claim that one should speak both against and for everything in order to discover the truth. He asks, what have they actually 'discovered'? They say they do not want to display their own view, but why hide it like a mystery or something shameful? The reason they give is that they do not want their students to be guided by authority, but by reason; but would it be worse if they were guided by both (*Luc.* 60)? The Academic practice was already known to Chrysippus, but the passage of Plutarch (*Stoic. rep.* 1035A ff.) which comments on Chrysippus' precepts in this area does not cite objections like those made by Lucullus, focusing rather on students' susceptibility to merely plausible arguments and their shaky hold on their apprehensions. Chrysippus' recommendation is that, if one does expose students to another, false view, one ought not to expose them at all to arguments for such a view, when they are not yet in a position to see those arguments for what they really are. In contrast, while Antiochus is aware that people often do not appreciate just how secure their own cognitive appearances are (*Luc.* 46), he is persuaded of the value of countering Academic arguments (*Luc.* 17), and he also seems to have seen the advantages of combining reasoned support for a view with the authority of a respected teacher. This might be taken to offer theoretical justification for Varro's practice of combining argumentation *pro* and *contra* a given position, himself taking on the rebuttal and settling the matter at the end in a display of his own authority. In that case, the structure of *On the Latin Language* could be a legacy of Antiochus.

⁷² Dahlmann 1935: 1174–5; see the fine discussion in Ax 1995.

CHAPTER 13

Other followers of Antiochus

Carlos Lévy

At first sight it might seem hard to write a whole chapter on a theme both as restrictive and as heterogeneous as the above title suggests. But in reality the topic is far richer than first impressions make clear. True, there is a lesser concern about the rather disparate group constituted by the ‘other’ followers (other, that is, than Varro, the subject of the preceding chapter),¹ but any effort to unify this group could only be artificial and consequently has not been attempted here.

Since Antiochus’ brother Aristus, and likewise Theomnestes, seem to have been purely teachers of Antiochus’ doctrine, I have included their own disciples in this study, namely Brutus and Horace, even though they were not the direct disciples of Antiochus himself. In addition, with regard to Lucullus, I have tried to paint a more realistic picture than the one we find in Cicero’s eponymous dialogue. He was certainly a cultivated man (his expansive library is testimony to this), and he was interested in philosophy, but with no deep commitment to its study. More generally, one can wonder how far-reaching Antiochus’ influence was on the Roman aristocrats who were ostensibly interested in his doctrines.

THE ALEXANDRIAN QUESTION

Aristo, Dio and others

In ‘Antiochus in Alexandria’, the epilogue to his opening chapter of his 1978 book *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, John Glucker took it upon himself to destroy ‘a legend’, namely the idea that it was Antiochus’ passing through Alexandria that triggered the development in that city of Middle Platonist and Eclectic philosophy.² There is indeed a long list given by Glucker of those who have seen in the opening of Cicero’s *Lucullus* the

¹ An exhaustive list of these ‘others’ is given by Barnes 1989: 59–62.

² Glucker 1978: 90–8.

historical source of inspiration for Eudorus, Arius Didymus and Philo. The arguments put forward by Gucker aim at turning the episode recounted by Cicero into a mere visit made by Antiochus to the city when accompanying Lucullus, a visit with no real philosophical consequences apart from the momentary success of a *disputatio* held amongst some brilliant philosophers. Gucker is certainly right in taking to task the myth of Antiochus as founder of Alexandrian Platonism. However, things are perhaps a little less simple than he claims. He especially underestimates the importance of networks. One of the elements he neglects is the continual and constant relations between the Academy and Alexandria. When one reads Philodemus' *Index Academicorum*, despite its incompleteness it is easy to feel a relatively dense presence of Alexandrians. There is Zeno of Alexandria, who used to write down the *scholia* of Carneades and to turn them into notes (*hypomnēmata*) – notes sometimes met with anger from his master, who did not always recognize his own line of thought.³ We can surmise that such a role put Zeno in a privileged position if he wished to disseminate Academic writings in his native city. Amongst the other listed disciples of Carneades, we find not only Antipater, Nicostratus, Sosicrates and Demetrius, all of Alexandria, but also the interesting case of Zenodorus of Tyre.⁴

We are told there that Zenodorus had his school in Alexandria, and there seems no reason for doubting this information. The negative arguments brought forward by Fraser and accepted by Gucker are of two kinds.⁵ Some remarks concern palaeography, which Dorandi's edition of the Philodemus text has now shown to be unfounded.⁶ Others focus on the fact that Ptolemy VIII Euergetes II, Physcon (182–116 BCE), had subjected the Greek city of Alexandria to bloody repression, making it difficult in principle, according to Fraser, to imagine a philosophical school opening its doors in such conditions. Notwithstanding the chronological uncertainties which remain regarding the date at which Zenodorus opened his school in Alexandria, the very fact that he was not a citizen of that city may have been an advantage for him. Although the information is difficult to interpret, it is safe to assume that a network, bringing Alexandrian students to Athens, had been established at least since the time of Carneades, and it is highly unlikely that these students would sever all contact with their native city. The sentence preceding the mention of Antiochus and

³ Phld. *Index Ac.* xxii 37.

⁴ Phld. *Index Ac.* xxiii 9 (Antipater); xiii 48 (Nicostratus); xxiv 2 (Demetrius); xxiv 8 (Sosicrates); xxiii 2–3 (Zenodorus of Tyre).

⁵ Cf. Fraser 1972: vol. II, 707 n. 92, and Gucker 1978: 95.

⁶ Phld. *Index Ac.* xxiii 2–3: Ζηνόδωρος Τύριος κα[τ'] Ἀλεξανδρείαν ἡγήσα[μενος].

his disciples names a certain Maecius (Maikios), the object of many fruitless discussions.⁷ But, leaving aside the identity of this mysterious man, it is clear that both Athens and Alexandria are being discussed. The presence of Dio and Aristo in the *disputatio* of the *Lucullus* must therefore be considered not a mere chance or coincidence, but rather as typical of the connection existing between Athens and Alexandria. Although we may concede Glucker's claim that there had not been an 'Antiochean circle of Alexandria', at least judging from our sources, it would be going too far to imagine that the changes undergone by the Academy did not trigger any discussions in these intellectual circles, which had already been connected with it for some time.

Dio and Aristo were the students of both Antiochus and of Aristus, and according to Cicero's *Lucullus* they were the men Antiochus most valued after his brother.⁸ The second of the two later abandoned the Academy to become a Peripatetic, together with Cratippus.⁹ As for Dio, a new reading of the papyrus by David Blank shows that he remained in the Academy, contrary to what was commonly asserted on the basis of previous editions.¹⁰ He accompanied the Alexandrian embassy to Rome in 57 BCE, a fact which illustrates his importance in the city. He is mentioned in two places by Cicero in the *Pro Caelio*, and in both he is connected with Alexandria.¹¹

The prosopographic and historical approach nevertheless prevents us from reaching any conclusions on the influence of Antiochus in these Alexandrian circles if the evidence of the philosophical texts is neglected. Trying to determine whether Antiochus' thought had some effect on Alexandrian Middle Platonists has its risks. Recently Mauro Bonazzi, in a thorough study, has underlined some elements of philosophical continuity between Antiochus and Eudorus about the doctrine of the soul.¹² In view of this, I shall offer some remarks on Philo of Alexandria, an author who is not usually considered as a philosopher but who, I believe it can be said without exaggeration, reflects in his works a great many philosophical themes which were in circulation at the time.¹³ Such an approach is intended to shed light merely on one aspect of the Alexandrian intellectual

⁷ Phld. *Index Ac.* xxxiv 3; cf. Barnes 1989: 59.

⁸ Cic. *Luc.* 12 and Phld. *Index Ac.* xxxv 5–10, on Dio and Aristo as hearing Antiochus' lectures.

⁹ Phld. *Index Ac.* xxxv 10–14. For Aristo's fragments, cf. Mariotti 1966.

¹⁰ Bücheler 1869, followed by Dorandi 1991, reads ἀποστατήσαντες, which occurs nowhere else in the work. For Blank's recent reading, see Appendix, T3.

¹¹ Cic. *Cael.* 24: 'Titus Gaiusque Coponii, qui ex omnibus maxime Dionis mortem doluerunt, qui cum doctrinae studio atque humanitatis, tum etiam hospitio Dionis tenebantur. habitabat is apud Titum, ut audistis, Dio; fuerat ei cognitus Alexandriae'; *Cael.* 51: '... per quos Alexandrinus Dio, qui tum apud Luceium habitabat, necaretur'.

¹² Bonazzi 2007: 123–8. Cf. also Bonazzi, this volume.

¹³ Runia 1981.

scene. A precise evaluation would require a thorough analysis of a number of authors. Yet a few points can be made already.

One indisputable trace of Antiochus' presence is the distinction between *vita beata* and *vita beatissima*.¹⁴ To give a single example, the Antiochean Brutus in his *De virtute* as reported by Seneca, evaluated the situation of the exiled Marcellus as follows:¹⁵ 'Brutus, in the book he wrote on virtue, says that he saw Marcellus in exile at Mytilene, living as happily as the limitations of human nature permit' ('quantum modo natura hominis pateretur'). It is possible that thinking about exile in this way found its source in Antiochus himself, since Varro and Brutus are cited together shortly before.¹⁶ We may note moreover that the expression 'quantum modo' brings a Platonic nuance to the Antiochean *vita beatissima*, the latter notion being closer to Stoicism in that it does not underline human limitations.

Regardless of the truth of this argument, it is apparent that such methods can never result in certainty as to Antiochus' presence in the Philonian corpus. John Dillon has suggested the philosophical dependence of Philo of Alexandria on Antiochus regarding the difference between *vita beata* and *vita beatissima*,¹⁷ but I shall limit myself to saying that it is probable that the famous distinction is present in at least one passage of Philo's works.¹⁸ In order to explain allegorically the expression 'having lived in peace, at a good old age' (Genesis 15.15), referring to Abraham, Philo explains in the *Quis heres* that we live 'a life of true bliss and happiness' (εὐδαιμόν' ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ μακάριον) when 'the external goods open the path to wellbeing and glory, the bodily goods open the path to health and vigour, and the goods of the soul open the path to the knowledge of virtue'. It is likely that the double adjective reinforced by the adverb 'truly' is the Greek equivalent of the Ciceronian *beatissima*, as is confirmed by the mention of the three kinds of goods. As for the rest, the greatest prudence is needed. For if the admission of goods other than those of the soul brings Philo close to Antiochus, on the other hand the omnipresence in his works of the Middle Platonist theme of 'becoming as like god as possible' (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν) implies that the concept of

¹⁴ Prost 2001: 254–9.

¹⁵ Sen. *Helv.* 9.4: 'Marcellum vidisse Mytilenis exsulantem et, quantum modo natura hominis pateretur, beatissime viventem.'

¹⁶ Sen. *Helv.* 8.1: 'adversus ipsam commutationem locorum, detractis ceteris incommodis quae exilio adherent, satis hoc remedii putat Varro, doctissimus Romanorum, quod quocumque venimus eadem rerum natura utendum est; M. Brutus satis hoc putat, quod licet in exilium euntibus virtutes suas secum ferre.'

¹⁷ Dillon 1977: 146–8.

¹⁸ *Quis rerum divinarum heres sit* 285, cf. Winston 1984: 409–14.

oikeiōsis, central to the ethics of Antiochus, is absent from the ethics of Philo.¹⁹

A last point remains, namely the presence of doxographical resemblances such as those which we find for example between Cicero's New Academic speech at *Lucullus* 117–24 and Philo's *De somniis* 1.14–57, with the following succession of notions: principles, world, body, soul. These resemblances are all the more striking since in Philo, just as in Cicero (*Tusc.* 1.52), doxographical elements of a sceptical nature lead to the theme of necessary self-knowledge. Complete sense might be made of all this if we could show that Antiochus' *Sosus* was the source for the whole of Cicero's *Lucullus*.²⁰ It can be added, however, that in *De aeternitate mundi*, which I am assuming to be an authentic work of Philo, Aristotle is presented as a philosopher who constantly tried to surpass his predecessors (*Aet.* 16: προσυπερβαλεῖν . . . σπουδάσας τὰς τῶν παλαιῶν εὐρέσεις). The Greek expression for 'predecessors' here, literally 'the ancients', is the semantic equivalent of *antiqui*, the term used by Cicero to express Antiochus' thesis of an Old Academy which brought together both Aristotle and the Academics. But Philo says exactly the opposite. For him Aristotle was an innovator in all areas of philosophy, and not only, as Antiochus held, in his rejection of the Forms. So the echoes of Antiochus' doctrines in Philo are weak.

CRATIPPUS

We have a good deal of biographical and philosophical information about Cratippus, thanks not only to Philodemus but also to Cicero, who met him at Ephesus in 51,²¹ entrusted the education of his son to him at Athens in 45 and later secured Roman citizenship for him. We do not know when it was that he left the Academy but, contrary to what has been claimed by Moraux, it is not certain that the event was less important for Cratippus' contemporaries than it appears to us.²² Symbolically, the appearance of a philosophical identity which was specifically Peripatetic, at a time when the Peripatos does not seem to have had a scholarch since Diodorus,²³ must have been an important event, not to be underestimated. As for the content of Cratippus' doctrines, most of the extant testimonies are found within demonstrations constructed by Cicero, making a precise evaluation

¹⁹ Cf. Lévy 1998: 153–64. On Antiochus and *oikeiōsis*, cf. Schofield, Chapter 8 above.

²⁰ On Cicero's sources, cf. Lévy 1992: 181–204; Griffin 1997; Hatzimichali, this volume.

²¹ Cic. *Timaecus* 1. For more details on his biography, cf. Dorandi 1994c.

²² Moraux 1973: 225–6.
²³ Cic. *Fin.* 5.13–14. Ferrary 1988: 468 deduces from *De or.* 1.45 that Diodorus was still active about 110 BCE.

difficult. In the first book of the *De divinatione* we are told that Cratippus argued in defence of inspired divination by distinguishing between two parts of the soul: 'One which possesses sensation, movement, desire is not free from the actions of the body, whilst the other, the part which shares in reason and intelligence, reaches the height of vigour when it is the furthest from the body.'²⁴ The parallels which have been drawn with the *De philosophia* of Aristotle and more recently with Plato's *Meno* have led Tarrant to consider Cratippus as 'a possible source of revived Platonic doctrine'²⁵ and Ferrary to conclude that the philosophy of Cratippus remained 'a variant on Antiochus' return to the *veteres*, the traditional line of Plato–Aristotle–Theophrastus–Dicaearchus prevailing over the line of Plato–Xenocrates–Polemo–Zeno'.²⁶ However, bearing in mind that Antiochus criticized Aristotle for having ruined ('labefactavit') the theory of Forms and Theophrastus for trampling more violently still on the authority of the old doctrine through the fragility of his ethics,²⁷ one wonders what place there is for Cratippus in this tradition. In addition, a few years later dogmatic Middle Platonism appeared in rather mysterious conditions, with a transcendentalism which it is not easy to relate to Antiochus' philosophy. Moraux suggests two alternative causes of Cratippus' attitude: either the rediscovery of the Aristotelian corpus, or a shift with regard to Antiochus' doctrine. With regard to the former suggestion, which may seem the most attractive one, we are faced both with the problem of dating Andronicus' edition, and with the fact that it is impossible to determine with any certainty that Antiochus' disciple Aristo is the same Aristo as the one mentioned by Simplicius as a commentator on Aristotle's *Categories*.²⁸ As for the second hypothesis, it is difficult to understand how a mere shift could have justified such a radical departure.

This is an appropriate point at which to introduce Staseas of Naples. In 91 BCE, the year in which the *De oratore* is dramatically set, M. Pupius Piso had a guest in his house: Staseas, a man described as *Peripateticus* and 'the foremost in that field ('in illo suo genere omnium princeps')'.²⁹ Whatever his institutional status may have been – and nothing suggests that he had held the position of scholar – he seems to have been the

²⁴ Cic. *Div.* 1.70. ²⁵ Tarrant 2000: 68–70 evokes *Meno* 81d2–4. ²⁶ Ferrary 1988: 469 n. 115.

²⁷ Cic. *Ac.* 1.33: 'vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae.'

²⁸ Simplicius mentions Aristo (fr. 1a Mariotti) among the commentators on the *Categories*. Moraux 1973: 181–2 identifies him with the Aristo of Alexandria who followed Antiochus' teaching, but he admits that it could be another Aristo, a contemporary of Eudorus of Alexandria, who was the author of a treatise on the Nile. About the problem of identification, cf. Caujolle-Zaslavsky and Goulet 1989.

²⁹ Cic. *De or.* 1.104.

leading exponent of Peripatetic philosophy of the time. Book 5 of Cicero's *De finibus* gives us some precise and interesting information about this matter. At the beginning of the dialogue (5.8), Piso places Antiochus in a direct line from Staseas, giving the impression that there were no other Peripatetics around at the time who were more renowned than Staseas. However, at the end of the dialogue (5.75), Cicero points out to Piso that he has presented more of Antiochus' doctrine than that of Staseas. The difference lay in the fact that Staseas 'was of the opinion of those who give considerable weight to fortune good or bad and to bodily goods or evils'. In other words, Antiochus annexed Peripatetic doctrine but corrected it, at least with regard to ethics, in the direction of greater firmness, bringing it closer to Stoicism. Given these elements, we may suppose that Cratippus' and Aristo's motivation was twofold: firstly to take on Peripatetic thought at a moment when, because of the death of Staseas, it had no worthy representative, and secondly to defend a much more fallibilist position than that of Antiochus.

The doctrine of divination attributed to Cratippus in the *De divinatione* follows that line of thought: man is unable to anticipate the future himself, thus no artificial divination is possible and he must await divine revelation. Admittedly one part of the human soul is divine, but the other one precludes separation from the body and is subject to greater fallibility. With contentions like this, Cratippus joined Staseas in going beyond Antiochus. In effect, the expression used by Cicero to designate Cratippus at the beginning of the *Timaean* is almost word for word the same as had been used for Staseas in the *De finibus*:³⁰ 'Peripateticorum omnium quos quidem ego audierim, meo iudicio facile princeps.'

PRACTICAL ETHICS. ANTIOCHUS AND ROMAN ARISTOCRATS:
PISO, LUCULLUS, BRUTUS

The problem of the best way of life

It is a commonly held view, especially amongst those who view 'Roman philosophy' as an oxymoron, that for eminent Romans association with philosophers was purely a matter of cultural vanity. In fact, as Barnes rightly notes, there is 'no reason to doubt that Cicero and his friends associated with Antiochus not, or not merely, for his political *apercus* or his moral authority but rather for his prowess in the traditional and

³⁰ Cic. *Timaean* 2.

technical sport of philosophizing'.³¹ Nevertheless, it is more than probable that Antiochus was often asked by his Roman friends about the relation and hierarchy between philosophy and politics. One could imagine that Antiochus considered that political life, or at least a life combining politics with theoretical philosophy, was the best kind of life. In fact, things are a little more complex. This is evident from Piso's speech in the last book of the *De finibus*, where he faithfully expresses Antiochus' attitude on the matter. Piso is said to have been a *familiaris* of Antiochus and to have studied with him for several months.³² In his speech, he stresses the existence of an innate desire for knowledge³³ and dissociates knowledge from utility, giving as an argument an allegorical interpretation of the Homeric tale about Ulysses and the Sirens. But, at the same time, he says that there is a natural tendency towards action and he presents the hierarchy of human activities as follows:³⁴

Activities are of various kinds, so much so that the more important actually eclipse the less; but the most important are, first, according to my own view and that of those with whose system we are now occupied, the contemplation and the study of the heavenly bodies and of those secrets and mysteries of nature which reason has the capacity to penetrate; secondly, the practice and the theory of politics; thirdly, the principles of prudence, temperance, bravery and justice, with the remaining virtues and the activities consonant therewith, all of which we may sum up under the single term of morality.

This strong preference for contemplation and the apparent devaluation of moral virtues is problematic.³⁵ For we here find the ethical virtues relegated to third position, following a comparison of two kinds of activity (contemplation and politics). It is very strange, as Thomas Bénatouïl has observed, to see the *honesta* placed at the end of the list. In my opinion, one way to reconcile the problems created by the text is to read it along two different axes: one expressing what we can call the genetic aspect of ethics, the other its social aspect. From a genetic point of view, Piso describes the following sequence:

³¹ Barnes 1989: 62. ³² Cicero, *Fin.* 5.8 and 5.75. ³³ *Fin.* 5.52.

³⁴ *Fin.* 5.58: 'actionum autem genera plura, ut obscurentur etiam maioribus minora, maximae autem sunt primum, ut mihi quidem videtur, et iis quorum nunc in ratione versamur, consideratio cognitioque rerum caelestium et earum rerum quas a natura occultatas et latentes indagare ratio potest, deinde rerum publicarum administratio aut administrandi scientia, tum prudens, temperata, fortis, iusta ratio, reliquaeque virtutes et actiones virtutibus congruentes, quae uno verbo complexi, omnia honesta dicimus.' (Trans. Rackham 1914.)

³⁵ For Bénatouïl 2009, the text must be interpreted in the context of Antiochus' anti-Stoic polemics, see also Bénatouïl 2007.

- (a) at the moment of birth, we possess a certain weakness and softness ('teneritas ac mollitia quaedam', 5.58) which prevents the human being from seeing the best;
- (b) the radiance of virtue and happiness ('virtutis... beataeque vitae... lumen') dawns upon us later;
- (c) much later comes a full understanding of their nature (reflexivity).

Nature places in us only the germ of virtue and it is our responsibility to seek out its rational developments, until our full purpose is realized.³⁶ In a process evidently inspired by Aristotle, *ars* takes over from Nature. The same definition of *honesta* as occurs at the end of 5.58 reappears at the end of 60: they are virtuous mental processes, or actions in harmony with virtue. But at 5.61–2, it is clear that the word *honesta* covers all the processes of virtue's development, from the first natural outlines to its full realization.³⁷ It is this more general meaning of *honesta* that in my opinion accounts for its apparent subordination to contemplation and political action, which are both enactments of realized virtues.

If one accepts this hypothesis, the issue is now why political action is ranked after contemplation. The answer depends on the consideration that if contemplation cannot exist without reflexivity, politics serves to give expansiveness to ethical virtues. At 65–6 these are integrated into the concentric circles of *oikeiōsis* (parents, friends), a schema which Antiochus considers Academic and Peripatetic, but which is in reality much more probably Stoic.³⁸ It is remarked here that this assimilation of ethical virtues into a predominantly social structure gives them more visibility ('nihil est tam illustre nec quod latius pateat'). Sociability, of which political activity is only an aspect, forms the horizontal dimension of ethical action, with reflexivity forming the vertical. An ethical virtue must have a social aspect,³⁹ something which is enhanced by politics, where reflexivity is only a possibility, bestowed upon the philosopher in order to understand what is inherent to virtue. Throughout the passage, the virtues of social and political action, appreciated so much by his Roman friends, are skilfully reconciled, together with the affirmation of Antiochus' own superiority as

³⁶ Cic. *Fin.* 5.60: 'itaque nostrum est (quod nostrum dico, artis est) ad ea principia quae accepimus consequentia exquirere, quoad sit id quod volumus effectum.'

³⁷ *Fin.* 5.60: 'eaeque omnia quae aut ita in animis sunt aut ita geruntur uno nomine honesta dicuntur'; 61–2: 'atque ea in optima quaque indole maxime apparent, in qua haec honesta quae intellegimus a natura tamquam adumbrantur. sed haec in pueris; expressa vero in iis aetatibus quae iam confirmatae sunt.'

³⁸ Cf. Brunschwig 1986; Long and Sedley 1987: 350–4; Inwood 1996.

³⁹ Cic. *Fin.* 5.66: 'quicquid aget quaeque virtus, id a communitate et ea quam exposui caritate ac societate humana non abhorrebit'.

a philosopher. Did he consider this position the one he should defend? Apparently not entirely, as in Augustine's *City of God* we find a long passage on Antiochus' position about the definition of the *summum bonum*, expressed in Latin by Varro,⁴⁰ in which it is said that for the Old Academy the best way of life was neither the contemplative one nor the active one, but the mixed one, a compromise between the two. However, Cicero's and Augustine's testimonies are not necessarily contradictory. Cicero is giving Antiochus' evaluation of the various kinds of action, whereas Augustine, in a more doxographical mode, is showing that Antiochus did not confuse teleology with the problem of the kinds of life. To choose only reflexivity, to live as if a human being were only a soul, entailed the risk of neglecting sociability, a risk emphasized by Cicero himself at the beginning of the *De officiis*.⁴¹ Moreover, in this way Antiochus could better persuade his Roman friends that giving some time to *contemplatio* was a step towards the best way of life. By affirming the superiority of contemplation, Antiochus underlined the difference between his own conception of ethics, with its greater affinity to Aristotle, and the Stoic one. But by giving a special dignity to political action, through the use of the circles of *oikeiōsis*, he found his own way of reconciling hierarchy and complementarity. Whatever may be the philosophical roots of this position, it seems evident that it was skilfully constructed by someone who aimed to have the best relations with the Roman aristocracy.

This reflexion upon modes of life is an important element of Antiochus' impact on his leading Roman followers, a subject to which I now turn.

Lucullus and Brutus

It seems certain that Lucullus had no deep interest in philosophical culture, mainly because Plutarch mentions no studies of this kind in his youth, an observation already made by Elizabeth Rawson.⁴² In fact it is probably Cicero who gives us the best evaluation of Lucullus' level of philosophical knowledge when he says that this Roman general, like the other characters in the first version of the *Academica*, despite having some general notions about the problems which were discussed in the dialogues, lacked training and technical precision.⁴³ Plutarch is, however, more emphatic about

⁴⁰ August. *De civ. D.* 19.3. Cf. Lévy 1999; Tsouni, this volume.

⁴¹ Cic. *Off.* 1.19: 'alterum est vitium quod quidam nimis magnum studium multamque operam in res obscuras atque difficiles conferunt easdemque non necessarias.'

⁴² Rawson 1985: 7.

⁴³ Cic. *Att.* 13.16.1: 'quod erat hominibus nota non illa quidem ἀπαιδευσία sed in his rebus ἀτριψία'.

Lucullus' culture when he says: 'He was fond of all philosophy, and well disposed and friendly towards every school.'⁴⁴ Lucullus' library was splendid and he certainly gained a sense of pride from it, but nothing proves that it was seen purely as a means of displaying his wealth and exceptional social status.⁴⁵ Cicero's affirmation that Lucullus was more interested in culture, and especially in philosophy, than many people thought can be interpreted as a literary trick, but it cannot be proved that it was in contradiction with the facts.⁴⁶ He made use of philosophy at least once in his active life when, giving a constitution to the city of Cyrene, he cited Plato's sayings about their ancestors.⁴⁷

We know that Brutus was the disciple not only of Aristus, his friend and companion (φίλος καὶ συμβιωτής), but also of Theomnestes, who presumably was the successor of the latter at the head of the Antiochean school.⁴⁸ Cicero calls him explicitly *Antiochius*, an adjective he also uses for Varro, although it is not certain that he had ever known Antiochus.⁴⁹ Most of Cicero's philosophical works are dedicated to Brutus, but nothing is left of Brutus' numerous writings. As David Sedley has pointed out, the philosophical personality of Brutus presents a twin aspect: an unambiguous choice of allegiance to the Old Academy, and political action which cannot be disconnected from that philosophical choice.⁵⁰ Sedley argues, and rightly so, against the Stoic image which has stuck to Brutus. It derives from the eclecticism with which the doctrines of Antiochus have been thought to be imbued: a mix of Platonism and Stoicism, put down to a development or an evolution which could have led him towards the Stoa at the end of his life. In his analysis of the passage from Plutarch's *Life of Brutus* 12.3–4, Sedley has shown that the dialectic of Brutus and especially his use of the concept of illegal monarchy (μοναρχίας παρανόμου) is of Platonic inspiration. That Brutus followed Antiochus' doctrine is evident from his rejection of the favoured Stoic solution, suicide. He left himself with no recourse other than to pursue a theoretical life and/or political action, the murder of a tyrant being the most extreme form of the latter.

⁴⁴ Plut. *Luc.* 42.2. At 1.4 he says that at the end of his life Lucullus was fond of theoretical philosophy.

⁴⁵ Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 42.1, which says that Lucullus' use of books was more honourable to him than his acquisition of them, and Cic. *Fin.* 3.7.

⁴⁶ Cic. *Luc.* 4. ⁴⁷ Plut. *Luc.* 3.

⁴⁸ Cf. Plut. *Brut.* 2.3 (Aristus) and 24.1 (Theomnestes and Cratippus).

⁴⁹ Cic. *Att.* 13.25.3: 'qua re si addubitas, ad Brutum transeamus; est enim is quoque Antiochius'; *Ac.* 1.13: 'eandem quidem sententiam sequitur quam tu, nam Aristum Athenis audivit aliquamdiu, cuius tu fratrem Antiochum.'

⁵⁰ Sedley 1997.

It is, however, interesting to observe that what appears so clear in Plutarch becomes much more complex in Cicero's correspondence. The philosophical identities open up in a mirror game, in which it is important to show up the other less for what he thinks than for what he does not want to be. The letters are a good means for confirming the depth of Brutus' philosophical commitments, which according to Plutarch influenced his dispositions. They also enable us to see how Stoicism, which neither Cicero nor Brutus followed, remained nevertheless a sort of reference point for philosophical identity. The question of the authenticity of the following two letters⁵¹ is still disputed, but even Beaujeu, a fierce opponent of the argument for legitimacy, acknowledges that no certainty can be reached on the subject. Given that Plutarch himself does not doubt the authenticity of the correspondence,⁵² even if the letters *were* forged the forgery is ancient and thus at least revealing of the reputation of the two writers in their own times or soon after.

In letter 1.17, from Brutus to Atticus, the reference to the *De finibus* is clear but the content is rather different from the doctrine presented in the Ciceronian treatise. In section 4 Cicero is charged with considering as the worst evils ('ultima esse in malis') death, exile and poverty, false evils which a real philosopher does not fear. He has a kind of happiness (though the actual word is not used) which appears in connection with false goods, the realization of material desires, and enslavement, as long as it is with honour – *servitus honorifica*. The adjective here is given a twist by its etymological relation to *honestus*, a twist which Brutus underlines by adding '... if there can be any honour in suffering the deepest and most ignominious affronts'.⁵³ It is noteworthy that the three terms used for the evils here refer back, almost verbatim, to what we find in the *Tusculans* when Cicero blames people who fear 'poverty, infamy and death'.⁵⁴

The same criticism is expressed in section 5 of the letter in a still more direct form, since it questions the very meaning of Cicero's philosophical work: 'For of what use to him are those extremely voluminous writings in defence of our country's freedom, on dignified conduct, on death, on exile, on poverty?' In contrast to Cicero, who writes about philosophy but does not live by philosophy, Brutus presents himself as an authentic philosopher, implicitly in the tradition of Antiochus' doctrine of the mixed life, which

⁵¹ Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.16 and 17. Beaujeu 1996: 175–6.

⁵² Plut. *Brut* 22.4–5, which contains some passages corresponding very closely to what we find in 1.16 and 17.

⁵³ Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.17.4: 'si quidam in extrema ac miserrima contumelia potest honorificum esse'.

⁵⁴ Cic. *Tusc.* 4.46: 'qui paupertatem, qui ignominiam qui mortem timent'.

tries to reconcile theory and practice. Can one go further in the definition of what he considers his philosophical commitment? We find the response in section 9 of letter 1.16, from Brutus to Cicero, which contains a number of interesting elements:

- happiness ('*mihi quidem ita beatus videbor*') is associated with a decision ('*consilium*') which is taken without weakness or possible variation: '*constanter ac perpetuo*', terms which not only are a very clear condemnation of Ciceronian variations but also place the discussion at a semantic level with clear Stoic resonances, which are enhanced by the determination to neglect human exigencies ('*neglegere humana*');
- however, this wisdom is exclusively applied, given Brutus' own concerns, to the field of politics ('*abstrahere a servitio civitatem nostram*');
- the next sentence is interesting because it refers back to the main criticism which Cicero had levelled against the Peripatetics, and more specifically Theophrastus:⁵⁵ the bestowing of an exaggerated importance upon fortune. But as we can see, Brutus, in a sort of *sententia*, proclaims himself above *fortuna*;⁵⁶ others may rejoice in their *fortuna* only if it is favourable to them, whereas he will feel *gaudium*, the Latin translation of *chara*, one of the three good passions (*eupatheiai*) in Stoicism. Presenting himself thus as a man indifferent to fortune, he transforms his image considerably in the direction of Stoicism, within a dramatic context – but he is alone in so doing, since his affirmation is refuted by Cicero.

In letter 1.15, whose authenticity is uncontested, Cicero berates Brutus (5) with harsh irony about their respective attitudes when faced with the tyranny of Antony. He himself had left Rome before he was obliged to return to it, apparently out of *caritas patriae* – words which signal a protest against being kept away from the fatherland – and here he takes the opportunity to lash out at his correspondent: 'You were backing out, Brutus: I say "backing out" because our dear Stoics declare that the sage never "takes to flight".' He alludes so to Brutus' exile as being a manifestation of fear, one of the four bad passions according to the Stoics. As everyone did, Brutus had escaped, but, posing as a Stoic, he did not acknowledge his flight as such. Cicero pretends to accept this line of thought, in the name of their joint adherence to Stoicism, but this is merely a manner of speaking: neither of them is a wise man, but whilst one of them, the New Academic, the man of probabilities, does

⁵⁵ Cic. *Luc.* 134; *Fin.* 5.12.

⁵⁶ Cic. *Ad Brut.* 1.16.9: '*si secuta fuerit quae debet fortuna, gaudebimus omnes; si minus, ego tamen gaudebo.*'

not pretend to be, the Antiochean can be under the illusion that he is. 'I consider that your wisdom is unfailing', he says to Brutus, a little further down, only to bring out his weaknesses the better.⁵⁷

This game about Brutus' philosophical identity does not end with the correspondence between him and Cicero. In book 2 of Lucan's *De bello civili*, the difference is highlighted between Brutus and Cato, the uncontested embodiment of the Roman Stoic sage. Brutus stresses his own fallibility, saying about himself that he is *dubius*, while Cato possesses an invincible strength, *certum robur*.⁵⁸ He tries to persuade Cato that the latter's perfection entails a peaceful life, alien to violence and similar to the regular course of the stars, but Cato, though admitting the impiety of civil war, affirms his decision to fight to the death for liberty.⁵⁹ In an epic context Lucan is here putting on stage, not without accuracy, the conflict between the Academic, for whom philosophical perfection, contemplation, is sheltered from human conflicts, and the Stoic, who considers that wisdom cannot isolate itself from social and political life.

It seems important to add a word about Brutus in the *Lucullus*. Although he is not present in the text, his mention in the correspondence has a certain relevance for the reconstruction of the work. I shall not reopen the question of the sources of the *Lucullus* and that of the importance of Cicero's intermediate project presented in a letter to Atticus.⁶⁰ Once the characters of the first version – Catullus, Lucullus and Hortensius – had been substituted by Cato and Brutus, it seems to me very probable that Cicero would have given to Cato, the Stoic, the epistemological speech which had been Lucullus' originally; to Brutus the presentation of the Old Academy; and to himself everything concerning the New Academy. It is inadmissible to object that Brutus was too close to Stoicism, since there is no evidence that Cicero held any such view about Brutus at the time when he was writing these works.⁶¹ In the *Brutus* he presents him as following the philosophers 'in whose teaching and precepts argumentative method is combined with vocal charm and fecundity' ('quorum in doctrina atque praeceptis disserendi ratio coniungitur cum suavitate dicendi et copia'), meaning of course those of the Old Academy as reconstructed by Antiochus – very different from Stoicism. What seems probable is that, had Cicero chosen that cast of characters, the images of Antiochus and Brutus would have been more sharply demarcated.

⁵⁷ *Ad Brut.* 10: 'existimo quidem nihil a te nisi sapienter.'

⁵⁸ Lucan 2.245: 'derige me, dubium certo tu robore firma.'

⁵⁹ Lucan 2.285–325. ⁶⁰ Cic. *Att.* 13.16.1. ⁶¹ Pace Griffin 1997: 22–3.

A POET IN THE ACADEMY: HORACE

The influence that the Academy had upon Horace is most certainly one of the less studied aspects of his personality. We know that he had been in Athens for some time already when Brutus arrived there at the end of August 44.⁶² He himself recounts his stay at the Academy in the following way: 'Kindly Athens added somewhat more training, so that, you know, I was eager to distinguish the straight from the crooked, and, in the groves of Academus, to seek out truth. But troubled times tore me from that pleasant spot.' The last sentence alludes to his enrolment in Brutus' republican party, which led him to fight at Philippi and ultimately find himself on the defeated side.⁶³

Whose lessons did Horace attend in Athens? We know that upon his arrival in Athens Brutus had followed the lessons of Theomnestes and Cratippus, and we may therefore suppose that it is Theomnestes who supervised Horace's study of Platonism.⁶⁴ It is unlikely that Aristus had Horace as a student, as the last mention of him as a practising philosopher is in the *Tusculans*, where Cicero speaks of his time at Athens in 50, following a stay in Cilicia.⁶⁵ Had Aristus been still alive after the civil war, it is probable that Cicero would have sent his son to him, not to Cratippus.⁶⁶ The question remains of the kind of teaching Horace would have received from Theomnestes, a philosopher who seems unlikely to have attempted to revive the New Academy.⁶⁷ Unfortunately we can provide only a very fragmentary answer, as follows.

True enough, we find in one of the *Epistles*⁶⁸ a clear allusion to the dialectical sophism called *sorites* in Greek and *acervus* in Latin, but this does not require that the poet was trained in scepticism, since even in a dogmatic Academy he could have encountered such a mode of reasoning. To see the famous eclecticism of Horace as a consequence of the education he received in Athens would necessarily be risky, for it is hard to imagine how Epicureanism could have been included in his learning there. Nevertheless,

⁶² Horace, *Ep.* 2.2.43–6. 'inter silvas Academi quaerere verum' (45) suggests philosophical work much harder than could be done in the peaceful Epicurean *hortus*.

⁶³ That his frequenting of those 'groves' had some long-term consequences may be deduced from the fact that, when leaving for Sabina, he took with him the works of Plato, cf. *Sat.* 2.3.11–12: 'What use was it to you to pile up Plato over Menander and Eupolis and Archilochus, to take with you such companions?' However it remains uncertain if it is Plato the philosopher or Plato the poet, leader of the Middle Comedy.

⁶⁴ Cf. p. 300 above with note 48. ⁶⁵ Cic. *Tusc.* 5.22. ⁶⁶ On Aristus, see Glucker 1978: 112–13.

⁶⁷ Pace Gantar 1972. On Theomnestes, see Glucker 1978: 114–15.

⁶⁸ Hor. *Ep.* 2.1.47: 'dum cadat elusus ratione ruentis acervi'.

some precise traces of his studies in the Platonic school can be found in his works. In a passage in the *Odes* he addresses the Stoic Iccius who is about to set sail for Arabia.⁶⁹ He reminds him of the principles of the philosophy of Panaetius, speaking of the *Socratica domus*. An interesting note indeed, for we can recognize there the idea nurtured by Antiochus and Cicero, albeit sometimes with polemical tones, of a Socratic family of which the Stoics were part.⁷⁰ When speaking of his fellow-student Messala Corvinus, a man with whom he had fought at Philippi, he notes: 'He is drenched in Socratic discourses' ('Socraticis madet sermonibus', *Odes* 3.21.9–10). This Socratic immersion, which did not, however, prevent an immersion in wine, suggests a continuation of the philosophical culture acquired in Athens.⁷¹ But the most relevant passage is in the *Ars Poetica*, in a Peripatetic context on which it is unnecessary to comment. Horace says that, in order to write well, one needs to have some common sense, and he suggests that his reader look for some in the Socratic works, the *Socraticae chartae*, probably a generic word to designate Academic, Peripatetic and Stoic practical philosophy.⁷² There, he says, can be found an enumeration of the duties one owes to his fatherland, friends and family – a somewhat disorderly recalling of the ties of social *oikeiōsis*. After a list of various social functions ('personae') – the senator, the judge, the general leaving for war – he insists on how important it is to know how to give each his deserts; in other words, he points to certain *convenientia* which are variations on the *decorum* of Panaetius as developed in Cicero's *De officiis*. Reading such a passage tends to connect it with the *Socratica domus* of the first *Ode*, but we can also add two further links:

- A very short fragment from Brutus confirms the importance of practical, and especially family ethics in the works of the former students of the Old Academy. According to Seneca,⁷³ Brutus set out many precepts for parents, for children and for brothers ('dat multa praecepta et parentibus et liberis et fratribus').
- In the *Partitiones oratoriae* – which Cicero says he drew 'from that middle Academy of ours' ('e media illa nostra Academia'),⁷⁴ an expression which does not refer to a specific period of the history of the Academy but designates what Cicero perceived as the core of Academic inspiration – we also find some advice about how to behave in the face of social

⁶⁹ Hor. *Odes* 1.29.14: 'libros Panaeti Socraticam et domum'.

⁷⁰ Cf. *De or.* 3.62, 3.67, 3.71 and *Div.* 1.5.

⁷¹ Hor. *Odes* 3.21.9.

⁷² Hor. *Ars p.* 309–18.

⁷³ Hor. *Ep.* 95.45.

⁷⁴ Cic. *Part. or.* 139.

institutions,⁷⁵ with particular stress on *caritas* being the source of many kinds of relations. *Caritas* is a concept with a special importance in the last book of the *De finibus*,⁷⁶ and therefore perhaps another trace of Antiochus' influence.

CONCLUSION

If Antiochus had really aimed, as is often supposed, to build an eclectic system associating Platonism, Aristotelianism and Stoicism, the result might have been a greater unification of philosophic identities. Our study of Antiochus' impact upon his various followers has led to rather different conclusions.

Antiochus' interest in Aristotelianism did at least help the rebirth of an autonomous and powerful Aristotelian movement. It is much harder to understand how he could have been an active stimulator of Middle Platonism, but even that cannot be excluded, since some elements of Cratippus' thought may point that way. Last but not least, he helped to clarify not only what was common between Platonism and Stoicism, but also how deep were the differences. For his Roman students, however, it is certain that because of his allegiance to Plato and Aristotle, and his attraction to a form of Stoicism freed from its harshest aspects, he must have seemed like a kind of mirror image of Panaetius, and no less alluring for that. Above all, his skilful efforts to show that there was no necessary contradiction between action and contemplation seem to have encouraged some of his prominent Roman auditors to claim philosophy as a non-negligible component of their own identity.⁷⁷

⁷⁵ Cic. *Part. or.* 88: 'nam cum deorum, tum parentum patriaeque cultus eorumque hominum qui aut sapientia aut opibus excellent ad caritatem referri solent.'

⁷⁶ Cic. *Fin.* 5.37, 5.65, 5.66.

⁷⁷ Further reading relevant to this chapter's topic includes Van Ooteghem 1959; Gottschalk 1987: 1085–7; Colish 1985; Bénatouil 2007.

*Antiochus and Platonism**Mauro Bonazzi*

MAPPING PLATONISM

The issue of Antiochus' relationship to Middle Platonism is as old as it is complicated. Antiochus is a shadowy figure, mentioned only a few times by Platonists of the Roman imperial age, whereas the only unifying factor of Middle Platonism seems to be that it is in the middle of something else: trying to clarify Antiochus' philosophical position through an analysis of his relationship to Middle Platonism runs the risk of being a typical case of *explicatio obscuri per obscurius*. Besides, the very category of (Middle) Platonism as distinct from the Academy, distinguishing a doctrinal and a sceptical interpretation of Plato, does not work very well. For Antiochus regarded himself as an Academic, explicitly denying any contact between the genuine Academic philosophy and any kind of scepticism,¹ and so did other early imperial Platonists such as Eudorus of Alexandria and the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus*.²

This is not simply a matter of classifications and terms. In fact, the real and most important problem is that there is not a single Platonism, but many competing Platonisms. Platonism is better described as a battlefield, where many different Platonists attempted to reconstruct the genuine sense of Plato's philosophy in mutual competition for hegemony. Moreover, the search for the genuine Plato was further complicated by the confrontation with other philosophical schools. Given Plato's importance and glamour, many of the most important schools claimed a relationship, be it positive or critical, with his philosophy, and this provoked the emergence of several images and interpretations of Plato himself. Along with Plato the sceptic we find Plato the Stoic; and while the Pythagorean renewal pointed out Plato's

¹ Cic. *Luc.* 70; Sext. *Emp. Math.* 7.162 and 7.201.

² Cf. Eudorus of Alexandria *ap.* Stob. 2.42.7 W.; Anon. *In Arati Isagogen* 1.6, p. 96.27 Maas; Simpl. *In Cat.* 187.10; Anon. *In Thet.* 54.38–55.13. On the Academic/Platonic distinction, cf. Glucker 1978: 206–25 and Bonazzi 2003b: 52–9.

debt to Pythagoras, the new interest in the school treatises recommended also an engagement with Aristotle.

In short, the complex situation of Platonism at the beginning of the imperial age is best reduced to an identity problem, which explains the importance of genealogies and doxographies. A privileged way to state what one took Plato and Platonism to be was to reconstruct, so to speak, a family tree, showing the genealogy of a tradition which ran from Plato to one's own day. Such reconstructions are not to be dismissed as 'a quaint attitude providing no more than a picturesque backdrop to the real philosophical investigations'; on the contrary, their function was rather to provide an authority and a framework within which one could enquire and debate.³ Such reconstructions were already part of the philosophical activity of the Hellenistic Academy, in relation to both Socrates (first) and Plato (later), and would become cardinal for imperial Platonists, from Plutarch and the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus* to Plotinus and Proclus. It is against this background that we can better appreciate Antiochus' stance in the long history of the Platonist tradition. Indeed, a major part of Antiochus' philosophical activity bears on his historical reconstruction of Greek philosophy, and his genealogy will have some effect also on the development of imperial Platonism, as I will try to show.⁴ Cicero repeatedly reports that Antiochus aimed at reviving the philosophy of the *veteres*, basically the philosophy of Plato along with his successors in the early Academy from Speusippus to Polemo (Cic. *Luc.* 70; *Ac.* 1.13), Aristotle included (*Fin.* 5.7, 5.14; *De or.* 3.67). 'Plato left a most complete philosophical system' ('perfectissimam disciplinam', *Luc.* 15);⁵ and this 'single and concordant system of philosophy developed under two names: the philosophy of the Academics and the Peripatetics. Despite their difference in name, they agreed in their doctrine' (*Ac.* 1.17; cf. also *Luc.* 136; *Fin.* 4.5, 5.14 and 5.21; *Leg.* 1.38, 1.55; *De or.* 3.67). Whereas the Academics 'diligently preserved the doctrines', Aristotle and the subsequent Peripatetics introduced some modifications of the genuine tenets, to the extent that these latter eventually came to abandon some cardinal tenets and are therefore removed from the tradition (*Ac.* 1.33–4). Elsewhere the Stoics too are inserted into this tradition and regarded as contributing to the elucidation of Plato's view, in spite of some innovations, terminological (*Luc.* 15; *Leg.* 1.54; *Nat. D.* 1.16) or more substantial (*Ac.* 1.7, 1.37, 1.43).

³ Sedley 1989: 117.

⁴ For a fuller account of Antiochus as a historian of philosophy, cf. Sedley, this volume. See further Görler 1990, Tarrant 2007.

⁵ On *disciplina* cf. Karamanolis 2006: 53.

From the point of view of imperial Platonism the first and most significant element of Antiochus' reconstruction is Plato, whose importance cannot be dismissed. The claim that Plato left a 'most complete philosophical system' (*Luc.* 15) is, as far as we know, after the sceptical interlude of the Hellenistic Academy the first statement advocating a systematic and doctrinal interpretation of Plato. It is impossible to deny the importance of this claim for the following centuries. More precisely, in the *Academica* it is argued that from Plato's manifold and eloquent lead, a single and concordant system of philosophy was established under the names of the Academics and the Peripatetics (*Ac.* 1.17). The assumption seems to be that Plato's philosophy was doctrinal in nature and yet the literary form of his dialogues partially obscured the details of the system. Hence it was the task of his heirs to reconstruct and show the coherence of his philosophy (*Ac.* 1.17).⁶ Again it is noteworthy that the commitment to a doctrinal interpretation of Plato and the conviction that the task of his Platonist heirs was to reconstruct the system out of the dialogues are the basic assumptions of all the imperial interpretations of Plato. As we read in Stobaeus, Plato is 'multi-voiced (*polyphōnos*) not multi-opinionated (*polydoxos*)'.⁷ A possible difference between Antiochus and subsequent Platonists may be that he seems to focus on Plato *and* the early Academy taken together, whereas the latter concentrate more directly on Plato. This is partly correct; yet it is remarkable that Eudorus of Alexandria also shares this feature of Antiochus when, in reading Plato's *Timaeus*, he tries to reconcile Xenocrates' and Crantor's interpretations of the Platonic dialogue.⁸ In Antiochus' case at least, his interest in both Plato and the Academy can be explained by reference to the context, for Antiochus' quarrel with the Academic sceptics forced him to insist on the continuity between Plato and his first successors in opposition to the claim that Plato's real heirs were the Hellenistic sceptics. And since the major merit of the Old Academics is the preservation (*Ac.* 1.34) and formal systematization of the philosophy of their teacher (*Ac.* 1.17), Plato's importance remains undisputed.

Plato, however, is not alone. For Antiochus' target was more ambitious than simply recovering Plato's doctrines. Along with Plato, other protagonists of Antiochus' drama, playing positive and negative parts, were the Academics (early and Hellenistic), the Peripatetics and the Stoics. And the outcome was to appropriate Aristotelianism and Stoicism to Platonism,

⁶ For a similar, but not identical, view, cf. Karamanolis 2006: 51.

⁷ Stob. 2.55.5–7 W. (cf. Cic. *Ac.* 1.17: '... Platonis autem auctoritate, qui varius et multiplex et copiosus fuit...').

⁸ Plut. *De animae procreatione in Timaeo*. 1012D–1013B.

while outlawing the Academic sceptics. The confrontation with Academic scepticism is most important if we are to evaluate the pivotal role played by this genealogy in Antiochus' philosophy. The Hellenistic Academics, from Arcesilaus down to Philo of Larissa, feature as Antiochus' main adversaries. This in turn explains the importance of the early Academy: within the context of Hellenistic and post-Hellenistic debates, it is easy to see that the restoration of the early Academy as Plato's authoritative heir aims at the ejection of scepticism from the realm of Platonism. Plato's philosophy was 'diligently preserved' from Speusippus to Polemo (*Ac.* 1.34) and radically 'subverted' by Arcesilaus, Carneades and Philo (*Luc.* 15). Moreover, Antiochus claimed, the Academic betrayal did not lead to Plato's eclipse, because the Platonic heritage was further supported by Zeno, formerly Polemo's pupil, and the Stoics. Unusual as it may seem, this reconstruction is far from presupposing a merely antiquarian interest but rather provides Antiochus with insidious weapons in his battle against the Academic sceptics. For in stressing his own relationship with the Stoics he could claim membership of a tradition starting from Plato. Leaving aside the relation with the Stoics (to which I will return soon) and turning to imperial Platonism, it is easy to see that Antiochus succeeded in rejecting scepticism from the Platonic tradition. Broadly speaking, imperial Platonists can be divided into unitarians and non-unitarians, the first group championing the view of the unity of the Academy from Plato onwards (Plutarch, anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus*),⁹ the second claiming that the Hellenistic Academy marked a break in the history of Platonism (Numenius, Neoplatonists).¹⁰ The agreement of this latter group with Antiochus is patent, and the position of the former is not far different, since the unitarian thesis was defended on the assumption that the Hellenistic Academy was not properly speaking sceptical.¹¹ Hence, in spite of the many divergences, all agreed in banishing scepticism – Antiochus' main target. Moreover, Antiochus' influence is still greater, to the extent that it was the non-unitarian thesis that would in fact prevail.

Also in the case of Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition Antiochus' importance must not be undervalued. From Cicero's evidence it appears

⁹ Plutarch was the author of a treatise, sadly lost, entitled *On the Unity of the Academy Stemming from Plato* (Περὶ τοῦ μίαν εἶναι ἀπὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Ἀκαδημείαν; Lamprias Catalogue 63); for the anonymous commentator, see *In Tht.* 54.38–55.13.

¹⁰ Numenius, fr. 24–8 des Places from *On the Dissension between the Academics and Plato* (Περὶ τῆς τῶν Ἀκαδημαϊκῶν πρὸς Πλάτωνα διαστάσεως). Numenius' accusation will be shared by all later Platonists, the most eloquent testimony being the anonymous *Prolegomena in Platonis philosophiam*, 10.1–12.3; cf. Bonazzi 2003a: 57–95.

¹¹ For a detailed overview, cf. for example Brittain 2001: 220–54 and Bonazzi 2003a: 179–240.

that according to Antiochus Aristotle and the Peripatetic tradition experienced a destiny similar to that of Plato and the Academic tradition. Both in the *Academica* and in *De finibus* 5 the history of the Lyceum is a history of decadence, which can be divided into four phases manifesting ‘a process of progressive deviation’:¹² (1) the normative phase of Aristotle, (2) Theophrastus, (3) the degenerate third-century Peripatetics, Strato, Lyco, and Aristo, and (4) philosophers too deviant to be called Peripatetics, namely Hieronymus, Critolaus and Diodorus. Antiochus’ history has rightly been charged with its factiousness: his major purpose was not only to separate the Peripatetics from Aristotle but also to claim Aristotle (and, with some qualifications, Theophrastus) for Platonism: even though Aristotle introduced some (unneeded) innovations (*Ac.* 1.33; on this see below), he is still part of the ancient tradition. And since Antiochus was the most resolute upholder of the integrity of that tradition, the reconstruction eventually culminated in a celebration of Antiochus himself, the philosopher who followed the views of the ancients most diligently (*Fin.* 5.14). Unfair as it is, Antiochus’ treatment of Aristotle and Aristotelian philosophy had a major effect on the history of Platonism. For Aristotle was, after centuries, for the first time being linked to Plato and the Academy, and the exploitation of his doctrines for the reconstruction of the Platonist philosophy permitted. Remarkably, although Aristotle was absent from the Hellenistic genealogies of the Academy,¹³ his importance is indisputable as far as imperial Platonism is concerned, to the extent that one may dare to define Platonism as an attempt to respond *more Platonico* to Aristotelian issues. Antiochus’ contribution to the development of imperial Platonism is evident when it is considered that he was the first to insist both on Aristotle’s Academic credentials and on his importance for a correct assessment of Plato’s philosophy.¹⁴

¹² Hahm 2007: 77 commenting on *Fin.* 5.14, cf. also *Ac.* 1.32.

¹³ See esp. Cic. *Ac.* 1.44, Plut. *Col.* 1121F–1122A.

¹⁴ Where Antiochus’ genealogy appears to differ from imperial Platonism is in relation to Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism. For Platonists it was common to consider Plato’s philosophy the apex of a tradition first inaugurated by Pythagoras, and, unsurprisingly, the Pythagoras-Plato connection was exploited against the Socratic and aporetic interpretation of Plato championed by the Hellenistic Academy. Indeed, Pythagoras never shows up in the genealogies of the Hellenistic Academy, while he is always present in the Platonist genealogies from Plutarch onwards; cf. Mansfeld 1992, Donini 1999. Yet, the assumption that Antiochus does not intervene in this story is misleading. The Pythagoreanism which was so strictly bound up with the new dogmatic Platonism had almost nothing to share with the original Pythagoreanism; on the contrary it rather repeats the cardinal tenets of the early Academy of Speusippus and Xenocrates. In fact, behind the flag of Pythagoras there emerges the doctrine of the early Academy, which was strongly advocated by Antiochus himself for the first time after centuries. In this sense at least Antiochus is also part of the story, even though

Broadly speaking then, Antiochus emerges as a major philosopher in the history of Platonism. Yet the situation is more complex. In later Platonism, after the second century, the rejection of scepticism is paralleled by the rejection of the term 'Academic', contrary to Antiochus' aim. That this cannot be simply dismissed as a terminological problem is shown by the fact that Antiochus himself was progressively eclipsed by the genuine Platonic tradition and relegated to the Dark Ages of the Academic period.¹⁵ And like scepticism, so Aristotle: when the idea of a (subordinate) accordance of Aristotle with Plato was decisively settled after a protracted debate, it was traced back to Plotinus' teacher Ammonius Saccas.¹⁶ Antiochus' influence is ambiguous, because the actual success and circulation of some of his views do not correspond to a balanced acknowledgement of his merits on the part of his imperial colleagues.

In spite of his merits, Antiochus' contribution was dismissed by subsequent Platonists. Why? A possible explanation leads directly to the core problem of the 'Antiochus affair': his commitment to Stoicism. Surely, Antiochus' most striking claim is that the Stoics continued Plato's tradition. Such a claim led many ancient and modern readers to the conclusion that Antiochus converted to Stoicism, thereby concealing his contribution to the renewal of a systematic Platonism. Under the guise of his Academic loyalty Antiochus regarded himself as 'a champion of the Porch'.¹⁷ Yet such an interpretation conflicts with existing evidence and does not adequately account for Antiochus' strategy.

A first issue concerns the reliability of ancient testimonies. The sources connecting Antiochus with the Stoics¹⁸ convey the views of Antiochus' adversaries, and this is not without importance. A misleading tendency in modern scholarship distinguishes between historical reconstructions and philosophical debates, as if the first were not a proper part of philosophy.

the testimonies at our disposal do not explicitly refer to any interest in the wisdom of Pythagoras, with the partial (and not very significant) exception of *Fin.* 5.87. Moreover, similar considerations apply also to Aristotle, whose reception into Platonism is mediated by a Pythagorean interpretation. Bizarre as it may appear, Aristotle is also regarded as a (not always faithful) heir of Pythagoras (cf. e.g. Anon. *Vit. Pyth. ap. Phot. Bibl. cod.* 249.438b15–441b14; Porph. *Vita Pythagorae* 53). Plainly, such a strange claim was legitimated by his (early) Academic affiliation, which points again to Antiochus.

¹⁵ For the contrast between light and darkness as marking the different phases in the history of Platonism, cf. Procl. *Theol. Plat.* 1.1, 5.10–16 Saffrey–Westerink.

¹⁶ Cf. e.g. Hierocles, *De prov., ap. Phot. Bibl. cod.* 214.173a, with Hadot 1978: 74–6.

¹⁷ Barnes 1989: 79; Görler 1990.

¹⁸ Cic. *Luc.* 69, 132, 137; Sext. Emp. *PH* 1.235; Numen. fr. 28.13; August. *C. acad.* 3.41, *De civ. D.* 19.3. Contrary to what is usually assumed, it is difficult to reconstruct Plutarch of Chaeronea's position from passages such as his *Cic.* 4.1–3: Antiochus' defection to Stoicism is presented not as Plutarch's thesis but as that of some other anonymous critics (ὡς φασιν ἑνιοί).

In fact, in antiquity history of philosophy was an important and legitimate part of the philosophical debate. In the present case, testimonies from Cicero the Academic to Augustine do not report that Antiochus was a Stoic but rather criticize him for being Stoic. Conversely, this charge is always denied by Antiochus' spokesmen, by claiming that it is the Stoics who endorse the Academic doctrines, not the opposite. Antiochus always presented himself as an Academic, and this also remains undisputed by non-sympathetic witnesses such as Cicero and Sextus.

The meaning of the claims of Antiochus' spokesmen is made clear by an overall evaluation of his genealogy and of its significance. Plainly the main target of Antiochus' polemics was scepticism or, better, the legitimacy of a sceptical interpretation of Plato and the Academic tradition. At issue with the Academics is the legacy of Plato: who is the legitimate heir of his philosophy? And as we have already observed, the introduction of Stoicism as legitimate heir to Plato serves to exclude scepticism by showing that there is a continuous tradition descending from Plato to Antiochus. But this does not necessarily imply adherence to Stoicism. Important as it may be, Stoicism is not the end, but a means to promote and revive true Platonism.

Given Antiochus' claim, this is hardly surprising. A result of the demand for a return to the truth of the ancients is the censure of innovations. Indeed, for the whole post-Hellenistic age, 'innovation' (*kainotomia*) is commonly dismissed as selfish ambition. This also holds in the case of Antiochus. Whereas the early Academics 'diligently preserved the doctrines they had received from their predecessors' (*Ac.* I.34), Zeno made changes ('mutavit', *Ac.* I.40; 'commutaverat', *Ac.* I.37), disagreed ('dissensio... a superioribus', *Ac.* I.42) or, even worse, made some new pronouncements ('dixit nova', *Ac.* I.40) – an expression employed also against Arcesilaus and his *Nova Academia* (*Ac.* I.43).¹⁹ Similar criticisms occur also where Zeno is reported to have 'tried to correct the tradition' (*Ac.* I.35: 'corrigere conatus est disciplinam', which does not imply that he succeeded). By themselves, terms such as *corrigere* and *correctio* (cf. also 43) do not convey any positive value. For the problem was not so much to correct the philosophy of the ancients as to recover and articulate it. Hence a better interpretation is to

¹⁹ See also Cic. *Fin.* 5.13: 'Strato physicum se voluit: in quo etsi est magnus, *tamen nova pleraque*' (my emphasis). Clearly Zeno, who is part of the tradition, is treated far better than Arcesilaus, the originator of the *defectio* (*Ac.* I.44). But taken together the above statements suffice to contradict Görler's claim of Antiochus totally applauding Stoic innovations (Görler 1994: 948–9: 'uneingeschränkter Beifall'; cf. also Görler 1990: 136–9: 'uneingeschränktes Lob'). In the text we lack any explicit approval of Stoic innovation.

read these words as conveying a charge against the typically Stoic pretence of modifying the doctrines of the ancients in order to integrate them into the Stoic system.²⁰ Neither here nor elsewhere are Stoic innovations ever explicitly approved.

In short, there are no grounds for not taking Antiochus' claims seriously: his major aim was to restore true Platonism in opposition to the scepticism which had subverted the Academy in the Hellenistic period (*Luc.* 15). Nevertheless, Stoicism too was assumed to be part of the tradition, and Antiochus had to account for this inclusion. In what remains I will consider the path Antiochus followed and its consequences with regard to imperial Platonism. In essence, I will argue that Antiochus' aim was a 'subordinated integration' of Stoicism. Given the assumption that Stoicism and Platonism were not two incompatible systems, Antiochus needed to show how reconciliation was possible. He achieved this by identifying concepts and doctrines which were potentially traceable to both schools. But this does not imply that the two schools were equally important; for it is Stoicism that was integrated into Platonism and not the converse. Hence integration leads to subordination. This strategy will also bear consequences for the reception of Antiochus by imperial Platonists.

If this is Antiochus' position, it is also interesting to consider what was the position of his Stoic colleagues. Indeed, a heightened concern with the history of philosophy is one of the hallmarks of first-century BCE philosophy in general, and not of Antiochus alone. We find a parallel concern in Panaetius and in the other leading Stoic of the time, Posidonius. Antiochus is reported as having attended Mnesarchus' lectures,²¹ and this implies a certain degree of knowledge of Panaetius, Mnesarchus' teacher. Similarly, despite the silence of the sources, I argue that it is more economical to assume that Antiochus was aware of Posidonius too, as indeed Cicero and many others were also. It seems plausible to infer that Antiochus' knowledge of Stoicism was not restricted to minor figures such as Mnesarchus or Dardanus but extended also to other leading Stoics of his time. Here, I suppose, Cicero's testimony has its limits, for his Academic stance and concern with the Academic–Stoic debate prevented the provision of a complete account on Antiochus and the Stoics. What is noteworthy is that Panaetius and Posidonius, like Antiochus, were both interested in joining Stoicism and Plato. Panaetius is reported to have always talked about not only Plato but also Aristotle, Xenocrates, Theophrastus and Dicaearchus,

²⁰ Prost 2001: 263.

²¹ Cic. *Luc.* 69; Numen. fr. 28; August. *C. acad.* 3.15, 3.41.

while Galen repeatedly underlines Posidonius' admiration for Plato.²² Even though the interpretation of Panaetius and Posidonius is very controversial, we can safely assume that their interest in Plato (and Aristotle) depended on the wish to present the philosopher(s) as imperfect forerunners of Stoic philosophy.²³ Remarkably, this is what Antiochus is implicitly accused of by his adversaries, as the charge of being a Stoic implies that Antiochus, in spite of his professed Old Academic loyalty, in fact considered Stoic doctrines superior to the Platonic ones. And this is what Antiochus' spokesmen in Cicero deny.

Hence a most intriguing situation emerges. The comparison with the authoritative Stoics of his time shows that Antiochus' task was much more difficult than might have been expected, for he had to fight simultaneously on two fronts – both against the Academic sceptics with their aporetic interpretation of Plato, and against the Stoics, who claimed that Plato was an imperfect forerunner of Zeno and Chrysippus. Antiochus' task was to steer a middle course between these two extremes. In so far as Plato is a systematic philosopher, he is much closer to Stoicism than to scepticism; but this does not imply Stoic superiority, the opposite being the case. If we take seriously what Antiochus' spokesmen said of Antiochus, and I do not see any compelling reason to prefer the claims of his adversaries to those of his spokesmen, it follows that Antiochus, far from being a Stoic in disguise, was trying to integrate Stoicism into Platonism, and therefore to subordinate it – the reverse of the strategy adopted by Panaetius and Posidonius in order to subordinate Plato into Stoicism.²⁴ This also helps to account for the negative response of the Stoics, who did not accept Antiochus as one of their number: Diodotus 'despised' his doctrines (*Luc.* 115), and Cicero's Stoic spokesman Balbus is astonished by Antiochus' failure to notice the gulf which divides Stoicism from the *veteres* (*Nat. D.* 1.16).

Unfortunately, owing to lack of evidence, it is difficult to reconstruct Antiochus' philosophical position in detail, and this prevents a balanced evaluation of his relationship with imperial Platonism and a true assessment of his influence from being realized. Nevertheless, on some issues at least we are better informed. Cicero tells us that according to Antiochus

²² Cic. *Fin.* 4.79 (= T 79 Alesse); cf. also *Tusc.* 1.79–80, *Phld. Index St.* LXI, and Cic. *Luc.* 135 (on Crantor = T 120, 1, 89 Alesse); for Posidonius, see Gal. *PHP* 4.425, 5.481, 4.421 (= T 95–7 Edelstein–Kidd); cf. also Strabo 2.3.8 and *Simpl. In Cael.* 700.7 on Aristotle (= T 85, 100 E–K).

²³ See, for instance, Tieleman 2003: 284–5, and Gill 2006: 213–14 on Posidonius; Tieleman 2007: 110–16 on Panaetius.

²⁴ See also Sedley 2003b: 22–3.

the judgement of truth and the determination of the good are the two principal issues in philosophy (*Luc.* 29): following his view I will address two problems, one concerning epistemology the other ethics and moral psychology. More specifically, I will concentrate on the theory of Forms and on his theory of passions – in other words on two basic problems of Platonism. In so doing we will be able to reach a more balanced evaluation of his philosophical project and his influence in the following centuries.

ANTIOCHUS AND THE FORMS

1. In an influential book Willy Theiler argued that Antiochus restored Platonic Forms and interpreted them as the thoughts of god.²⁵ Theiler's interpretation raised many controversies, thus further confusing a topic which was already confused by itself. Perhaps the best way to disentangle all the intricacies is to distinguish the two main issues. An explicit link connecting Antiochus with the thesis of the Forms as thoughts of god is lacking from the available evidence; on the other hand, Cicero mentions Platonic Forms in explicit relation to Antiochus. Hence, for the time being, it is safer to concentrate on the second issue alone, and to consider the possible role of Platonic Forms in Antiochus' epistemology, while leaving an accurate scrutiny of the first issue for another occasion.²⁶ Needless to say, despite the restriction in scope the ground for controversy remains very wide indeed. In the first version of Cicero's *Academica* Lucullus commits Antiochus to Stoic epistemology, while in the second version his spokesman Varro supports the Platonic (and early Academic) theory of knowledge. Now, contrary to what has sometimes been assumed,²⁷ it may be observed that this is not a matter of blatant contradiction. Since both texts concede a role to sensation, they are not completely opposed. Yet, in *Academica* 1 sensation is further subordinated to the mind and the Forms, whereas in the *Lucullus* the senses feature as the only basis for knowledge, and mind itself is regarded as a sense. Plainly, the assessment of Antiochus' epistemology requires a preliminary valuation regarding the reliability of the existing sources.

Many scholars have argued for the *Lucullus*, but the arguments they have adduced do not confirm their claim. It has been insinuated that, since Antiochus approves the Aristotelian criticisms, Platonic Forms are dismissed even in *Academica* 1, with the result that the only reliable model

²⁵ Theiler 1930; see further: Luck 1953; de Vogel 1954; Long 1974: 228; Donini 1982: 75–6; Karamanolis 2006: 64–71.

²⁶ See also Boys-Stones, this volume. ²⁷ Lévy 1992: 187, whose general conclusions I endorse.

is provided by the Stoic epistemology of the *Lucullus*.²⁸ Yet this patently goes against the logic of *Academica* 1. The development of *Ac.* 1.16–43 is clear: first an overview of the philosophy of the *veteres* is provided (chapters 16–32); afterwards ‘innovations’ or ‘dissipations’ of the ancient system follow (chapter 33). Unfortunately the text of the manuscripts is corrupt: ‘disputationes’ makes little sense.²⁹ A plausible emendation seems to me ‘dissipationes’ suggested by Baiter. In any case, the more neutral reading ‘immutationes’ does not bear a very positive value, given that Antiochus’ alleged claim is to restore the *vetus* philosophy. The claim for the superiority of the ancients does seem to contrast with the search for novelty. Moreover, the negative value of the ‘innovations’ is clear from what immediately follows, the criticism of Aristotle for undermining the Forms.³⁰ In fact, some scholars have argued that Antiochus approved Aristotle against Plato, and where Varro speaks of ‘the Forms . . . which Plato had embraced to an amazing degree’ (‘mirifice’), they give the adverb ‘mirifice’ an ironical twist.³¹ Now, even conceding that Antiochus could be ironical at Plato’s expense, which I strongly doubt, the next sentence shows that this is not the case. After Aristotle, Varro argues, Theophrastus ‘shattered the authority of the tradition even more violently’ (‘vehementius’). It cannot be denied that Theophrastus is blamed for his innovations. But since Theophrastus erred ‘more violently’, it follows that Aristotle went wrong ‘violently’. The use of the comparative must connect Theophrastus and Aristotle. And since the only Aristotelian innovation mentioned concerns the Forms, it follows that Antiochus did not approve that ‘innovation’.³² Therefore, there is no criticism of Platonic Forms.

The same is also applicable to the Stoics. For, as I have already observed,³³ Antiochus’ historical claims rely on the assumed superiority of those

²⁸ Cf. e.g. de Vogel 1959: 279; Barnes 1989: 95–6; Brittain 2006a: xxxiii n. 58.

²⁹ Cic. *Ac.* 1.33: ‘haec erat illis prima forma a Platone tradita; cuius quas acceperim †disputationes† [dissipationes: Baiter : immutationes Davies] si vultis exponam.’

³⁰ Cic. *Ac.* 1.33: ‘Aristoteles primus species quas paulo ante dixit labefactavit, quas mirifice Plato erat amplexatus, ut in is quiddam divinum diceret. Theophrastus autem, vir et oratione suavis et ita moratus ut probitatem quandam prae se et ingenuitatem ferat, vehementius etiam fregit quodam modo auctoritatem veteris disciplinae.’

³¹ Cf. Dillon 1977: 92 n. 1.

³² Donini 1979: 276–7. It is important to notice that Aristotle’s innovation is not regarded as eliminating Forms but as diminishing their metaphysical role: the verb employed, ‘labefactavit’, means ‘weaken’ and not ‘eliminate’, and the weakening refers to the divine aspect of the forms (‘quiddam divinum’), in other words their metaphysical aspect. Karamanolis 2006: 61–3 argues that according to Antiochus Aristotle rejected the transcendent aspect of the Forms (alluded to by the adjective ‘divinum’), while adhering ‘to Plato’s belief in the unchanging sameness of the Forms’ and in their importance in the process of human knowledge.

³³ See above, pp. 313–15.

ancients whose philosophy he was recovering, whereas nowhere are Stoic innovations explicitly commended. In the field of ethics, the parallel of the *De finibus* 5 confirms that, in cases of divergence, Antiochus' sympathies aligned with the Academics without explicit rejection of Stoicism – Antiochus tried to show that there was no real incompatibility between the two schools by adapting Stoic theory to an Academic model (on this see below).³⁴ Regrettably evidence is missing in the case of knowledge, but it still remains the most economical assumption to argue for the same position also in this case, in the absence of contrary proofs. This is not surprising, given Antiochus' claim to be an Academic reviving and promoting the philosophy of the (Old) Academics.

A second claim is that Platonic Forms were part of the historical drama but had no role in the philosophical arguments.³⁵ Yet, as I have tried to show, the assumed difference between historical sketch and philosophical arguments echoes modern assumptions and contrasts with the ancient views. Important as the *Lucullus* may be, *Academica* 1 demands a proper account and cannot be easily dismissed.

Unfortunately, the arguments in favour of *Academica* 1 do not definitely settle the issue either. They do, however, prove more cogent. As a general rule, in cases of different versions of the same text it may be argued that it is safer to rely on the most recent version. Admittedly, this general rule is far from being conclusive, because the two texts do not fit together precisely. More important is the basic question of the function of the two passages in the economy of the two texts. Generally speaking, as Rackham pointed out, 'in Cicero's encyclopaedia of philosophy *Academica* is the article on epistemology'.³⁶ More precisely, the *Lucullus*, the second book of the first version, deals with the philosophy of Arcesilaus and Carneades – the Hellenistic Academy before Philo introduced his innovations. As is well known, the controversy on the legitimacy of Academic scepticism is not only interior to the Academy but heavily reliant on the Stoic–Academic dispute. This provokes some ambiguity in the case of Antiochus, who has to play two roles at the same time, the Antiochean and the Stoic. Indeed, in the *Lucullus* Antiochus appears to defend the Stoic theory of knowledge against the Academic sceptics. Hence two possibilities follow: either (1) accepting the identification of Antiochean and Stoic, with the consequence of considering Antiochus nothing but a Stoic, or (2) admitting that there is some contrast between the two texts. The identification

³⁴ In fact, many details in the field of ethics also remain difficult to interpret. But on the major issues at least Antiochus' appropriation strategy is clear, see section 3 below, pp. 325–31.

³⁵ Barnes 1989: 95 and Glucker 1997: 72 n. 17. ³⁶ Rackham 1933: 400.

(1) may account for the *Lucullus*, but it does not account for *Academica* 1 and even contradicts it, because the latter criticizes (and hence distances itself from) the Stoics for according too much weight to sensations.³⁷ Hence it seems better to acknowledge (2) that there is some contrast between the two texts. No doubt Antiochus supported the arguments of the Stoics against the sceptical Academics, as we read them in the *Lucullus*. Yet this does not exclude that the Stoic epistemology itself can be ameliorated by the Platonic and early Academic theory. Indeed Varro's doxography, which reports Antiochus' views, explains Platonic superiority, leaving the Stoic–sceptic controversy aside. In conclusion, if we choose the *Lucullus*, we cannot account for *Academica* 1, and instead we have to dismiss it as irrelevant, contrary to the evidence. Conversely, if we choose *Academica* 1, we can account, though partially, also for the *Lucullus* as a (dialectical, according to Lévy) response to the sceptical Academy, which does not deal with the Plato–Stoicism relation. Admittedly, ambiguities remain, but even though the problem is not settled once and for all, it seems better to rely on the most recent version.³⁸

2. If we now turn to a closer reading of *Academica* 1, it is important to see that in chapters 30–2 it is not a matter of Platonism as opposed to Stoicism, as if in Platonism there were space only for Forms and in Stoicism only for the senses. The first sentence clearly states that senses play the important role of activating the process of knowledge: 'quamquam oriretur a sensibus, tamen non esse iudicium veritatis in sensibus' ('the criterion of truth, even though it arose from the senses, was not in the senses'). The point is that senses constitute a necessary condition for knowledge but are not a sufficient condition for it. Such an acknowledgement of the role of the senses is not incompatible with what we read in many of Plato's dialogues and leaves open the possibility of an agreement, albeit partial, with Stoicism.

Mind, the faculty of discerning what is simple, uniform and the same as itself, the Forms, is the proper criterion of truth, the judge of things ('mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem', 'mind, they held, was the judge of things'). In these chapters, as many commentators have observed, references to Plato are evident. The Latin 'id quod semper (est) simplex et unius

³⁷ *Ac.* 1.35, 40–2.

³⁸ According to Lévy (1992: 187–94) this is further confirmed by Cicero's letters. In a letter to Atticus (26 June 45) Cicero informs Atticus that he has scrapped the first version and has decided to transfer the conversations to Cato and Brutus ('eosdem illos sermones ad Catonem Brutumque transtuli'; *Att.* 12.16). Cato and Brutus are introduced in the roles of a Stoic (Cato) and an Antiochean (Brutus); therefore, one of the reasons of Cicero's dissatisfaction was that too much was condensed in the *Lucullus*. Contra, Griffin 1997: 20–7.

modi tale quale (est)', 'that which is eternally simple and uniform to its own quality', is reminiscent of the language of *Phaedo* 78c–d, as well as of *Timaeus* 27d. But we must be careful not to infer that the only activity of the mind is the contemplation of Forms. The text does not say that. Instead it states that the mind, in so far as it contemplates the Forms, is able to judge things ('rerum') – in other words that, in consequence of its acquaintance of the Forms, it is the best judge of the reliability of the information provided by senses.³⁹

In order to further understand the interaction between mind and senses it is important first to consider the limitations of the senses. Basically, senses are not independently reliable, owing to the properties of external objects, which are too small and continually slipping or flowing away – the reference here being, as Long rightly remarked, to the *Theaetetus*.⁴⁰ Alone the senses merely provide just opinion, not genuine knowledge. The distinction between opinion and knowledge and the parallel criticism of the senses are typical of Plato, and may appear incompatible with Stoicism. Yet, we must keep in mind that the senses are criticized only when acting on their own. For the Stoics too no perception is criterial by itself. The sentence that follows, 'knowledge they deemed to exist nowhere else except in the notions and reasonings of the mind' ('scientiam autem nusquam esse censebant nisi in animi notionibus atque rationibus'), confirms what I have so far assumed: firstly that this presentation, however Platonic, does not radically contrast with Stoicism, and secondly that Antiochus was in some way willing to mediate between Plato and Stoicism. By itself the sentence allows two possible readings: either that the proper objects of real knowledge are something separate from our world – they are transcendent (or, better, divine) Forms – or that it is the conceptions of the soul that warrant real knowledge in this world. The terms employed seem to support the second reading. What is remarkable in the sentence is the use of the term 'notio', which is Cicero's commonest rendering of the Greek *ennoia* or *prolēpsis*:⁴¹ *ennoiai/prolēpseis* are distinctively Stoic conceptions and terms,

³⁹ Reid and many other commentators argue that the language used by Cicero for describing the Forms mirrors the *Phaedo*. Indeed the *Phaedo* also provides a parallel for the interaction between sense experience and Forms, for instance at 74c–76a, where 'some awareness of universal standards as we perceive their physical counterpart is regarded as a commonplace': Tarrant 2005: 119.

⁴⁰ Cf. Long 1995: 46 n. 18: 'No citation from Plato is given at *Acad.* 1.31, but two of Cicero's expressions in this context are virtual translations of sentences in *Tht.* 182, "nihil umquam esset constans", and "continenter laberentur et fluerent omnia". Cicero's Latin is closer to Plato's actual words here than to other Platonic contexts he could have had before him, such as *Crat.* 439d and *Tim.* 49e.'

⁴¹ Cf. *Top.* 31 with Reid 1885: 213.

which, along with the senses, constitute the Stoic criterion.⁴² Here the employment of this term does not seem a very appropriate description for the act of contemplating divine Forms. But it fits the second reading: given the previous hint at the Platonic Forms, the *notiones* correspond to the Forms as possessed by the mind ('animi'), and promote the proper knowledge of things, their definitions ('definitiones rerum'). The way we conceive of things is guided 'by some awareness of the Platonic Forms which define the right way to think about things'.⁴³ Knowledge is not supplied by sense perception but needs conceptions (and Forms) which enable one to judge the information provided by the senses and promote the proper definition of things in terms of what is stable, that is proper knowledge. This corresponds to what was stated at the beginning of chapter 30: the process of knowledge is started by senses ('quamquam oriretur a sensibus'), but completed by the mind ('mentem volebant rerum esse iudicem'), which owing to its acquaintance with Forms is also the best judge of things ('rerum').

If this reading is correct, some more general comments are in order. What is remarkable is the employment of *notio*, which cannot be taken as a neutral term. In fact, as Cicero's evidence itself shows, the term was known as distinctive of Stoicism.⁴⁴ Besides, there are other elements which, however Platonic in flavour, are reminiscent of Stoicism. For instance the strict connection among conceptions, knowledge (*epistēmē*) and definition.⁴⁵ This may appear strange in a section devoted to Plato and the Academics, but since Antiochus claimed that the Stoics were themselves part of the old tradition, he also had to show how they were connected. Here a problem emerges with *Academica* 1. The work's literary development, introducing the doctrines of the ancients first and then the Stoic innovations, seems almost bound to give rise to the impression of a stark opposition between the two schools, which, given Antiochus' claims of affinity, is not the whole story. Hence the importance of such a term as *ennoia*, which occurs in many dialogues and thus provides an important link, legitimates the comparison

⁴² Cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.54 (ὁ δὲ Χρύσιππος . . . κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἰσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν· ἔστι δ' ἡ πρόληψις ἐννοια φυσικὴ τῶν καθόλου), Alexander, *De mixtione* 217.3–4.

⁴³ Frede 1999: 320. ⁴⁴ Cf. *Ac.* 1.42.

⁴⁵ 'A definition is regarded as the linguistic articulation of a generic "conception" (*ennoia*): Long and Sedley 1987: vol. 1, 194. Cf. e.g. Diog. Laert. 7.42 (= LS 31A3): τὸ ὀρικὸν . . . πρὸς ἐπίγνωσιν τῆς ἀληθείας· διὰ γὰρ τῶν ἐννοιῶν τὰ πράγματα λαμβάνεται, 'the one to do with definitions likewise for the discovery of the truth, since things are grasped through conceptions'; cf. also Gal. *Def. med.* 348.17–349.4; Cic. *Tusc.* 4.53 (= LS 32D, 32H8), and also August. *De civ. D.* 8.7 (= *SVF* 2.106 = LS 32F): 'The Stoics thought that dialectic should be derived from bodily senses, claiming that from this source the mind conceived its concepts (which they call *ennoiai*) – that is, concepts of the things which they articulate by definition.'

and corroborates Antiochus' claim about the similarity between Platonism and Stoicism.⁴⁶ As will emerge, this is not the only instance of Antiochus adopting Stoic terms and concepts in a Platonic context.

Shall we then conclude that Antiochus succeeded in combining Platonic and Stoic epistemology? I do not think so. The passage hides a major divergence. As Stoic *notiones* are assimilated to Platonic Forms it follows that they cannot be taken as the product of sense experience, but as innate. And it may be reasonably doubted whether such a reading of *notiones* is compatible with Stoicism – whether Stoic theory of mind can be described in terms of Platonic innatism. Yet, in defence of his thesis, Antiochus could exploit the analogy of function, for both Stoic conceptions and Platonic forms have the same function in the process of knowledge.⁴⁷ In so doing, Antiochus provides a response to the basic problem of Stoic epistemology: how we know that our concepts correspond to what we perceive. The standard theory states that from repeated sensations we develop concepts which corroborate the data of our sensations. Such a theory is based on the decisive assumption that nature itself constructs us in such a way that there is a tight connection between the external world and the human mind, so that our mind has the natural ability to acquire knowledge.⁴⁸ But, since the inference of concepts from sense perception serves to corroborate sense perception, this theory may have to face the charge of circularity. Plato and Platonism provide a metaphysical answer to such a charge. We develop concepts from repeated sensations, but these concepts are not created *ex nihilo*, rather we already possess them in an embryonic form needing only to develop and articulate them. From the very beginning sensation is warranted by the concepts/Forms, and concepts are further and progressively articulated in definitions through experience. Forms, in other words, are the concepts which enable us to perceive and know things as they are.

If my reconstruction is correct, we have a clear example of Antiochus' strategy. When combining Stoic and Platonic terms and concepts, his aim was not simply to place Plato and Stoicism on the same level. The comparison between *notiones* and Forms serves also to expose the limits of the Stoics, who conceded too much importance to senses. Comparison, in other words, leads to subordination. The Stoic theory, though not completely rejected, turns out to be inadequate, because it does not

⁴⁶ Cf. *Phd.* 73c, 99e, 100a, *Resp.* 524e, *Ti.* 47a, *Phlb.* 59d. See Dörrie and Baltes 2002: 129, and Chiaradonna 2007: 213 n. 17.

⁴⁷ Karamanolis 2006: 65. ⁴⁸ Frede 1999b: 296.

adequately explain how appropriate concepts are formed and lacks the proper metaphysical apparatus, which is provided instead by Plato's theory.⁴⁹

3. Is it possible to detect other texts, which may help to clarify Antiochus' doctrine? It has been claimed that a close parallel comes from *Fin.* 5.59, where Cicero reporting Antiochus' ethics speaks of 'small concepts' ('parvae notiones') as implanted in human beings.⁵⁰ If the verb for 'implant' ('ingenuit') alludes to the *innate* character of these *parvae notiones*, we would find an explicit confirmation. Although the text implies an ethical theory incompatible with that of the Stoics,⁵¹ its value with regard to epistemology is debatable since the concern here is ethical development in children, not theory of knowledge.

Much more promising is *Tusc.* 1.57. Cicero quotes the *Meno* and *Phaedo* in order to show that 'learning is nothing but recollection'. For if the young slave of the *Meno*, in spite of his inexperience, could solve the geometrical problem, he must have already had such notions, needing only to remember them.⁵² Even though the name of Antiochus is not mentioned, the explicit equation of (Stoic) *notiones* and Platonic Forms as the metaphysical criterion enabling human knowledge of the sensible world presents a striking and indisputable resemblance with the Antiochean Varro.⁵³

⁴⁹ Problems also arise with respect to Plato's theory, because against the interpretation of Forms as notions it may be objected that it deprives Forms of their transcendence. In fact, Varro stresses the metaphysical (*Ac.* 1.30) and divine (*Ac.* 1.33) character of the Forms, and this seems to show that in Antiochus' interpretation Forms not only were exploited in the process of human knowledge but were also granted an ontological transcendence. Unfortunately, the silence of the sources prevents a complete reconstruction of Antiochus' interpretation of Platonic Forms.

⁵⁰ Cic. *Fin.* 5.59: Nature neglected 'the highest and noblest part of man's nature. It is true she bestowed an intellect capable of receiving every virtue, and implanted in it at birth and without instruction notions of the loftiest ideas (*ingenuit sine doctrina notitias parvas rerum maximarum*), laying the foundation of its education, and introducing among its endowments the elementary constituents, so to speak, of virtue.'

⁵¹ See Gill 2006: 171–2.

⁵² Cic. *Tusc.* 1.57–8: 'nec vero fieri ullo modo posse, ut a pueris tot rerum atque tantarum insitas et quasi consignatas in animis notiones, quas ἔννοιαι vocant, haberemus, nisi animus, ante quam in corpus intravisset, in rerum cognitione viguisset. cumque nihil esset, ut omnibus locis a Platone dissemitur – nihil enim putat esse, quod oriatur et intereat, idque solum esse, quod semper tale sit quale est (ἰδέειν appellat ille, nos speciem) – non potuit animus haec in corpore inclusus agnoscere, cognita attulit; ex quo tam multarum rerum cognitionis admiratio tollitur.'

⁵³ See also Tarrant 2005: 104–5. In spite of the similarities, Cic. *Leg.* 1.26, *Div.* 1.115 and *Orat.* 7–10 are more controversial; on this last see Long 1995: 47–8. Outside Cicero, other texts which have been repeatedly traced back to Antiochus are Seneca's letters 58 and 65, but since they mainly concern the issue of the Forms as thoughts of god, I will not discuss them here. On Sext. Emp. *Math.* 7.141–4, see Sedley, this volume.

Leaving aside Cicero, the conflation of Platonic Forms and Stoic conceptions will be common to imperial Platonists, as is apparent from the evidence of Alcinous, the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus* and Plutarch, among others.⁵⁴ Even though those Platonists endorse different epistemological models, they all exploit the Stoic concept for their own (Platonist) purposes. Stoic notions are inserted into a metaphysical context, one distinctive of Platonic theory rather than of Stoicism. And it is this Platonic metaphysical context that properly accounts for their role and function in the process of acquiring knowledge. In the words of Alcinous:

If we had in fact to start from particulars in forming our conception of common qualities (εἰ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν κατὰ μέρος ἐνενοοῦμεν τὰς κοινότητας), how could we ever traverse the infinite series of particulars, or alternatively how could we form such a conception on the basis of a small number (for we could be deceived, as for instance if we came to the conclusion that only that which breathed was an animal); or how could concepts have the dominant role they have (πῶς ἂν τὸ ἀρχικὸν εἶεν αἱ ἐννοιαί)? So we derive our thoughts through recollection, on the basis of small sparks, remembering under the stimulus of certain particular impressions what we knew long ago but forgot at the time of our embodiment (ἀναμνηστικῶς οὖν νοοῦμεν ἀπὸ μικρῶν αἰθυγμάτων, ἀπὸ τινων κατὰ μέρος ὑποπεσόντων ἀναμνησκόμενοι τῶν πάλαι ἐγνωσμένων, ὧν λήθην ἐλάβομεν ἐνωματωθέντες).⁵⁵

Moreover, what is remarkable is not only the conceptual parallel, but also Middle Platonism's exploitation of such a parallel in order to reject the legitimacy of a sceptical interpretation of Plato⁵⁶ and to state the superiority of Platonism with respect to Stoicism.⁵⁷ In other words, just as in the case of Antiochus, the adoption of such terms and concepts is not a matter of a *lingua franca* employed by different philosophers in different senses, but of an explicit appropriation of the Stoic doctrine.⁵⁸ In this specific case at least, the similarities with Antiochus' appropriation strategy are striking, thereby confirming his influence.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ See for φυσικὴ ἐννοια, Alcinous, *Didaskalikos* 155.32; 156.19–23; 158.4; Albinus, *Prologue* 150.21–2 and 33–5; Anon. *In Thet.* 46.42–48.7; 47.43; Plut. fr. 215F; Nemes. *De natura hominis* 69.3; Procl. *Theol. Plat.* 1.15, p. 73, line 14 Saffrey–Westerink; for κοινὴ ἐννοια, Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 1000E; Porph. *Marc.* 10; for ἐννοια, Alcin. *Did.* 165.10; 178.8; Anon. *In Thet.* 55.30; 56.34. Cf. Whittaker in Whittaker and Louis 1990: 84 n. 58 and Chiaradonna 2007.

⁵⁵ Alcin. *Did.* 178.4–11, trans. Dillon 1993 (slightly modified).

⁵⁶ Cf. Anon. *In Thet.* 47.36–48.11. ⁵⁷ Plut. fr. 215F Sandbach.

⁵⁸ See the revealing remarks of Boys-Stones 2005: 216–23, and Chiaradonna 2007: 209–15.

⁵⁹ Another interesting parallel which deserves closer attention is Anon. *In Thet.* 23.1–12, where, as in *Ac.* 1, *ennoiai* are related to definitions: οἱ ὅροι... παραλαμβάνονται... πρὸς τὸ ἀναπλῶσαι τὰς κοινὰς ἐννοίας· τοῦτο δ' οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ἄνευ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὸ γένος ἕκαστον καὶ τὰς διαφοράς.

ANTIOCHUS ON HUMAN NATURE AND PASSIONS

I. Antiochus' views on human beings and the human soul are another controversial issue.⁶⁰ The basic evidence is the *De finibus* 5 (and, with more caution, 4), but the 'Academic books' will prove no less important. The main topic of the *De finibus* concerns the nature of happiness; more precisely the question whether virtue is sufficient for happiness or not. This was much disputed in Hellenistic ethics between Stoics and followers of Aristotle, the first claiming that virtue alone was sufficient, the latter arguing that other factors played a role in promoting or reducing happiness. In spite of the divergence, Antiochus insisted on an intrinsic agreement between the early Academy (plus Aristotle) and Stoicism. For the Stoics had changed the names but conveyed the entire system of philosophy of the ancients and were therefore part of the tradition (*Fin.* 5.74). Antiochus' arguments need not be tackled here; what is important is that the claim about happiness provides the context within which the question of Antiochus' conception of human nature and soul can be placed (5.34).⁶¹ For it is only by stating the nature of human beings that it is possible to reach safe conclusions in the field of ethics. Since it is manifest that man consists of body and mind, with the mind playing the pivotal role, the end is a balanced realization of both parts, 'balanced' meaning the hierarchical acknowledgement of the superiority of mind to body.⁶² Obviously, the body-soul distinction holds for the Stoics as well, and this offers a justification for the presumed agreement between the *veteres* and the Stoics. But, apart from this similarity, the dispute on 'primary natural things', which include health and other bodily advantages, makes it possible to show that Antiochus supports a view of the human being which is not identical with the Stoic one. Broadly speaking, the Stoic devaluation of 'primary natural things' in comparison with virtue is challenged on the assumption that the Stoics in so doing treat the human being as nothing but the mind. Admittedly mind (or *psychē*, or reason) is the most important element, and this confirms the pre-eminence of virtue; yet mind is not the only constituent of human beings, and the goods of the body must also be accounted for. Hence, when the Stoics claim that in full ethical development only virtue is important, they risk treating men simply as mind. This argument occurs in the fourth book of the *De finibus*

⁶⁰ Most useful are Donini 1982: 76–8; Prost 2001; Gill 2006: 166–73; see further: Dillon 1983; Lévy 1990; Görler 1994: 955–65; and Bonazzi 2009.

⁶¹ In this paragraph I am indebted to Gill 2006: 166–73.

⁶² Cic. *Fin.* 5.26 *ad fin.*; cf. also *Fin.* 5.34–40, August. *De civ. D.* 19.3.

(4.26–8), where Antiochus' name is not mentioned.⁶³ The fifth book, the book devoted to Antiochus (cf. *De Fin.* 5.8, 5.75), provides the grounds for the reconciliation. For since the Stoics in their polemics against Aristo's indifference thesis recognize some value in primary natural things, in practice they come to agree with the ancients (*Leg.* 1.55). Needless to say, both the legitimacy of the charge and that of the reconciliation are far from correct. But it is important to notice here that the distortion of the Stoic doctrine depends on the adoption of a different model. For the Stoics, reason is not a distinct part, but a function which informs all the activities of the human being as a psychophysical unit. Hence virtue is sufficient for happiness. Plainly Antiochus' defence of primary natural things presupposes a different soul–body model, a core-centred and part-based model, which reflects the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine on two major aspects at least: as Christopher Gill writes, 'It expresses the concept of the human being as a combination of psyche and body, seen as distinct entities, and to some extent the idea that there is a rational (or divine) core in the human personality.'⁶⁴ Again, Antiochus tries to adapt Stoicism to a different system.

2. If we now turn to a closer analysis of the soul, things become much more complicated. At issue is whether the human *psychē* can be rightly conceived as consisting of parts or not. The notion of part is ambiguous and needs further qualification. Both the Stoics and the Academics, each school in its own way, think that the soul has parts, eight and three (or two) respectively. Analogously, Antiochus often endorses the distinction of the soul into mind and senses (*Fin.* 5.34; *Ac.* 1.30), in a way basically compatible with both Stoics and Academics and remarkably similar to the view of Mnesarchus, one of his Stoic teachers, who himself distinguished the soul into two basic faculties, one called *aisthētikōn* (including, together with the senses, the vocal and reproductive faculties), the other *logikōn* ([Gal.] *Hist. phil.* 24). But the problem does not concern so much the physiology of the soul as the possible existence of a part (or a power or faculty) which can oppose reason and impair its functioning in the control of a man's actions and life.⁶⁵ In terms of the Hellenistic debates, it is the relationship between reason and passion that is at issue. According to the Stoics the soul is rational and passions are the outcome of false belief. Cicero's evidence indicates that Antiochus supported the opposite view, in the footsteps of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition. That such was Antiochus' stance can be inferred from *Academica* 1, and is confirmed by

⁶³ Cic. *Fin.* 4.26–8. Such a criticism is, however, consistent with Antiochus' view, and it can reasonably be assumed that Antiochus himself might have shared it.

⁶⁴ Gill 2006: 170. ⁶⁵ Inwood 1985: 28.

De finibus 5. In *Academica* 1 (in opposition to the Stoic ‘innovations’)⁶⁶ the view that passions are natural and non-rational is attributed to the Academics; passions are ascribed to one part of the mind which contrasts with the rational part:

And whereas they did not remove emotion from humanity altogether, and said that sorrow and desire and fear and delight were natural, but curbed them and narrowed their range (*cumque perturbationem animi illi ex homine non tollerent, naturaque et condolescere et concupiscere et extimescere et efferri laetitia dicerent, sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent*), Zeno held that the wise man was devoid of all these, as if they were ‘diseases’ (*quasi morbis*); and whereas the older generation said that these emotions were natural and non-rational, and placed desire and reason in different regions of the mind (*cumque eas perturbationes antiqui naturales esse dicerent et rationis expertes, aliaque in parte animi cupiditatem, alia rationem collocarent*), he did not agree with these doctrines either, for he thought that even the emotions were voluntary and were experienced owing to a judgement of opinion, and he held that the mother of all the emotions was a sort of intemperance and lack of moderation. These more or less were his ethical doctrines. (*Ac.* 1.38–9, trans. Rackham 1933).

In the *De finibus* the same view is attributed to Antiochus. At 5.31–2 it is claimed that a moderate amount of passion is natural (*‘haec ipsa nimia in quibusdam futura non fuisse nisi quaedam essent modica natura’*: ‘this very excess would not have occurred in exceptional cases, were not a certain moderate degree of such timidity natural’, 31 trans. Rackham); and, in so far as it is natural, passion is something opposed to reason and not the result of judgement. Besides, at *Fin.* 5.53 Cicero mentions the case of many wise men who, when in prison or in exile, ‘have solaced their sorrow with the pursuit of learning’ (*‘dolorem suum levarunt’*). The very eventuality of solacing sorrow rather than rationally eliminating it seems to imply its naturalness in opposition to the Stoic standard theory.⁶⁷ In Antiochus’ philosophical vocabulary ‘natural’ is a key word. Passions, to the extent that they are natural, have to be taken as a movement towards or away from things according with or contrary to nature.⁶⁸ The problem then is simply their excess, and not their existence nor their presumed dependence on a false belief.

The comparison between the *De finibus* and the ‘Academic books’ may also help with the issue of soul parts. Piso’s description of human nature can be paralleled by *Academica* 1. In Piso’s account the human being is basically divided into body and mind (*Fin.* 5.34), and the mind’s virtues are equally

⁶⁶ On Stoic ‘innovations’, see above, section 1, pp. 313–15.

⁶⁷ Cf. also *Tusc.* 3.59–60 with Bonazzi 2009: 44–5. ⁶⁸ Prost 2001: 265.

divided between natural and moral, the latter in turn moulded partly by practice partly by reason (cf. *Fin.* 5.36, 5.38). In *Ac.* 1.38–9 Varro, among other criticisms such as the demotion of ‘bodily’ and ‘external’ goods to the status of indifferents and the reworking of appropriate actions, states that Zeno placed all the virtues in reason (‘omnes in ratione ponebat’), rejecting the importance of nature and practice. The comparison with the *De finibus* shows that Antiochus was committing himself to the ancients’ view. And since the reason for Zeno’s mistaken innovation ultimately depends on his insistence on the uniqueness of reason – in other words on his monistic psychological model – it may be argued that Antiochus was more inclined to side with the part-based model of the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition.

From the above evidence it appears that Antiochus was taking sides with the early Academy in opposition to Stoicism. This is essentially correct but cannot account for the whole story – for Antiochus’ repeated claim that the Stoics substantially follow the ancients with terminological innovations (*Ac.* 1.37; *Fin.* 5.74) means that the Stoics were also part of that tradition. As already observed, a possible ambiguity of *Academica* 1 emerges, because its literary development, by introducing the doctrines of the ancients before the innovations of the Stoics, was bound to give rise to the impression of a stark opposition without reconciliation. The problem however remains: how was it possible to reconcile two theories as different as the Stoic and the Platonic ones? In the case of the soul, one possible explanation is that, since the Stoics too were ready to admit the existence of powers within the soul (presentation, assent, impulse, reason: Iambl. *ap.* Stob. 1.369), Antiochus could have perhaps exploited such a division. Nevertheless this is far from a full explanation, as the silence of our sources makes any attempt highly speculative.

Fortunately we are in a better position with regard to passions. In the terms of the Hellenistic and imperial debates the concern was the contrast between Stoic *apatheia* and Peripatetic *metriopatheia*. In Stoicism the dogma that passions are false judgements is strictly connected to the ideal of *apatheia*, freedom from passions. But in the above-quoted *Ac.* 1.39 Varro regards passions as somehow natural and calls for their restraint (‘sed ea contraherent in angustumque deducerent’), not their eradication. Hence Varro seems to be favouring the ideal of *metriopatheia*, which was distinctive of Aristotle and his school, and which was advocated in the early Academy and by many subsequent imperial Platonists.⁶⁹ The same

⁶⁹ Cf. Speus. frs. 108–9 I.P. with Isnardi Parente 1980: 354–60; Crantor *ap.* Cic. *Tusc.* 3.12; *Luc.* 135; [Plut.] *Cons. ad Apoll.* 102D; Plut. *De virt. mor.* 443C, 444B, 445B and *passim*; Alcín. *Did.* 184.20–36 and 186.15–24; Calvenus Taurus T 16 Gioè; Maximus of Tyre 27.7.

applies to the 'moderate' ('modica') degree of passion' of *Fin.* 5.31. Given his declared affiliation to the teaching of the ancients, Antiochus' approval of *metriopathea* should not cause any surprise. Yet this does not mean a complete rejection of Stoic *apatheia* (and of the possibility of mediating between the two schools). A testimony from the *Lucullus* indicates that the opposite was the case. At first sight the text of *Luc.* 135 seems to contradict *Academica* 1, for Cicero charges Antiochus with attributing the Stoic *apatheia* doctrine to the Old Academy. Certainly Cicero's charge, given its dialogical role, needs be taken with great caution. For, *qua* spokesman of the Hellenistic Academy of Arcesilaus and Carneades, Cicero is more concerned with stressing inconsistencies than reporting doctrines, and this weakens the reliability of his criticisms.⁷⁰ Yet simply dismissing this statement as false would be misleading. Cicero claims that Antiochus agrees with the Stoics that the wise man does not submit to passions: a more plausible reading of the text demonstrates that Cicero's emphasis is on the possible conciliation between Stoicism and the Old Academy, hence between *apatheia* and *metriopathea*. That is what Antiochus was trying to do, and what Cicero criticizes as contradictory. Here we find an important confirmation that Antiochus did not necessarily aim to highlight the stark opposition between Platonism and Stoicism, but rather to mediate between the two, subordinating the latter.

But was it possible to reconcile *apatheia* and *metriopathea*? And if so, how? Owing to lack of evidence, it is difficult to reconstruct Antiochus' argument exactly. But I would say that Antiochus may have exploited at least the following two points. First he could argue that the Stoic conception of *pathos* is much too restrictive. The Stoics tend to take passions 'as if they were diseases' ('quasi morbis', *Ac.* 1.38), and, in so doing, they overstress one meaning only of *pathos*. Such a reduction, Antiochus could point out, depends on their desire to set themselves apart, but it is one-sided, because – and this is his second point – in no way do they dare affirm that the wise man is *completely* devoid of passions. Like many others, Antiochus could exploit the polysemy of *pathos*, which can be taken to mean 'passion' but also 'emotion'. The Stoic wise man is devoid of *pathē* in the sense of passions, but not in the milder meaning of *eupatheia*, 'good *pathos*' or 'rational emotion'.⁷¹ For the Stoics *eupatheia* is the appropriate uplifting of the soul for the fully rational person, who can dominate emotional impulses. *Apatheia* then is better described as *eupatheia*.⁷² Given such an

⁷⁰ See *Luc.* 132. ⁷¹ Reid 1885: 149.

⁷² One interesting parallel, much more polemical in tone and not aiming at any conciliation, is provided by Plut. *De virt. mor.* 449A–B.

intermediate term, it was easy for Antiochus to assimilate Stoic *eupatheia* to the Old Academic moderate *pathos*, since both prescribe rational control against excess of passions. The Stoics could react by claiming that from their standpoint it is not correct to count *eupatheia* among *pathē*, but Antiochus would have replied that in practice the Stoic position was far from incompatible with the Old Academic view, and that those supposedly conflicting views were, if not the same, very similar.

A possible example occurs in *Fin.* 5.95, where Piso claims that 'where there is virtue . . . there misery and sorrow cannot be, though pain and annoyance can'. The meaning of the sentence seems to be that the wise man can face certain emotions without losing his psychic control; he can suffer ('labor') but without becoming miserable ('miseria') in consequence of his *labor*, can be annoyed ('molestia') without feeling sorrow ('aerumna'). Hence it seems that there are different levels of emotions/passions and that the wise man feels only weak or moderate versions of them. Like the Stoics, Antiochus attributes to the wise man 'reasonable' versions of passions under different names. But since he differs from the Stoics in also introducing a kind of *eupatheia* for the passion of sorrow, it is also clear that Antiochus is not slavishly following them. Remarkably, a *eupatheia* for the *pathos* of sorrow does not exist at all in Stoicism but will be quite common for Platonists such as Philo of Alexandria or Plutarch, who will oppose to the passion of grief (*lupē*) the *eupatheia* of 'pricking of conscience' (*dēgmos*).⁷³ Again a possible (specific) Antiochean influence on subsequent Platonists emerges.

Another interesting text is the above-mentioned *Fin.* 5.32: 'Who does not suppose that the wise man himself, even when he has resolved that he must die, will yet be affected by parting from his friends and merely by leaving the light of the day (*tamen discessu a suis atque relinquenda luce moveatur*)?' However correct, the decision to die contrasts with the self-love generated in everyone by nature and cannot fail to produce a stirring of the soul. But this does not mean that the sage is like other men, because, unlike others, it is clear that he is able not to fall into excessive passion. On the contrary, as long as this motion does not degenerate into a disease, it remains a moderate ('modica') emotion and can be regarded as the legitimate response of the wise man to a given situation. Unfortunately, Cicero's statement is too short and it fails to explain what exactly this motion consisted of. More precisely it is not clear whether it is a matter

⁷³ See Philo, *Quaest. in Genesin* 2.57, *Legum allegoriae* 2.8; Plut. *De virt. mor.* 449A-B with Dillon 1977: 151-2.

of sorrow or fear. In the first case we would have another example of the new *eupatheia* of sorrow we have already found at 5.95, in the second we would meet the *eupatheia* of caution (*eulabeia*). In both options, and in the text of 5.95 as well, the task of mediating between Platonism and Stoicism appears very difficult. The absence of a *eupatheia* for grief in Stoicism, far from being casual, depends on their strong commitment to the providential nature of the universe. For the Stoic, there was not and could not have been a *eupatheia* for grief. On the other side, in the case of caution and fear, it is not clear how rational caution can be equated with the moderate amount of fear that the wise man feels. Analogies, in short, are more verbal than substantial. If the reference to *eupatheiai* is correct, one may object that Antiochus is exploiting the *eupatheiai* in a way which is hardly compatible with the Stoic psychological model, and which appears rather closer to the view of Plutarch, who observes that when 'the Stoics call those "joys", "wishings" and "precautions" of theirs *eupatheiai* and not *apatheiai*, in this case they use the terms correctly. For a *eupatheia* arises when reason does not destroy the emotion but composes and sets it in order in the souls of temperate persons' (*De virt. mor.* 449B).

In general, I would not defend the philosophical validity of Antiochus' interpretation. Just as in the case of the indifferents, with passions too the adoption of Stoic terms and doctrines betrays a distortion of the Stoic theory. Clearly, a syncretistic approach has to concern itself with similarities at the cost of rigour. But in any case it is clear, as I hope to have shown, that such a recasting of Platonist doctrine in Stoic terms has to be properly regarded not so much as a historically detached reconstruction, but as an attempt at appropriating Stoic terms and doctrines in order to subordinate Stoicism to Platonism. It is within this context that the issue of Antiochus' possible influence on later Platonism becomes important.

FINAL REMARKS

To return to the issue from which we began, we can now conclude that Antiochus undeniably exerted some influence on the development of imperial Platonism. Even though the silence of the sources on too many topics prevents our arriving at an overall assessment of Antiochus' philosophy, the surviving evidence presents Antiochus as taking a Platonist stance on such important issues as the theory of Forms, human psychology and passions. A similar discourse also applies to more specific doctrines such as the comparison between Platonic Forms and Stoic notions, or between

metriopatheia and *apatheia*. But it would be unsafe to infer from these doctrines that Antiochus can be legitimately regarded as ‘the’ founding father of Middle Platonism, because it is the actual existence of a philosophically coherent movement called Middle Platonism that is controversial. Thus we can observe that Plutarch appears to have shared Antiochus’ position on Stoic *eupatheiai*, but not his defence of Platonic Forms, whereas Alcinous, though sharing his comparison between Forms and Stoic notions, inserted them in a wider and more articulated theory which it would be unwarranted to trace back to Antiochus alone. Moreover, it must also be remembered that some doctrines which were popular among Platonists, most notably the emphasis on the transcendence of the first divine principle, are not attested for Antiochus.⁷⁴ Plainly, it is not to the simple reception of specific doctrines that we must look when assessing the role he played in the development of imperial Platonism.

What is truly remarkable is his desire to recover the original philosophy of Plato and his first Academic successors, and to exploit it within the context of contemporary debates. On this decisive issue Antiochus appears to have exerted a very significant stimulus for imperial philosophy in general, and for Platonism in particular. If the problem for Platonists is the loss of a definite identity, Antiochus shows up as the first (psycho)therapist. He insists on the necessity of a systematic reading of Plato and renews interest in Aristotle and the early Academy: the coordinates (along with Pythagoreanism) from which a doctrinal and systematic Platonism could be built.⁷⁵ No less important is the parallel assumption that Platonism is the core of ancient philosophy. The consequence of such a belief is that integration and subordination of other philosophies becomes legitimate. In the following centuries it will be common for Platonists to claim that important doctrines of other schools are already present in Plato. This explains the massive use of Stoic terms and definitions in Alcinous’ *Didaskalikos*, or Plutarch’s claim, supported also by the anonymous commentator on the *Theaetetus*, about the dependence of Aristotelian categories on Plato.⁷⁶

Yet, and for all that, already in antiquity Antiochus’ merits failed to be adequately noticed. The analysis conducted so far detects a possible explanation in his relationship with Stoicism. In spite of all his divergences,

⁷⁴ Cf. Bonazzi 2005: 136–9.

⁷⁵ Unlike his successors, Antiochus’ concern with the systematization of Platonism was not affected by the practice of commentary writing: this is an important difference.

⁷⁶ Plut. *De an. procr.* 1023E; Anon. *In Tht.* 68.1–7. On Stoic terms in Alcinous, see above, section 2, p. 324 and Whittaker 1987, 114–17.

Antiochus agreed with Arcesilaus, Carneades and Philo that a confrontation with Stoicism was necessary in order to define the Academy's own philosophical position – a belief which was further prompted by the parallel and opposite attempts of Stoics such as Panaetius and Posidonius to appropriate Plato. In this sense, in consequence of his concern with the most important Hellenistic school, Stoicism, Antiochus can be regarded as one of the last Hellenistic thinkers, before the engagement with Aristotle (and Pythagoreanism) became the prominent theme of the Platonist agenda. And this helps to explain the negative judgement of imperial Platonists, who, despite adopting a number of Stoic terms and doctrines, were no longer willing to share Antiochus' view that the construction of a systematic and doctrinal Platonism could not avoid a confrontation with the *perfectissima disciplina* (*Fin.* 5.83) of the Stoics. In the battlefield of Platonism, Antiochus advanced so far beyond the Stoic lines that he was viewed as a defector, an ally of the school he had tried so resourcefully to conquer.

Appendix

A guide to the testimonies for Antiochus

David Sedley

The textual sources for Antiochus were collected by Mette (1986–7). Before Mette, the most recent edition had been that of Luck (1953): 73–94. To the best of my knowledge these testimonies have never, as a collection, been translated into any modern language. The great bulk of them, however, are to be found in the writings of Cicero, which are themselves easily available with translation into most major modern languages. A full set of the sources would have to include considerably more text than Mette printed, since three entire Ciceronian speeches – those of Varro in *Academica* 1, Lucullus in the *Lucullus*, and Piso in *De finibus* 5 – are explicitly expositions of Antiochus’ philosophy. The aim of this appendix is therefore to print and translate in full the non-Ciceronian testimonies, but simply to list most of the Ciceronian ones – those three complete speeches included – along with a brief indication of content (marked with italics). For helpful *apparatus criticus*, the reader is referred to Mette in the first instance.

I have chosen to retain Mette’s numeration, rather than risk causing confusion by introducing a new one. When Mette divides the material into ‘testimonia’ (T1–8) and ‘fragments’ (F1–11) the former are apparently meant to be biographical, the latter doctrinal. Their content is not in reality so neatly separated into these two groups, however, and an arguably preferable alternative would have been to call almost all of them ‘testimonia’, that is, items of evidence *about* Antiochus, and to use ‘fragment’ only for F2, the one verbatim quotation to survive from his own pen. For simplicity’s sake Mette’s designation will nevertheless be retained in what follows, although my precise selection of material within a single fragment or testimonium will sometimes differ from his.

Testimonies and fragments alike are limited to contexts in which Antiochus is named. Passages whose Antiochean provenance is purely a scholarly conjecture, however plausible, including Cicero’s entire critique of Stoic ethics in *De finibus* 4, are excluded. On the same ground, I have chosen to omit Mette’s F9a (= Cicero, *Fin.* 2.34) and F9b (= *Fin.* 4.49–50).

T1 Numenius, *On the Academics' Dissension from Plato*: Numenius, fr.8 Leemans = fr.28 des Places (Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel* 14.9.3)

Φίλωνος δὲ γίγνεται ἀκουστής Ἀντίοχος, ἑτέρας ἄρξας Ἀκαδημίας. Μνησάρχῳ γοῦν τῷ Στωικῷ σχολάσας ἐναντία Φίλωνι τῷ καθηγητῇ ἐφρόνησε, μυρία τε ξένα προσήψε τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ.

Antiochus became Philo's pupil. He founded another Academy. At any rate, after studying with the Stoic Mnesarchus he took the opposed viewpoint to his teacher Philo and saddled the Academy with thousands of alien ideas.

T2 [Galen], *On the History of Philosophy* 600.1–4

τούτου δὲ Καρνεάδης κατέστη διάδοχος, <ὅς> τῆς νέας Ἀκαδημίας τὰς ἀρχὰς συνεώρηκεν, ἧς Κλειτόμαχος μετέσχευ. εἰσὶ δὲ πρὸς ταύταις πάσαις Ἀκαδημαῖαι δύο νεώτεραι, ὧν τῆς μὲν προτέρας προέστη Φίλων, Ἀντίοχος δὲ τῆς ἐφεξῆς.

His [Hegesinus'] successor was Carneades, who saw the beginnings of the New Academy, of which Clitomachus was a member. In addition to all these Academies, there are two newer ones, of which the earlier one was headed by Philo, the one after it by Antiochus.

T3 Philodemus, *History of the Academy* xxxiv 34–xxxv 16¹

.....]πατρὸς διεγ[έν]ετο	
.....] τὸ πλείστ[ον] τοῦ	35
βί[ου] πρεσβεύων Ἀ[θή]νη-	
θεν [ε]ῖς τε Πώμη[ν κ]αὶ πρὸς	
τοὺς [έ]ν ταῖς ἐπαρχε[ίαι]ς στρα-	
τηγ[ού]ς, κα[ὶ] τ[ὸ] π[ε]ράς ἐν	
τῇι Μ[ε]σοποταμίᾳ Λευκίῳ	40
Λευκ[ό]λλῳ προσκαρτε-	
ρῶν [έ]τελεύτησεν ἡγα-	
πημέ[νο]ς ὑπὸ πολλῶν κά-	
xxxv	
μοῦ καὶ αὐτὸς [ή]μῶς ἀπο-	1
δεδεγμένος. τὴν δὲ δι-	
ατριβὴν αὐτοῦ διεδέξατο	
ἀδελφὸς ὢν καὶ μαθητὴς	
Ἀριστος. ἀκουστὰς δὲ καίπερ	5
ἀσχολούμενος ἔσχε πλεί-	
ους, καὶ δὴ καὶ συνήθεις ἡ-	
μῶν Ἀρίστωνά τε καὶ Δίω-	

¹ The revised readings are due to David Blank. Most of them, with full app. crit., are in Blank 2007, but the text printed here includes his subsequent modification (*per litteras*): he now, after discussion with Enzo Puglia, thinks that the passage on Antiochus does not after all end at xxxv 16 but continues for at least a further three lines, here partly reconstructed by him.

να Ἀλεξανδρεῖς καὶ Κρά-
 τιππον Περγαμηνόν, ὧ[ν 10
 Ἀρίστων [μὲν] καὶ Κράτ[ιπ-
 πος ε. [.]να[.] α-
 κούσαντε[ς] ζῆλον ε[.]
 ἐγένοντο Περιπατη[τι-
 κοί, Δ[ί]ων δὲ τῆς ἀρ[χ]αίας Ἀ- 15
 καδημείας, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ πο[λ-
 λούς τινας, [πρ]ώτους δ' ἀφ'
 ὧν ε[.]τ[.]ξα[. .

...] he spent most of his life on embassies from Athens both to Rome and to the generals in the provinces, and in the end it was in Mesopotamia, while in attendance upon Lucius Lucullus, that he died. He had been loved by many people, including me, and had himself received us hospitably. His successor as school head was Aristus, his brother and pupil. Despite his practical engagements he had many students, including our friends Aristo and Dio, both of Alexandria, and Cratippus of Pergamum. Of these, Aristo and Cratippus... having heard... emulation... became Peripatetics, Dio a member of the Old Academy. From Dio many individuals, and primarily those from whom [...]

T4a Strabo, *Geographica* 16.2.29

... ἐντεῦθεν ἦν Ἀντίοχος ὁ φιλόσοφος μικρὸν πρὸ ἡμῶν γεγονώς.

From there [i.e. Ascalon] came the philosopher Antiochus, who lived a little before our time.

T4b Stephanus of Byzantium, *Ethnica* p. 132.3 Meineke

πολλοὶ δὲ ἐξ αὐτῆς κεχρηματίκασι, φιλόσοφοι μὲν Ἀντίοχος ὁ Κύκνος καὶ Σῶσος καὶ Ἀντίβιος καὶ Εὐβίος Στωικοὶ ἐπιφανεῖς.

Many people from there [i.e. Ascalon] have made a name for themselves: as philosophers, Antiochus the Swan, Sosus, Antibius and Eubius, eminent Stoics...

T4c Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.107

...perpetua peregrinatione... in qua aetates suas philosophi nobilissimi consumpserunt, Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilas, Lacydes, ... Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, ... innumerales alii, qui semel egressi numquam domum reverterunt.

... permanent displacement... in which the most noble philosophers spent their lives: Xenocrates, Crantor, Arcesilaus, Lacydes, ... Clitomachus, Philo, Antiochus, ... and innumerable others, who once they had left home never returned there.

Tsa Plutarch, *Life of Cicero* 4.1–4

[1] ἀφικόμενος δ' εἰς Ἀθήνας Ἀντιόχου τοῦ Ἀσκαλωνίτου διήκουσε, τῇ μὲν εὐροίᾳ τῶν λόγων αὐτοῦ καὶ τῇ χάριτι κηλούμενος, ἃ δ' ἐν τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐνεωτέριζεν, οὐκ ἐπαινῶν. [2] ἤδη γὰρ ἐξίστατο τῆς νέας λεγομένης Ἀκαδημείας ὁ Ἀντίοχος καὶ τὴν Καρνεάδου στάσιν ἐγκατέλειπεν, εἴτε καμπτόμενος ὑπὸ τῆς ἐναργείας καὶ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, εἴθ', ὥς φασιν ἔνιοι, φιλοτιμίᾳ τινὶ καὶ διαφορᾷ πρὸς τοὺς Κλειτομάχου καὶ Φίλωνος συνήθεις τὸν Στωικὸν ἐκ μεταβολῆς θεραπεύων λόγον ἐν τοῖς πλείστοις. [3] ὁ δὲ Κικέρων ἐκεῖν' ἡγάπα κάκεῖνοις προσεῖχε μᾶλλον, διανοούμενος, εἰ παντάπασιν ἐκπέσοι τοῦ τὰ κοινὰ πράσσειν, δεῦρο μετενεγκάμενος τὸν βίον ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς καὶ τῆς πολιτείας ἐν ἡσυχίᾳ μετὰ φιλοσοφίας καταζῆν. [4] ἐπεὶ δ' αὐτῷ Σύλλας τε προσηγγέλθη τεθνηκώς, καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῖς γυμνασίοις ἀναρρωννύμενον εἰς ἕξιν ἐβάδιζε νεανικὴν ἢ τε φωνὴ λαμβάνουσα πλάσιν ἡδεῖα μὲν πρὸς ἀκοὴν ἐτέθραπτο καὶ πολλή, μετρίως δὲ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν τοῦ σώματος ἡρμοστο, πολλὰ μὲν τῶν ἀπὸ Ῥώμης φίλων γραφόντων καὶ δεομένων, πολλὰ δ' Ἀντιόχου παρακελευομένου τοῖς κοινοῖς ἐπιβαλεῖν πράγμασιν, αὐθις ὥσπερ ὄργανον ἐξηρτύετο τὸν ῥητορικὸν λόγον καὶ ἀνεκίνει τὴν πολιτικὴν δύναμιν, αὐτόν τε ταῖς μελέταις διαπονῶν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαινουμένους μετιῶν ῥήτορας.

[1] Upon arrival in Athens, Cicero studied under Antiochus of Ascalon, charmed by his mellifluous discourses and by his charisma, although he did not approve of his doctrinal innovations. [2] For Antiochus had by this date seceded from the so-called New Academy and abandoned Carneades' position, whether because he was won over by self-evidence and sense perception, or, as some say, it was out of a kind of competitive rift with the associates of Clitomachus and Philo that in most matters he switched to favouring the Stoic account. [3] Cicero's sympathies were for the former position, and he had a stronger adherence to it. His thought was that, if he were to leave public affairs altogether, it would be to here that he would transfer his life from the forum and republic, living in tranquillity with philosophy. [4] But when he had heard the news of Sulla's death, and his body, reinforced by exercise, had attained a vigorous condition, and his voice had been shaped and developed into a voluble one that was pleasant on the ear and in harmony with the condition of his body, frequent pleading letters from his friends in Rome and frequent urgings from Antiochus to concentrate on public affairs led him once more to start sharpening his rhetorical discourse as an instrument and to summon up his political abilities, exercising himself in declamations and studying with the celebrated orators.

T5b Anon. *On Famous Men* 81.1–2

[1] Marcus Tullius Cicero . . . [2] adolescens Rosciano iudicio eloquentiam et libertatem suam adversus Sullanos ostendit, ex quo veritus invidiam studiorum gratia Athenas petivit, ubi Antiochum Academicum philosophum studiose audivit.

[1] Marcus Tullius Cicero, . . . [2] as a young man, by the verdict he secured for Roscius demonstrated his eloquence and his freedom in opposing the Sullan party. As a consequence, in fear of their resentment, he went to study in Athens, where he studiously attended the lectures of the Academic philosopher Antiochus.

T5c Cicero, *Letters to Gaius Pansa* 1.1 (VI Purser)

de Antiocho fecisti humaniter, quem quidem ego semper dilexi meque ab eo diligenti sensi.

You have dealt humanely with the matter of Antiochus, whom I always loved, and felt myself to be loved by.

T6a Plutarch, *Life of Lucullus* 42.3–4

[3] φιλοσοφίαν δὲ πᾶσαν μὲν ἡσπάζετο καὶ πρὸς πᾶσαν εὐμενὴς ἦν καὶ οἰκεῖος, ἴδιον δὲ τῆς Ἀκαδημείας ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔρωτα καὶ ζῆλον ἔσχευεν, οὐ τῆς νέας λεγομένης, καίπερ ἀνθοῦσης τότε τοῖς Καρνεάδου λόγοις διὰ Φίλωνος, ἀλλὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς, πιθανὸν ἄνδρα καὶ δεινὸν εἰπεῖν τότε προστάτην ἐχούσης τὸν Ἀσκαλωνίτην Ἀντίοχον, ὃν πάσῃ σπουδῇ ποιησάμενος φίλον ὁ Λεύκολλος καὶ συμβιωτὴν ἀντετάττετο τοῖς Φίλωνος ἀκροαταῖς, ὧν καὶ Κικέρων ἦν. [4] καὶ σύγγραμμά γε πάγκαλον ἐποίησεν εἰς τὴν αἵρεσιν, ἐν ᾧ τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς καταλήψεως λόγον Λευκόλλῳ περιτέθεικεν, αὐτῷ δὲ τὸν ἐναντίον· Λεύκολλος δ' ἀναγέγραπται τὸ βιβλίον.

[3] As for philosophy, although he [Lucullus] loved it all and was well disposed and friendly to all of it, right from the start his personal passion and commitment were for the Academy: not the so-called New Academy, although in the hands of Philo it was at that time flourishing with the arguments of Carneades, but the Old Academy, which at that time had as its head a persuasive and gifted speaker, Antiochus of Ascalon. Having with all eagerness made Antiochus his friend and companion, Lucullus set himself in opposition to Philo's pupils, one of whom was Cicero. [4] Cicero wrote a splendid treatise about the school, in which he assigned the argument in favour of apprehension to Lucullus, and the opposing one to himself. The book is entitled the *Lucullus*.

T6b Aelian, *Historical Miscellany* 12.25

ἵνα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐμοὶ προσηκόντων οὐδὲν ἦττον ἤπερ καὶ οἱ Ἕλληνες προσήκουσι μεμνῶμαι (διαφέρει δέ μοι καὶ τούτων, εἴ γε Ῥωμαῖός εἰμι), καὶ Λεύκολλος Ἀντιόχου τι ὦνητο τοῦ Ἀσκαλωνίτου καὶ Μαικίνας Ἀρείου καὶ Κικέρων Ἀπολλωνίου καὶ ὁ Σεβαστὸς Αἰθνοδώρου.

To mention people who are no less close to me than the Greeks are (being a Roman, I take an interest in them too), Lucullus too drew benefit from Antiochus of Ascalon, Maecenas from Arius, Cicero from Apollonius, and Augustus from Athenodorus.

T7 Plutarch, *Lucullus* 28.8 (*Suda* λ 688)

ταύτης τῆς μάχης Ἀντίοχος ὁ φιλόσοφος ἐν τῇ Περί θεῶν γραφῇ μνησθεὶς οὗ φησιν ἄλλην ἐφεωρακέναι τοιαύτην τὸν ἥλιον.

Antiochus the philosopher mentions this battle [Tigranocerta, 69 BCE] in his work *On the Gods*, and says that the sun had not witnessed another like it.

T8 Plutarch, *Brutus* 2.2–3

[2] τῶν δ' Ἑλληνικῶν φιλοσόφων οὐδενὸς μὲν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἀνήκοος ἦν οὐδ' ἀλλότριος, διαφερόντως δ' ἐσπουδάκει πρὸς τοὺς ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος· [3] καὶ τὴν νέαν καὶ μέσσην λεγομένην Ἀκαδημίαν οὐ πάνυ προσιέμενος, ἐξήρτητο τῆς παλαιᾶς, καὶ διετέλει θαυμάζων μὲν Ἀντίοχον τὸν Ἀσκαλωνίτην, φίλον δὲ καὶ συμβιωτὴν τὸν ἀδελφὸν αὐτοῦ πεποιημένος Ἀριστον, ἄνδρα τῇ μὲν ἐν λόγοις ἕξει πολλῶν φιλοσόφων λειπόμενον, εὐταξίᾳ δὲ καὶ πραότητι τοῖς πρώτοις ἐνάμιλλον.

[2] Of the Greek philosophers, there was none that Brutus did not study receptively, but his strongest enthusiasm was for the Platonists. [3] And not completely approving of the so-called New and Middle Academies, he attached himself to the Old one, and remained an admirer of Antiochus of Ascalon, having made Antiochus' brother Aristus his friend and companion. Aristus was a man who fell short of many philosophers as regards ability in discourse, but who rivalled the best of them in good conduct and kindness.

F1 Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 1.220, 235

[220] Ἀκαδημαῖοι δὲ γεγόνασιν, ὡς φασί, πλείους ἢ τρεῖς, μία μὲν καὶ ἀρχαιοτάτη ἢ τῶν περὶ Πλάτωνος, δευτέρα δὲ καὶ μέση ἢ τῶν περὶ Ἀρκεσίλαου τὸν ἀκουστὴν Πολέμωνος, τρίτη δὲ καὶ νέα ἢ τῶν περὶ Καρνεάδην καὶ Κλειτόμαχον· ἐνιοὶ δὲ καὶ τετάρτην προστιθέασιν τὴν περὶ Φίλωνα καὶ Χαρμίδαν, τινὲς δὲ καὶ πέμπτην καταλέγουσι τὴν περὶ τὸν Ἀντίοχον . . . [235] ἄλλὰ καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν Στοᾶν μετήγαγεν εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν, ὡς καὶ εἰρησθαί

ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὅτι ἐν Ἀκαδημίᾳ φιλοσοφεῖ τὰ Στωικά· ἐπεδείκνυε γὰρ ὅτι παρὰ Πλάτωνι κείται τὰ τῶν Στωικῶν δόγματα. ὡς πρόδηλον εἶναι τὴν τῆς Σκεπτικῆς ἀγωγῆς διαφορὰν πρὸς τε τὴν τετάρτην καὶ τὴν πέμπτην καλουμένην Ἀκαδημίαν.

[220] There have, it is said, been more than three Academies. One, the oldest, is that of Plato's followers; the second, the Middle Academy, is that of the followers of Polemo's pupil Arcesilaus; the third, the New Academy, that of the followers of Carneades and Clitomachus. But some people add a fourth, the one that followed Philo and Charmidas, and some also list a fifth, the one that followed Antiochus. . . . [235] But in addition, Antiochus transferred the Stoa into the Academy, so that it was even said of him that he pursued Stoic philosophy in the Academy. For he showed that the doctrines of the Stoics are to be found in Plato. This makes clear the difference of the Sceptical movement from the so-called Fourth and Fifth Academies.

F2 Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 7.162 and 7.201–2

[162] ὅθεν καὶ φαντασίαν ῥητέον εἶναι πάθος τι περὶ τὸ ζῶον ἑαυτοῦ τε καὶ τοῦ ἑτέρου παραστατικόν. οἷον προσβλέψαντές τι, φησὶν ὁ Ἀντίοχος, διατιθέμεθ' ὡς τὴν ὄψιν, καὶ οὐχ οὕτως αὐτὴν διακειμένην ἴσχομεν ὡς πρὶν τοῦ βλέπειν διακειμένην εἶχομεν· κατὰ μέντοι τὴν τοιαύτην ἀλλοιώσωσιν дуεῖν ἀντιλαμβανόμεθα, ἐνὸς μὲν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀλλοιώσεως, τουτέστι τῆς φαντασίας, δευτέρου δὲ τοῦ τὴν ἀλλοιώσωσιν ἐμποιήσαντος, τουτέστι τοῦ ὁρατοῦ. καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων τὸ παραπλήσιον. . . . [201] οὐκ ἀποθεν δὲ τῆς τούτων δόξης εἰκόασιν εἶναι καὶ οἱ ἀποφαινόμενοι κριτήριον ὑπάρχειν τῆς ἀληθείας τὰς αἰσθήσεις. ὅτι γὰρ ἐγένοντό τινες τὸ τοιοῦτο ἀξιοῦντες, προὔπτον πεποιήκεν Ἀντίοχος ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς Ἀκαδημίας, ἐν δευτέρῳ τῶν Κανονικῶν ῥητῶς γράψας ταῦτα “ἄλλος δὲ τις, ἐν ἰατρικῇ μὲν οὐδενὸς δεύτερος, ἀπτόμενος δὲ καὶ φιλοσοφίας, ἐπέθετο τὰς μὲν αἰσθήσεις ὄντως καὶ ἀληθῶς ἀντιλήψεις εἶναι, λόγῳ δὲ μηδὲν ὅλως ἡμᾶς καταλαμβάνειν.” [202] ἔοικε γὰρ διὰ τούτων ὁ Ἀντίοχος τὴν προειρημένην τιθέναι στάσιν καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδην τὸν ἰατρὸν αἰνίττεσθαι, ἀναιροῦντα μὲν τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, κατὰ δὲ τὸν αὐτὸν χρόνον αὐτῷ γενόμενον.

[162] Hence [according to Carneades] an impression should be said to be a kind of affection belonging to the animal, one that conveys both itself and the other thing. For example, says Antiochus, when we turn our gaze upon something, we adopt a certain visual disposition, and do not have our vision disposed as it was before we turned our gaze. But in virtue of this kind of modification we grasp two things, of which one is the alteration itself, that is, the impression, while the second is the thing that caused the alteration in us, that is, the object seen. And something similar applies to the other senses. . . . [201] Not far distant from these people's [the Cyrenaics'] opinion seem to be those who declare the senses to be the criterion of truth. For the fact that there have been people of such an opinion has been made clear by Antiochus the Academic, who in book 2 of his *Canonica* writes the following words: 'Someone else, second to none in medicine, and who

tried his hand at philosophy as well, believed that perceptions are really and truly apprehensions, and that we cognize nothing at all by reason.' [202] By these words Antiochus seems to be hinting at the faction just mentioned, and in particular Asclepiades the doctor, who rejected the commanding-faculty (*hēgemonikon*), and who was a contemporary of Antiochus.

Note. In F2 the Antiochean material cannot be guaranteed to extend beyond the selected sentences. However, some scholars hold that the entire doxography of which they form part is drawn from Antiochus, whether this be identified as sections 141–260 (Sedley (1992) and this volume), or, even more ambitiously, the whole of 89–260 (Tarrant (1985)). For further discussion, see Sedley, Brittain, this volume.

F3 Cicero, *On Laws* 1.53–4

Cicero and Atticus share their admiration for Antiochus; the only difference between him and the Stoics, according to Cicero, is his school's inclusion of non-moral goods.

F4 Cicero, *Brutus* 315

Cicero recalls his six months of study under Antiochus at Athens in 79 BCE.

F5 Cicero, *Lucullus* 4, 10–63, 66–7, 69–71, 97–8, 102, 109, 111, 113, 115, 131–5, 137, 139, 143–5

The whole of Lucullus' speech on behalf of Antiochus' epistemology, Luc. 11–62, is a testimony for Antiochus (see Luc. 61).

The following passages are singled out because they contain Antiochus' name.

Cicero's proem [4] How Lucullus adopted Antiochus as his companion, and learnt much philosophy from him . . .

Lucullus' speech [10–12] A description of Antiochus' anger when, at Alexandria in 87/6, he received a copy of Philo's 'Roman' books, and went on to write the *Sosus* . . . [18] Antiochus accused Philo of falling into the very position that he was seeking to avoid regarding 'apprehension' . . . [28–9] Antiochus argued that the New Academics' denial of apprehension, being their 'doctrine' (dogma), was one thing over which they should not suspend judgement; and that they should therefore claim to apprehend it . . . [48–9] Antiochus devoted one whole day's discussion to the New Academic sorites arguments aimed at showing that false impressions may be altogether indistinguishable from true ones . . . [61] Antiochus' foregoing arguments² against the New Academy, propounded at Alexandria in 87/6 BCE, were repeated by him to Lucullus in Syria shortly before his death.

² Mette here prints 60 as well as 61. Its inclusion may give the impression that the reference of 61 is only to these last remarks in 60, whereas it is in fact to the whole of Lucullus' speech from 13 onwards.

Catulus speaking [63] *Antiochus held one philosophical position for many years before changing his mind.*

Cicero's speech [66–7] *The Stoics and Antiochus deny that the sage, if he assents, is bound to hold mere opinions. . . [69–71]³ Antiochus' defection. He endorsed Philo's philosophy for years, so at what precise moment did the truth dawn on him? Why did he not then join the Stoics Mnesarchus and Dardanus? His former dilemmatic argument against Stoic apprehension, based on Dionysius of Heraclea's desertion from the Stoa, rebounded on him. . . [97–8] Antiochus endorsed and taught Stoic logic, which makes him vulnerable to the Liar paradox. Even outside disputes about logical puzzles, Carneades' views will be enough to refute Antiochus. . . [102] Antiochus' attack on the New Academy is surprising, given his familiarity with its arguments. . . [109] According to Antiochus, contra Antipater, it is self-contradictory to claim to know that nothing is knowable; and Carneades can be convicted of a different self-contradiction, based on the premise that the sage must know his own doctrines. . . [111] Antiochus accused Philo of incoherence for holding both that some impressions are true, some false, and that there is no difference between them. . . [113] Cicero regrets disagreeing with Antiochus, whom he loved and admired, but whose epistemology is not even true to that of the early Academy and Peripatos. . . [115] Cicero's Stoic philosopher-in-residence Diodotus scorns Antiochus' views. . . [131] Antiochus strongly approved the ethical views of Polemo. [132] Antiochus, with just a few changes, was a pure Stoic (germanissimus Stoicus). . . [133] Antiochus disagrees with the Stoic thesis that all sins are equal. . . [134] Antiochus holds that virtue by itself makes a life happy, but not supremely happy. [135] Antiochus allows non-moral goods and evils. . . [137] If Lucullus follows Antiochus, he is committed to defending the Stoic paradoxes. . . [139] The attractions of the moral end posited by Polemo, the Peripatetics and Antiochus. . . [143] Regarding the criterion of truth, Antiochus distances himself from the early Academy and follows Chrysippus. [144–5] Antiochus endorses Zeno's denial that any but the wise have (in the strict sense) 'knowledge'.*

F5a Themistius, *To Theodosius* 195a10–b2

καὶ δεῖ σφῶν τῆς ἄκρας ἐπιστήμης καὶ τλημοσύνης μᾶλλον ἢ Ἀντιόχῳ τε καὶ Ἀρίστῳ.

. . . and they [helmsmen in a stormy sea] need the height of knowledge and endurance, more than an Antiochus and an Aristo combined would.

³ Partly translated, pp. 12–13 above.

F6a Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 13.12.3

*Cicero proposes to transfer the Antiochean material to Varro in the revised version of *Academica* 1, noting that Varro is himself a follower of Antiochus.*

F6b Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 13.16.1–2

Cicero reassures Atticus that he can think of no one better suited than Varro to serving as spokesman for Antiochus.

F6c Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 13.19.3, 5

*In the revised *Academica* Varro has been assigned the ‘persuasive’ (pithana) arguments which Antiochus assembled against the case for inapprehensibility.*

F6d Cicero, *Letters to Atticus* 13.25.3

*It would be possible to transfer the relevant material in the *Academica* from Varro to Brutus, since he too is an Antiochean.*

F6e Cicero, *Letters to Friends* 9.8

*Cicero tells Varro he has assigned him the Antiochean role in the *Academica*.*

F7 Cicero, *Academica* 1.12–14

Cicero mentions Brutus’ study of Antiochean philosophy under Antiochus’ brother Aristus. He then justifies his own switch to writing about the New Academy instead of the Old by comparing Antiochus’ desertion of the New Academy for the Old. He also mentions Philo’s thesis, criticized in writing by his pupil Antiochus, of the unity of the Academy. Atticus declares his readiness for Varro to remind him of the views he himself long ago heard from the lips of Antiochus. Varro’s speech then begins.

The whole of Varro’s speech presenting Antiochus’ history of philosophy (Ac. 1.15–42) is a testimony for Antiochus.

F8a Augustine, *Against the Academics* 2.15, 3.42

[2.15] verum cum ita res se habeat ut vetus Academia magis aucta quam oppugnata videretur, exstitit Philonis auditor Antiochus, qui, ut nonnullis visus est, gloriae cupidior quam veritatis, in simultatem adduxit Academiae utriusque sententias. dicebat enim rem insolitam et ab opinione veterum remotissimam Academicos novos conatos inducere. in quam rem veterum physicorum aliorumque magnorum philosophorum implorabat fidem, ipsos etiam Academicos oppugnans, qui se veri simile contenderent sequi, cum ipsum verum se ignorare faterentur. multaque argumenta collegerat, quibus nunc supersedendum arbitror. nihil tamen magis defendebat quam percipere posse sapientem . . . [3.41] quippe Antiochus Philonis auditor, hominis quantum arbitror circumspexitissimi, qui iam veluti aperire cedentibus hostibus portas coeperat, et ad Platonis auctoritatem Academiam legesque revocare – quamquam et Metrodorus id antea facere tentaverat, qui primus

dicitur esse confessus non decreto placuisse Academicis nihil posse comprehendere, sed necessario contra Stoicos huiusmodi eos arma sumpsisse – igitur Antiochus, ut institueram dicere, auditis Philone Academico et Mnesarcho Stoico, in Academiam veterem, quasi vacuum defensoribus et quasi nullo hoste securam, velut adiutor et civis irrepperat, nescio quid inferens mali de Stoicorum cineribus, quod Platonis adyta violaret. sed huic arreptis iterum illis armis et Philo restitit donec moreretur, et omnes eius reliquias Tullius noster oppressit, se vivo impatiens labefactari vel contaminari quidquid amavisset.

[2.15] But since the fact of the matter is that the Old Academy seemed more strengthened than under attack, onto the scene came Philo's pupil Antiochus. In the eyes of some out of a greater passion for fame than for truth, he brought the views of both Academies into debate. For he used to say that the New Academics had tried to introduce something novel and very far removed from the opinion of the ancients, a point on which he invoked the authority of the ancient physicists and other great philosophers. In doing so, he attacked even the Academics themselves for arguing that they followed what was 'like the truth', since they admitted to not knowing the truth itself. He had a large collection of arguments which I think I should skip on this occasion. But there was nothing that he used to defend more strongly than the thesis that the sage can achieve apprehension . . . [3.41] Antiochus was a pupil of Philo, a most prudent man to the best of my belief, who had already, as if the enemy were in retreat, begun to open the gates and to call the Academy back to Plato's authority and laws – although an attempt to do the same thing had also been made earlier by Metrodorus, who is said to have been the first to admit that it had not been a doctrine of the Academics that nothing could be apprehended, but that it had been necessary to take up arms of this kind against the Stoics – anyway Antiochus, as I had started to say, having studied under the Academic Philo and the Stoic Mnesarchus, had crept into the Old Academy, which was as it were devoid of defenders, and carefree as if there were no enemies. Although he came in as if a citizen and supporter, he brought in from the ashes of the Stoics some kind of evil to violate Plato's sacred precinct. But Philo once more took up those old arms and, until his death, resisted Antiochus; and our beloved Cicero stifled the latter's legacy, rather than tolerate that anything he had loved should, while he himself was still alive, be undermined and contaminated.

F8b Augustine, *City of God* 19.3

haec sensisse atque docuisse Academicos veteres Varro adserit auctore Antiocho, magistro Ciceronis et suo, quem sane Cicero in pluribus fuisse Stoicum quam veterem Academicum vult videri.

That this [the thesis that the happiest life includes all non-moral as well as moral goods] is what the Old Academics believed and taught is asserted by Varro on the authority of Antiochus, who was both Cicero's and Varro's teacher, and whom Cicero admittedly wants to be seen as in more respects a Stoic than an Old Academic.

F9 Cicero, *On Ends* 5.1, 6–75, 81–2, 86–95

[1] Cicero recalls a conversation held in the Academy at Athens in 79 BCE, just after he had, as he regularly did, attended a lecture by Antiochus in the Ptolemaeum. . . [6–8] In Cicero's narrative, Piso remarks that young Lucius Cicero is an assiduous attender of Antiochus' lectures. Lucius confirms this, while admitting his attraction to Carneades' philosophy too. Piso urges Lucius to endorse the Old Academy, which as he will have heard from Antiochus includes not only Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo, and so on but also Aristotle and the early Peripatetics. Piso undertakes to expound this school's ethics, which he has learnt from his philosopher-in-residence Staseas of Naples and from several months of lectures by Antiochus. Cicero, as narrator, asks his addressee Brutus to confirm the accuracy of Piso's ensuing exposition, pointing out that Brutus is himself an Antiochean, taught by Antiochus' own brother Aristus.

[9–74] The whole of Piso's speech is a testimony for Antiochus' ethics (see 8, 75), as are Piso's subsequent replies to Cicero at 77–8, 81–2, 86–95

The following passages are singled out because they contain Antiochus' name.

[14] The Peripatetics have differed over the specification of the final good, but Antiochus' own doctrine is, Piso believes, faithful to that of the ancients, shared by Aristotle and Polemo alike. . . [16] Antiochus liked to use the 'Carneadean division' of doctrines on the final good. . . [75] Piso agrees that Staseas differed from Antiochus in attaching more importance to luck and to bodily goods and evils, but insists that Antiochus' account is more reliable. . . [81] Piso cites the distinction between a 'happy' and a 'supremely happy' life, which Cicero in his reply notes is a distinction habitually made by Antiochus.

F10 Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 3.59–60, 5.21–3

[3.59–60] Carneades, Antiochus wrote, used to criticize Chrysippus for praising the consolatory powers of a Euripidean passage on the universality of suffering. . . [5.21–3] We are reminded that Brutus, on the authority of Aristus and Antiochus, denies that virtue is the only good. Cicero says he debated the same matter with Antiochus frequently, and with Aristus while at Athens in 50 BCE, resisting the constant theme of Antiochus' writing that virtue alone is enough to make a life happy but not supremely happy. In Cicero's view, given the Antiochean division of evils into three kinds, no one afflicted by all the evils of two of these kinds (the external and the bodily) could be happy at all.

FII Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* I.II, I.I6

[II] Cicero emphasizes the influence on him of philosophers with whom he has long been intimate: Diodotus, Philo, Antiochus and Posidonius . . .

[I6] Cotta speaks of a book by Antiochus which the latter recently sent to Balbus, according to which the Stoics agree with the Peripatetics in substance, disagreeing only in words. Balbus in reply expresses his surprise that Antiochus could not see the huge difference between the two schools in ethics.

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